UI-2022-002023

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 1 May 2025
• Promulgation date: 24 Oct 2025
• Publication date: 10 Nov 2025
• Last updated on: 10 Nov 2025

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2022-002023

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/09201/2017


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 October 2025


Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CANAVAN


Between

N Z N
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R. Jesurum, instructed by Duncan Lewis Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr N. Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 01 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity because the case involves the consideration of welfare issues in relation to a number of children. I make clear that the order is not made to protect the appellant’s reputation following his convictions for criminal offences. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or his family members. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Upper Tribunal has been conscious of, and apologises for, the delay in issuing this decision. There has been an unavoidable delay in preparing some decisions due to personal circumstances arising from a bereavement which occurred shortly before this appeal was reheard. It is a complex case which required detailed consideration of the evidence given that it involves the assessment of the welfare of a number of children and the decision is important to the family as a whole. Also, it is the fourth time a decision has been made in relation to this appeal, so the decision needed to be comprehensive. The Upper Tribunal has referred to the recording of the hearing as well as its detailed contemporaneous note before finalising the decision.
BACKGROUND
2. For a series of different reasons, the deportation proceedings in this case have been ongoing for several years. It is not necessary to set out the long procedural history in detail. It is known to the parties. A relatively brief summary of the background should suffice.
3. On 10 May 2016 the appellant was convicted of possession with intent to supply Class A and B drugs for which he was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment. On 05 December 2016 the respondent issued a notice of decision to make an automatic deportation order (Stage 1) in accordance with section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (‘UKBA 2007’). The appellant made submissions to the respondent as to why he should not be deported.
4. On 07 February 2017 the respondent made a decision to refuse a human rights claim and issued a signed deportation order (Stage 2). The human rights claim initially was certified with reference to section 94B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘NIAA 2002’) (removal pending outcome of appeal). Following an application for judicial review, the respondent agreed to withdraw the decision in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in R (Kiarie & Byndloss) v SSHD [2017] UKSC 42. On 10 August 2017 the respondent made a fresh decision to refuse a human rights claim. The decision attracted a right of appeal under section 82 NIAA 2002. That decision is the subject of this appeal.
5. It is unclear why it then took so long to hear the appeal in the First-tier Tribunal. The supplementary decision letter refers to the appeal being dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal for the first time on 22 July 2019. It not clear whether the Upper Tribunal set aside that decision although it is reasonable to infer that did if a subsequent decision was made. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal again on 01 May 2020. No copies of those decisions appear to be included in the bundle. The 2020 decision was set aside by the Upper Tribunal and the case was remitted for a fresh hearing. A First-Tier Tribunal judge remade the decision and allowed the appeal in a decision sent on 31 December 2021. The Upper Tribunal found that the decision involved the making of an error of law in a decision sent on 15 November 2022 (annexed).
6. The lengthy delay in remaking the decision in the Upper Tribunal resulted from adjournment applications made by both parties. The appellant did not appear for a substantive hearing listed on 21 June 2023. At that point it became apparent that he was on remand awaiting trial for further offences. Another delay was warranted to await the outcome of the trial. It was not an effective use of court time or public resources to determine the appeal without knowing whether the appellant would be convicted of further offences or not.
7. On 06 November 2023 the appellant was convicted of possession with intent to supply Class A drugs. This time he was sentenced to a period of 51 months’ imprisonment (4 years 3 months). The appeal paused again while the appellant made further representations and the respondent prepared a supplementary decision letter dated 02 May 2024.
8. Further requests were made for time to prepare fresh evidence in relation to some of the children who would be affected by the decision. Two case management hearings took place in mid-2024. Some further obstacles arose in finding an accessible hearing room for the substantive hearing given the appellant was serving a custodial sentence and at least one witness had disabilities that made the usual hearing venue in the Royal Courts of Justice difficult to access. The appellant’s representatives made another application to adjourn the substantive hearing listed in February 2025 to obtain further evidence relating to one of the children. This was granted by the duty judge.
9. By the time the appeal was listed for a final hearing on 01 May 2025 the appellant had been released from prison on licence. The appellant, his adult daughter (‘A’), her mother (‘PH’), the appellant’s sister (‘NN’), and his current partner (‘IA’) gave evidence. Oral submissions were made on behalf of both parties. The content of the evidence and submissions is a matter of record and is known to the parties. It does not need to be set out in any detail here. I will refer to any relevant aspects of the evidence or legal arguments during the course of my decision. The Upper Tribunal has also considered the consolidated trial bundle of 770 pages and has access to the evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal in 2021. Given the volume of evidence, it is not possible to set out the content of each and every document, but the essential aspects of the evidence will be outlined where necessary.
DECISION AND REASONS
Findings of fact
Immigration history
10. The appellant is 44 year old Jamaican citizen. He was born in Jamaica but says that he lived in the island of Sint Maarten from infancy (an autonomous country in the Caribbean which is part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands). The appellant says that he first entered the UK in December 1998 when he was 17 years old, although slightly varying dates have been given in different pieces of evidence. He says that he entered with his mother, who is a Dutch citizen. It is unclear whether she entered the UK with rights of free movement under the EU Treaties. Despite his mother’s nationality, there is no evidence to indicate that the appellant was entitled to European citizenship or previously had a right of residence under EU law. The appellant does not pursue any arguments on this basis.
11. The appeal proceeds on the basis that there is no evidence to show that the appellant has ever had lawful leave to remain or any other right of residence in the UK. Even if he had not been convicted of criminal offences, the appellant would be liable to removal from the UK. Perhaps because there is no evidence of lawful residence or of any significant ties to the UK beyond the fact of his family life here, the appellant did not seek to rely on any arguments relating to his private life.
12. The appellant’s witness statement from 2021 does not provide a detailed account of how he has spent his time in the UK. Some information can be gleaned from the children’s birth certificates, which variously describe the appellant as a painter and decorator or a mechanic and from a Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) prepared in November 2016. Beyond that, there is very little information about the appellant’s private life in the UK. For this reason, the appellant’s case is focussed solely on the impact that deportation is likely to have on his family members. In particular, the 10 children who are likely to be affected by the decision, of whom 7 are still under 18 years old.
13. Despite the significance of a further conviction, and directions made by the Upper Tribunal, the appellant did not prepare an up to date witness statement for the hearing. The numbers and whereabouts of other members of the family are unclear. However, in oral evidence the appellant mentioned that his mother, 2 sisters, and 2 brothers live in the UK. Another brother lives in Sint Maarten. The PSR from 2016 recorded that the appellant had 8 siblings with whom he maintained regular contact. At the hearing the appellant said that he was one of 6 siblings. The PSR also noted that the appellant’s oldest son lived in Jamaica. The appellant’s father is mentioned in various reports, but it seems that no information has been provided in relation to him. The wider family circumstances are simply unclear.
14. I cannot rule out the possibility that the appellant might have more connections to Jamaica than he claims, but for the purpose of this decision I will accept the evidence of his family members that they spent most of their childhood in Sint Maarten. Although the appellant has not lived in Jamaica for any length of time, no meaningful case has been formulated, nor any evidence produced, to suggest that his return there would in itself amount to a breach of his human rights. The evidence shows that he has grown up in a Jamaican family and is likely to have connections with the Jamaican community in the UK. His partner was also born to Jamaican parents. It is likely that he is at least familiar with Jamaican culture. The evidence suggests that he is likely to have some practical skills that would enable him to find work. The appellant might also benefit from support and assistance from family members in the UK.
Criminal history and risk assessments
Convictions 2007-2016
15. The most up to date record of the appellant’s antecedents is contained in a print out from the Police National Computer (PNC) from 08 May 2024. This records miscellaneous offences from 05 June 2007 for possession of cannabis, driving a vehicle without a licence and while uninsured, and failing to stop when required to do so. The offences attracted a conditional discharge, a fine, and a 6 month disqualification. The appellant received further convictions for possession of Class A (cocaine) and B (cannabis) drugs on 20 January 2013 and for possession of cannabis on 11 February 2016. These were dealt with by way of fines, forfeiture, and destruction. The offences can be described as relatively minor and none attracted a custodial sentence.
Convictions 2016
16. The index offences which triggered a decision to make an automatic deportation order also related to drug offences. On 18 November 2016 the appellant was convicted of possession with intent to supply Class A (cocaine/heroin) and Class B (cannabis) drugs. He was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment.
17. The short format PSR prepared in November 2016 described the offences. On 14 April 2015 a large quantity of Class A and B drugs were found in a vehicle that the appellant was driving, including heroin, crack cocaine, and cannabis. A search was conducted at the appellant’s home address and ‘a large bag of cannabis was found, along with a quantity of self seal bags, digital scales and £640 in cash’. At the date when the appellant was interviewed for the report on 09 November 2016 i.e. shortly before sentencing, he claimed that the drugs were bought in bulk for ‘social supply’ among friends. The appellant said that he had used cannabis since he was about 14-15 years old and cocaine since he was 15-16 years old. He also purchased the heroin for his own use and intended to share it at a party. The probation officer queried the credibility of his claim that he was not selling drugs for money. The PSR went on to say that the appellant showed a good understanding of the negative impact that drugs could have on individuals and families. He expressed remorse for the offences. There was some evidence to indicate that the appellant had taken positive steps to address his drug use through voluntary engagement with drug agencies. He claimed that he no longer used cocaine or heroin and had reduced his cannabis use. Although he admitted to a problem with alcohol misuse in the past, following the death of a friend, he claimed that he had stopped drinking in excess 7 months previously and ‘now only drinks Guinness.’
18. The family history recorded in the PSR said that the appellant was raised by both parents in Jamaica. He described a good upbringing and a positive relationship with his parents and siblings. He told the probation officer that he came to the UK in 1999. All but two of his siblings also lived in the UK. He described having been in long-term relationships in the past but was single at that date. The PSR recorded that the appellant had 8 children and 2 step-children. His eldest son lived in Jamaica and the other children lived with their mothers. He had regular contact with the children.
19. The PSR recorded that the appellant attended secondary school in Jamaica. There is no mention of Sint Maarten, but it is possible that this might have been an assumption on the part of the probation officer based on the appellant’s nationality. The appellant left school when he was 14 years old without any qualifications. In November 2016 it was said that he lived alone in a flat rented in his brother’s name. He worked cash in hand and also received some financial assistance from his siblings. It is clear from the PSR that the appellant was aware of the fact that he was remaining in the UK without leave to remain. A check with the Home Office revealed that he was liable to removal and had made no attempt to regularise his immigration status.
20. The PSR concluded that there was a pattern of offending in relation to possession of drugs since 2007 and also referred to cautions as far back as 2002 and 2005. However, this was the first time that the appellant had been convicted for possession with intent to supply. The risk assessment indicated a ‘low to medium risk’ of the appellant engaging in further general offending behaviour within the next 2 years. The probation officer’s assessment was that the likelihood of committing offences relating to cannabis, in particular, was ‘high’. The report acknowledged that the custody threshold was crossed.
21. The judge’s sentencing remarks indicate that the appellant pleaded guilty, but at a late stage after a trial date was set. The judge considered the appellant to be a ‘low-level’ street dealer. The sentencing remarks referred to the appellant having no immigration status or permission to work. The suggestion was that he had worked cash in hand previously and that at least one motivation for the offence was for financial advantage. The judge took into account the fact that he had a number of children in the UK but ‘had not done anything, by the looks of it, about it.’ It is reasonable to infer that the judge was referring to the appellant’s lack of action in seeking to regularise his immigration status despite the number of children that he had in the UK.

Convictions 2018
22. Further convictions for drugs offences are recorded in the PNC on 22 August 2018. On this occasion the appellant was convicted for possession of Class A (cocaine) and Class B (cannabis) drugs, assaulting a constable, and failing to surrender to custody. He received a sentence of 12 weeks’ imprisonment suspended for 12 months. It is notable that these convictions, albeit relating to possession, continued to show a pattern of drug use, at the very least, despite the assurances given during the PSR process in 2016. It is also notable that these convictions occurred after a deportation order had been signed during a period when the appellant knew that he was liable to removal. In other words, the threat of deportation appeared to have no effect on the appellant in terms of further offending, which took place within 2 years as assessed by the probation officer who prepared the PSR.
OASys assessment 2020
23. There is an incomplete copy of an OASys assessment dated 16 January 2020 in the bundle. It begins on pg.24 of 42 of the assessment. A complete copy of the report was filed by the respondent at an earlier stage in the proceedings, but that copy is virtually unreadable given that every other page is upside down.
24. It is unclear why an OASys assessment was prepared in January 2020, at a time when the suspended sentence period had expired. The PNC record does not indicate any further offences during the suspension period. The first page of the report states that the reason for the assessment was ‘Start of Suspended Sentence Order’. The page relating to the ‘offence details’ refers to the incident that took place on 06 June 2018 when the appellant assaulted a constable (by biting) during an arrest. The appellant was searched. A large bag of cannabis, smaller bags of cannabis, a small bag of crack cocaine, and 4 phones were found.
25. The OASys assessment recorded the level of risk of serious harm to the public as ‘medium’ in the community, but ‘low’ in all other respects. The OGRS3 (Offender Group Reconvictions Scale) probability of proven reoffending within 2 years was assessed as 57% ‘medium’ and the OGP (Offender General Predictor) probability of non-violent reoffending within 2 years was assessed as 48% ‘medium’. The OVP (Offender Violence Predictor) probability of violent offending was assessed to be ‘low’. In relation to his capacity to change, the report noted that the appellant was ‘quite motivated’ However, it also noted that he lacked insight into how his behaviour affected others. He tended to focus on how the offence affected him and his immigration status. The assessor considered that his use of drugs might also inhibit his ability to change.
26. The First-tier Tribunal Judge who heard the appeal in December 2021, considered the evidence relating to rehabilitation that was before him at the time. He recorded that the appellant said ‘that he is now a reformed character and has promised himself and his children that he will never get involved in any further criminal behaviour.’ At the date of that hearing, the appellant attributed his behaviour ‘to his associates and financial concerns as he was not permitted to work.’
Convictions 2023
27. Although the appeal was initially successful before First-tier Tribunal at the end of 2021, the Upper Tribunal set aside the decision because the judge failed to give adequate reasons and did not apply the relevant legal framework. By December 2022 the appellant would have known that a fresh hearing would be needed and that his immigration status was still precarious. Despite the ongoing deportation proceedings, and despite his previous claim of rehabilitation, the appellant was arrested again on 18 May 2023. The evidence indicates that it was likely to be an intelligence led arrest at his home address where he lived with his partner, IA, and their children.
28. The PNC records that the appellant was convicted of possession with intent to supply Class A (heroin/cocaine) and Class B (cannabis) drugs. The judge’s sentencing remarks provide some detail about the nature of the offence. The judge said that it was clear from the quantities of drugs and cash and other items recovered from his home that he was ‘plainly in charge of a central operational function in what appears to be a vibrant drugs supply business.’ He also found that it was evident from the quantity of cash and drugs found that the appellant was active in a chain rather than dealing on his own behalf and ‘must have been a trusted and significant member of that operation.’
29. Importantly, the judge found that it was an aggravating factor that the appellant had drugs and other items in the home which he shared with his partner and children. Indeed, ‘two young children were present at the time you had drugs in the bag on the kitchen table’. The fact that he had a previous conviction for drugs supply was also an aggravating factor albeit it was from 2016. The judge gave credit to the appellant for steps that he had taken in custody to address substance misuse, which was a factor in the offence. However, the judge made clear that he did not accept that the appellant was dealing ‘simply to maintain your own habit.’ Again, some credit was given for a late guilty plea. This time, the appellant was given a much longer sentence of 51 months’ imprisonment (4 years 3 months).
30. In relation to the most recent offence, the appellant has produced a letter from Phoenix Futures dated 22 May 2024. Phoenix Futures is an intervention service working in the prison. The letter confirmed that the appellant had been actively working with the team. He had completed a number of ‘in cell packs’. No explanation is provided as to what these packs were, but it is reasonable to infer from the description that it was likely to be self-guided learning. The appellant completed work relating to Harm Reduction, Triggers & Craving, Relapse Prevention, Emotions and Feelings, Building confidence and self-esteem, Stress Management, Cocaine and Crack, Heroin and Overdose, and Cannabis Awareness. He had also completed ‘Keywork and Brief Intervention sessions around substance misuse.’
OASys assessment 2024
31. A further OASys assessment is dated 20 September 2024. It records the appellant’s conditional release date as 04 July 2025. The licence expiry date is recorded as 19 August 2027. A copy of the appellant’s licence shows that he was released on 30 January 2025.
32. The OASys assessment summarised the details of the offence, including the fact that the appellant claimed to the police that the drugs were for his own use. There was no known direct victim, but the assessment recorded that members of the public were victims because of potential psychological harm and the financial impact on society. Children were often victims of drug dealing through county lines or witnessing drug dealing in their homes. There was also the possible risk of overdose for anyone using drugs. Again, the motivation for the offence was recorded as financial gain because the appellant was ‘unable to work or claim benefits due to his immigration status.’ Again, the appellant assured the assessor that he would ‘not be selling drugs in the future as he understands the significance of the overall effect on the community and that selling drugs can cause widespread harm.’ It was recorded that he accepted ‘full responsibility’.
33. The assessment also recorded that the appellant believed that he suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). No information is noted to say why the appellant thought this. Nor was any evidence produced by the appellant for the hearing, either in the form of witness evidence or expert evidence, to support this statement. The OASys assessment went on to note that the offence formed part of an established pattern of similar offending.
34. Possible release addresses were to his mother’s or sister’s addresses Kent. The accommodation section of the report noted that there were no domestic violence concerns recorded at either address. No mention is made of his partner’s address in London where the children lived. At the end of that section, the assessor seems to have incorrectly recorded that the appellant was ‘originally from Jamaica however he has a Dutch passport’.
35. In the section relating to education and training the assessment goes on to record that the appellant had worked as a mechanic in the past. The appellant had disclosed that he had ‘some issues with reading and writing.’ Again, there is some inaccuracy in the record of the appellant’s immigration history because the assessor recorded that ‘Immigration… have suspended his indefinite leave to remain. He is now prohibited from working or claiming benefits.’ This section of the report went on to say that the appellant had a ‘can do approach to work and skills in the prison.’ His offending behaviour was driven by a ‘lack of education and employment opportunities which stems from his vulnerable immigration status.’
36. The next section deals with relationships. The OASys assessment recorded no problems in childhood or with close family members. He was in a relationship with a partner but they were not living together (it is unclear whether this refers to the fact that he was in prison). Section 6.7 asked if there was evidence of current or previous domestic abuse, which is checked ‘yes’ in relation to a current or former partner. The notes simply refer to a ‘past domestic abuse history in 2011, as documented in the SARA at that time.’ This is likely to be a reference to a Spousal Assault Risk Assessment (SARA). No further details are given. Again, there is an inaccurate reference to the appellant holding a Dutch passport, but this seems to have stemmed from a misunderstanding by the assessor of the appellant’s account of having moved to the ‘Netherlands Antilles’ as a child.
37. The assessment then goes on to consider lifestyle and associates. Here the assessor notes that the appellant had a pattern of offending behaviour because he uses and buys drugs. He is likely to be influenced by others. Given his regular activities, and his already stretched financial situation, ‘it would be easy for him to be influenced to offend so that he could afford his own drugs and an additional income.’ His actions were considered to be reckless given that he is a father and was in an unstable situation regarding his immigration status. The assessor queried whether the appellant’s claim to use Class A drugs was used to explain why he was in possession of those drugs. He admitted to smoking cannabis but claimed that it was only at the weekends.
38. In relation to thinking and behavioural issues, the assessor noted that the appellant ‘has some deficits with his thinking and behaviour as he repeats the same mistakes and that it appears he does not learn from them.’ The assessor went on to note that the family was in a precarious situation ‘with few options to support themselves’. It is unclear whether the assessor was aware of the fact that IA and the children have access to state support if needed. The notes then said that the appellant used drug dealing as a way to support himself ‘which has had a negative impact on him and his family.’ He did not think about the impact on his ability to be a parent. The assessment recorded that he kept in touch with the children. The appellant reported to the assessor that he takes his family to church every Sunday and that he reads the bible every day in prison.
39. The section relating to the Risk of Serious Harm asked whether the appellant’s behaviour and circumstances have a negative impact on a child’s wellbeing. The assessment recorded ‘yes’ in relation to identifiable children (‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘J’ and ‘K’: see family genogram below). In the summary of the conclusions relating to the risk of serious harm at section R10, the assessment identified potential risks to the general public, known adults, the 7 children, and himself.
40. The nature of the risk included physical risks. ‘Children at home that witness drug use and drugs for sale could inadvertently swallow a tablet they have found, or might feel scared to be around something they know is inherently wrong.’ The appellant was assessed to be a direct risk to known adults and children. The nature of the risk included psychological harm through witnessing drug paraphernalia in the home. The notes went on to say: ‘This is likely to have a long lasting and detrimental impact and may cause them to feel unsafe. The risk of inadvertent physical harm cannot be understated due to debts and rival drug sellers.’ The risk was likely to be at its greatest on release if the appellant started to deal drugs because it ‘could bring dealers and drug debt collectors to his home which could harm his children.’ This section concluded by recording that the appellant considered himself to be a family man who tried to be a good person and to be ‘responsible for his children and respectable to others.’ It was said that his faith was important to him. If he was able to work he would be able to desist from crime.
41. In relation to planning and supervision, the OASys assessment noted that the appellant would not reside with his children on release. If the appellant did start to reside with the children, it was considered that a referral would need to be made to the local MASH (Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub).
42. As to static risk factors, the OGRS3 probability of proven reoffending within 2 years was 49% ‘low’. The OGP assessment of static and dynamic risk factors, which take into account the appellant’s personal circumstances, recorded that the probability of proven non-violent reoffending within 2 years was 39% ‘medium’. The OVP assessment of static and dynamic factors recorded that the risk of reoffending was 14% within 2 years, which was said to be ‘low’. The likelihood of serious harm to others was assessed to be ‘medium’ in relation to the appellant’s children and to the public.
Licence and supervision
43. The length of the sentence means that the appellant will be on licence until 19 August 2027 following his release from prison i.e. at least 2 years. The fact that he would be under supervision during that period is likely to act as a protective measure.
44. The evidence shows that the appellant’s supervision on licence began on 30 January 2025. He was granted immigration bail on the same date, subject to an electronic monitoring condition and a weekly reporting requirement. The terms of his licence conditions were that he resides at an address approved by his supervising probation officer. The licence did not specify an address, but the appellant said he is living at his sister’s address in Kent.
45. Although the appellant said that he must report to a supervising officer. There is no evidence from that officer to confirm whether the appellant had complied with the conditions of his licence in the 3 months since his release from prison. Nor is there any up to date evidence from his supervisor as to what work, if any, was being done in terms of rehabilitation.
Children’s Services assessments 2023-2024
46. The safeguarding concerns relating to the risks that the appellant’s criminal behaviour posed to his children, which were highlighted in the OASys assessment dated 20 September 2020, echoed an earlier multi-agency referral to discuss concerns arising from the appellant’s arrest. A CYPS Single Assessment was produced by Children’s Services with the involvement of the local MASH team in June 2023.
47. Concerns were expressed about the fact that a large amount of drugs were found in the family home. There were also concerns that the mother claimed that a taser found in the home belonged to her. The mother was likely to be aware of the fact that there were drugs in the home, which raised concerns as to whether she would be a protective factor for the children. There was a history of other warrants being executed at the address in relation to an adult sibling who was arrested for a violent robbery. The appellant told me that this was a reference to his partner’s child ‘B’ who is currently serving a 6 year sentence for robbery. There were concerns that the children were at risk of neglect ‘due to their parents decision making and lifestyle’.
48. The CYPS assessment noted that the family had a long history with more than one social services department. There were previous concerns with an adult sibling being linked to gangs, the children having poor attendance at school, poor home conditions, domestic abuse, and substance misuse. An elder sibling disclosed that ‘the family was linked to organised crime’. The assessor spoke to the children during a visit to the family home. They were observed to be sad that their father was no longer in the home. The assessor noted that the children seemed to share a close, warm and loving relationship with their mother and that they missed their father.
49. In assessing parenting capacity the assessor noted that the children’s basic needs were being met. The household was observed to be relatively tidy although the assessor took into account the fact that this was a planned visit. The safety and protection of the children was identified as an area of concern. During the father’s arrest the police found large quantities of Class A drugs in plain view of the children. The children’s exposure to substance misuse and sale of drugs was ‘likely to cause the children significant physical and emotional harm’. Access to substances may demonstrate an unsafe home environment for the children which could place them at risk. Potential adult intoxication may also impede an adult’s ability to respond appropriately to the potential risk and the children’s needs.
50. The CYPS assessment went on to describe some initial resistance from IA who said that she was no longer willing to co-operate despite the social workers raising concerns about the safety of the children with drugs in the house. However, 2 days later IA rang the social workers to apologise. The rest of the evidence, including other evidence from 2024 from the Allocated Social Worker (ASW), suggests that IA is likely to have co-operated with social services since then.
51. The CYPS assessment then set out a summary of the family’s social care history. In June 2012 the children were made subject to a Child Protection Plan in a north London borough due to concerns around domestic abuse and the impact that it was having on B’s behaviour. The case was closed in November 2013. In November 2017 there was a referral from the Probation Service prior to the appellant’s release from prison in relation to the 2016 offence. No further action was taken. In May 2018 there was a referral from North Middlesex Hospital Safeguarding midwife with concerns about erratic antenatal care and IA’s use of cannabis. The baby, ‘J’, tested positive for cannabis. Other referrals in February 2019 mentioned the appellant being abusive towards staff in the North Middlesex Hospital after one of the children was admitted for sepsis. In January 2020 concerns were reported about B being threatened and targeted by a group of boys affiliated with a gang. It appears that the problems with B being targeted eventually led to the family being rehoused in another borough.
52. The CYPS assessment went on to note that IA had previous criminal convictions dating back to 2000 including possession with intent to supply Class A drugs for which she was sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment and another conviction with a suspended sentence for having a bladed article. Since 2009, no further convictions were recorded against IA. The social workers considered this information to be historic and it was not a current concern for the wellbeing of the children. In September 2020 a referral was received from the primary school that 4 of the children attended due to concerns that the family were not being appropriately supported by professionals and as a result the children were out of education and living in poor home conditions. At that time social services found that the concerns surrounding domestic abuse were not substantiated. IA accepted that she used cannabis. Although this was a concern there was no evidence to show that her cannabis use had detrimentally affected her parenting capacity. IA expressed a wish to stop using cannabis. Records showed that she engaged with ante-natal services and no concerns were reported pre or post birth in respect of the youngest child ‘K’.
53. The summary of the social care history went on to note that in December 2022 the police executed a warrant at the family home to arrest B. It was reported that the appellant’s behaviour ‘woke up the entire household’. The home was reported to be ‘severely unkempt’ and ‘in disarray’. It was reported that IA could not remember the names of the children when asked. At the date the CYPS assessment was prepared in 2023 the family were occupying a private rented property which was observed to be clean and well organised during home visits. The family was reported to be in receipt of ‘the relevant benefits’.
54. A series of concerns arose from the assessment. Social services were worried that the children’s prolonged exposure to parental drug use may normalise drug use/selling to the children. They were worried that the children were at risk of child criminal and sexual exploitation. They were concerned that the parents had not been open and honest with professionals. It was still unclear who visited the home and there were concerns about the parents’ lifestyle choices and the risks to the children associated with drugs being in the home. There were question marks relating to the parents’ emotional availability due to drug use. On the other side, the children presented as resilient, were clean and well presented, and were attending school. The report concluded as follows:
‘It is clear the children are living in a home where they are exposed to criminal activity and potential associates of the adults who are also involved in crime and are a risk to the children. It is likely that [IA] was aware of the drugs stored in the home which raises concerns that she may not be a protective factor for the children. The children are at risk of neglect due to their parents’ decision making and lifestyle. It is a worry that drugs [were] found in easy access to the children which could have resulted in anything from serious injury or death.
Whilst the children appear to be very well cared for, it is likely that the children have been exposed to the parental drug use and have come to normalise this. Given that this is the second time that the family come to the attention of … Children Services within a space of 5 months it is my view that the children should be subject to a Child Protection Plan under the category of Neglect.’
55. Safeguarding concerns relating to the children were raised in the CYPS assessment dated 14 June 2023. Similar concerns relating to potential risks to the children arising from the appellant’s criminality surrounding the use and sale of drugs were raised in the OASys assessment dated 20 September 2024. Safeguarding is an important issue in this case.
56. To this end, some evidence was produced at an earlier stage of the case management process from the family’s ASW, Mr Moses Mwesigwa. The ASW answered a series of questions from the appellant’s solicitor in an email dated 12 April 2024. This was nearly a year after the CYPS assessment at a stage when the appellant was in prison. The ASW said that there had been progress in providing support to the children. The children would be stepped from a Child Protection Plan to a Child In Need Plan. The ASW said that no concerns had come to the attention of Children’s Services relating to the appellant’s contact with his children while he was in prison. The children had spoken positively of contact with their father and had said that they missed him a lot. The ASW said that it is likely to be in the best interests of the children to continue to have contact with their father.
57. The ASW was asked whether there would be any concerns relating to contact once the appellant was released from prison. In response to this question the ASW said that due to the serious nature of the crime it was expected that Children’s Services would be contacted by the Probation Service with an update. It was likely that there would be ‘a joint risk assessment and safety plan’ prior to his release from prison. Children’s Services would want to satisfy itself that there is no repeat of ‘drugs related and other risks’ to the children when the appellant was released. The evidence of the ASW is consistent with the OASys assessment, which recommended that a referral would need to be made to MASH before considering whether the appellant could return to the family home.
58. A later email dated 26 July 2024 from the same ASW said that the children continued to ‘miss their father terribly’. His absence is a significant factor in his children’s daily emotional, behavioural and physical presentation. The children seemed to be in a constant state of worry and helplessness. However, he also said that those needs can be met by services from other agencies including Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS). CAMHS had made initial contact with the family. The family had also been referred to Thriving Communities, a service that provides interventions that could address issues around negative behaviour in schools, provide support for the children, and address risks relating to potential child criminal exploitation. The family and other agencies were prepared for case closure. The ASW said that IA had been ‘exceptional’ in working with various services to address the risk. At the date of this email, the appellant was still in prison albeit it was said that he had been involved in continuing to encourage his children to do well in school, to engage with services, and to listen to their mother.
59. Despite the assessments relating to the risk of reoffending and the associated risks to the children done by Children’s Services in 2023 and the Probation Service in 2024, the appellant did not produce any up to date evidence from either of those services. It is clear from the last OASys assessment and the email correspondence from the ASW that a joint risk assessment was likely to be needed when the appellant was released from prison. It is notable that no evidence has been produced from the appellant’s supervising probation officer or from the ASW since his release from prison.
60. The evidence also includes reports prepared by Independent Social Workers (ISW) instructed by the appellant’s solicitors. The first is a report of Peter Harrocks dated 20 September 2021 i.e. before the most recent conviction. The second is a report of Tahera Khan dated 25 March 2024 i.e. after the most recent conviction and after the CYPS assessment but before the most recent OASys assessment. Despite the fact that safeguarding is a key issue that all social workers have a duty to consider in assessing the welfare of a child, neither report engages with any potential risk arising from the appellant’s criminal behaviour. For this reason, I will consider those reports in more detail when I move on to assess the impact that deportation is likely to have on the appellant’s children.
Witness evidence relating to rehabilitation
61. In respect of the witness evidence relating to rehabilitation, it is notable that the appellant was the only witness who did not prepare an up to date statement for the hearing. No explanation was offered for this failure. As a result, there was no detailed evidence from the appellant, and none was called, to explain how or why he came to reoffend despite the previous assurances given to the First-tier Tribunal judge and the fact that he was well aware that his position in the UK was precarious due to the ongoing deportation proceedings.
62. It is difficult for the appellant to argue that the fact that he completed some self-learning in prison is likely to make any difference to the likelihood of reoffending when he completed similar courses when he was sent to prison in 2016. The fact that he was convicted of further drugs offences in 2018 and then again in 2023 indicates a continued pattern of offending in relation to the use and sale of drugs. When asked about this in cross-examination the appellant said that he accepted his ‘mistakes’. He told me that he now realised how his mistakes have affected his children. He said that he was ‘ready to make that change.’ He has given those assurances on previous occasions.
63. During the hearing the appellant repeatedly emphasised that he has become more focussed on his religious faith during the last period of imprisonment. This was something that he also mentioned to the probation officer who conducted the OASys assessment. His daughter mentioned her own faith during the course of her evidence and said that she felt more able to talk to her father about Christianity. Aside from this, there was no other evidence from the prison or from the appellant’s church relating to his attendance or activities. The appellant mentioned that he had been volunteering for the church with his mum. Despite having attended at least one earlier hearing, the appellant’s mother did not attend or give evidence to support the appellant’s account (beyond a brief letter said to have been written in 2016).
64. Even if the appellant has become more devout since his last period of imprisonment there is no evidence to suggest that this is likely to have any significant bearing on the likelihood of reoffending. The appellant’s previous assurances that he was ready to change and that he understood the impact of his offending behaviour did not lead to any real change in practice. Indeed, there was an escalation in the seriousness of his offending behaviour. In the absence of any meaningful evidence of rehabilitation from independent sources, the appellant’s oral assurances are not persuasive.
65. I have spoken to the appellant on a number of occasions during the case management process and at the final hearing. He is an affable person who is pleasant to talk to. He gave the impression of wanting to be open about his ‘mistakes’. However, the responses that he gave were very similar to the assurances given to the First-tier Tribunal judge in 2021, which turned out to be hollow. Despite the appearance of openness when discussing offending and rehabilitation with probation officers, the evidence discloses a pattern of repeated offending relating to the use and sale of drugs spanning a long period of time. The appellant continues to make the same mistakes despite the threat of deportation, despite repeated assurances of reform, and despite his claim that he understands the effects that his offending behaviour has on his children. The last OASys assessment observed that he might have difficulty in learning from his mistakes. That is borne out by the evidence.
66. When the appellant was questioned in more detail about the potential risks to the children expressed in the CYPS assessment and the last OASys assessment, his answers suggested elements of denial and only superficial insight into the risks that use and sale of drugs in the family home might pose to his children. The appellant was defensive when it was put to him in cross-examination that the evidence indicated that his behaviour might present a safeguarding risk to the children. He said that ‘those people do not know what they are saying.’ When I asked him to help me understand how the situation might present a risk to his children the appellant told me that ‘there were drugs in the house and stuff like that’. The appellant said that he understood the impact that the use and sale of drugs might have on his children on a previous occasion but went on to continue to offend, this time in a more serious manner.
67. In so far as IA’s evidence touched on the issue of rehabilitation and safeguarding issues relating to the children, she told me that she was angry when the appellant was arrested with drugs in the house in May 2023. When asked whether she had noticed any differences in the appellant since he was released from prison on this occasion, IA said that his relationship with the children remained the same, but he now had a greater ‘connection with his religion.’
68. IA told me that she had not spoken to Children’s Services since the appellant’s release from prison. The last time she spoke to the ASW was when ‘he discharged me’ in May or June 2024. This was broadly consistent with an email from Mr Mwesigwa dated 26 July 2024 saying that the case was preparing for closure due to the excellent work that IA had done with relevant services to reduce the risk to the children. At this point, the appellant was still in prison. IA said that the ASW said that they would do a check when the appellant came out of prison, but nothing had been done. The appellant told me that he last spoke with Mr Mwesigwa in January 2025, but IA said that she did not know anything about that. To this extent there were inconsistencies in the evidence as to whether there has been any further input or risk assessment from Children’s Services at the time when the appellant was due to be released. IA said that she had spoken to the probation officer, but not further information about the conversation was offered or elicited from the witness during cross-examination.
69. In general, IA gave her evidence in an open way. However, I find that there were elements of denial as to whether she had knowledge that the appellant had significant amounts of drugs in the house. The social care history outlined in the CYPS assessment indicates that she also has a history of drug use. At times she has not co-operated with services that sought to support the family in safeguarding the children. In 2020 it was recorded that IA expressed a wish to stop using cannabis, but when B was arrested in 2022 IA was reported to not even remember the names of the children when asked, which might suggest continued drug use.
70. Unfortunately, the family history indicates that there have been sufficient concerns about the welfare of the children for several referrals to be made to Children’s Services during the course of the last 10 years. The CYPS assessment completed in 2023 found that the children were cared for at that time, but the concerns arising from that assessment related to the lifestyle and choices of both parents, which placed the children at risk of harm. At that time, there were concerns that the parents had not been open and honest with professionals. It was not thought plausible that IA did not know about the drugs on the premises. Indeed, one of the reasons why the children were made the subject of a Child Protection Plan was because there were concerns over their mother’s ability to safeguard the children.
71. I formed the same view of the evidence given by the appellant and IA at the hearing. Due to the level of assessment and support required by Children’s Services over the years, it seems likely that both parents discovered that it is best to appear to be co-operative and perhaps to say what they think the professional person they are talking to might want to hear. However, the patterns in the history of social care and the appellant’s continued offending surrounding drugs indicate that, despite interventions, the pattern that caused referrals eventually continued.
72. IA told me that she was offended by the suggestion in CYPS assessment that she might have known about the drugs in the house, which felt like a defamation of character. However, during the course of her evidence she accepted that she has known about the appellant’s drug use. It seems highly unlikely she would not in view of the fact that she previously accepted that she also used cannabis. In circumstances where it was the lifestyle of both parents that raised safeguarding concerns relating to the children following the appellant’s arrest in 2023, it is implausible that IA did not know that the appellant was keeping drugs in the house, or that he was also selling drugs, when at least some of the drugs were reported to be found in a bag on the kitchen table.
73. Nor do I find IA’s explanation about having ‘confiscated’ the taser found in the house from her nephew, and then forgotten about it, to be particularly credible. Given that there were several incidents of criminality linked to the home, including the arrest of B, and then the appellant’s arrest, it is likely that the taser might be carried by a member of the family involved in criminality. There is no evidence to indicate whether the police took any action following IA’s admission at the time of the appellant’s arrest, but I cannot discount the possibility that IA might have been covering for the appellant. Even if her explanation is taken at its highest, it was at the very least irresponsible to keep such a weapon in a home with so many children.
74. The appellant and IA gave different accounts as to whether they have had further contact with the ASW since he was released from prison. Despite the fact that the OASys assessment and the ASW both said that a multi-agency risk assessment would need to take place when the appellant was released from prison, there is no up to date evidence from either source.
75. During the course of these proceedings, there has been at least one attempt by the appellant and those representing him at the time (not Mr Jesurum) to dissemble about the fact that he was on remand when it was suggested that the hearing listed on 21 June 2023 could go ahead based on submissions only. It was only when the Upper Tribunal asked why the appellant had not attended the hearing, and asked a direct question as to whether he was on remand, that those representing the appellant were forced to admit that was the case.
76. For this reason, it is at least possible that a multi-agency risk assessment might have been done but the appellant and his partner have chosen not to disclose the fact. Even if an assessment has been delayed, or a decision has been made not to do one, which seems unlikely, there is no evidence from the Probation Service or Children’s Services to say what the current position is in relation the multi-agency risk assessment that both services said would need to take place when the appellant was released from prison.
77. The Upper Tribunal does not have the same powers as the Family Court to order evidence to be produced from social services departments. An immigration appeal is an adversarial process. In contrast to civil litigation, there is no general duty to disclose all information in immigration appeals. However, this principle is qualified by the duty not to knowingly mislead the Tribunal: see Nimo (appeals; duty of disclosure) [2020] UKUT 88 (IAC), CM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 1303, and R v SSHD ex p Kerrouche No.1 [1997] Imm AR 610.
78. The fact that the appellant was convicted of further offences during the course of this appeal, and was sentenced to a much longer period of imprisonment, now tips him into the category of serious offenders in the statutory framework relating to the assessment of Article 8 of the European Convention. Given the much higher hurdle that he now needs to overcome to succeed in this appeal, up to date evidence relating to his rehabilitation, and whether safeguarding concerns had been addressed, should have been at the forefront of the evidence. Instead, the appellant did not even taken time to prepare a witness statement. There is no evidence from the ASW. There is no evidence from the supervising probation officer.
79. There is limited information about the situation as it stood at the date of the hearing. The evidence from the ASW dated 12 April 2024 expressed no concerns about the appellant’s interpersonal relationships with the children, indeed he said that it would be in the best interests of the children to continue to have contact with their father. This is also supported by the evidence given in the ISW reports, the evidence from both mothers, and the evidence given by the appellant’s adult daughter A. However, in April 2024 the ASW did not express an opinion as to whether there would be safeguarding concerns if the appellant lived in the same home as the children. Indeed, the ASW made clear that it was likely that there would need to be a multi-agency safeguarding assessment when he was released from prison.
80. The most recent evidence from Mr Mwesigwa dated 26 July 2024 was glowing in his assessment of IA’s work with Children’s Services. It is clear that during the appellant’s time in prison she worked hard to improve the situation for her children. The ASW mentioned that the appellant had been involved in the process on the telephone and once on camera. The appellant continued to encourage his children. Mr Mwesigwa said that the professionals involved had ‘expressed pleasure working with the family.’ However, there was nothing in that email to suggest that there were no longer any safeguarding concerns surrounding the appellant’s criminal behaviour. At the time when the ASW wrote the email, the appellant was still in prison.
81. I set out the history of the appellant’s offending in some detail above because it shows a long term pattern of offending relating to the appellant’s use and sale of drugs. This pattern continued long after his children were born and despite earlier assurances that he understood the impact that this behaviour had on his children and the wider implications that it had for society. The pattern also includes an escalation of offences from the use to the sale of drugs with the last offence being the most serious.
82. The evidence relating to the offences committed in 2016 and 2023 contains references to drugs being found at the appellant’s home address. Although the surrounding information indicates that the appellant might not have been living with IA in 2016, it is a concern that when the appellant is selling drugs for financial gain that drugs are kept at his residential address. This is at the heart of the safeguarding concerns expressed by Children’s Services and the Probation Service.
83. The only witness statement that the appellant has prepared is dated 06 December 2021 and is out of date. In that statement he said that he remained clean, but subsequent events showed that he continued to sell drugs on an even larger scale. There does not appear to be any reference to the appellant claiming that he no longer uses drugs in the most recent OASys assessment. In section 7 the assessor concluded that the appellant’s lifestyle and associates were linked to his offending behaviour. Indeed, at section 8 it is recorded that the appellant continued to use cannabis but claimed that he only used it at weekends. His drug use was found to be linked to his offending behaviour. The evidence indicates that both parents are likely to have used cannabis on a long term basis. I have not been pointed to any evidence to suggest that the position is likely to have changed. Given the clear link between the appellant’s use of drugs and his offending behaviour, this is a matter that tends to point to a lack of rehabilitation.
84. I also take into account the fact that throughout the OASys assessments and the earlier PSR the appellant has attributed his lack of immigration status as a factor that led him to sell drugs for financial gain. This is despite the fact that he also said that he did some cash in hand work as a painter and decorator and as a mechanic. Albeit illegal working is still an offence, it does not follow that because a person does not have a formal immigration status that they are forced into the far more harmful criminality of selling drugs. This was still a choice made by the appellant connected with his own long standing drug use and lifestyle choices. In the most recent OASys assessment the assessor made a link between the appellant’s precarious immigration status and his offending behaviour. However, the probation officer was unlikely to have the same information and expertise that is available to this tribunal to put his claim in context.
85. The appellant says that he entered the UK in 1999 with his mother when he was 17 years old. He has other siblings who live in the UK, but little information is provided about their circumstances or their immigration status. The only identity document produced seems to be his mother’s Dutch passport. The overall family history is opaque.
86. In 2016, the respondent did not accept that there was sufficient evidence to show that IA or the children were British citizens because IA was born in the UK to Jamaican parents after 01 January 1983. IA’s mother did not naturalise as a British citizen until after she was born. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal judge, IA produced a copy of a British passport issued on 14 August 2017. However, it is unclear whether IA was registered as a British citizen before or after many of the children were born. There might still be some technical legal question marks, but the respondent now appears to accept that the children born to IA are likely to be British citizens. There did not appear to be any dispute as to the children born to PH albeit there is no supporting evidence to show that they are in fact British citizens as stated.
87. The reason why I took this short detour relating to the status of the appellant’s partner and children is to demonstrate that for many years it is likely that there were routes for the appellant to regularise his immigration status as the parent of a number of children who were born in the UK or who were British citizens. Even though the appellant became an adult in 1999, and seems to have been aware of his lack of status, there is little evidence to suggest that he made any meaningful attempts to regularise his status before deportation proceedings began in 2016. The judge who sentenced the appellant in 2016 made a similar observation.
88. In his witness statement, the appellant suggested that when he was studying at college, he lost is passport and was unable to register a dependent of his mother. When he sought advice from solicitors the solicitor ended up being arrested for an unrelated matter. No explanation is given as to when this happened, why the appellant could not apply for a new passport, or why he did not continue to pursue an application to regularise his status in the UK. The appellant then said that he and IA instructed solicitors to make an application for leave to remain in 2012. He said that he was ‘unsure whether they made such application because they were subsequently closed down.’ Again, no explanation is offered as to why he did not ensure that an application for leave to remain was made. No evidence is produced to support either claim.
89. The fact that the appellant has repeatedly attributed his offending behaviour to his lack of immigration status seems to be a deflection of responsibility when, on the facts relating to his family life in the UK, a case could have been made to regularise his status at a much earlier stage. The appellant has offered no adequate explanation as to why he did make an application to regularise his status so that he could provide more stable support for his children. For these reasons, I find that the fact that the appellant had a precarious immigration status was insufficient reason to explain his offending behaviour.
Conclusion – offending/rehabilitation
90. Drawing the evidence relating to the risk of reoffending and rehabilitation together. The most recent risk assessment that is available is contained in the OASys report dated 20 September 2024, around 7 months before the hearing. This showed a clear connection between the appellant’s use of drugs and his offending behaviour. The appellant admitted that he continued to use cannabis. No persuasive evidence has been produced to show that the appellant is likely to have moved away from this lifestyle since his release from prison.
91. The static assessments as to risk were that the probability of proven reoffending within 2 years was ‘low’. However, the probability of proven non-violent reoffending within 2 years was ‘medium’. The appellant has proven that previous assessments were fairly accurate in that he did go on to commit further drug related offences on each occasion. The assessor noted that the appellant might have ‘some deficits with his thinking and behaviour as he repeats the same mistakes and that it appears he does not learn from them.’ The appellant’s pattern of continued offending surrounding drugs, despite his previous assurances that he has learned from his mistakes, appears to bear this out.
92. The likelihood of the appellant causing serious harm to others was assessed to be ‘medium’. Despite the appellant’s previous assurances to probation officers and to the First-tier Tribunal that he understood the impact that his offending behaviour might have on his children, the appellant went on to commit further offences, which included being arrested with significant amounts of drugs in the family home.
93. The fact that the risk assessment specifically identifies his own children among those who are likely to be at risk of serious harm from his criminal behaviour should have given the appellant serious cause to reflect on his chosen lifestyle. However, the evidence that he gave at the hearing indicated that he still has a limited understanding of the risks that the continued use and storage of drugs in the family home and/or involvement in the selling of drugs might pose to his children. The appellant was focussed on telling me about the good interpersonal relationships he has with his children but was less willing to take responsibility for the fact that his criminal behaviour might place them at risk of serious harm. In fact, he suggested that the professionals who raised concerns about the risks his behaviour surrounding drugs might pose to the children ‘do not know what they are saying.’
94. Although the evidence shows that in the last 2 years the appellant’s partner worked hard to improve the situation for her children, this was done while the appellant was in prison and was not living in the family home. I was not directed to any current evidence to suggest that IA no longer uses cannabis. In the past she expressed a desire to stop using it but later evidence suggested that she might have continued to do so although it was not assessed to affect her parenting abilities at that time. Given that the appellant admits to still using cannabis there is a risk that drugs might still be present in the family home. This is likely to lead to a risk of reoffending and would also pose a risk to the children as outlined in the CYPS and OASys assessments. The evidence shows that there have been concerns that IA has known about the use and storage of drugs in the family home in the past and was willing to claim responsibility for a taser found in the home (possibly covering for the appellant or another family member). Indeed, that was one of the reasons why a Child Protection Plan was put in place following the appellant’s arrest.
95. No up to date information has been provided from social services to help me to understand the exact level of progress that IA made in responding to the children’s needs before the case was closed last year or whether she would now be in a position to act as a protective factor for the children. No up to date information has been provided to show whether a risk assessment was carried out or not when the appellant was released from prison. If no risk assessment has taken place, there is insufficient evidence to show why not given that Children’s Services and the Probation Service both indicated that a multi-agency assessment would be needed. The evidence of the appellant and his partner was somewhat contradictory and unclear in relation to this issue.
96. I conclude that insufficient evidence has been produced by the appellant to counter the risk assessments. When the evidence relating to the risk of reoffending is considered in the round, it shows that the appellant admits to making mistakes, but finds it difficult to learn from them in any meaningful way. It is clear that he cares for his children, but despite saying that he understood the harm that his continued criminal behaviour might have on them, their best interests did not act as a protective factor on the last occasion. Insufficient time has passed since his release from prison to know whether the similar assurances he now gives are likely to have any more meaning in practice.
97. For these reasons, I conclude that insufficient evidence has been produced to show that the public interest in deportation is in any way reduced due to rehabilitation. The law requires me to place significant weight on the fact that the appellant was sentenced to over 4 years’ imprisonment. The evidence shows that there is likely to be a ‘medium’ risk of general reoffending within 2 years and an attendant ‘medium’ risk of serious harm to the general public arising from drugs offences and to his own children for the reasons explained in the CYPS and OASys assessments.
Family life and children
General
98. I accept much of the evidence about the strength of the appellant’s interpersonal relationships with his children in the UK, as did the respondent, so it does not need to be set out in as much detail. However, when evaluating the impact of deportation on specific children I will deal with the evidence relating to each child in turn.
99. Given the fairly complex set of familial relationships involved in this case, it may help to set them out before considering the evidence in more detail. The appellant has at least 9 children from 3 different relationships. It is said that he does not have any contact with one of those children but he does have ongoing relationships with the other children. At one point, the birth dates of the children interchange between the mothers. During the course of the appeal proceedings some of the children have become adults. The appellant has 2 children with his former partner PH. He has 6 children with his current partner IA. His partner IA also has 2 older children from former relationships. I will refer to the children with the letters that were assigned to them in birth date order at an earlier stage in these proceedings. I have also set out their respective ages at the date of the hearing.
100. The following genogram may assist in understanding the familial relationships.
Figure 1. Family Genogram

















101. In assessing the best interests of the children, I have considered the principles outlined in ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC4, Zoumbas v SSHD [2013] UKSC 74 and EV (Philippines) and others v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 874. The best interests of children are a primary consideration, but are not a paramount consideration and can be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other factors.
102. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (‘BCIA 2009’) requires the respondent to have regard to the need to safeguard the welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom. I have also taken into account the statutory guidance ‘UKBA Every Child Matters: Change for Children’ (November 2009), which gives further detail about the duties owed to children. In the guidance, the respondent acknowledges the importance of international human rights instruments including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). The guidance goes on to confirm: ‘The UK Border Agency must fulfil the requirements of these instruments in relation to children whilst exercising its functions as expressed in UK domestic legislation and policies.’ The UNCRC sets out rights including a child’s right to survival and development, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents, the right not to be separated from parents and the enjoyment of the highest attainable standards of living, health and education without discrimination. The UNCRC also recognises the common responsibility of both parents for the upbringing and development of a child.
103. The respondent no longer disputes that the appellant has a genuine parental relationship with his children. Nor is it suggested that they should relocate to Jamaica with him to continue their family life there. I am only required to evaluate what the impact of deportation would be if the appellant’s partner and children remained in the UK without him i.e. the ‘stay scenario’.
104. No detailed account has been given of the nature and extent of the appellant’s relationships in the UK. The appellant says that he was in a relationship with PH for around 8 years. His daughter A said that he did not live with them although she did have regular contact with him.
105. Similarly, no detailed account has been provided as to the nature and extent of the appellant’s relationship with IA over the years, including what periods he may or may not have lived in the family home. They had their first child together in 2008. The CYPS assessment mentions potential domestic abuse in 2012. An email from the ASW dated 29 February 2024 suggests that the historical concerns related to IA. The PSR from 2016 referred to the appellant being single and living alone in a flat rented in his brother’s name at that time. The appellant then spent some time in prison. There is a suggestion, but no more, that the appellant might have lived with the children after that. From 2023 he was imprisoned again for 2 years before being released in January 2025. The evidence is that the appellant had been living with his sister since his release from prison. It is reasonable to infer from this that his supervising probation officer has not yet deemed it appropriate for him to live with the children in the family home.
106. No clear chronological picture of the nature and extent of the appellant’s family life with IA or the children emerges from the documentary evidence, the witness statements, or from the evidence given at the hearing. On the evidence currently before the Upper Tribunal, I conclude that the mothers of the children have always been the primary carers who have day to day responsibility for the upbringing of the children. The evidence shows that it is likely that the appellant has had regular contact with his children. He provides them with emotional support. It is said that he takes them to school, helps them with their homework, does activities with them, and often cooks family meals with them. Whether this is something that he has done throughout their childhood is unclear given that there is some evidence to suggest that he has not always lived in the family home and may have had issues relating to misuse of Class A drugs such as heroin in the past. There is little evidence to suggest that the appellant has provided any financial support to the children beyond the evidence that he sold drugs for financial gain.
107. All that can be gleaned from the limited evidence relating to the situation as it stood at the date of the hearing, was that the appellant’s licence conditions did not yet permit him to reside in the family home with IA and the children. There was no up to date evidence from Children’s Services to say whether a multi-agency risk assessment had taken place or not. The last known assessment appears to be the risk assessment contained in the OASys report dated 20 September 2024, which assessed the appellant to present a ‘medium’ risk of serious harm to the children if he were to continue reoffending in relation to drugs.
108. The dated evidence from Children’s Services from 12 April 2024 suggested that there were no concerns, at that stage, with the appellant having contact with his children. The evidence indicates that there have not been any concerns relating to the appellant’s interpersonal relationships with his children. It is unclear whether the appellant has always been a constant presence in the children’s lives. In general, the evidence shows that the appellant provides his children with warm and loving emotional support and some practical support. Both mothers gave evidence to say that his influence was important in their children’s lives and that his emotional supports helps to provide his children with some of the stability that they need. This is also born out by the evidence from social work and teaching professionals as well as from other members of the family.
109. In general terms, the evidence shows that the children have missed their father a lot during the time that he has been in prison. The absence of his emotional support is likely to have had a detrimental impact on all of the children. The most recent evidence from the ASW dated 26 July 2024 said that the appellant’s absence was a ‘significant factor in his children’s daily emotional and behaviour presentation; ability to concentrate in school; and also impacts their physical health.’ He said that the children seemed to be in a constant state of worry and helplessness. In an earlier email dated 12 April 2024, the ASW made clear that it was in the best interests of the children to have contact with their father. However, this was at a time when the appellant was still in prison. The ASW also made clear that a multi-agency risk assessment would need to take place when he was released from prison before he could return to the family home.
110. However, the ASW went on to say that said that ‘those needs can [be] met by services from other agencies including … (CAMHS).’ The evidence also shows that since the appellant has been in prison IA has been successful in turning around the situation as it stood when the children were placed on a Child Protection Plan shortly after his arrest in 2023. Although it is reported that the appellant had input into the process, the evidence from the ASW suggests that it was necessarily limited due to obstacles to participation arising from his imprisonment.
111. The information contained in the ASW’s emails suggests that most of the work has been done by IA with the support of various local services. Their housing situation was stabilised. The children were said to be in school. Referrals were made to CAMHS. The family was referred to Thriving Communities, a service that provides support surrounding negative behaviour in schools, in and out of school support for children, addresses child criminal exploitation risks, and also provides some degree of therapeutic work. The evidence from Children’s Services also indicated that significant levels of support were being provided by the children’s schools. Other emotional and practical support is likely to be available from the appellant’s mother, sister, and other members of the family.
112. In an email dated 29 February 2024, the ASW suggested that the children D, E, and G, in particular, had struggled in their father’s absence. At that time, the children shared their concerns that their mother might move back to north London in their father’s absence to access additional support from extended family members. They were concerned that this might expose them to criminal exploitation. They felt safer when their father was around.
113. These concerns might have stemmed from the experience of their step-brother, B, who was reported to have had problems when they lived in north London. However, it seems that the appellant’s presence did not prevent B from sliding into criminality when the family moved to the London borough where they currently live. B was arrested in the family home in December 2022. This was only a few months before the appellant, whose behaviour gave rise to the safeguarding concerns that triggered the Child Protection Plan (see [43]-[50] above) and the risk assessment conducted by the Probation Service (see [36]-[38] above).
114. The concerns that some of the children expressed about their mother moving back to north London were not borne out in practice. In the appellant’s absence, and with increased support from a range of different services, IA was able to keep the children in the family home and has taken significant steps to improve the situation for the children. I was not pointed to any evidence to suggest that any of the children were currently at risk of child criminal exploitation and it seems that specific support services have been provided to try to address any potential risks.
115. In contrast, the Probation Service risk assessment indicates that the appellant admits to the continued use of drugs, has difficulty in learning from past mistakes, and that there is likely to be a ‘medium’ risk of reoffending within 2 years. There is no current evidence to show that the concerns surrounding the appellant’s criminal behaviour and the risks that it is likely to pose to the children have been addressed. This is reflected by his licence conditions. The evidence as it stood at the hearing shows that the appellant’s presence in the family home is more likely to bring the children into contact with criminal behaviour and the associated risks than his absence.
116. The ISW reports of Peter Harrocks (2021) and Tahera Khan (2024) were prepare upon instructions given to them by the appellant’s solicitors. Both ISWs were asked to comment on whether deportation would be ‘unduly harsh’ on the appellant’s children, but this is mixed question of law and fact for the court to decide.
117. What is notable from the instructions given to the ISWs is that it seems that they were only asked to comment on the interpersonal relationships between the appellant, IA, and the children as they stood at the time each report was written. Although Mr Harrocks did consider the welfare checklist contained in section 1 of the Children Act 1989, which should include consideration of the risk of harm that the children suffered or were at risk of suffering. Neither social worker considered whether the appellant’s criminal convictions might give rise to any safeguarding concerns relating to the children. Although both ISWs mentioned the fact of convictions there was no meaningful engagement with safeguarding issues in either report.
118. Mr Harrocks cannot be criticised for failing to go into safeguarding issues in much detail. The list of documents he was provided with in 2021 pre-dated the Child Protection Plan put in place in 2023. His view that some of the children might be at greater risk of child criminal exploitation in the absence of their father was given without much information relating to the appellant’s criminal history or with the benefit of the later risk assessments that are now before the Upper Tribunal.
119. While I accept that the children might to some extent be more vulnerable to exploitation from those outside the home in the absence of some of the emotional support and additional stability that their father is able to provide, in fact, I have not been referred to any evidence to suggest that any of the children have had such problems since their father was sent to prison in 2023. For these reasons, Mr Harrocks’ opinion does not change my assessment of the risks relating to potential child criminal exploitation (see [106]-[110] above).
120. In contrast, Ms Khan prepared her report on 25 March 2024. This pre-dated the OASys assessment dated 20 September 2024. The record of the list of documents she was provided with refers to a CYPS assessment dated 25 March 2023. No copy of an assessment of that date appears to be in evidence before me. It is possible that this might be a typographical error and in fact she was referring to the CYPS assessment started on 23 May 2023 because later in the report Ms Khan refers to the children being placed on a Child Protection Plan (7.10). Her report does not engage with the safeguarding concerns outlined in that assessment (see [43]-[51]). Ms Khan noted that Children’s Services confirmed that there were no current concerns in respect of the appellant’s contact with his children (3.2). It is possible that this might be a reference to the ASW’s email dated 12 April 2024 in which he also made clear that a risk assessment would need to take place following the appellant’s release from prison. Ms Khan might have proceeded on the assumption that there were no longer any safeguarding concerns, when the evidence was in fact more nuanced.
121. It was within the area of expertise of the ISWs to assess the strength of the family relationships with one another and the likely impact that deportation might have on the children. However, both ISWs were asked to answer mixed questions of fact and law, which were for the court to decide. Although the fact of the appellant’s convictions were noted, it is a significant weakness that neither of the ISW reports consider whether the appellant’s criminal behaviour presented any safeguarding risks to the children. No up to date evidence was produced from the ASW or an ISW in response to the risk assessment contained in the OASys report dated 20 September 2024, which assessed the appellant to pose a ‘medium’ risk of serious harm to the children.
122. I bear in mind that both ISW reports are dated and do not reflect the situation at the date of the hearing. In so far as they testify to the warm and loving relationships within the family between the parents and the children, this is not disputed. Nor do I have any difficulty in accepting that the evidence as a whole, including witness testimony and other evidence from professionals who have worked with the children, shows that their father’s absence is likely to have a detrimental impact on the emotional lives of the children and their ongoing development. However, it must be recognised that the appellant’s absence and potential long term separation from his children results from his own actions and his apparent inability to learn from previous mistakes.
123. Even though the appellant’s absence is likely to have a detrimental impact on the children, the evidence also shows that IA was able to significantly improve the situation for the children with the support of a range of services during the time that the appellant was in prison. No doubt it placed additional burdens on her to address the needs of so many children, but with the support of extended family members and a range of support services, the overall situation was reported to be much improved. The support was stepped down to a Child in Need Plan and then the case was closed in or around July 2024. Although IA says that it would be easier to raise the children with practical and emotional support from the appellant, nothing in the evidence suggests that she was unable to address the children’s needs adequately in his absence with the additional support that was put in place.
124. Of the 7 children, F has never lived in the same household as the appellant and was 15 years old at the date of the hearing. D, E, G and H live with IA. Their ages range between 12-16 years old. Some of the older children were reported to help take younger children to school. Only J and K were under 10 years old, with the attendant high levels of practical and emotional support that younger children might require. This is not to say that the older children do not need significant levels of emotional support, the evidence indicates that they do, but as children get older it is reasonable to assume that they are more capable of doing some tasks for themselves and could assist to some extent with the practical running of a household. The evidence indicates that the appellant continued to provide emotional support and to encourage his children during his time in prison albeit that the level of contact was much reduced.
125. Having made those general findings, I will now turn to consider some of the evidence relating to the individual children.
Children B and C
126. B and C are IA’s children from earlier relationships. They are now young adults. There is little up to date evidence relating to the likely impact that deportation might have on these children. It is said that the appellant has played a paternal role in their lives since a young age.
127. An undated letter from B that was before the First-tier Tribunal in 2021 said that the appellant had been in his life since he was 2 years old. The appellant ‘means the world to me’ and played a big role in his life. He loved him dearly. The appellant had been there for him more than his own father. There is evidence to show that B had difficulties with members of a gang when he lived in north London. No detail has been provided as to what happened after the family moved to a different borough. No detail has been given as to how or why B came to be arrested in December 2022. The appellant told me that B was convicted of robbery and sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment. He is not due to be released until December this year. Other evidence suggests that B’s imprisonment has had a detrimental effect on other children in the family. So little information has been provided it is difficult to assess the extent that this issue might have affected the other children.
128. I have not been pointed to any direct evidence from C and cannot see any reference to such evidence in the index to the bundle or the skeleton argument. IA does not refer to C’s current situation in her most recent statement and there is no up to date statement from the appellant. Both Mr Harrocks and Ms Khan spoke to C when they prepared their reports in 2021 and early 2024, but there does not appear to be any up to date evidence relating to C’s situation at the date of the hearing.
129. In so far as C is mentioned in the ISW reports, she was 16 years old at the date she spoke to Mr Harrocks and was 18 years old when she spoke to Ms Khan. She told Mr Harrocks that her father was in Jamaica. The appellant was like a second father. She would find it very upsetting if she were to be separated from him. She worried about the effect that it would have on her mother and her younger siblings and was reported to be tearful and distressed when talking about the issue.
130. When she spoke to Ms Khan, C was reported to be studying Health and Social Care in college. She hoped to become a midwife. She was working part-time in retail. C told Ms Khan that she had a good relationship with the appellant, who raised her. She kept in contact with her birth father and had visited him in Jamaica 2 years before. C thought that it would ‘be the worst thing ever’ if the appellant were deported. She did not want to go through that again and did not want her siblings to have to go through it. C described having to take more responsibility for things at home since the appellant went to prison. She was responsible for picking up and looking after the younger children and also helped with cooking. She did not have to worry about these things when the appellant was at home.
131. B and C are not the appellant’s biological children, but I accept that he has played a significant parental role in their lives. They are now young adults, so the legal exceptions to deportation do not strictly apply. Whilst the evidence shows that his deportation is likely to have a detrimental effect on them because they would miss the emotional support that he is likely to provide, there is insufficient evidence to show that the effect on B would be harsh, let alone unduly harsh.
132. Although the evidence indicates that the effect of losing a second father figure to deportation is likely to have a cumulative impact on C, she appears to be forging her own adult life through work and study and is likely to become less reliant on the appellant for emotional support. She has been able to keep in contact with her biological father through calls and at least one visit. It is likely that she could continue to keep in contact with the appellant in the same way. For these reasons, I conclude that the effect of deportation on C might be harsh, but does not meet the stringent threshold to show that it would be unduly harsh.
Children A and F
133. A and F are the appellant’s children with PH. I had the benefit of hearing evidence from A and her mother at the hearing. A was an open and articulate witness who was able to express herself clearly. PH was treated as a vulnerable witness due to various disabilities. At times she appeared to find it more difficult to understand the questions, which sometimes needed to be repeated in a more straight forward way. PH was also less able to articulate her answers clearly. Nevertheless, the gist of her evidence was clear.
134. A presented as a capable young woman who has now reached adulthood and is forging an independent life of her own. She works and has moved out of the family home she used to share with her mother and sisters. She maintains family ties with her mother and younger sister (F). She also has occasional contact with her siblings that live in IA’s household. She said that she missed the appellant when he was in prison and was unable to visit as much as she wanted. She keeps in contact with her father on the telephone during the week and might see him once or twice a week.
135. A explained that her younger sister was particularly impacted by their father’s absence. She told me about an incident in May 2023 when her sister F drove their mum’s car into a wall. A was worried about the impact that deportation would have on the family, including her younger siblings. She claimed not to be aware of her father’s drug use or the fact that he was selling drugs. This is perhaps unsurprising given that, on her own evidence, her father had never lived in the family home. She was upset that her father had gone to prison because she was unable to see him as much, but did not appear to attribute any responsibility for this to her father.
136. It is clear from A’s evidence that she has an emotional bond with her father albeit she does not rely on him for practical or financial support. She would find it upsetting if he were to be deported to Jamaica. She said that it would be difficult to visit him because she did not earn enough money to even afford visits to see him in prison when he was moved further away.
137. Her mother believes that it would have a detrimental impact on her daughters if the appellant were to be deported. The appellant had always been an anchoring presence in their lives. In the appellant’s absence, A had to take on additional responsibilities beyond her years to provide emotional support to her younger sister. PH said that she struggled with her own disabilities and health issues. PH said that A struggled with anxiety, depression and emotional exhaustion at times as she tried to support members of the family.
138. There appears to be no direct evidence from F. Like the other children, the evidence shows that she is likely to have a loving bond with her father and keeps in regular contact with him. The evidence shows that F has struggled with her mental health and needs psychological support. Although it is not suggested that F’s problems are rooted solely in the appellant’s absence following his imprisonment, it is said that her situation was exacerbated by the reduced support that he could provide to his daughter. PH told me that F suffered severe bullying at school, which impacted on her mental health. The counselling that she was offered had helped her ‘partially’.
139. The safeguarding records from F’s school indicate that she had been suffering from low self-esteem, difficulty in regulating her emotions, and had some history of self-harm. The records mention problems with bullying at school although there is mixed evidence as to whether this was current or historical. It is clear that F was finding aspects of her school and family life very difficult. The records also show that F’s mother expressed concerns about signs of ADHD and autism, particularly in light of her own diagnosis of ADHD.
140. F drove her mum’s car into the wall of the car park at their home on 05 May 2023. This happened just before the appellant’s arrest on 18 May 2023 and not because of it. The school records record that PH was concerned that her daughter was anxious and depressed. She took her to hospital after this incident. Thankfully it seems that she was unhurt. Because F said that she felt suicidal, she was assessed by CAMHS and a referral was made to Children’s Services. F said that her stress and anxiety was ‘linked to school work, teachers an other factors that she is unsure of.’ She also mentioned feeling guilty about not spending enough time with her baby sister. A safety plan was made for school and home.
141. The records indicate that further steps were taken to provide F with support from the CAMHS service. On 07 June 2023 F was reported to be feeling better after having visited her father. She was excited to see him. At that time F said that she did not feel the need to self-harm and was not experiencing suicidal ideation. The outcome of a Child and Family Assessment is recorded in an email from the school records dated 03 July 2023. The assessment made a number of recommendations for further support to be provided to F and her family, including counselling support for her mother. By September 2023 F was reported to be in high spirits and had a new attitude towards learning. However, a couple of weeks later she said that she was struggling with her father being in prison and was reported to be very concerned about his immigration status. At the end of 2023 their grandfather died, which also had an impact on her mood.
142. By May 2024 the school safeguarding records note further concerns raised by F’s mother about her mental health. Her attendance at school was reported to be poor. Children’s Services appeared to be involved in supporting the family. Her mother was struggling to get CAMHS support due to a waiting list, but efforts seemed to be being made to assist her. In July 2024 the records indicate that there were concerns that F might have been using cannabis. She was among a group of girls who were noted to smell of cannabis and a grinder was later confiscated from her at school.
143. By September 2024 there was mention of a referral for PH and F to a parenting programme. In November 2024 F was suspended from school for assaulting another student. Arrangements were made for her to attend interim learning and then a respite placement with a view to her moving to another school in the longer term. In February 2025 the records indicate that F was going through assessments for ASD and ADHD. F was offered places in alternative schools, which her mother rejected. Instead, she asked for F to conduct online learning rather than return to her old school. During the course of February 2025 arrangements were made for F to be enrolled in online learning. It was unclear whether F had returned to school at the date of the hearing.
144. Other evidence from the school and referral services are consistent with this picture. The evidence contained in the ISW reports pre-date these developments, but is broadly consistent with the overall picture, which shows that F has been struggling with emotional and behavioural issues for various different reasons and is requiring fairly significant levels of support from her family members and professional services. The fact that her father was absent because of his imprisonment was not the cause, but was an exacerbating factor.
145. The most recent evidence is a psychological and neurodevelopmental assessment dated 07 April 2025 prepared by Dr Jessica Crumpton, a chartered registered Clinical Psychologist. Dr Crumpton said that the assessment of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) was co-facilitated with Dr Phebe Burns, also a Chartered Clinical Psychologist. They concluded that F presented with a complex emotional and behavioural profile, characterised by emotional intensity, impulsivity, reactive risk behaviour, and difficulties with emotional regulation. She had a past history of self-harm. Although she did not report any current suicidal ideation, her past behaviour and profile of impulsivity and emotional vulnerability suggested that ongoing risk monitoring was warranted. Based on their assessment, F did not meet the diagnostic criteria for ASD. Her presentation was more consistent with emotional dysregulation and traits seen in ADHD. Further assessment for ADHD would be ‘clinically appropriate’.
146. PH and F both identified the appellant as a ‘protective emotional figure’ in her life. He was able to play a key role in supporting F during moments of distress, particularly when her mother feels unable to manage her behaviour on her own. In Dr Crumpton’s opinion, his involvement in her life contributed to her emotional containment and ability to regulate. She noted that his previous ‘detention’ appeared to coincide with a deterioration in F’s wellbeing. In fact, the evidence shows that F had already got to a distressing point shortly before the appellant was arrested in May 2023 rather than because of it. Understandably, the fact that he was then arrested only exacerbated the situation for her. Dr Crumpton concluded that the appellant’s deportation would remove a stabilising attachment figure in F’s life, thereby increasing her vulnerability to emotional and behavioural difficulties, including self-harm. F would benefit from continued access to therapeutic and educational support and from the ongoing involvement of both parents in her care.
147. PH reported to Dr Crumpton that F’s emotional wellbeing improved after her father’s release from prison in January 2025. She appeared to be more secure once she had regular contact with him again. F feels emotionally supported by her father and tends to respond to his guidance more readily. In contrast, F had been more emotionally withdrawn when her father was in prison because she had less access to his support. When F was able to speak to her father on the phone during a time of crisis, he played a significant role in helping her ‘snap out of it’. PH considered the bond between F and her father to be a protective factor. PH expressed concerns about the effect that it would have on F’s emotional well-being if her father were to be deported.
148. The evidence shows that A would be upset by her father’s absence and reduced level of emotional support. If he were to be deported it is likely to place additional burdens on her in terms of providing support to her mother and younger siblings. However, like C, the evidence also shows that she is a capable young woman who is beginning to develop an independent life away from the family home. Although she would not be able to have as much contact with her father as she would wish, she would be able to keep in contact with him through calls and perhaps occasional visits (albeit she says that she couldn’t currently afford the fare). Again, the exceptions to deportation do not strictly apply to A because she is now an adult. Nevertheless, I conclude that although the effect of deportation on A would be harsh, the evidence does not show that the situation would reach the elevated threshold of unduly harsh.
149. In relation to her younger sister F. The evidence shows that she is a vulnerable 15 year old girl who has been struggling with emotional regulation and behavioural issues for some time. These are not caused by her father’s absence during his 2 periods of imprisonment, but the consequences of his behaviour have exacerbated the emotional difficulties that she faces. The evidence shows that her father is likely to be a protective figure in her life who is able to provide emotional support. However, she also has the support of her mother and older sibling and has other family members in the UK. The evidence also shows that efforts are being made to provide her with educational and mental health support, which might assist her during any transition period if her father were to be deported.
150. The appellant is able to provide more support when he is not incarcerated. However, there is evidence to show that he was still able to provide emotional support and encouragement to his daughter while he was in prison. The emotional impact of her father being deported is likely to have a more significant impact on F given the difficulties that she is facing at this time. While long distance support is not likely to be as satisfactory as the support he could provide in person, the appellant would be able to provide regular telephone support if he is not in prison. Because of F’s particular vulnerabilities, the effect of deportation is likely to have a more significant detrimental effect, placing her at higher risk of self-harm and/or emotional dysregulation. Although she would continue to have the support of family members and professional services, I am satisfied that the effect of deportation is likely to reach the more stringent threshold of unduly harsh in respect of F.
Child D
151. D was 16 years old at the date of the hearing. The only evidence that comes directly from him is an undated letter that was before the First-tier Tribunal in 2021. D said that his family was extraordinary. His father was half of everything to him and his mother was the second half. Without his dad ‘the whole household … would feel emotional pain.’ If his dad was not with him there would be a heavy load on his mind, which would stop him from achieving his dreams. D said that his parents worked well together and that his dad did his best to look after him and his siblings. It would be a burden of his mum to look after 8 children on her own.
152. In her statement, IA said that D feels responsible for his younger siblings but the emotional burden of his father’s absence is overwhelming. He found it stressful preparing for GCSEs in his father’s absence. His performance at school was affected. His father’s advice and support is crucial for D, who often sits alone in his room and does not mix with his siblings. The appellant used to take D to school and would help him with his homework. He also took him to play football about once a week. IA also said that D had been referred to CAMHS for support.
153. The some of the evidence from the ISWs is dated and has been overtaken by the work done with Children’s Services since 2023. In 2021, D told Mr Harrocks that he was upset when his father was detained. He lost focus at school. D thought that everyone in the family would be affected without his father. In early 2024, it was recorded that IA shared that D’s school was looking into providing counselling for him because they were worried about his emotional wellbeing. He also suffered from asthma and has had anxiety attacks in the past. When Ms Khan spoke to D he said that life is harder without his dad and was worried about his mum and his siblings. He was also sad that his older brother, B, was in prison. I have not been pointed to any evidence relating to any other particular vulnerabilities in relation to D.
154. There is no up to date evidence relating to D from Children’s Services save the evidence from the ASW from 2024, which said that D, E, and G, were being provided with additional support in school. The evidence indicates that D is likely to feel responsible for his younger siblings if his father were to be deported, which would place additional burdens on him at a time when he is trying to study for exams. His father’s removal from the UK is likely to be deeply upsetting and will remove an important element of support. However, the appellant could continue to provide emotional support to D remotely albeit it would not be adequate as far as D is concerned. For these reasons, I conclude that the effect of deportation on D is likely to be harsh, but there is insufficient evidence to show that it would reach the elevated threshold of unduly harsh.
Child E
155. E was 15 years old at the date of the hearing. She also wrote an undated letter for the hearing that took place in 2021. At the time she was 11 years old. E said that she had the best dad in the world but then changed her mind and said that he was the best dad in the galaxy. She said that her dad took care of them. Their family would not be complete if he was not around.
156. In her statement, IA said that E had significant behavioural changes in her father’s absence. She was involved in a physical altercation at school, which led to her being placed in an educational unit for 6 weeks. She returned to school and is being mentored. E had difficulty in processing her emotions. Without her father she had become more volatile and emotionally unpredictable. She really misses her father. When she asked E what she wanted for her birthday she said that she just wanted daddy to come home. E enjoys cooking with her father and he would help her with her maths homework.
157. In 2021, Mr Harrocks’ report said that E found it upsetting when her father was not there. She missed him a lot. All the fun would be gone without him. She found it hard to focus when he was away. In 2024, Ms Khan’s report said that E was in a pupil referral unit at the time because she was involved in a fight and had a knife in her possession. There were some concerns about her attendance at the referral unit. E expressed a wish to return to main stream schooling. Following the intervention by Children’s Services the evidence shows that E has returned to school. She was also identified with D and G as one of the children who had emotional needs that required additional support. The evidence shows that the family has made progress since the appellant’s arrest in 2023 and are being given additional support through CAMHS and Thriving Communities.
158. My conclusion in relation to E is similar to D. The evidence shows that she found it difficult in her father’s absence, which affected her focus and behaviour at school. The up to date evidence indicates that IA has done a lot of work to improve the situation for her children and that the family has received support from the children’s schools and additional services. E is likely to be adversely affected if her father had to leave the country but would be able to access emotional support from him remotely. For these reasons I conclude that the effect of deportation is likely to be harsh, but does not meet the elevated threshold to be unduly harsh.
Child G
159. G was 13 years old at the date of the hearing. He also wrote a letter for the hearing in 2021. He said that his dad meant so much to him. He helped him with his homework and took him to school every day. When his dad was in jail G was so sad. When he was at school his father was all he could think of. When he came home he was so happy.
160. In her recent statement, IA said that G got into a fight with another boy outside school while his father was in prison. This was not the first time he had been involved in a fight. He was also answering back to teachers. At the time it appears that he was out of school on Educational Links. G tended to retreat inwardly. He should have been referred to an anger management course by the school but this never happened. The reduced emotional support from his father has led G to be overwhelmed, which made it difficult to focus on his school work. He had always been disruptive in class but it had got worse in his father’s absence. His father was a calming influence on G who provided him with some stability. IA also said that G had recently been referred to CAMHS for an ADHD assessment and is awaiting an assessment for Autism.
161. In 2021, Mr Harrocks reported that G was impacted by their father’s absence in a similar way to E. He was finding it difficult to focus in school. In 2024, Ms Khan said that G presented as shy and a little reserve. IA had reported behavioural issues and disruptive behaviour in class. G shared that he wanted to improve his behaviour at school and does not want to get into any more trouble. G enjoyed music and likes to rap about his struggles. When asked about those struggles he said that not seeing his dad was one of them. G said that he loves his dad dearly. His father encouraged him to do better and to change his behaviour. He found his homework easier when his father was there to explain it to him. G witnessed his father being arrested, which he found distressing. If his father was at home school would be better for him because he would be happier.
162. It is unclear whether G was back in school at the date of the hearing. The evidence is similar to that of D and E in so far that it is clear that G found his father’s absence particularly difficult and this affected his behaviour and performance at school. Similar to the other 2 children, I conclude that the effect of deportation on G is likely to be harsh, but is not elevated to unduly harsh.
Child H
163. H was 12 years old at the date of the hearing. I cannot see any direct evidence from her in the form of a letter although her wishes and feelings are reported by others.
164. In her statement, IA said that H missed the special bond that she shared with her father. She has a natural talent for maths and would enjoy challenging her father’s maths abilities. She was the youngest of the girls. She often volunteered to accompany her father to walk the dog or to go to the shop. She missed her father and often cried a lot after they visited him in prison.
165. In 2021, Mr Harrocks described H as a bubbly child, but she felt down in the absence of her father. She said that she was dragging herself into class and all the joy had gone from her life. She was supported by the school when they noticed the change in the children. In 2024, Ms Khan also observed H to be bubbly and confident. Her mother reported that she was ‘doing ok’ at school but her motivation around learning had declined. H said that she enjoyed maths lessons. She also enjoyed art and spending time at home with her siblings. She would like to be an accountant. H said that her father was always there for her and would help her with different things. She really missed her father and ‘hopes he will be a better person on release from custody’. H described her mother as a funny person who is energetic and ‘there for you’. She helped with her younger brother ‘but we all take care of each other’.
166. My conclusion in relation to H is the same as the other 3 children. The effect of deportation is likely to have a detrimental effect on H because her father provides her with fun and emotional support, but there is no other evidence at the date of the hearing to show that the absence of her father would go beyond harshness to being unduly harsh.
Children J and K
167. J and K are the youngest children, aged 6 and 4 years old at the date of the hearing. They are too young to record their wishes and feelings in writing. In her statement, IA said that both children have been deeply affected by their father’s absence. J, as the older child, tries to understand the situation but is often confused and upset. Sometimes it is hard to get him to go to bed because he is waiting for his father. He is quite emotional and often needs to be comforted. Both children often ask when their father will be coming home.
168. In 2021, Mr Harrocks noted that the youngest children were born after their father’s release from the first prison sentence. At the time, Mr Harrocks referred to a period of immigration detention, but it is unclear when the appellant might have been detained. The children were reported to be upset by their father’s absence. J did not want to eat and K kept waking and would only sleep while wrapped in his father’s coat. In 2024, Ms Khan noted that J was energetic and keen to talk to her. He was not aware that his father was in prison. When he visited him he believed his father was at work. J enjoyed playing with his brother K. J often asked for his father to read a bedtime story. J told Ms Khan that he missed his father and ‘wants him to teach me things’. He wanted his dad to come home because he enjoyed bedtime stories with him. At the date when Ms Khan visited the family K had recently started nursery. K also said that he missed his father. IA said that K often woke up in the night crying for his father.
169. The situation for the youngest children is a little different in that children of that age are more likely to need physical as well as emotional comfort from their parents. It is clear from the evidence that both boys missed their father when he was in prison. It seems that they are too young to have any meaningful understanding as to why their father was absent from the family home. Beyond their normal emotional reactions to missing their father, there is no evidence of any particular vulnerabilities or severe behavioural problems. The effect of deportation is likely to be more long term for the younger children. In time they might adjust to their father’s absence, but they would not have the benefit of his physical presence and support during a longer period of their childhood than the other children. Nevertheless, my conclusion in relation to J and K is the same as most of the other children. The effect of deportation is likely to have a detrimental effect on their emotional wellbeing and ongoing development. While the effect would be harsh, there is insufficient evidence to show that it would be unduly harsh.
Conclusion – best interests of the children
170. I have no hesitation in finding that it would be in the best interests of all of the children to continue to benefit from the love and emotional support that their father provides. The evidence shows that many of the children rely on their father as one of the stabilising factors in their lives. They have all missed him during periods of absence when he was serving sentences of imprisonment. The effect of those absences has been particularly difficult for the teenage children, who are already going through a challenging time during adolescence. The evidence shows that D, E, F, and G, in particular, have had emotional and behavioural difficulties.
171. However, since their father’s arrest in May 2023 significant efforts have been made to improve the situation for the children, who were reported to be in school with additional support by the time the case was closed with Children’s Services in or around July 2024. The evidence shows that this progress was largely due to the hard work put in by IA with the support of Children’s Services albeit the appellant did what he could to support his children from prison.
172. The appellant’s absence clearly had a significant impact on the children’s emotional lives and they missed him very much. This impacted on their ability to focus at school and their behaviour both at home and school. However, from an adult perspective, it also allowed for steps to be taken to address the children’s needs, which were not being met at the time when the appellant was arrested with a large amount of drugs in the family home in May 2023. Given that the appellant’s offending behaviour was assessed to be one of the risk factors that gave rise to the Child Protection Plan, to a large extent the appellant’s absence enabled IA and the children to improve their situation with the additional support provided by Children’s Services and referrals to other support services.
173. In April 2024, the ASW made clear that it was in the children’s best interests to have contact with their father. The evidence indicates that there have not been any concerns in relation to the appellant’s interpersonal relationships with his children. They continued to keep in contact with him by phone and visits while he was in prison.
174. The fact that the ASW considered that it was in the children’s best interests to have contact with their father is not the same as saying that it was in their interests to live in the same household. The ASW also made clear that a risk assessment would need to take place when the appellant was released from prison. The OASys assessment also considered that a risk assessment would be needed. As I have already noted, there is no evidence to show that a multi-agency risk assessment has taken place. At the date of the hearing, the appellant’s licence conditions did not permit him to live in the family home.
175. The evidence relating to the emotional impact that the appellant’s deportation is likely to have on the children shows that it is not likely to be in their best interests for him to be deported. This is a large family on a limited income, which has required significant support from a variety of services in recent years. The likelihood of IA being able to take so many children to Jamaica to visit their father is negligible. The children are likely to be facing long term separation from their father with little or no prospect of any in person contact. Although it is likely that the appellant could continue to provide emotional support to his children through modern means of communication, and would be able to speak to them more often than he could in prison, this is an inadequate substitute for the day to day presence of a father, especially for the youngest children who might require more physical love and affection.
176. However, the evidence also shows that in practical terms IA has been able to care for the children in his absence. No doubt it puts additional pressure on her given that she has so many children. But many of the children are now a bit older. The evidence shows that they have been able to step into some roles such as taking younger siblings to school or helping with the cooking. While this has also placed some additional pressures on those children, this is a consequence of the appellant’s offending behaviour. Professional support from various different sources is being offered to the family. The children also have the support of extended family members in the UK, including the appellant’s mother, sister, and IA’s family. Despite having assured the judge in 2021 that he understood the impact that his offending and imprisonment was likely to have on his children, the appellant was convicted of a more serious offence. At the same time, the conditions in the household at the time were of sufficient concern for a Child Protection Plan to be put in place.
177. Although I conclude that it would be in the best interests of the children to continue to have contact with their father, the evidence as it stood at the hearing did not show that it was in their best interests for him to live in the family home. The OASys assessment concluded that the appellant presented a ‘medium’ risk of non-violent reoffending within 2 years and a ‘medium’ risk of serious harm to the children associated with offending relating to the use and sale of drugs. It also found that the appellant found it difficult to learn from his previous mistakes.
178. The appellant admitted that he continued to use cannabis. His evidence at the hearing still showed little insight into the harm that the use and sale of drugs might cause to his children, as outlined in the CYPS assessment. There was a distinct absence of a response to the appellant’s criminal behaviour or the safeguarding concerns in the evidence produced on behalf of the appellant. For these reasons, the picture relating to the best interests of the children does not point solely in one direction. To some extent, the absence of their father while he was in prison created space for the family situation to be stabilised and protected them from potential risks associated with the use and sale of drugs.
179. In immigration proceedings the best interests of the children are a primary consideration, but are not treated as a paramount consideration as they would be in family law proceedings. The best interests of the children can be outweighed by the cumulative weight of other factors. In this case, the countervailing factor is the public interest in deporting ‘foreign criminals’. Because the appellant was convicted of a more serious offence during the course of these proceedings, greater weight must now be placed on the public interest than before. I will now turn to consider the applicable legal framework.
ARTICLE 8(1) – FAMILY LIFE
180. The appellant is a 44 year old man who has lived in the UK for around 27 years. He has spent all of his adult life in the UK. Although there is very little evidence as to the strength of any private life, his length of residence is still significant. He has a partner with whom he has 6 children and another 2 children from a former relationship. His partner also has 2 older children who have grown up with the appellant as a father figure in their lives. In all, 10 children are likely to be affected by the decision to remove the appellant to Jamaica albeit 3 of them have since become adults. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the evidence shows that the appellant’s removal pursuant to the deportation order would interfere with his right to private and family life in a sufficiently grave way to engage the operation of Article 8(1) of the European Convention.
ARTICLE 8(2) - PROPORTIONALITY
181. Article 8 of the European Convention protects the right to private and family life. However, it is not an absolute right and can be interfered with by the state in certain circumstances. It is trite that the state has a right to control immigration and that rules governing the entry and residence of people into the country are ‘in accordance with the law’ for the purpose of Article 8. Any interference with the right to private or family life must be for a legitimate reason and should be reasonable and proportionate. 
182. Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘NIAA 2002’) applies where a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches a person’s right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention. In cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals the additional public interest considerations contained in section 117C apply. The ‘public interest question’ means the question of whether an interference with a person’s right to respect for private and family life is justified under Article 8(2).  
183. The courts have repeatedly emphasised that significant weight should be given to the public interest in deportation. However, that is not to say that the weight to be given to the public interest is uniform or monolithic: see Akinyemi v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2098. The more serious the offending behaviour; the greater the weight is placed on the public interest in deportation. The less serious the offending behaviour; the more readily an individual’s compelling or compassionate circumstances might outweigh the public interest in deportation.  
184. The exceptions to deportation outlined in section 117C(4) (private life) and 117C(5) (family life) NIAA 2002 reflect the respondent’s position as to where a fair balance is struck between the weight that must be given to the public interest in deporting foreign criminals and the person’s right to private or family life in cases involving periods of up to 4 years imprisonment. The exceptions do not apply in cases involving periods of imprisonment of 4 years or more although the factual basis can be considered as part of the overall assessment made under section 117C(6) (very compelling circumstances).
185. Section 117C(5) states that an exception to deportation applies where a person has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner or children and the effect of deportation would be ‘unduly harsh’. In HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1176 the Court of Appeal made clear that the test did not required a level of harshness beyond the ‘ordinary’ harsh effects of deportation. The assessment must still focus on the effect of deportation on the particular child and whether the degree of harshness is sufficiently severe to outweigh the public interest in deportation. How a child will be affected by the deportation of a parent will depend on range of different factors. This approach was approved by the Supreme Court: see HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22. The Supreme Court emphasised the elevated nature of the test. ‘Harsh’ denotes something severe or bleak and the addition of the adverb ‘unduly’ raised an already elevated standard still higher.
186. Section 117C(6) NIAA 2002 states that the public interest requires deportation unless there are ‘very compelling circumstances’ over and above Exceptions 1 and 2. The test has repeatedly been described as a demanding one involving a high threshold: see NA (Pakistan) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 662 and KO (Nigeria) v SSHD [2018] UKSC 53. A custodial sentence of 4 years or more ‘represents such a serious level of offending that the public interest in the offender’s deportation almost always outweighs countervailing considerations of private or family life’: see Hesham Ali v SSHD [2016] 1 WLR 4799 [46]. Although there is no ‘exceptionality’ requirement, it follows from the statutory scheme that the cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be rare. The commonplace incidents of family life, such as the natural love between parents and children, will not be sufficient: see NA (Pakistan) [33] and HA (Iraq) [50]. The assessment under section 117C(6) of the NIAA 2002 and paragraph 398 of the immigration rules reflects the overall balancing exercise undertaken by the Strasbourg court when assessing whether the interference with a person’s private or family life is justified and proportionate under Article 8(2) of the European Convention. After all, that is the stated intention of the statutory scheme.
187. The need to consider the relevant principles outlined in the Strasbourg jurisprudence has been emphasised by the senior courts: see Hesham Ali [25-33], HA (Iraq) and NA (Pakistan) . Relevant cases include Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50, Üner v Netherlands (2006) 45 EHRR 14, Maslov v Austria [2009] INLR 47, Jeunesse v Netherlands (2014) 60 EHRR 17, and Unuane v United Kingdom (2021) 72 EHRR 24. In summary, relevant factors to be considered might include the nature and seriousness of the offence, the person’s length of residence, whether the person is a lawfully settled migrant or not, the time elapsed since the offence was committed, the nationalities of the various people concerned, the family situation, the best interests of the person’s children, and the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.
188. In light of the findings of fact made above, I have weighed the public interest considerations against the individual circumstances relating to the appellant’s private and family life in the UK.
189. In relation to the public interest considerations, I have taken into account the following factors:
(i) The most recent conviction now tips the appellant into the category of serious offenders who have been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 4 years or more. The appellant can only resist deportation if he is able to show that there are ‘very compelling circumstances’ over and above the exceptions to deportation that might outweigh the significant public interest in deporting a serious offender.
(ii) The most recent conviction forms part of a pattern of offending relating to the use and sale of drugs that has only got more serious over the years.
(iii) There is little or no reliable evidence relating to rehabilitation that might reduce the significant weight that must be placed on the public interest in deportation in circumstances where the appellant was assessed to pose a ‘medium’ risk of non-violent reoffending within 2 years. At the date of the hearing, insufficient time had passed since his release from prison to assess whether there has been any rehabilitation.
(iv) Any risk of reoffending surrounding the use and sale of drugs is also likely to be associated with a ‘medium’ risk of serious harm to the appellant’s children.
190. In relation to the individual circumstances of the appellant and his family members, I have given careful consideration to the following factors:
(i) The appellant has lived in the UK for 27 years i.e. his entire adult life. However, the weight to be placed on this factor is reduced by the fact that there is no evidence to show that he has ever had lawful leave to remain or attempted to regularise his status even after his children were born. There is little evidence relating to the strength of any private life in the UK beyond the fact that he has children and other family members here.
(ii) The appellant may not have any practical experience of living in Jamaica although it is likely that he has cultural connections. The evidence relating to the wider family circumstances is vague. For this reason, I cannot entirely discount the possibility that some relatives might still live in Jamaica. For example, there is at least one reference to the appellant’s oldest son living in Jamaica. It is not argued that the mere fact of removal to Jamaica would give rise to a breach of the appellant’s human rights nor was any evidence produced to support such an argument. The appellant does not seek to argue that he meets the criteria of the private life exception under section 117C(4) NIAA 2002.
(iii) The appellant is in a long term relationship with IA. Little detail has been provided about the nature of the relationship over the years. The evidence suggests that the relationship has not always been consistent. It is unclear when the appellant has lived with IA and the children or not. The evidence shows that deportation would place additional burdens on IA if she lost some of the practical and emotional support that the appellant might provide. However, with support from local services, other family members, and the growing maturity of some of the children, IA has been able to support the children while the appellant was in prison. In fact, the evidence shows that she was able to improve the outcomes for her children in his absence. It is not argued that deportation would be unduly harsh on IA although I find that the impact of deportation would be harsh because she would be left raising a large number of children on her own.
(iv) The appellant’s case is almost entirely focused on the effect that deportation would have on the 10 children. Some of those children are now adults but 7 are still under 18 years old. It is in the best interests of the children to continue to have contact with their father. I also take into account that many children are likely to be affected by the appellant’s removal. The evidence shows that the appellant is likely to be one of the stabilising influences in the children’s emotional lives. His absence during periods when he has been in prison has had a detrimental effect on their ability to concentrate at school and has exacerbated emotional or behavioral issues. All of the children will be deeply upset by their father’s absence if he were to be deported. The effect of deportation is that the children are likely to face long term separation from their father with little prospect of face to face visits. This is likely to adversely affect their longer term happiness and development. I have found that the effect of deportation would be harsh in relation to nearly all of the children, save for F, in respect of whom it is likely to be unduly harsh.
(v) However, the unusual feature in this case is the evidence showing that the best interests of the children do not necessarily point in one direction (see [177]-[178] above). It also indicates that, despite the appellant’s previous assurance that he understood the risks that the use and sale of drugs might have on the children, in fact, the appellant did not put their best interests first and continued to reoffend. The appellant’s evidence disclosed a lack of insight into this issue.
(vi) The detrimental impact that the appellant’s absence had on his children during periods of imprisonment was a direct consequence of his own behaviour. Similarly, the fact that further offending of a more serious nature occurred during ongoing deportation proceedings also indicates that the appellant has a lack of understanding of the negative consequences of his actions for his partner and children. The appellant’s behaviour was assessed to pose a ‘medium’ risk of serious harm to the children and was one of the reasons why a Child Protection Plan was considered necessary. There is insufficient evidence to show that the safeguarding concerns surrounding the appellant’s offending behaviour have been addressed.
(vii) There are no concerns about the appellant’s interpersonal relationships with the children. For this reason, it would be in their interest to still have in person contact with their father. While it is in the children’s best interests to continue to have contact with their father, the evidence at the date of the hearing showed that it is not likely to be in their interests for him to live with them in the family home. The appellant’s contact with his children was already reduced by a period in prison and now by the terms of his licence conditions. If the appellant were to be deported, the children could continue to benefit from his emotional support through modern means of communication. The appellant could provide that support on a daily basis if necessary if he is not incarcerated, albeit that it is likely to be less beneficial to the children compared to in person support.
191. I conclude that the separation of the appellant from his children is likely to give rise to emotional and behavioural difficulties and is likely to affect children’s ability to flourish and develop in the way that they deserve. The effect of deportation is also likely to place additional burdens on IA and the older children. The evidence shows that the consequences of the appellant’s behaviour have already had negative effects on the children. A more prolonged and permanent physical absence is only likely to exacerbate any difficulties that the children have been facing. While the appellant’s absence would undoubtedly affect the family in a negative way, other evidence shows that IA has been able to meet the children’s needs with the assistance of other family members and support services while the appellant was in prison. Indeed, their circumstances improved in the appellant’s absence albeit the children are still facing challenges.
192. This has been a particularly difficult decision because it affects so many children who are already vulnerable. The likely effect of deportation on the children gives rise to a compelling picture, but the additional support that has already been put in place is likely to ameliorate the effects of deportation to some extent.
193. The more serious nature of the recent conviction creates a much higher hurdle for the appellant to overcome. The evidence shows that the appellant has difficulty in learning from his mistakes. His assurances of reform cannot be given any weight. The pattern of reoffending in relation to the use and sale of drugs has only got worse despite his previous assurances. The continued risk of reoffending adds further weight to the public interest in deportation. The weight to be placed on the public interest is significantly increased in circumstances where there has been repeat offending at a more serious level, there is no reliable evidence of rehabilitation, and the fact that any risk of reoffending in relation to the use and sale of drugs itself poses a ‘medium’ risk of serious harm to his children.
194. Although the evidence relating to the effect that deportation would have on the children gives rise to compelling circumstances, I conclude that it is not sufficient to show that there are ‘very compelling circumstances’ to outweigh the significant weight that must be placed on the public interest in deportation for the purpose of section 117C(6) NIAA 2002.
195. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the decision to refuse the human rights claim is not unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal is DISMISSED on human rights grounds

M. Canavan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 October 2025


ANNEX

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2022-002023
(HU/09201/2017)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision Promulgated
on 30 August 2022


…………………………………


Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CANAVAN


Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

N Z N
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent


Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the original appellant (N Z N) is granted anonymity because the case involves consideration of child welfare issues. I make clear that the order is not made to protect the original appellant’s reputation following his conviction for criminal offences. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the original appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Representation:

For the appellant: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the respondent: Mr E. Nicholson, instructed by Duncan Lewis Solicitors


DECISION AND REASONS
1. For continuity, I will refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal although technically the Secretary of State is the appellant in the appeal before the Upper Tribunal.
2. The original appellant (N Z N) appealed the respondent’s (SSHD) decision dated 03 March 2021 to refuse a human rights claim in the context of deportation proceedings.
3. The appellant is a Jamaican citizen. He was born in Jamaica but says that he lived in the Netherlands from infancy. He says that he first entered the UK in 1998 when he was 17 years old. He entered with his mother, who is a Dutch national. There appears to be no record of the appellant being granted leave to enter or remain in the UK. There appears to be no evidence to indicate whether the appellant might have been entitled to European citizenship considering his mother’s nationality or might have had a right of residence under European law. The respondent made the deportation order with reference to domestic law rather than making a removal decision on public policy grounds with reference to European law.
4. First-tier Tribunal Judge Lucas (‘the judge’) allowed the appeal in a decision sent on 31 December 2021. He noted that the appellant had five convictions for 14 separate offences. The index offence leading to the respondent’s decision to make a deportation order was a conviction for possession with intent to supply Class A and B drugs for which he was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment [6]–[7]. The judge noted that the appellant has two children from a previous relationship and eight children with his current partner [15] (in fact he has six children with his current partner and two step-children). He summarised the respondent’s position in the decision letter. The respondent did not accept that there was sufficient evidence to show that the appellant had a genuine and subsisting relationship with the children. It would not be ‘unduly harsh’ for his current partner and her children to relocate to Jamaica or to remain in the UK without him [8]-[9]. The judge noted particular pieces of evidence, including the witness statement of the appellant’s partner, a letter of support from Enfield Council, letters from some of the children, and a letter from the school [17]. The judge also noted that there was a ‘significant’ piece of evidence from an independent social worker [18]. He considered the submissions made by the respondent in response to the ISW report [20]. He also summarised the legal submissions in which both parties referred to the relevant Court of Appeal case in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1176 [21]-[31].
5. The judge gave weight to the public interest in deportation. He noted that the appellant had committed several offences from 2007 to 2016 without thought for the effect that it might have on his large family [33]-[34]. He found that the sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment for the index offence was ‘relatively modest’ [36]. Having considered the ‘fundamental principle’ relating to the public interest in deportation, the judge went on to consider whether the appellant met the requirements of any of the ‘statutory exceptions’ to deportation [37]. He concluded that the appellant failed to meet the requirements of the private life exception contained in section 117C(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘the NIAA 2002’). The judge accepted that the appellant was genuinely remorseful and that there had been ‘clearly effective attempts to rehabilitate himself.’ There had been no further recidivism [40].
6. The judge went on to make the following findings relating to the effect of deportation on the appellant’s children:
’41. Having considered the facts of this case holistically I am – just – led to the conclusion that Section 117C (5 and 6) apply in this case. The family life exception, in my view – just – mitigates the clear and obvious public interest in his deportation.
42. I adopt a child centred approach as set out in the case of Zoumbas. I have considered the evidence from the Appellant, from his partner and the children themselves. I have also considered the letters from the school and the clear facts (sic) that the Appellant is a primary carer for his children and that there would be clear and deleterious consequences from (sic) his removal for his children and partner. The sheer size of the family makes this almost axiomatic. In this regard I am also reliant upon the findings and Report of the Independent Social Worker. I conclude that the impact upon 10 children and indeed his stepchildren would be adversely and disproportionately affected by the removal of this Appellant.
43. I have therefore concluded just that the best interests of the children in this case – 10 of them – outweigh the public interest in his deportation.’
7. The Secretary of State applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The grounds of appeal are in a standard format often used by the respondent in appeals involving deportation. They cite a series of cases relating to deportation and are not particularised. The only part of the grounds relating to the facts of this case are the following two paragraphs:
‘7. There is no finding that the appellant’s partner was unable to cope with the care of the children when the appellant was in prison. The independent social worker’s report alludes to the emotional effect on the children of the appellant’s deportation, however this is a matter for the appellant and his partner to manage. The FTTJ has failed to consider that the appellant’s partner may seek the support of Social Services in caring for the children, if necessary, following the appellant’s deportation.
8. It is submitted that the FTTJ fails to make a reasoned finding that the appellant’s deportation would result in unduly harsh consequences for the children. Instead the FTTJ seeks to rely on the best interests of the children [43], which is not the correct test. Furthermore, the FTTJ suggests that the fact that there are 10 children involved in this case of itself outweighs the public interest in the removal of foreign national offenders [42]. The FTTJ accepts that the appellant is remorseful on the basis of a bare assertion by the appellant himself [40]. It is submitted that this does not amount to a reasoned finding that the appellant has effectively rehabilitated himself, nor that the financial motive for the offending will not lead to offending in the future. Indeed, the FTTJ is alive to this possibility in effectively giving the appellant a final warning, rather than applying the established case and statute law.’
8. First-tier Tribunal Judge Cox granted permission on the ground that it was arguable that the judge did not apply the correct test of ‘unduly harsh’ although permission was not restricted to that single point.
9. At the hearing, Mr Tufan made an application to amend the grounds to include an argument to say that the judge erred in failing to consider an OASys assessment. The application was made late and without any adequate explanation as to why it was not made in writing in good time before the hearing. After exploring the issue further, The OASys report was said to have been filed with the First-tier Tribunal the day before the hearing, but Mr Tufan was unable to say whether it was drawn to the attention of the judge. Nothing on the face of the decision suggests that the Home Office Presenting Officer who attended the hearing referred to an OASys report in their submissions. In view of the fact that the application was made late, and that there was no evidence to show that the judge was referred to the report, I refused the application to amend the grounds.
10. On behalf of the Secretary of State, Mr Tufan was right to confine his submissions to the point made at [8] of the grounds of appeal. The statement made at [7] made nothing more than a general submission relating to the respondent’s view of the evidence. MR Tufan submitted that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for his findings. The judge failed to apply the test of ‘unduly harsh’ and did not give adequate reasons to explain why he concluded that the exceptions to deportation under sections 117C(5) and (6) NIAA 2002 applied. He failed to conduct any analysis of the report prepared by the Independent Social Worker or to explain why he gave such weight to the report.
11. On behalf of the original appellant, Mr Nicholson relied on a written response to the respondent’s grounds of appeal. He submitted that it was clear that the judge was aware that the test was ‘unduly harsh’. He considered the content of the Secretary of State’s decision, which referred to the relevant test. He referred to section 117C(5), which contained the same test. Mr Nicholson submitted that the judge clearly was aware of the elevated test because he stated that he had ‘just’ reached the conclusion that the evidence relating to the children outweighed the public interest in deportation. Mr Nicholson referred to [60] of the Court of Appeal decision in HA (Iraq) (2020) in which Lord Justice Underhill discussed the application of section 117C(6), stating that it is necessary to conduct a full proportionality assessment. The judge explained that he took a child centred approach. He accepted that the appellant was a primary carer and considered the sheer number of children who would be affected by the decision. The judge gave adequate reasons to explain why the appeal was allowed. The grounds only argued that the judge erred in respect of the test contained in section 117C(5). Permission was not granted to argue that the judge erred in respect of section 117C(6).
Decision and reasons
12. The grounds of appeal are not pleaded clearly beyond a general assertion that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for his decision. Mr Nicholson is correct to point out that the grounds only appear to challenge findings relating to the test of ‘unduly harsh’ for the purpose of section 117C(5) NIAA 2002. It is trite to say that a judge need not give detailed reasons relating to each and every piece of evidence. It is possible to give succinct but clear reasons for a decision. However, those reasons do need to be adequately explained and evidence that is material to the decision should be evaluated properly so that the unsuccessful party can understand how and why the judge came to the decision that they did.
13. In this case the judge’s core reasoning is brief, to the extent that it was possible to simply quote the key reasoning at [6] above. Earlier in the decision, judge summarised the decision letter, which referred to the test of ‘unduly harsh’ contained in the exception to deportation under section 117C(5). Notably, the decision-maker found that it would not be unduly harsh for the nuclear family the appellant has with his current partner to go to Jamaica with him (the ‘go’ scenario) or to remain in the UK without him (the ‘stay’ scenario). It is also clear from the judge’s summary of the submissions made at the hearing that he was referred to relevant cases that give guidance on the assessment of the ‘unduly harsh’ test. The judge also referred to sections 117C(5) and 117C(6)during the course of his findings.
14. However, those references only formed part of a general summary of the evidence and submissions. When it came to the section where the judge made his findings, there is no evaluation of the relevant test. He listed the evidence that he had considered but at no point in the decision does he explain the content nor explain why he gave weight to that evidence. Whilst the parties are aware of the content of the evidence, it is a key task of a judicial decision-maker to evaluate that evidence.
15. The judge appeared to place weight on the report prepared by an Independent Social Worker (ISW), but at no point outlined what the social worker’s conclusions were or explained why he placed weight on that evidence or why it might outweigh the public interest in deportation. On a closer reading of that report, the ISW conducted the interviews in less than ideal circumstances by Zoom. The self-reported information from the family did not disclose any particularly unusual circumstances. Some of the children were reported to have found it difficult in the appellant’s absence when he was in prison. They were living in a somewhat precarious situation due to difficulties in housing such a large family who were reliant on public funds for support. Otherwise, there were not reported to be any significant health problems or disabilities among the children. In assessing the best interests of the children, the ISW found that the appellant was a supportive parent but did not appear to take into account any potentially negative factors, such as the fact that the appellant had several convictions for possession and intent to supply class A drugs. The ISW came to the self-evident conclusion that it would not be in the best interests of the children to be separated from a supportive parent.
16. Although an overall reading of the decision might indicate that the judge was aware of the ‘unduly harsh’ test contained in section 117C(5), of more concern is the rather muddled nature of the findings, which do not make clear what legal framework the judge actually applied.
17. At two points in the decision the judge referred more generically to ‘proportionality’ rather than making a specific self-direction to the ‘unduly harsh’ test [10][42]. It would have been better to focus on the specific test applicable to the exception. However, technically this is not incorrect because section 117A(3) NIAA 2002 makes clear that ‘the public interest question’ assessed under section 117C means the question of whether an interference with a person’s right to private and family life is justified under Article 8(2). In other words, the statutory scheme is concerned with an overall assessment of proportionality.
18. The judge stated that both sections 117C(5) and (6) applied in this case. However, no clear findings were in fact made as to how or why deportation would be ‘unduly harsh’ on the children. There was no analysis of the ‘stay’ or ‘go’ scenarios required by the legal framework. There was no analysis of the ISW report or the other evidence that he said he had considered. Whilst there is some force in the judge’s observation that the sheer size of the family made it almost axiomatic that there would be ‘clear and deleterious consequences’ for the appellant’s partner and children, he did not go on to explain how or why that was the case with reference to the content of the evidence. The fact that there would be ‘adverse’ consequences might seem obvious, but the key task was to explain was how and why those adverse consequences were sufficiently serious for the effect of deportation to reach the threshold of ‘unduly harsh’. This is absent from the reasoning. For these reasons, I conclude that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for his finding that section 117C(5) applied.
19. Although I accept that the grounds of appeal did not particularise a specific challenge to the finding that section 117C(6) applied, there was a general challenge to the overall reasoning. I cannot ignore the fact that the same lack of reasoning and muddled references to the legal framework undermine the apparent finding made at [41] that section 117C(6) applied. Immediately after that statement, the judge said that the ‘family life exception’ (section 117C(5)) ‘mitigates the clear and obvious public interest in his deportation.’ It is unclear from this whether the judge was making a finding relating to the ‘unduly harsh’ test contained in section 117C(5). If he was, it is trite that the test does not involve a balancing exercise with public interest considerations as he appears to find.
20. If he was actually going on to conduct a full balancing exercise under section 117C(6) it is not clear from the subsequent findings at [42]-[43]. At no point is there a direction to the test of ‘very compelling circumstances’, let alone any clear reasoning to explain why the family circumstances were sufficiently compelling to outweigh the public interest in deportation.
21. At [44] the judge found that the best interests of the children outweighed the public interest in deportation. Although the best interests of the children are an important part of assessing whether deportation would be ‘unduly harsh’, the best interests of the children are not determinative of either of the assessments under sections 117C(5) or (6). Firstly, it is not clear what findings related to which section of 117C. Secondly, the best interests of the children are not determinative of either test. Thirdly, if the judge was conducting an assessment under section 117C(6), which is not clear, there is a lack of reasoning to explain how or why the evidence relating to the family circumstances was sufficiently compelling to meet the requirements of either test.
22. I accept that the number of children affected by the decision is unusually high in this case. But the mere fact that the appellant has a large family does not make the outcome of the appeal so obvious that the judicial decision maker was exempted from giving clear and structure reasons in the context of a proper analysis of the evidence. On this occasion, I conclude that the reasoning relating to the evidence was lacking and the application of the legal framework was confused and unclear. It is not possible to ascertain with any confidence the basis upon which the appeal was allowed.
23. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.
DECISION
The First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error on a point of law
The decision will be remade at a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal


Signed M. Canavan Date 14 November 2022
Upper Tribunal Judge Canavan