UI-2022-001578

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 21 Oct 2025
• Promulgation date: 20 Mar 2026
• Publication date: 08 Apr 2026
• Last updated on: 08 Apr 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2022-001578
First-tier Tribunal No: DC/00025/2019

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 20th of March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON

Between

NERIM CANAMETI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Hodgetts of Counsel, instructed by OTB Legal
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. In a decision promulgated on 13 August 2025, the Upper Tribunal found an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 7 February 2022 dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision to deprive him of his British citizenship under section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 (the “BNA 1981”). A copy of that decision is annexed to this one and sets out the detailed history of this appeal as well as the Appellant’s immigration history and will not be repeated here unless needed. This is the remaking of the Appellant’s appeal.
The appeal
2. The four issues in this appeal are (i) whether the Respondent lawfully exercised her discretion to deprive the Appellant of his British citizenship pursuant to section 40(3) of the BNA 1981 by making a mistake of fact as to the reasons for delay; (ii) whether the Respondent lawfully exercised that same discretion when failing to take into account delay at all; (iii) the best interests of the Appellant’s children pursuant to section 55 of the Broders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009; and (iv) whether the Respondent’s decision is a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s right to respect for private and family life in the United Kingdom contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Respondent’s decision
3. In her decision dated 22 March 2019, the Respondent decided that the Appellant’s British citizenship was obtained fraudulently and that he should be deprived of the same. I do not set out the reasons given on that first aspect in the decision, that the Appellant obtained his citizenship fraudulently, as there is no dispute on the facts on this – the Appellant accepts that he dishonestly made an asylum claim as a Kosovan national and maintained that deception up to and including his naturalisation as a British citizen on 23 December 2003. As such, the Appellant concedes that both the condition precedent and causation are made out. The letter sets out the full history of the Appellant’s dealings with the Appellant, which includes later correspondence in relation to deprivation.
4. Further to setting out the background history, the Respondent stated:
“12. In light of this information, a letter was issued to you on 17th September 2008 [Annex Q1-Q2 refers], advising that deprivation action was being considered and providing you with the opportunity to supply mitigating circumstances. Your then legal representatives, Karis Law, replied on 14th October 2008, requesting an extension of time in order to provide full assistance in this matter [Annex R1 refers]. However, no further correspondence was received by either you or your representatives. Your case was then identified as a potential nullity case and was therefore put on hold; the application of Section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 to deprive individuals of British Citizenship was the subject of several appeals that were lodged in October 2009 and were not finally determined until December 2017 in the Supreme Court. The process of monitoring these appeals had an impact on the finalisation of decisions in several other cases, including this one.
13. A further investigation letter was sent to you via recorded delivery on 24th May 2018, again requesting your mitigating circumstances in response to our allegations [Annex S1-S3 refers]. You failed to respond to the same, although Royal Mail Track and Trace facility confirms that the letter was collected […].
5. As to the second aspect of the decision, whether the Appellant should be deprived of citizenship, the Respondent acknowledged that the decision was a discretionary one and states that in making the decision a number of factors were taken into account before concluding that deprivation would be both reasonable and proportionate.
6. The first matter referred to is Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, noting that the Appellant would lose the right to a British passport and to vote in general elections as some of the benefits and entitlements citizenship confers; as well as impacting on the Appellant’s identity as British since 2003. There was no consideration of the possible impact of removal of the Appellant from the United Kingdom as a deprivation decision itself does not preclude a person from remaining in the United Kingdom.
7. The second matter referred to is statelessness, on which the Respondent considered that even if the decision rendered the Appellant stateless, this would not preclude deprivation in light of the seriousness of the fraud, the need to protect and maintain public confidence in the UK immigration system and the public interest in preserving the legitimacy of British nationality. In any event, the Appellant could engage with the relevant authorities in Albania to reinstate his Albanian citizenship if it had been lost.
8. The Respondent then set out a relatively short period of 4 weeks within which a deprivation order would be made following the Appellant being appeal rights exhausted and within a further 8 weeks, a decision would be made as to whether the Appellant would be removed from the United Kingdom or be granted leave to remain.
9. The Respondent’s conclusion is set out in paragraph 30 as follows:
“30. The effects of deprivation action on you [and your family members] must be weighed against the public interest in protecting the special relationship of solidarity and good faith between the UK and its nationals and also the reciprocity of rights and duties, which form the bedrock of the bond of nationality. Having weighed those effects, it has been concluded that it is reasonable and proportionate to deprive you of British citizenship.”
The Appellant’s case
10. In outline terms the Appellant’s case is as follows. First, that the Respondent’s exercise of discretion to deprive him of British citizenship was premised on a mistake of fact and/or a misunderstanding of the reasons for the delay between 2009 and 2014. The records showing that the Appellant’s case was only on hold from 2014. Secondly, that the Respondent’s decision failed to take into account an obvious legally relevant consideration, mainly the delay between 2008 and 2019 in making a decision to deprive the Appellant of his British nationality and can not be maintained in light of the policy now that requires consideration of delay. Thirdly, that depriving the Appellant of his British citizenship would be contrary to his children’s best interests due to the financial impact on the family as a whole and the worry and anxiety caused to them and to the Appellant’s son in particular. Finally, that taking all of the consequences and circumstances into account, the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation in the limbo period (until a further decision on leave or removal is taken) would breach Article 8.
11. In his written statement signed and dated 16 July 2025 (incorporating information from his earlier written statement dated 1 July 2019 which was never received by the Respondent), the Appellant sets out his history and current circumstances.
12. As to his original claim, the Appellant states that at the time of his entry to the United Kingdom his life was genuinely in danger in Albania due to a blood feud and that for this reason, if he had been honest about his identity and circumstances then, he would have had a successful asylum claim. However, on arrival in the United Kingdom, a place that he was unfamiliar with and did not speak the language of, he relied on advice from others that he should claim to be from Kosovo and did so without understanding the full consequences.
13. The Appellant states that his correct details were first disclosed to the Respondent when he sponsored his sister’s application for entry clearance as a student in 2005 and confirmed his true nationality during her appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of that application. The Appellant thought this was a good opportunity to finally be honest about his identity and that the Respondent would then investigate and either deprive him of his citizenship or allow him to keep it; but there was no contact from the Respondent following this.
14. In 2008 the Appellant sponsored his wife’s application for entry clearance to join him in the United Kingdom, using his true identity and nationality; a matter which was addressed by the First-tier Tribunal in her appeal against the refusal of that application. The appeal was allowed and the Appellant’s wife joined in him in the United Kingdom in December 2008.
15. The Appellant was contacted by the Respondent on 17 September 2008 indicating the consideration of depriving him of his British citizenship as to which he understood that his then legal representatives had responded in January 2009 but the Appellant did not realise until relatively recently that this had never been received by the Respondent. In 2009, the Appellant’s understanding was that representations had been submitted and he was waiting for a decision from the Respondent. He also thought that no further action would be taken as the Respondent had permitted his wife to join him in the United Kingdom on the basis that she was married to a British citizen; originally with a six month visa, following which she was granted a further two years leave to remain and then indefinite leave to remain all on the same basis.
16. In 2014, the Appellant applied to renew his British passport and did so using his correct name, which he had changed through a change of name deed. A new passport was issued in 2014.
17. In 2016, the Appellant’s wife applied to naturalise as a British citizen, which was approved.
18. As time went on without any further contact from the Respondent, the Appellant believed that the matter about his citizenship had been resolved and there was no longer any consideration of depriving him of the same. He continued with his life here, had a son on 24 September 2009 and a daughter on 13 October 2019; trained to be a gas engineer and set up his own company which he continues to run; as well as purchasing property here.
19. The letter from the Respondent in 2018 again saying that they were considering deprivation of the Appellant’s citizenship came as a shock as he thought the matter had been resolved and since then, he feels like he has had to put his life on hold, holding back on making any big decisions and had a period during which he was unable to travel abroad with his family.
20. The Appellant states that he is fully integrated in to the United Kingdom, his wife is a British citizen and his children were born here. If deprived of his citizenship now, he would lose his right to work whilst waiting for a decision on leave to remain with a loss of income for his family and a loss of goodwill from regular customers built up over the years. The Appellant’s eldest child is due to take his GCSEs this year and his daughter is due to start primary school.
21. The Appellant attended the hearing, adopted his written statements and gave oral evidence in English. In cross-examination he confirmed that he has a successful business in the United Kingdom as a gas safety engineer; owns his own property; owns a second rental property; has savings of around £12,000 but was unsure of the amount of his wife’s savings. When asked if these resources would be sufficient for his family for up to eight weeks whilst waiting for a decision on leave to remain, the Appellant said they would, but he didn’t know how much would be left at the end and during that period he would lose most of his clients. He explained that if he is not available, customers would go elsewhere as some services have a time limit or deadline that can not wait, such as services and gas certificates and the Appellant did not know if those customers would return to him in the future. His experience is that even a two week holiday loses him a month’s work and he does not employ anyone else in the business to cover the work.
22. The Appellant’s wife works as a maths teacher. The Appellant’s son is in the course of his GCSEs and worries a lot about the Appellant’s situation which he knows about. He understands that his own status would not be affected by any decision in relation to the Appellant, but worries about the situation. When asked if there was any specific impact on his son beyond general worry, the Appellant was unable to identify anything other than concern that the Appellant may be deported and if so that he would have to go to Albania with him.
23. A letter dated 13 July 2025 from the Appellant’s wife sets out her family circumstances consistent with the Appellant’s evidence and confirms that when no further action was taken by the Respondent until 2018, they both believed that the matter had been resolved and deprivation action would not be pursued. The uncertainty and legal proceedings since have caused distress and affected the mental health and financial stability of the family, with their children feeling the strain of the situation. The family have not been able to travel abroad together. The Appellant’s removal would be devastating on the rest of the family, who supports them all emotionally, practically and financially.
24. The bundle contains various further documents, including copies of the Appellant’s British passports (issued in 2014 and 2022); identity documents for other family members; financial information; information relating to his children’s education; letters of support and personal photographs. Previous appeal determinations, immigration papers and statements (not received by the Respondent previously) are also included; as are some documents and statements from Albania as to the claimed blood feud there.
The Respondent’s case record
25. The bundle before the Upper Tribunal includes a copy of the Respondent’s GCID notes which, so far as relevant (omitting unnecessary details), contains the following information:

Annex B letter sent 18/09 sms 131205291. File on Annex B Tirana non priority shelf.
Date – 18-Sep-2008

Sols letter rec linked to file on Non Priority Annex B shelf dated 18th …
Date – 17-Oct-2008

Agents have written in requesting an extension of time to provide a response to Annex B letter. I have allowed them until 15 November. Letter sent to advise. File on new referrals shelf as not part of pilot.
Date – 20-Oct-2008

Papers prepared for DAG – file on minded to deprive shelf overflow.
Date – 10-Mar-2009

Referred to RD for approval.
Date – 05-Oct-2009

Returned from […], agreed to deprive.
Date – 13-Nov-2009

Case referred to HS – Batch 6. As this is a non-admission case, request sent to British Embassy, Prishtina for a Kosovan birth record check.
Date – 18-Nov-2009

Response received from British Embassy, Kosovo, no record of birth. All enquiries are now complete.
Date – 18-Jan-2010

PNC Requested.
Date – 19-Nov-2014

[DO NOT DISCLOSE SECTION]

Nullity case – as per current policy all nullity cases on hold awaiting Kaziu outcome.
File to CSF.
Date – 21-Nov-2014

Pnc requested for […] on sru
Date – 2-Apr-2018

[DO NOT DISCLOSE SECTION]

Stage 1 SRU Case – Annex C sent to subject today via RD. The subject claimed he was Kosovan but he is in fact Albanian.
Findings and reasons
Issue 1 – whether the Respondent lawfully exercised her discretion to deprive the Appellant of his British citizenship by making a mistake of fact as to the reasons for delay
26. In relation to the first issue, Mr Terrell submitted that there was only a limited utility in analysing what was meant in paragraph 12 of the decision and in any event, it was not false or misleading. At its worst, it could be considered imprecise or lacking in detail, but not misleading. The paragraph reflects that an extension of time request was made in 2008 (which is not in dispute); that the case was put on hold as a ‘potential nullity case’ (which is consistent with the GCID records showing this at least by November 2014 when it was formally on hold) and that there was an impact on the Appellant’s case of litigation between 2009 and 2017 as to nullity and/or deprivation of citizenship.
27. In relation to the first issue, Mr Hodgetts submitted that the wording in paragraph 12 of the decision letter (that the consideration of deprivation for this Appellant was put on hold and finalisation of decisions, including the Appellant’s case was impacted by litigation not resolved until a Supreme Court decision in 2017) was false and misleading for three reasons. First, the litigation referred to was that culminating in the decision in Hysaj v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 82 which began not as an appeal but an application for judicial review in 2014 (not 2009); secondly that appeal concerned decisions to treat citizenship grants as nullities (rather than deprivation of citizenship); and thirdly, the GCID records show the Appellant’s case was only put on hold in 2014 and no earlier. That coincided with a change of the Respondent’s policy about such cases. The decision to put the Appellant’s case ‘on hold’ was never communicated to the Appellant. There is no difficulty on this issue about whether it involves any post-decision evidence because the information was contained on the Respondent’s own file at the date of decision and up to the date of hearing, the Respondent has not adduced any evidence or explanation for the delay between 2008 and 2014.
28. Mr Hodgetts highlighted further that appeals against deprivation, which did arise from October 2009 onwards, were separate to the litigation in Hysaj on nullity. Those cases included a number of deprivation decisions being withdrawn in July 2013 where the individuals had been in the United Kingdom for 14 years or more (relevant to a policy in force at that time) and whilst nullity action was pursued in the Hysaj litigation.
29. At the time of the first notice to the Appellant in 2008 that deprivation action was being considered, Mr Hodgett’s skeleton argument referred to there being an expectation that a decision would be taken, whether or not representations were received. At that time, it was said that in accordance with the policy in force in 2008, the Appellant would have benefited from a presumption that deprivation would not be pursued against those who had been in the United Kingdom for 14 years or more. At the oral hearing, Mr Hodgetts accepted that it was not until 2014 that the Appellant had been in the United Kingdom for 14 years and therefore the point about the previous policy would not assist him on the correct facts in 2019; although would have been relevant still by the time his case was put on hold in November 2014.
30. This first issue in this appeal can be dealt with relatively briefly as it is a straightforward question on the facts as to whether the Respondent made a mistake of fact in paragraph 12 of the decision letter when referring to the Appellant’s case as “being identified as a potential nullity case and was therefore put on hold”.
31. I find force in Mr Terrell’s submission that there is limited utility in analysing the text in paragraph 12 of the decision letter which gives only a very brief overview of the situation and at its highest could be said to lack detail as to the precise history of extensive litigation in numerous cases concerning British citizenship obtained by fraud and deception; on different tracks through the tribunal and court system (in terms of appeals and applications for Judicial Review) as to whether a person should be deprived of such citizenship or whether it was simply a nullity. The culmination of all of that was the decision of the Supreme Court in Hysaj, but there were numerous other cases on different points prior to that; many of which had an impact on the correct approach to be taken by the Respondent to fraud cases.
32. To establish a mistake of fact, there would in essence need to be clear evidence of the same and what the actual position was; which is very far from having been established in the present case in the way in which it was submitted on behalf of the Appellant. It has not been established on the evidence that his case was anything other than identified as a potential nullity and put on hold and precise dates of when this happened are far from clear from the limited records available. It is however consistent with extensive litigation over a very long period beginning around 2009 and I take judicial notice of the history of various strands of litigation and that many cases were put on hold through this period, albeit not all of them, as self-evidently a number of decisions were made which progressed through to appeals in the Upper Tribunal and Court of Appeal, and Judicial Review claims.
33. I find that what is said in paragraph 12 of the Respondent’s decision can at its highest be described as lacking in precision and detail as to what precisely happened and when, but as a broad summary, it does not contain any mistake of fact, nor is it misleading.
34. I turn below to the detail of the nature of the appeal and standard of review in deprivation cases, but on either a full merits approach or a public law principles approach, the first issue has not been made out as a mistake of fact and in any event was not one which as a standalone point would have had any bearing overall on the decision to deprive.
Issue 2 – whether the Respondent lawfully exercised her discretion to deprive the Appellant of his British citizenship by failing to consider or properly take into account the delay prior to her decision.
35. As a general point in relation to the second issue, Mr Terrell emphasised that Laci, was not a factual precedent, but authority for the proposition “that ‘mere’ delay itself can never be a factor that qualifies the public interest in depriving a person of their fraudulently obtained citizenship and exposing them to the limbo period. However, a delay that is exceptional can be.” Further, that as a matter of principle, it would be wrong to treat a delay justified by the Respondent as qualifying the public interest and wrong to treat as qualifying the public interest a delay in a case in which a person could not have been entitled to believe their citizenship was secure and benefitted from it.
36. As to the exercise of discretion, Mr Terrell submitted that this is challengeable only on public law grounds and therefore on the evidence available to the decision maker at the time. Although in Laci the Court of Appeal referred to the exercise of common law discretion and the Article 8 proportionality exercise as being similar, they were not identical.
37. Mr Terrell submitted that applying the approach in Friends of the Earth Ltd & Ors, R (on the application of) v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52, the question is whether, applying the Wednesbury standard, the Respondent’s delay and inaction is so obviously material because it would be contrary to the intentions of the BNA 1981 not to take it into account. In short, the Respondent’s position was that it was not. The BNA 1981 confers a wide discretion on the Respondent and there was no specific requirement to take delay in to account. That is particularly so in the circumstances of the present appeal during which by the time of the decision under challenge, no representations had been made at all by or on behalf of the Appellant in relation to any delay or to provide any information as to his current circumstances, or as to any prejudice caused by delay or any information as to the Appellant’s belief about the situation. In these circumstances, if delay had been expressly considered, it would not have assisted the Appellant at all given the lack of any relevant information to take into account.
38. I asked Mr Terrell if certain matters in relation to the Appellant’s circumstances would have been obvious and known to the Respondent in 2018, even without representations, such as his wife’s status, the passage of time since the first letter in 2008, and that he had been issued with a British passport in 2014. Mr Terrell maintained that the Respondent’s decision was a rational one and that many factors could have been taken into account but that it was not contrary to the intention of the BNA 1981 or irrational not to do so. There is little within the BNA 1981 that can be identified as factors which must be taken into account, the primary intention being a power to deprive a person of citizenship obtained by fraud and a very wide discretion to do so. Mr Terrell did not submit that delay can never be relevant, and would be relevant, if, for example, it was expressly referred to in policy (which it was not at the time of the decision under challenge here) or if a person had expressly relied upon it; but it is not a required element to consider pursuant to the BNA 1981.
39. In his skeleton argument, Mr Hodgetts had relied on the decision in U3 v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKSC 19 on behalf of the Appellant to the extent that evidence post-dating the decision under challenge can be considered by a Tribunal as to the sustainability of a decision at the date of hearing and that applied even if a decision was merely maintained at that point. Mr Terrell distinguished the approach in U3 as being relevant only to the approach in SIAC cases where there is a national security assessment which can be updated and a specific review stage; which does not exist or have any equivalence in a normal statutory appeal. In the present case, there was no new or supplementary decision to permit taking post-decision material or any policy in place at the date of hearing in to account.
40. On behalf of the Appellant in relation to the second issue, Mr Hodgett’s submitted in summary that first, the Respondent’s decision was vitiated by her failure to take into account the delay and inaction was an obvious point that fell within the third category in the Friends of the Earth litigation; secondly and in the alternative, that if the Tribunal’s role in accordance with Berdica v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKUT 276 (IAC) and U3 was to assess the ‘sustainability’ of maintaining the decision on public law grounds at the date of hearing, then the failure to take into account the delay once aware of it was contrary to the current policy, ‘Deprivation of British Citizenship’ version 4.0, 12 June 20251 (which requires delay to be taken into account) and ignoring the current policy would be contrary to the principle of good administration set out in Mandalia v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 5. Finally, and in any event, the delay would be relevant to the assessment of proportionality under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (dealt with in detail in relation to the fourth issue below).
41. At the time of the Respondent’s decision in 2019, there was no reference to length of residence in the relevant policy; however, at the date of hearing, a relevant consideration to the exercise of discretion was whether there was any delay in the Respondent making a decision once a fraud had been uncovered. When asked how delay should be considered by the Respondent as it is not expressly stated in the current guidance, Mr Hodgetts stated that the tribunal was required to give deference to the Respondent’s consideration of the exercise of discretion, but may reduce the degree of deference if a public law error is identified and consider at the date of hearing whether the decision was proportionate. Mr Hodgetts went further in submitting that the appeal could also be allowed on the basis of a public law error and the matter would then return to the Respondent to consider the exercise of her discretion afresh.
42. Mr Hodgetts submitted that in accordance with U3 (paragraphs 43 to 49 and 64 in particular) and Berdica, the Tribunal when considering the appeal is required to consider the sustainability of the Respondent’s decision in light of the evidence as at that date and the decision itself is that as maintained on review in light of such evidence. Further, Mr Hodgetts accepted that there was no authority to establish any obligation on the Respondent to keep a decision under review during the course of an appeal (although there is now the requirement for a Respondent’s Review during the course of an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, it was not in place when the present appeal was lodged), but in any event, there was no requirement for an express review by the Respondent, it would be sufficient simply for the decision to be maintained on appeal by continuing to defend it.
Discussion
43. To decide the second issue in this appeal, it is first necessary to determine the precise nature of the task faced by the Tribunal in terms of (i) what evidence can be taken into account; (ii) what the decision under challenge is, in particular whether it is the decision as it stood at the date on which it was made or the decision maintained at the date of hearing (expressly by a review of the same or impliedly by its continuing defence during an appeal); and overall (iii) what the nature of the appellate jurisdiction is in relation to the exercise of discretion for the purposes of an appeal under section 40(3) of the BNA 1981. To answer these questions, a detailed consideration of the statutory provision and more recent authorities on deprivation is necessary.
44. So far as relevant to this appeal, section 40 of the BNA 1981 provides as follows:
“(3) The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of their citizenship status which results from his registration or naturalisation if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the registration or naturalisation was obtained by means of –

(a) fraud,
(b) false representation, or
(c) concealment of a material fact.”
45. The right of appeal against such a decision is provided for in section 40A of the BNA 1981 for an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (and onwards to the Upper Tribunal).
46. In Chaudhry v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 16, the Court of Appeal accepted (albeit for their own reasons) a change of position by the Respondent as to the correct approach to be taken by a Tribunal on an appeal against a decision made pursuant to section 40(3) of the BNA 1981. In summary, the approach was set out as follows:
“54. For these reasons … the proper approach to an appeal under section 40A of the BNA 1981 from decisions of the Secretary of State made pursuant to section 40(3) of the BNA 1981 is: (i) it is for the FTT to find, in the event of a dispute, as a fact whether there was fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact for the purposes of section 40(3) of the BNA 1981; (ii) the decision of the Secretary of State on the causation issue whether the registration or naturalisation was obtained by the impermissible means is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds, in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1); (iii) the exercise of the Secretary of State’s discretion to make an order depriving a person of citizenship status is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No. 1); and (iv) it is for the FTT to consider whether the Secretary of State had acted in breach of other relevant legal obligations, including those arising under section 6 of the Human Rights Act. Although due weight would need to be given to the findings, evaluations and policies of the Secretary of State, the decision was for the FTT.”
47. For completeness, the reference above to the principles set out by Lord Reed in R (Begum) v Special Immigration Appeals Commission [2021] UKSC 7 (“Begum No. 1”) is to the following paragraph:
“71. Nevertheless, SIAC has a number of important functions to perform on an appeal against a decision under section 40(2). First, it can assess whether the Secretary of state has acted in a way in which no reasonable Secretary of State could have acted, or has taken into account some irrelevant matter, or has disregarded something to which he should have given weight, or has been guilty of some procedural impropriety. In doing so, SIAC has to bear in mind the serious nature of a deprivation of citizenship, and the severity of consequences which can flow from such a decision. Secondly, it can consider whether the Secretary of State has erred in law, including whether he has made findings of fact which are unsupported by any evidence or are based upon a view of the evidence which could not reasonably be held. Thirdly, it can determine whether the Secretary of State has complied with section 40(4), which provides that the Secretary of State may not make an order under section 40(2) “if he is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless”. Fourthly, it can consider whether the Secretary of State has acted in breach of any other legal principles applicable to his decision, such as the obligation arising in appropriate cases under section 6 of the Human Rights Act. In carrying out those functions, SIAC may well have to consider relevant evidence. It has to bear in mind that some decisions may involve considerations which are not justiciable, and that due weight has to be given to the findings, evaluations and policies of the Secretary of State, as Lord Hoffman explained in Rehman and Lord Bingham reiterated in A. In reviewing compliance with the Human Rights Act, it has to make its own independent assessment.”
48. To the extent that the decision in Chaudhry changed the previously applied position (that even the first question as to whether there had been fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact was reviewable on appeal only on public law principles), the Court of Appeal noted that the earlier reported decisions of the Upper Tribunal, in particular Ciceri (deprivation of citizenship appeals: principles) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKUT 238 (IAC) and Chimi v Secretary of State for the Home Department (deprivation appeals; scope and evidence) [2023] UKUT 115 (IAC) would need to be reformulated in accordance with the test set out above [para 53]. The same paragraph went on to confirm:
“53. […] It means that an appellant will be able to adduce evidence (if so advised) on both the precedent facts of fraud, false representation and concealment of a material fact, and on matters relevant to section 6 of the 1998 Act. The evidence can be adduced and examined in one go, and it will be for the FTT to apply the relevant evidence to the separate legal tests.”
49. In Kolicaj v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 10, the Supreme Court considered the application of R (Begum) v Special Immigration Appeals Commission [2021] UKSC 7; R (N3) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKSC 6; and U3 v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKSC 19 to deprivation cases pursuant to section 40 of the BNA 1981 where the route of appeal is to the First-tier Tribunal rather than to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”); albeit the particular facts of that case concerned deprivation pursuant to section 40(2) of the BNA 1981 on conducive grounds. So far as relevant to the current appeal, the following passages from Kolicaj are relevant:
56. Like Begum No 1 and N3, so far as is relevant to this appeal U3 … concerned a deprivation of citizenship decision and an appeal to SIAC under section 2B. However, as explained at para 54 above, that is not a significant point of difference from the present case, where the appeal is to the FTT under section 40A.
57. …
58. This court again spelled out that an appeal to SIAC under section 2B is a substantive appeal on the merits (“an appeal in reality as well as in form”) and is not equivalent to an application for judicial review [… para 43]. SIAC is, accordingly, “not necessarily confined to the application of administrative law principles”: ibid (which is to say that the legal principles to be applied on the appeal will vary depending on the nature of the issue and that sometimes this will involve the application of administrative law principles and sometimes not). New evidence can be adduced on an appeal: para 44. SIAC is not confined to considering material which was or ought to have been available to the Secretary of State when she took her decision, but can consider other material, including evidence which has only subsequently come into existence: para 45.
59. In U3 this gave rise to the question, what happens if new evidence is presented to SIAC which was not available to the Secretary of State? Lord Reed explained that the Secretary of State (typically acting by her officials by operation of the principle in Carltona Ltd v Comrs of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560) keeps the deprivation decision under review throughout the appeal process in light of the new evidence and any submissions and, if the decision is maintained, it is the decision as so maintained which is treated as being under challenge in the appeal: […] paras 20 and 46-47. Lord Reed again emphasised, as in Begum No 1 […] para 69, that an appeal under section 2B “can raise different issues, to which different legal principles apply”: […] para 50 (see also U3, […] para 60). He gave examples of this at paras 51-68. In relation to the assessment of the risk to national security posed by the appellant, there were institutional and constitutional reasons why SIAC should attach considerable weight to the Secretary of State’s assessment, having regard to the nature of that issue, meaning that the substance of the principles to be applied to that issue was the same as in ordinary administrative or public law: paras 63-68.
[…]
62. The analysis in Begum No 1, N3 and, in particular, U3 as explained above, shows that there is no fairness gap of the kind contemplated by the Court of Appeal, to which its judgment was a response. An individual affected by a deprivation decision has the right to challenge it by an appeal in which they can introduce evidence of their own and make any representations they wish. The decision which is the ultimate subject of consideration by the FTT (or by SIAC, as the case may be) is the decision which the Secretary of State seeks to maintain and defend after taking account of any such new evidence and any such representations: see U3 (paras 56-59 above). The FTT (or SIAC) is not limited to a review of the decision as originally made by the Secretary of State. […]
63. Mr Chirico sought to suggest that there was a basis for distinguishing the trio of judgments from this court, Begum No 1, N3 and U3, on the grounds that they concerned appeals to SIAC under section 2B rather than appeals to the FTT under section 40A. I do not accept that submission. The fundamental nature of an appeal against a deprivation decision is the same in both cases, as was emphasised in N3. The procedural differences between an appeal in the FTT and an appeal in SIAC exist solely to enable SIAC to be in a position to examine sensitive secret information relied upon by the Secretary of State which cannot be made public: see para 54 above.
[…]
70. As explained above, an appeal under [section 40A or under section 2B] is a full appeal. It is not a form of judicial review confined to examining the Secretary of State’s deprivation decision in light of the circumstances existing at the time it was taken. That is so even though the principles of law to be applied on appeal are, in relation to some issues, equivalent to ordinary public law principles. […]
50. It is helpful to set out in more detail the decision in U3 beyond the summary of it given in Kolicaj as it more clearly makes the distinction between the fact-finding and review tasks faced by SIAC (and by extension the First-tier Tribunal) and the relevance of new evidence. The relevant passages are as follows:
“45. The fact that an appeal to SIAC is different from an application for judicial review is also illustrated by three aspects of the procedure. First, as appears from the provisions mentioned in the previous paragraph, SIAC is not confined to consideration material which was or ought to have been available to the Secretary of State at the time when the decision under appeal was taken. It can consider other material, including evidence which has only subsequently come into existence.
46. Secondly, where the decision is based on the Secretary of State’s national security assessment, that assessment is kept under review by the Secretary of State throughout the appellate proceedings, in the light of the evidence and submissions put forward on behalf of the appellant, as explained at para 20 above. An updated assessment is normally prepared and placed before SIAC, as occurred in the present case. As a result, evidence which becomes available after the decision was taken, including the evidence of the appellant, can be, and is, taken into account by the Secretary of State during the appeal. Accordingly, unlike in judicial review proceedings, it is not necessary for the decision to be set aside and taken afresh in order for new material to be taken into account. […]
47. It follows that SIAC only gets to the point of carrying out its own assessment of the evidence if the Secretary of State has decided to maintain his or her decision, having reviewed and updated the national security assessment in the light of the evidence and submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant during the appellate proceedings. This is a very different form of procedure from an application for judicial review. Having regard to that procedure, it is impossible to accept the submission, made on behalf of the appellant and the intervener, that it is necessary for the decision to be set aside whenever evidence is adduced on behalf of the appellant and the intervener, that it is necessary for the decision to be set aside whenever evidence is adduced on behalf of the appellant which is material to the Secretary of State’s decision, in order for that evidence to be taken into account.
48. Thirdly, it follows from the fact that the procedure allows for the admission of evidence that it must be within SIAC’s jurisdiction to make findings of fact. It does so on the balance of probabilities, in accordance with the general rule governing civil proceedings. SIAC made numerous findings of fact in the present proceedings, as it was entitled to do. However, as explained below, not every issue which SIAC may have to decide in an appeal can be determined by making findings of fact on a balance of probabilities.
49. It follows from the foregoing that, in an appeal under section 2 or 2B, SIAC can allow an appeal without there being any implication that the Secretary of State was not entitled to take the decision on the basis of the material then before him or her. This is a further difference from judicial review proceedings.
50. The next point that it is important to understand is that appeals under sections 2 or 2B can raise different issues, to which different legal principles apply. Accordingly, the nature of the issue raised in an appeal can affect the approach which SIAC is required to adopt when deciding that issue. Where an appeal raises a number of issues, different approaches may have to be taken to the different issues in the appeal.
51. For example, where an appeal is brought against a deprivation decision on the ground that the deprivation order would render the affected person stateless, contrary to section 40(4) of the 1981 Act, then the issue which SIAC has to determine is whether the order would render the person stateless […]. That is a different question from whether the Secretary of State’s decision was lawfully made in the first place, as it could have been if the Secretary of State was reasonably, albeit mistakenly, satisfied that the order would not have the effect of rendering the person stateless. […]
52. In an appeal of that kind, SIAC determines the issue in question by making a finding as to statelessness on the basis of all of the evidence before it, which will commonly include expert evidence as to the relevant foreign law. In deciding that issue, SIAC is evidently not confined to administrative law grounds of review of the Secretary of State’s decision. The nature of the issue that it has to determine requires it to find the facts for itself, on a balance of probabilities, and then to apply the law, as was explained in N3 at para’s 36-38.
53. Deciding issues concerned with human rights also commonly requires SIAC to make findings in fact, as it did in the present case in relation to the appeal brought under section 2 of the 1997 Act on the ground that the refusal of entry clearance was unlawful because it was incompatible with the article 8 rights of the appellant’s children. In order to decide such an appeal, SIAC has to determine for itself the impact of the decision on the children, and consider for itself the best interests of the children, as a matter of fact, before going on to decide for itself whether the resultant interference with the children’s right to respect for private and family life is prescribed by law, has a legitimate aim, and satisfies the test of proportionality. […]
54. However, not every issue which SIAC ay be required to decide on an appeal under sections 2 or 2B of the 1997 Act is of a kind which can be determined by making findings of fact on a balance of probabilities. In particular, where an appeal is brought against a decision on a ground which challenges the Secretary of State’s assessment that the decision is justified because the affected person poses an unacceptable risk to national security, the nature of that issue requires SIAC to adopt a different approach. That is so for two reasons.
55. In the first place, the question whether a decision is justified on the ground of a risk to national security is a different kind of question from whether a decision will render a person stateless. A decision of the former kind is based on an evaluative judgement or assessment that an unacceptable risk exists, not on the existence of a particular fact or the recurrence of a particular event. An understanding that a particular event has occurred may form part of the basis of the assessment, but such assessments commonly refer, as in the present case, to suspicions or likelihoods; and, as explained below, even where the assessment is based on an understanding that a particular fact exists or that a particular event has occurred, whether or not that can be proved on a balance of probabilities will not be determinative.
56. The reasoning process which is appropriate to evaluating a risk is different from the reasoning process which is appropriate to deciding the facts in issue in civil litigation. […]
57. […]
58. But not all the issues which courts and tribunals have to decide require facts to be proven in this binary way. In particular, where the issue to be decided is concerned with the evaluation of a risk, then the material circumstances are not limited to facts which have been proved to the civil standard of proof. A risk is a possibility. The existence of a risk can therefore arise from evidence which is sufficient to establish a possibility but falls short of proof on a balance of probabilities. The evaluation of the risk then depends on such factors as the degree of risk, the possible methods of addressing the risk, and the gravity of the consequences if the risk eventuates.
[…]
63. There is a second reason why SIAC’s function, in this context, differs from the usual judicial function. The assessment of a risk to national security, and a decision that it is sufficient to justify a deprivation decision or the refusal of leave to enter the UK, involve the exercise of judgment. Unlike the Parole Board assessing the risk of a prisoner’s risk of reoffending, SIAC is not the primary decision-maker. Responsibility for assessing whether a person presents such a risk to national security that a deprivation decision or the refusal of entry clearance is justified has been given by Parliament to the Secretary of State, subject to a right of appeal to SIAC. Furthermore, the Secretary of State is also exercising a discretion. Under section 40(2) of the 1981 Act, the Secretary of State “may” deprive a person of citizenship if satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good. Similarly, under section 3 of the 1971 Act, the decision whether to grant leave to enter the UK to a person who is not a British citizen is likewise discretionary. SIAC’s role within this context is therefore to review the Secretary of State’s exercise of her discretion, based on an evaluative judgment of the risk to national security.
64. The grounds on which the exercise of discretion is reviewed under English law are those established in administrative or public law. That is not to say an appeal to SIAC is equivalent to an application for judicial review: there are important differences, as was explained at paras 43-49 above. It is merely to identify the legal principles which are relevant to the review of a discretionary decision. They include the principle that the court will not interfere with a decision merely because it might have itself decided the matter differently, provided the decision is one that could reasonably be taken.
65. One further factor is also important. In carrying out a review of a discretionary decision by the person entrusted by Parliament to take that decision, and in particular when assessing the reasonableness of a decision, a court or tribunal will always attach weight to the assessment made by the primary decision-maker. […]”
51. For completeness, the Upper Tribunal found in Berdica that (1) In deprivation of citizenship appeals, consideration is to be given both to the sustainability of the original decision and also whether upon considering subsequent evidence the Secretary of State’s maintenance of her decision up to and including the hearing of the appeal is also sustainable. The latter requires an appellant to establish that the Secretary of State could not now take the same view. The issue in that particular case was whether the appellant was dishonest applying the review principles set out in Chimi, upon which there was further evidence available on appeal. Although this touched upon the issue of causation, there was no express consideration of the applicability of this principle to the issue of the exercise of discretion.
52. Drawing these matters together, the following principles are applicable to the determination of the present appeal, in which there is no dispute as to the use of deception and causation; only as to the exercise of discretion for the purposes of section 40(3) of the BNA 1971:
(a) There is no difference in substance between the approach in an appeal to SIAC and an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, both are substantive appeals on their merits, however the legal principles to be applied on the appeal will vary depending on the nature of the issue, sometimes it will be on administrative law principles, sometimes not [para 63 of Kolicaj and para 50 of U3].
(b) An appeal on the exercise of discretion is to be reviewed by the tribunal on public law grounds in accordance with Begum (No. 1) [para 54 of Chaudhry]. This is in contrast to the issue of precedent fact and any human rights issues, upon which there is a full merits review where a tribunal can make its own findings of fact and reach a decision as at the date of hearing [para 54 of Chaudhry and paras 51 to 53 of U3, which includes the same view in relation to any issue of statelessness].
(c) A review on public law grounds can include, inter alia, a failure to take into account a material consideration [para 71 of Begum].
(d) A review on public law grounds is not the same as in an application for Judicial Review, an appellant may adduce evidence which was not before the Respondent at the date of decision [para 58 of Kolicaj, by reference to paras 43 to 45 of U3].
(e) The evidence which an appellant can adduce can be in relation to the precedent fact issue, any matters arising pursuant to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 [para 53 of Chaudhry] and statelessness and [paras 51-52 and 55 of U3].
(f) A decision to deprive a person of their citizenship is one which is kept under review by officials throughout the appeal and if the decision is maintained on appeal, it is that maintained decision which is the one to be considered by the tribunal (rather than a review of the decision as originally made) [para 59 of Kolicaj, by reference to paras 20 and 46-47 of U3].
(g) In relation to a review of the exercise of discretion, SIAC (or the tribunal) is not the primary decision maker and their role is therefore to review the exercise of discretion by the Respondent and the sustainability of that exercise of discretion, having taken into account any new evidence or representations [paras 62 and 63 U3 and headnote (1) of Berdica]. In so doing, a court or tribunal will always attach weight to the assessment made by the primary decision-maker [para 65 of U3].
53. Applying these principles to the issue of the exercise of discretion in the present appeal to answer the questions posed in paragraph 43, the function of this tribunal is to review the Respondent’s decision as maintained at the date of hearing, in light of any further evidence and representations made by and on behalf of the Appellant, with the element of discretion to be reviewed on public law grounds with weight to be given to the assessment of the same by the Respondent. In terms of the human rights aspect of the appeal (dealt with in issues three and four below), that is to be determined following a full merits review of all of the Appellant’s circumstances as at the date of hearing, taking into account any new evidence and representations as to these and upon which the tribunal will make findings of fact as needed.
54. As set out above, there has been no active review of the Respondent’s decision in this case (nor any supplementary decision l, simply the maintenance of the same decision as was originally made. Although there is no difference in substance between an appeal to SIAC and to the First-tier Tribunal (save for the ability of the former to consider material relevant to security in a different procedural way) I do take into account that there is in the present appeal no security risk assessment nor updating of the same and in circumstances where the precedent fact is not in dispute, there was no further relevant information to that particular point, nor any issue of maintenance of the decision on the basis of both deception and causation.
55. The further evidence and representations on behalf of the Appellant consist of (i) further factual evidence as to his family circumstances (all of which are taken into account below in relation to the third and fourth issues as to the best interests of the children and Article 8); and (ii) submissions as to delay, both factually and by reference to the requirement to take this into account contained in the policy in force as at the date of hearing (which was not in place at the date of the original decision). The Respondent has, in effect, maintained the exercise of her discretion to deprive the Appellant of his citizenship in light of the further factual points raised; albeit with dispute as to the relevance of delay and the current policy to the decision.
56. I turn now to the application of the administrative law principles to the Respondent’s exercise of discretion, which focuses solely on whether the Respondent failed to properly take into account the delay between knowing of the Appellant’s deception and the decision. Both parties refer to and rely on the Friends of the Earth litigation. In that case, the Supreme Court set out the basic legal approach to what matters should be taken into account, identifying the three categories of consideration by reference to R v Somerset County Council Ex p Fewings [1995] 1WLR 1037, 1049, as “First, those clearly (whether expressly or impliedly) identified by the statute as considerations to which regard must be had. Second, those clearly identified by the statute as considerations to which regard must not be had. Third, those to which the decision-maker may have regard if in his judgment and discretion he thinks it right to do so. There is, in short, a margin of appreciate within which the decision-maker may decide just what considerations should play a part in his reasoning process.” [para 116].
57. In paragraph 117, there was a further reference to the three categories identified in CREEDNZ Inc v Governor General [1981] NZLR 172, 183 that “in relation to the third category of consideration that, notwithstanding the silence of the statue, “there will be some matters so obviously material to a decision on a particular project that anything short of direct consideration of them by [the public authority] … would not be in accordance with the intention of the Act.” In paragraph 119 it was confirmed that the test whether a consideration falling within the third category is “so obviously material” that it must be taken into account is the familiar Wednesbury irrationality test.
58. The present case potentially falls within the third category of matters identified in the Friends of the Earth litigation given that section 40(3) of the BNA 1971 does not prescribe any specific matters which should or should not be taken into account when depriving a person of their citizenship and contains only a very broad discretion to do so once the precedent fact has been established. The Appellant’s position is that delay is matter which was (i) known to the Respondent even in the absence of any representations relying the same, and (ii) obviously material to the exercise of discretion. The Respondent’s position (i) relies on the position at the date of the original decision under appeal (rather than as maintained at the date of hearing) that there were no representations relying on delay from the Appellant (nor any specific evidence of his belief or reliance on the lack of decision) and delay was not required to be considered as a matter of policy, and (ii) is that in any event, delay was not an obvious matter relevant to the exercise of discretion pursuant to the provisions of the statute.
59. The relevance of delay per se to the exercise of discretion in deprivation cases is not set out with any specificity in the case law referred to above (or elsewhere), it being referred to only in broad terms as relevant to administrative law principles and to the assessment under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, albeit not necessarily in the same way. Mr Hodgett’s was unable to identify the way in which delay should be taken into account for the purposes of reviewing the exercise of discretion, beyond reference to it potentially reducing the strength of the public interest; which is a matter already relevant to and taken into account in the Article 8 assessment. The Respondent’s current policy does not provide any assistance or clarity either as it does not specify in what way delay should be taken into account, beyond being relevant to the proportionality assessment for the purposes of Article 8.
60. Whilst I consider that delay may be relevant to the exercise of discretion, it is difficult to identity the specific or distinct way in which this would be relevant outside of the Article 8 consideration or in addition to it; other than perhaps in the sense of good administration which may consider, again similar points to the Article 8 assessment, as to whether it was the result of a dysfunctional system or simply reduced the weight to be given to the public interest. That may be more relevant in a case where there is no explanation for the delay, but that is not the present appeal.
61. Given that in the present case, the only two matters considered by the Respondent initially as to the exercise of discretion were statelessness (not in issue) and Article 8; and that the Appellant has not been able to identify any additional factors beyond the latter directly only delay; I find that there is nothing that this of itself, on the facts of this appeal, that can add to the exercise of discretion beyond what is already contained in any Article 8 assessment (as is also required by the current policy) and which has been undertaken afresh by the tribunal as set out further below; which includes express consideration of the impact of delay.
62. In all of these circumstances, it is not possible to conclude that the issue of delay was one which was so obvious to take into account as a freestanding relevant consideration in the Respondent’s exercise of discretion to deprive the Appellant of his citizenship. In any event, in practical terms, reliance on the issue in purely administrative law terms takes the Appellant’s case no further than the specific Article 8 assessment which encompasses consideration of delay (and as above, which is the only requirement in the current policy). For the reasons set out below, there is no breach of Article 8 on the facts of this particular case and therefore once delay has now been taken into account in that context and giving weight to the Respondent’s decision to deprive the Appellant of his British citizenship for the reasons given; there is no public law error in the decision to deprive pursuant to section 40(3) of the BNA 1971. That decision, as maintained at the date of hearing and further to the additional evidence and submissions on behalf of the Appellant is not one which is Wednesbury unreasonable nor, in the language of Berdica is one which is not sustainable in light of all of those matters.
63. For all of these reasons, there is no public law error in the Respondent’s decision, as maintained at the date of hearing, to exercise her discretion to deprive the Appellant of his British citizenship and the appeal is dismissed on this ground.
Issue 3 – the best interests of the Appellant’s children
64. In relation to the best interests of children in the context of a deprivation appeal, the approach to be taken by a Tribunal is set out in Mujaj (Deprivation: children’s best interests) [2025] UKUT 349 (IAC) as follows:

(i) First, it must identify whether the best interests of any child were relevant to any issue in the appeal. In a deprivation decision, the section 55 duty is mainly relevant to the exercise of discretion and to the article 8 assessment. Kolicaj [2025] EWCA Civ 10 at [37];
(ii) Second, it must identify which of those issues are to be determined by the tribunal according to public law principles;
(iii) Third, it must identify all of the respondent’s reasons for her decision, whether in the initial deprivation decision or in a subsequent review or reconsideration, and take them into account where it is procedurally fair to do so;
(iv) Fourth, with regard to those issues that are to be determined according to public law principles, it must determine whether the respondent complied with her section 55 duty;
(v) Fifth, if she did not, it must then decide whether the error was material and requires the decision to be set aside; and
(vi) Sixth, when deciding the issues that are for the tribunal to decide for itself, it must make its own findings about the best interests of any relevant child and take them into account as a primary consideration in accordance with established principles. Here, whether of not the respondent complied with her section 55 duty is unlikely to be relevant.
65. At the time of the decision under appeal, the Respondent was entirely unaware that the Appellant had any children in the United Kingdom such that the section 55 duty would be relevant; that is because no representations had been received from the Appellant as to his current circumstances, so there was no reliance by the Appellant on either the fact that he had by then, one British citizen child (with a second born later that year) or on any particular circumstances of that child.
66. As above, there has been no supplementary or later decision by the Respondent and this appeal was lodged prior to the procedural reforms in the First-tier Tribunal requiring a Respondent’s review. As such, it is not in dispute that the Respondent had not formally undertaken any assessment of the best interests of the Appellant’s two children. In these circumstances, it is a matter for the Upper Tribunal to determine the same.
67. The Respondent’s position is in essence that there is a lack of evidence of any significant impact on the Appellant’s children during the limbo period before a further decision is made, at most this amounts to worry for the eldest child but no risk of the children’s essential needs not being met during this time.
68. The Appellant’s position on this issue is in essence that depriving the Appellant of British citizenship would be contrary to his children’s best interests due to (i) the financial impact on the whole family; and (ii) worry and anxiety felt by the eldest child due to the uncertainty of the Appellant’s position whilst in his GCSE year.
69. There is relatively little information about the Appellant’s children before the Upper Tribunal beyond their basic details and stages of education, the eldest being in the final year of school with GCSE exams approaching and the youngest having started primary school this academic year. Both children are British citizens who speak English and have lived their entire lives in the United Kingdom with both of their parents. There is nothing to suggest that either child has any health conditions or other difficulties. At its highest, the Appellant states that his eldest child has general worries about what may happen as a result of this appeal process, but nothing more specific than that.
70. In the usual course of things, it is readily accepted that it is in a child’s best interests to remain with their immediate family members and in this case, to remain in the United Kingdom where they have spent their whole lives and where the eldest is at an important stage in his education and would be much more socially integrated than the youngest child whose focus would be more within the family having only recently started in formal education. Those best interests would not be affected directly by a decision to deprive the Appellant of his British citizenship given that (a) their status (and that of their mother) would not be affected and there would be no question of them being required to leave the United Kingdom; (b) would not at this point require the Appellant to leave the United Kingdom as there would be a further decision as to whether he is to be deported or granted leave to remain; and (c) all of the children’s basic needs would continue to be met during the ‘limbo’ period before that further decision is made. In this regard, I rely on the reasons set out below in relation in particular to the financial circumstances of the family during such period in that the family have sufficient resources and income to provide for themselves as needed and there would be no detrimental impact on the best interests of the children for this reason.
71. The loss of the Appellant’s British citizenship would, in reality, have no direct impact upon his children at this stage and would not affect their own identity, living situation, contact with their parents or access to education. They would remain in a stable home with both parents and there is nothing to suggest any harmful impact, at most, there is generalised worry for the older child due to the future uncertainty of whether the Appellant can, pursuant to a further decision, remain lawfully in the United Kingdom.
72. In all of these circumstances, the best interests of the children do not provide any basis upon which to successfully challenge the Respondent’s decision to deprive the Appellant of his British citizenship in this appeal, again, on either a full merits approach or a public law principles approach, as the decision itself does not directly or adversely affect their best interests. This is in any event a matter upon which will require further consideration and assessment for the subsequent decision required by the Respondent as to whether the Appellant should be granted leave to remain or removed from the United Kingdom.
Issue 4 – Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
73. In relation to Article 8, the Respondent’s position is that if the Appellant is deprived of British citizenship, he will face limited exposure to a period of limbo of approximately eight weeks between the signing of a deprivation order and the making of a further decision on whether to grant leave or to pursue removal/deportation. For this limited period, in accordance with Aziz & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1884, a Tribunal must avoid a “proleptic assessment” as to whether a person is likely to be removed as a consequence of any further decision and focus instead on this limbo period and in particular whether the public interest in depriving a person of their fraudulently obtained citizenship is sufficiently strong so as to justify exposing them to this limbo period. The Respondent’s position is that there is a significant public interest in such cases.
74. In the present appeal, the Respondent accepts the lengthy delay and has provided an explanation for it. First, there was a period of time for the Respondent to investigate and uncover the fraud. Secondly, the case was put on hold pending the outcome of the nullity litigation culminating in the decision of the Supreme Court in Hysaj & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 82. Further, Mr Terrell submitted that although there was a period between 2008 and 2018 with no communication between the Respondent and the Appellant, there was also never any indication from the Respondent that deprivation action would not be pursued or taken.
75. During the period of the delay, the Respondent’s position is that the Appellant has not suffered any prejudice and to the contrary (none having been identified with any specificity), has only benefited from his fraudulently obtained citizenship; including his right to live and work in the United Kingdom without restriction and his wife being granted entry clearance, leave to remain and ultimately British citizenship as well.
76. As to the limbo period, the impact on the Appellant would be relatively minor as he has sufficient financial means and resources for himself and his family for this period (his wife is in work, there are family savings and they own their own home) and whilst there may be an impact on his ability to work during this period, his business could resume in the future.
77. Overall, Mr Terrell submitted that there remains a significant public interest in depriving a person of a benefit to which they were never entitled in the first place and any consequences to the Appellant are a result of their own fraudulent activity, which in this case, included fraud in every dealing the Appellant personally had with the Respondent up to and including his application for naturalisation. Whilst accepted that delay can be treated as qualifying the strength of the public interest, it was submitted that it can not remove the public interest entirely. Notwithstanding the delay, it was submitted that the public interest was sufficiently strong to justify exposing the Appellant to a relatively short limbo period such that there is no breach of Article 8 in this case.
78. On behalf of the Appellant, Mr Hodgetts submitted that deprivation would be a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s private and family life taking into account (i) the Respondent’s inaction and delay before making the decision, during which the Appellant was not notified that his case had been put on hold and he was issued with a fresh British passport and during which the Appellant believed that no further action would be taken, particularly following his wife’s entry to the United Kingdom; (ii) the Appellant’s own disclosure of deception; (iii) the Appellant’s otherwise blameless and productive life in the United Kingdom; (iv) the Appellant’s length of residence of over 20 years at the date of decision (now over 27 years’ continuous residence) such that he is highly unlikely to be removed from the United Kingdom because of this and his family in the United Kingdom; (v) the strength of the Appellant’s private and family life in the United Kingdom; and (vi) the consequences of the limbo period. These would include the worry felt by the Appellant’s oldest child about the situation against his best interests; that the Appellant would not be able to work during the limbo period which would have an impact on his business in which he is the sole worker; there would be a loss of income to the family which would likely lead to them not being able to meet their current financial commitments and that would also have an impact on the best interests of the children.
79. At the hearing, Mr Hodgetts accepted that there was no evidence from the Appellant of him relying on the Respondent’s failure to take any action during the period 2008 to 2018 and nothing to suggest any life choices were made on the belief that no further action would be taken nor deprivation be pursued. Mr Hodgetts was unable to offer a specific reason as to why delay of itself reduces the public interest in deprivation beyond the mere passage of time meaning that deprivation is considered to be of less importance and drew an analogy with criminal proceedings. During a period of delay, the Appellant’s private and family life can be strengthened with further integration and ties to the United Kingdom, including financial ties, family, liabilities here and so on.
80. In relation to the limbo period itself, Mr Hodgetts submitted that the eight week period relied upon was a target and there was no hard and fast guarantee of a further decision within that period. Whatever the period is, there would be uncertainty for the whole family, which is already a concern in particular for the Appellant’s eldest child and there would be a financial impact on the whole family.
81. In broad terms, the deprivation of citizenship would be an interference with the Appellant’s private and family life established in the United Kingdom but would be in accordance with the law and a legitimate aim. The issue in relation to Article 8 in this case is whether deprivation would be proportionate for the limbo period, expected to be around eight weeks.
82. As already set out above, the Appellant has been resident in the United Kingdom continuously now for over 27 years during which time he has inevitably established social ties and runs his own business. I accept that there will be a degree of interference with his business during the limbo period as he would not personally be able to work; but there is nothing to suggest he would not be able to employ someone else during that period or that he would not be able to resume working or running his own business if granted leave to remain in a further decision. Whilst I accept that as a sole trader the Appellant’s own work is important to the business and there may be time sensitive work that he would not personally be able to undertake (such as annual safety inspections) I do not find that there would be any significant long term impact on the business or significant loss of customers. The Appellant offered nothing in support of the assertion that even a two week holiday lost him a month’s worth of business, nor that the limbo period would have any long-term adverse impact on the business.
83. In any event, I find that the Appellant personally and as part of his family as a whole have sufficient resources to sustain themselves during any limbo period. The Appellant owns his family home and owns another rental property which it is reasonable to expect will generate some income (or at the very least not incur any further financial liabilities) and he has savings of around £12,000. In addition, the Appellant’s wife is in employment and also has not insignificant savings. There is no evidence of any specific financial liabilities, let alone any significant ones and the Appellant’s own evidence was that he would have sufficient resources to meet the family’s needs during an eight week period. There is nothing to support Mr Hodgett’s submission that the family would not be able to meet ongoing financial commitments.
84. In these circumstances, there is no significant impact on the Appellant’s business or family for financial reasons and no risk that their essential needs would not be met during a limbo period. There would be no impact at all on other social ties or integration which could continue while the Appellant remains in the United Kingdom, although I do take into account as the Respondent did the loss of benefits of citizenship such as the ability to vote and loss of identity as a British citizen.
85. The Appellant also has established family life in the United Kingdom with his wife being granted entry clearance in 2008, further to which she was granted leave to remain and subsequently naturalised as a British citizen. The Appellant has two children, born in the United Kingdom and who are also British citizens. Their status as British citizens would be entirely unaffected by any decision to deprive the Appellant of his citizenship. As above, there is nothing to suggest the family would be adversely financially affected by the decision during a limbo period such that they could not continue to meet their essential needs and the only other impact identified was generalised stress and worry for the family and the eldest child in particular.
86. On the Appellant’s side of the balancing exercise is therefore his strong private and family life established in the United Kingdom, albeit the interference with the same is very limited in practical terms during the limbo period to not being able to work, albeit without such adverse financial circumstances that this would impact on him and his family during that period and with an impact of generalised stress and worry for the family for the same period. I consider the latter to be a relatively minor concern.
87. On the Respondent’s side of the balancing exercise is the public interest in depriving a person of British citizenship that has been obtained by fraud or deception. The starting point is as set out in paragraph 110 of the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Hysaj (Deprivation of Citizenship: Delay) [2020] UKUT 00128 (IAC) and endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Laci which states as follows:
“110. There is a heavy weight to be placed upon the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the system by which foreign nationals are naturalised and permitted to enjoy the benefits of British citizenship. That deprivation will cause disruption in day-to-day life is a consequence of the appellant’s own actions and without more, such as the loss of rights previously enjoyed, cannot possibly tip the proportionality balance in favour of his retaining the benefits of citizenship that he fraudulently secured.”
88. The Court of Appeal went on to refer to circumstances where there is something more (in that case, the Secretary of State’s prolonged and unexplained delay/inaction), the problems that may arise in the limbo period may properly carry weight in the overall assessment. It is not in dispute between the parties that delay is a relevant factor that can qualify (or at least be relevant to) the public interest in the present appeal and this is the third way in which delay may be relevant set out by Lord Bingham in EB (Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 41, as follows:
“16. Delay may be relevant, thirdly, in reducing the weight otherwise to be accorded to the requirements of firm and fair immigration control, if the delay is shown to be the result of a dysfunctional system which yields unpredictable, inconsistent and fair outcomes. … To the extent that this is shown to be so, it may have a bearing on the proportionality of removal, or of requiring an applicant to apply from out of country. As Carnwarth LJ observed in Akaeke v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 947, [2005] INLR 575, para 25:
“Once it is accepted that unreasonable delay on the part of the Secretary of State is capable of being a relevant factor, then the weight to be given to it in the particular case was a matter for the tribunal.”.”
89. In the present case, whilst there was a long period of uncertainty related to multiple strands of litigation involving the Respondent in relation to a range of issues relating to nullity and deprivation of British citizenship, I do not find that it has been established that this resulted from a dysfunctional system which yielded unpredictable and inconsistent outcomes (which is consistent the conclusion by the Upper Tribunal in Hysaj following a similar period of delay). There remains a question, as addressed below, whether the delay was otherwise unreasonable.
90. The parties have both referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Laci on this point. The facts of Laci are important to note given their similarity to those in the present appeal. Mr Laci was an Albanian national who had falsely claimed to be a Kosovan national after arrival in the United Kingdom and was granted leave to remain and ultimately British citizenship in 2005; all in the same false identity and nationality. Mr Laci’s true identity was discovered after his mother made an entry clearance application in 2007 and the Respondent wrote to him in 2009 regarding possible deprivation on the basis that citizenship had been obtained by fraud. Mr Laci admitted the fraud at that time, but there was then no further communication by the Respondent until 2018 when notice was given of consideration of deprivation. In between the communications, Mr Laci continued to live in the United Kingdom, pursuing education and employment, purchased a property, got married, had a child and was issued with a new British passport in 2016. The First-tier Tribunal allowed Mr Laci’s appeal against deprivation in all of the circumstances, including delay which was wholly unexplained at the time and with the conclusion that the delay was obviously unfair in the exceptional circumstances in that case.
91. Ultimately, that conclusion was upheld by the Court of appeal, not without hesitation, and with recognition that not every Tribunal would have reached the same conclusion. Conversely, that must mean that not every Tribunal who reached the alternative view would necessarily err in law either. Whilst the facts in Laci are very similar to the present appeal, I do not consider that any factual precedent was set by it and there are two key distinctions in from that in the present case, first, there was no material response from the Appellant to either piece of correspondence from the Respondent setting out her consideration of deprivation action (contrary to Laci in which the appellant admitted deception at the outset but made representations against deprivation); and secondly, there was at least some explanation for the delay at the time of the decision and during the course of this appeal. Also of note was that the passport issued to the Appellant in 2014 was in his true identity following his change of name by deed poll from the false identity he had continued to use up to that point.
92. In the present case, I take into account that ordinarily, a person should not expect to benefit from their own deception; but also that the weight to be attached to the public interest in deprivation in such cases should be reduced for the following reasons in the circumstances of the present appeal. These include the passage of time since 2008 when the Appellant was first notified by the Respondent of possible action to deprive him of his British citizenship, shortly followed by the grant of entry clearance to his wife to join him in the United Kingdom; the issue of a new British passport in 2014; and the lack of communication from the Respondent as to whether action was on hold or still to be pursued, during which time the Appellant continued to develop his family and private life in the United Kingdom, including having two children (although the second was born after the decision to deprive was made).
93. However, when considering what weight is to be attached to these factors, I also take into account that the Appellant never responded substantively to the correspondence about possible deprivation and never contacted the Respondent at all to check the position and that the Respondent has given an explanation for the delay in the context of significant other strands of litigation as to the correct route and principles in deprivation cases such that this Appellant’s case was put on hold (from 2014 at the latest, but the uncertainty and wider litigation began much earlier in 2009). There is nothing to suggest that the Appellant placed any reliance on the lack of communication and action by the Respondent prior to the decision being made and to the contrary, he simply continued to benefit from his own deception by being able to live and work and raise a family in the United Kingdom without restriction.
94. Overall, whilst I find that in the particular circumstances of this case, the weight to be attached to the public interest is to be reduced because of the delay, it is not reduced by such a significant extent that it is not still a weighty factor that as a matter of principle, a person should not expect to benefit from their own fraud. The public interest in this case is still strong and I do not find that it is outweighed by the minor adverse impact on the Appellant’s private and family life established in the United Kingdom during the relatively short limbo period. The strength of the public interest and balancing exercise may be different at a future point in time when a decision is required on whether the Appellant should be removed from the United Kingdom or granted leave to remain, but that is not the present issue. In conclusion, I do not find that the interference with the Appellant’s private and family life during the limbo period is disproportionate and there is therefore no breach of Article 8.

Notice of Decision
As set out in the annexed error of law decision, the making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law and as such it was necessary to set aside the decision.
The appeal is remade as follows:
The appeal is dismissed under section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981.
The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.


G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19th March 2026



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2022-001578
First-tier Tribunal No: DC/00025/2019

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMEATON

Between

MR NERIM CANAMETI
(ALSO KNOWN AS NERIM RAMADANI)
(No Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMNT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Hodgetts, counsel instructed by OTB Legal
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 18 May 2021 but not promulgated until 7 February 2022, dismissing his appeal against the decision to deprive him of his British citizenship under s.40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 (the “BNA 1981”).
2. In the course of arrival in the United Kingdom, the Appellant used a false name, Nerim Ramadani, but it is now known that his actual name is Nerim Canameti and that he formally changed his name in the United Kingdom to his true identity in 2014. This appeal was originally lodged in the name of Nerim Ramadani, which the Appellant has continued to use for a significant part of these proceedings, although on appeal to the Court of Appeal his true identity was used. We have for pragmatic reasons and without objection from the parties, referred above to the Appellant as Nerim Canameti which is both his true and his legal identity in the United Kingdom now, noting that he is or has also been known as Nerim Ramadani.
Background
3. The Appellant is a national of Albania (and more latterly a British citizen), who entered the United Kingdom on 13 September 1998 under a false name (Narim Ramadani) and claimed asylum the following day.
4. The Appellant falsely claimed to be an ethnic Albanian, born in Kosovo to Kosovan parents; claiming asylum on the basis that he would be at risk on return to Kosovo. He was granted refugee status following a successful appeal during which he maintained his false identity, nationality, place of birth and claim to be at risk. The Appellant was granted leave to remain as such under his false identify, and thereafter indefinite leave to remain on 14 August 2001 and British citizenship on 23 December 2003, all in the same name of Nerim Ramadani.
5. In or around 2006, the Appellant’s sister applied for entry clearance to the United Kingdom as a student with the Appellant as her sponsor. It was suggested that during her appeal against refusal initially some of his true identity and background was revealed, albeit that has not been accepted to have put the Respondent on notice of the same in this appeal so far.
6. In or around 2007, the Appellant’s then-fiancée applied for entry clearance to the United Kingdom. In support of that application, she gave the Appellant’s place of birth as Albania and provided his Albanian personal certificate in his true name. She confirmed that true identity during an interview with the Home Office in February 2008.
7. On 17 September 2008, the Respondent wrote to the Appellant, advising him that deprivation action was being considered. The Appellant was given 21 days to provide mitigating circumstances and was told that a decision on deprivation would be made in the absence of a response. The Appellant’s representatives sought further time to respond, which was granted to 15 November 2008, but did not in fact respond substantively thereafter. The Appellant however maintains that he completed an affidavit for his then representatives to send and was unaware that they had not done so.
8. The Respondent’s GCID records show that, ‘all enquiries now complete’ in relation to deprivation action on 18 January 2010.
9. On 10 March 2014, the Appellant changed his official name in the UK to his birth name, Nerim Canameti, and a further three passports have since been issued to him in that name.
10. The Respondent’s GCID records showed on 19 November 2014 that a PNC had been requested for the Appellant and on 21 November 2014, the entry showed: ‘Nullity case – as per current policy all nullity cases on hold awaiting Kaziu outcome’.
11. On 24 May 2018, nearly ten years after the first letter, the Respondent wrote to the Appellant for a second time inviting representations on why deprivation should not be pursued. The Appellant was informed in that letter that his case had been put on hold as a ‘potential nullity case’. The Appellant had not been informed of that prior to 2018 and had received no correspondence from the Respondent between 2008 and 2018. Although it is said a response was sent on behalf of the Appellant, the Respondent has no record of any reply.
12. On 22 March 2019, the Appellant was sent a notice of decision to deprive him of British citizenship under s.40(3) of the BNA 1981. The letter refers to the Appellant having been issued with a certificate of naturalisation and sets out in detail the various points in his immigration history at which various identity and other personal details were given and the conclusion that the Appellant used deception to obtain status in the United Kingdom, maintaining that deception through subsequent dealings with the Respondent up to and including the application for naturalisation as a British citizen. The deception was considered to be directly material to the grant of British citizenship and had the deception been known at the time, the application would have been refused on good character grounds.
13. In relation to the timeline for consideration of deprivation, the decision letter, so far as relevant states:
“2. You are aware that UK Visas and Immigration has, on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Home Department, been actively investigating the manner in which you have obtained your status as a British citizen on the grounds that this may have been obtained fraudulently.
…
12. In light of this information, a letter was issued to you on 17th September 2008 […], advising that deprivation action was being considered and providing you with the opportunity to supply mitigating circumstances. Your then legal representatives, Karis Law, replied on 14th October 2008, requesting an extension of time in order to provide full assistance in this matter […]. However, no further correspondence was received by either you or your representatives. Your case was then identified as a potential nullity case and was therefore put on hold; The application of Section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 to deprive individuals of British Citizenship was the subject of several appeals that were lodged in October 2009 and were not finally determined until December 2017 in the Supreme Court. The process of monitoring these appeals had an impact on the finalisation of decisions in several other cases, including this one.”
14. The Respondent’s decision further recognised that the decision to deprive on the grounds of fraud is a discretionary one and in making the decision to deprive, a number of factors were taken into account with the conclusion that deprivation would be both reasonable and proportionate. These included, so far as relevant (the section on statelessness not being relevant) as follows:
“Article 8 ECHR
23. If you held another form of settled status prior to naturalising as a British citizen and obtained a certificate of entitlement to the right of abode after naturalising as a British citizen, the loss of citizenship will result in the loss of the right of abode and with it the loss of the ability to enter and remain in the UK without any restriction on time or purpose. However, a deprivation decision does not itself preclude an individual from remaining in the UK. … According, although deprivation may culminate in a decision to remove you, it is not necessary to take into account the impact that removal would have on you and your family members.
24. British citizenship also confers a number of other entitlements and benefits, including the right to a British passport and the right to vote in general elections. It is acknowledged that deprivation action will have the necessary consequence that you will lose those entitlements and benefits. However, these are benefits to which you had no proper entitlement.
25. It is also accepted that you held British citizenship since 2003 and that loss of citizenship will have an impact on your identity, for example, you can no longer identify yourself as British. However, the misrepresentation only came to the Secretary of State’s attention after your partner provided details and evidence of your true identity in support of her Entry Clearance application in 2007. The Home Office would have considered taking deprivation action earlier if it could have done so.
…
30. The effects of deprivation action on you [and your family members] must be weighed against the public interest in protecting the special relationship of solidarity and good faith between the UK and its nationals and also the reciprocity of rights and duties, which form the bedrock of the bond of nationality. Having weighed those effects, it has been concluded that it is reasonable and proportionate to deprive you of British citizenship.”
15. The Appellant’s appeal to the First-tier Tribunal was dismissed by Judge Black in a decision dated 18 May 2021, but not promulgated until 7 February 2022. There is no explanation for the apparent delay in promulgation of the decision, which appears likely to have been an administrative error and there is nothing to indicate any involvement of the Judge after the decision had been signed.
16. In summary, before the First-tier Tribunal there was no dispute that the Appellant had used deception in his earlier dealings with the Respondent, up to and including his application for naturalisation and that the same was material to his British citizenship. The Appellant’s claim focused on the deception being within the Respondent’s knowledge since 2006 during his sister’s appeal, or at least from his wife’s application for entry clearance in 2008 and the delay between then and the decision to deprive in 2019 being egregious and not due to any nullity decision or other action during that time, but due to a dysfunctional system. The Appellant’s case was that in these circumstances, during which he had developed family life and ties in the United Kingdom, including having a child here; that the delay meant that the decision to deprive was not reasonable or proportionate.
17. The First-tier Tribunal found that the Respondent had been aware of the deception since 2008 but that it had been reasonable for the Respondent to put the Appellant’s case on hold pending firm judicial guidance in Hysaj v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 82. The First-tier Tribunal considered that the Appellant’s facts were similar to those in Hysaj and the outcome of that case was directly relevant to his. In terms of the delay, the First-tier Tribunal considered that the Appellant had only benefitted from this with no detriment to him; and that it was not a matter that the Respondent needed to have considered expressly. Overall, the Respondent’s decision was a reasonable one.
18. The Appellant did not pursue any Article 8 claim before the First-tier Tribunal.
The appeal
19. The Appellant appealed the decision of the First-tier Tribunal on two grounds as follows. First, that the First-tier Tribunal materially misdirected itself in law and failed to give adequate reasons on three points; (i) that it failed to apply the principles in Laci v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 769 and Ciceri (deprivation of citizenship appeals: principles) [2021] UKUT 00238 (IAC); both of which were handed down after the date on which the Judge signed the decision under appeal but before it was promulgated. The cases are relied upon to show that the First-tier Tribunal erred in failing to resolve a key issue as to the impact of delay in the proportionality assessment (although strictly for the purposes of Article 8 which was not pursued) and following these cases, that it was clear that delay is capable, together with other circumstances of the case, of justifying a decision that a person should not be deprived of British citizenship. The First-tier Tribunal thus erred in finding that delay was relevant and/or that a delay of 10 years was reasonable; (ii) that it wrongly referred to the decision being under section 40(2) of the BNA 1981 and not section 40(3); and (iii) that the Respondent’s decision said that both the Appellant’s case was actively investigated, but also on hold, which are mutually exclusive and there were inadequate reasons given to explain the significant delay of over 10 years in this case.
20. Secondly, that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law and failed to give adequate reasons in two further respects; (i) in failing to reconvene the hearing or invite further submissions following the decisions in Laci and Ciceri; and (ii) in failing to make any findings on the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation on the Appellant, which would be relevant following Ciceri even without an Article 8 appeal having been pursued.
21. The Upper Tribunal previously found no error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, however that decision was set aside by the Court of Appeal in an approved consent order sealed on 6 December 2024. The matter was remitted to the Upper Tribunal on the basis of the statement of reasons given in the Order, primarily that the Upper Tribunal’s decision rested on incorrect and/or incorrect facts material to the decision (namely that an extension of time had been given in 2008 for the Appellant’s response; that the Appellant had been re-issued with a passport in 2014; and that there was no suggestion that the Appellant had understood that the Respondent was not pursuing further action).
22. The matter returned to the Upper Tribunal for a de novo hearing on the grounds of appeal set out above upon which permission was granted by the Upper Tribunal previously.
23. Prior to the hearing, the Appellant made an application under rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to adduce a further witness statement from the Appellant and further evidence pertaining to the issues identified in Laci as being relevant to issues of proportionality under both common law and Article 8. It was initially understood that the material was relevant only to a re-making of the hearing if an error of law was found, but at the hearing it became apparent that much of the material was relied upon in relation to the error of law issues, particularly the SAR response which included part of the Respondent’s GCID records. In these circumstances, and where some of the factual information overlapped with much of what was also recorded in the Court of Appeal Order, we admitted the further documents.
24. At the hearing, on behalf of the Appellant, Mr Hodgetts relied on his skeleton argument and submitted that this included arguments which were a nuance on the original grounds as opposed to being new grounds of appeal being raised. However, during the course of his submissions it became abundantly clear that there was a specific point being pursued which was outwith the grounds of appeal; namely that the First-tier Tribunal made a mistake of fact amounting to an error of law as to the period during which deprivation action was put ‘on hold’ which was actually between November 2014 and 2019, not, as found by the First-tier Tribunal, between 2009 and 2019. This was on the basis of the Respondent’s GCID entry on 21 November 2014 which says that the deprivation action was on hold then, pursuant to a policy that was only introduced around that time and there was no other evidence to suggest that matters were on hold for any other reason since the last activity by the Respondent in January 2010.
25. An oral application was made to amend the grounds of appeal and seek permission to rely on this as a new ground of appeal. When asked as to the reason for delay in making the application up to part-way through his submissions at the hearing, Mr Hodgetts referred to the current solicitors only being instructed on 12 May 2023 and the SAR response only being received on 10 July 2023; which was then relied on in the Court of Appeal. However, ultimately he submitted that it was an error not to have sought permission to amend the grounds previously, at least since the Court of Appeal Order in December 2024.
26. On behalf of the Respondent, Mr Terrell objected to the application being made so late, without good reason and without any notice to the Respondent who did not in any event accept the factual mistake alleged and would require further time to investigate whether additional evidence was available in relation to it. The matter is not one which with due diligence could not have been raised previously and there was a failure of procedural rigour in raising it so late.
27. We refused the application to amend the grounds of appeal. The application was significantly out of time, with the original grounds of appeal having been submitted on 6 May 2022, over three years previously and at the very least there was significant delay of over seven months since the Court of Appeal Order and it being clear to the parties that the appeal would be remitted to the Upper Tribunal for a de novo error of law hearing. Oversight is not a good or sufficient reason for such a lengthy delay. There was no good reason to extend time and given that it would have necessitated an adjournment of the hearing to allow the Respondent to respond, adding yet further delay, it was not in the interests of justice to do so.
28. We also refused the application as in any event there was no arguable merit to the ground proposed as the factual matrix would not fall within the test set out in Akter (appellate jurisdiction; E and R challenges) [2021] UKUT 00272 (IAC), for an error of fact to even arguably amount to an error of law. In particular we considered that the Appellant would be in difficulty on the first limb as to whether the facts could have been established before the First-tier Tribunal with reasonable diligence but would inevitably fail on the second limb as the factual error relied upon was not uncontentious or objectively verifiable. To the contrary, it was still very much in dispute, with the Respondent having set out her reasons for the delay in the decision letter and there being a lack of evidence as to the precise position up to the policy introduced in 2014. For these reasons it was a ground of appeal that had no prospect of success before the Upper Tribunal.
29. Mr Hodgett’s submissions covered in detail the history and documentary evidence available in this case and thereafter focused his submissions on two main points. First, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in paragraph 38 of its decision by making a finding as to the reason for the Respondent’s delay between 2008 and 2018 being the need to await firm judicial guidance which lacked an evidential basis; and secondly, that the decision was not in accordance with Laci which the Appellant’s appeal was factually on all fours with.
30. On the first point, Mr Hodgett referred to the First-tier Tribunal’s reliance on paragraph 12 of the Respondent’s decision letter (set out above) and noted that although every sentence in it was factually correct and not challenged by the Appellant before the First-tier Tribunal; the evidence disclosed following the SAR request showed that it was misleading by not being specific enough as to when the deprivation action was actually put on hold and for what period; given that the litigation and policy putting potential nullity cases on hold was not introduced until 2014. If that information had been available earlier, the Appellant’s case would have been put differently. In any event, the information in paragraph 12 of the Respondent’s decision was not sufficient evidence for the findings made by the First-tier Tribunal as to the delay or reasonableness of it; upon which a conclusion had been jumped to without sufficient information for the entire period.
31. On the second point, Mr Hodgett’s submissions were in essence that the Appellant’s circumstances were factually the same as those in Laci, in that there had been a significant period of delay from the first contact from the Respondent as to possible deprivation action and a decision, during which the Appellant had believed that no further action would be taken, because, for example, his wife had been granted entry clearance and he had been issued a fresh British passport in his true identity in 2014, and there had been no further contact whatsoever on the matter since late 2008. This was submitted to be relevant whether the assessment of reasonableness of delay was undertaken under the common law or under Article 8, given that the Court of Appeal in Laci referred to there being a difference in principle between them, but not likely any different outcomes in practice and that in any event, the Respondent had considered Article 8 factors in relation to the exercise of her common law discretion.
32. We noted that in practical terms there would be potentially a considerable difference between the assessment of delay under the common law, given that the First-tier Tribunal was required to apply a standard of public law review to such a decision only and the assessment of delay under an Article 8 claim (which was not pursued by the Appellant) in which the First-tier Tribunal would have to decide for itself on the merits. Mr Hodgetts submitted that either way, it can not be said, as the First-tier Tribunal did, that delay was of no relevance to the exercise of discretion or assessment of it by the First-tier Tribunal. The First-tier Tribunal’s reliance on Hysaj was misplaced on the facts, in light of the decisions in Laci and Ciceri.
33. In conclusion, Mr Hodgetts accepted that his submissions on the second point were in essence, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in failing to consider and apply the decisions in Laci and Ciceri which were available prior to the decision being promulgated (albeit through no fault of the Judge as these were not available prior to the date of decision and the parties did not draw attention to either case prior to promulgation).
34. On behalf of the Respondent, Mr Terrell resisted the appeal on all grounds and relied on his detailed skeleton argument on the points raised. Mr Terrell emphasised that the issues in the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal were ones on which public law principles of review were the applicable standard (deception not being disputed by the Appellant) and therefore it should be borne in mind what information was before the Respondent at the date of decision in March 2019. At that time, it was very little indeed as no responses to any of the correspondence from either 2008 or 2018 had been responded to by the Appellant. For example, there was no information about his family life, no indication that he had had a child, no information about his private life and crucially no information as to the Appellant’s belief or otherwise that the Respondent was not taking any further action to deprive him of his citizenship. At the time of the decision, the Appellant had not raised any points as to delay at all.
35. In light of the vacuum of information about the Appellant, the Respondent’s decision letter appropriately considers the relevant factors to the exercise of discretion and engages with what could only be speculation as to the anticipated impact of the loss of citizenship. Nothing further could be considered as nothing further had been raised or relied upon.
36. In relation to Laci, Mr Terrell cautioned against a factual comparison and focused instead on the principles from that decision. In particular, it was accepted that delay can be relevant to the public interest in deprivation; but it was emphasised that it would only be in exceptional cases that a person could overcome the use of deception to obtain citizenship. In that particular case, exceptional factors were identified upon which it was ultimately found to be open to the First-tier Tribunal to allow the appeal. That was not to say that a different conclusion could not be reached or that such facts would or would not lead to a lawful decision on deprivation. Mr Terrell did however accept that there was not much difference on the facts between the Appellant’s case and that in Laci, but emphasised what he said was a relevant distinction that this Appellant had not set out any belief that the Respondent would not take any further action after 2008 and remained relevant even if it would have been reasonable for him to hold such a belief.
37. Mr Terrell also reiterated the correct public law approach to consideration of whether there had been a failure by a public authority to take into account a relevant consideration, as set out in Friends of the Earth Ltd & Ors, R (on the application of) v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52. This identified three categories, first, where matters must be taken into account, for example because they were set out in statute; secondly, matters clearly identified by statute as considerations to which regard must not be had; and finally, matters to which the decision-maker may have regard. The present appeal could only fall within the third category, but were not matters so obviously relevant that to fail to take them into account would be contrary to the intentions of the statute, in this case, the BNA 1981. It is not arguable that delay would be such an obviously relevant factor to consider and it was not, at the time of the decision a relevant factor set out in the Respondent’s policy (although it had previously been and is currently).
38. In relation specifically to paragraph 12 of the Respondent’s decision letter, Mr Terrell submitted that it was open to the First-tier Tribunal to find as it did as to the reasons for delay based on this and absent any contrary submissions to it on the point. In any event, the timeline outlined with appeals from 2009 fits with the timeline and history set out in Hysaj with reference to the Hatton Cross cohort of appeals from that earlier date; albeit there are obviously examples of cases which were not on hold and on which decisions were made which resulted in a number of reported cases on appeal, up to and including Hysaj itself.
39. In reply, Mr Hodgetts noted that there was never any indication given to the Appellant that his case was being considered as a potential nullity (to the contrary, the first letter was expressly as to the possibility of deprivation) and there is no evidence to suggest it was ever on hold for that specific reason.
Findings and reasons
40. Although there are two grounds of appeal, both of which were broken down in to smaller parts (not all of which we heard detailed oral submissions on); in our view there is a single key issue in this appeal as to whether the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in not applying the decisions in Laci and Ciceri, which in part requires an assessment of whether that was material to the outcome.
41. In the present case, there is an unexplained delay between the Judge signing the decision on 18 May 2021 and it being promulgated nearly 7 months later on 7 February 2022. As at the date the decision was signed, we do not find it contained any error of law on the grounds advanced by the Appellant and that on the whole, the First-tier Tribunal gave clear and cogent reasons for the findings made which were open to it on both the evidence available and the law as it was understood as at that date. For the reasons that follow, it is not necessary to give more detailed reasons for our findings looking at the decision at the date it was written.
42. The First-tier Tribunal was however still formally seized of the appeal up to the date upon which it was promulgated and by which time, Laci had been handed down by the Court of Appeal (on 20 May 2021) and Ciceri was reported in the Upper Tribunal (in September 2021). It would seem unlikely that the Judge who heard the appeal and signed the decision on 18 May 2021 was aware of the subsequent delay in promulgation and nothing to indicate that the potential relevance of these cases were drawn to her attention to consider whether any further action was needed (such as to reconvene the hearing or invite written submissions) before the decision was promulgated on a much later date.
43. We therefore make no criticism of the Judge, particularly in circumstances where the parties could (and arguably should) have raised this to be considered. However, the fact that they did not does not avoid the conclusion that there was an error of law in failing to consider relevant binding authority. We would note that had the Appellant’s representatives2 dealt with this issue comprehensively at the time (including on evidence later relied upon only in proceedings before the Court of Appeal) it would likely have saved considerable time and expense, likely avoiding the need for an onward appeal to the Upper Tribunal, let alone also to the Court of Appeal.
44. The case of Laci, from which Ciceri follows on drawing together the broader position in deprivation cases following it, is in our view self evidently relevant to the facts of the present appeal, albeit not determinative of them. In Laci, the Court of Appeal made clear in paragraph 37 that: “… only exceptionally will it be right for a person who has obtained British citizenship by (in short) deception to be allowed to retain it. It my view that is entirely correct: the reason is self-evident. … the reason why such an outcome will be exceptional is that it will be unusual for a migrant to be able to mount a sufficiently compelling case to justify their retaining an advantage that they should never have obtained in the first place. The UT was right to recognise that the necessary assessment arises both as a matter of common law and (potentially) in relation to Convention rights. …”. This was reiterated in paragraph 73, that in ordinary cases, deprivation of citizenship will be the inevitable outcome of a finding that it was obtained by deceit. However, it was considered that on the exceptional facts of Laci himself, that the unexplained inaction by the Respondent for almost a decade led to it being profoundly unfair for the question to be resurrected for the first time after that long [at 74].
45. In paragraph 75 of Laci, the Court of Appeal referred to the relevance of delay as set out in EB (Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL, the third category of which may potentially apply to a case such as that considered when assessing the weight of the public interest involved.
46. Of further importance to the present appeal is paragraph 77:
“77. In any event, whether or not the Appellant’s case on delay draws significant support from EB (Kosovo), it is important to appreciate that it has never been part of the Secretary of State’s case that the FTT was wrong to attach weight to this factor. As we have seen … the UT expressly acknowledged that it was material, and that is not challenged in the Respondent’s Notice. For that reason we heard no argument on the precise way in which the delay operated to reduce the public interest in depriving the Appellant of his citizenship or otherwise weighed in his favour. The Judge appears to have regarded it as self-evident that it should do so, and in the view of the extraordinary length of the delay I see no reason to disagree. I emphasis that this is not a case of “mere” delay, during which the appellant was left in uncertainty. The strength of the Appellant’s case is that he was entitled to, and did, believe that no further action would be taken and got on with his life on the basis that his British citizenship was no longer in question. Even in the absence of any specific finding that he made important life decisions on that basis, I can see why the FTT regarded the change in the Secretary of State’s position as obviously unfair.”
47. The First-tier Tribunal in Laci had found that that appellant, also an Albanian national who falsely claimed to be a Kosovar refugee, should “exceptionally” be permitted to retain his citizenship, in circumstances that included that: (i) the falsity had come to light through his own doing, (ii) a considerable period of nearly 10 years had passed between the Secretary of State informing him that deprivation action may be taken against him, and seeking to deprive him of his citizenship; (iii) a passport had been re-issued to the appellant during that time; and (iv) the appellant had no reason to believe that the Secretary of State was pursuing deprivation action.
48. The facts of the present appeal and those in Laci are strikingly similar, but in any event as a matter of principle as to the potential relevance of delay, the case was clearly of relevance to the present appeal and should have, by the date the First-tier Tribunal decision was belatedly promulgated, have been considered within it. The Court of Appeal also highlighted why Laci was distinguishable from the case of Hysaj which the First-tier Tribunal had relied upon as similar, but which for the same reasons as given by the Court of Appeal is more likely to be distinguishable.
49. We do not need to refer in any detail to the findings in Ciceri which follow on from Laci, albeit with broader clarity on the task of the First-tier Tribunal in cases such as the present and which, if considered before promulgation, could have had a material bearing on the outcome of the appeal.
50. Finally, we have noted Mr Terrell’s submissions as to the state of information before the Respondent and to the public law review test which would need to be applied as to the decision on the basis of essentially no evidence from the Appellant at that date. These are in our view however more relevant submissions for the remaking of the appeal and are not sufficient alone to show that the application of Laci to the present appeal would not have been material to the outcome of the appeal. As we have said, we do not consider it determinative, particularly because of what is said in paragraph 77 of Laci as to the lack of argument on the precise impact of delay on the public interest, but it can not be said that for these reasons the appeal was in any event bound to fail.
51. For these reasons, we find that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in failing to take into account and apply the decisions in Laci and Ciceri (albeit for what appear to be unexplained administrative delays rather than through any fault of the Judge); such that it is necessary to set aside the decision. Having considered the relevant guidance and the evidence already available to the Upper Tribunal, the appeal is retained in the Upper Tribunal for a de novo hearing. The Appellant has already indicated an intention to pursue his appeal on Article 8 grounds (as originally filed albeit abandoned by the date of first hearing), which is open to him to do on a de novo remake. Directions for the remaking hearing are set out below. The parties should notify the Upper Tribunal at the earliest time if there is any disagreement with the time estimate or if any further directions are required.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is necessary to set aside the decision.
We set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
Directions
1. The appeal to be relisted on the first available date after 15 September 2025 before UTJ Jackson for a face-to-face hearing at Field House, with a time estimate of 3 hours. An Albanian interpreter is required for the hearing.
2. Any further evidence upon which the Appellant wishes to rely must be filed and served no later than 14 days before the relisted hearing. The Appellant’s written statement dated 16 July 2025 will stand as his evidence in chief. If any other person intends to give oral evidence at the hearing, a written statement (or updated written statement) is required to stand as their evidence in chief.
3. Any further evidence upon which the Respondent wishes to rely must be filed and served no later than 7 days before the relisted hearing.
4. The parties are at liberty to, but are not required to, file and serve a skeleton argument no later than 3 days before the relisted hearing.


G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7th August 2025