Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2022-004608

First-tier Tribunal No: DA/00153/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

7th April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

TOMASZ LESZEK REWERS
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person.
For the Respondent: Ms Simbi, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 28 March 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. In a determination dated 10 January 2025 the Upper Tribunal found an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which allowed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision, dated 15 April 2021, to deport him from the United Kingdom.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Poland born on 2 February 1981.
3. The Appellant claimed to have arrived in the UK on 1 September 2004. On 16 November 2004 he registered on the ‘Accession State Work account registration Scheme’ which was a temporary measure used during the period from 2004 to 2011 to restrict incoming workers from the eight member states of the European Union in central Europe and the Baltic region of northern Europe, referred to as the A8 countries.
4. On 9 April 2018 the Secretary of State considered whether the Appellant should be deported from the United Kingdom but decided that he did not at that point meet the criteria for criminal deportation, although referred his case for consideration of administrative removal. On 17 May 2018 a decision was made not to pursue deportation, although a Warning Letter was issued to the Appellant.
5. On 26 March 2020 the Appellant was served with a ‘Notice of liability to deportation’ in accordance with the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (‘the 20216 Regulations”).
6. On 24 August 2020 the Appellant made an application under the EU Settlement Scheme.
7. The Appellant came to the attention of the Secretary of State as a result of his criminality, recorded in the Decision to make a Deportation Order dated 15 April 2021 (‘the Deport Decision’) at [5] in the following terms:
5. Your criminal history is detailed here:
◦ On 24 February 2007 you received a Caution from Nottinghamshire Police for ‘Common Assault’
◦ On 13 November 2008 you were convicted of one count of ‘Destroy or damage property’ and one count of ‘Common assault’ and given a Community order for 12 months and 12 months supervision, and ordered to pay £300 costs
◦ On 13 May 2009 you were convicted of ‘Breach of a community order’ resulting from your conviction of 13 November 2008 and the Community order was varied (2 compliance sessions added)
◦ On 18 February 2010 you were convicted of one count of ‘Common assault’ and one count of ‘Destroy or damage property’ and were sentenced on 21 April 2010 to a Community order for 12 months, an unpaid work requirement and ordered to pay £100 compensation
◦ On 2 October 2012 you received a Caution from Nottinghamshire Police for ‘Destroy or damage property’
◦ On 23 December 2013 you were convicted of ‘Threatening to destroy or damage property’ and were sentenced on 21 March 2014 to a Community order, Supervision requirement for 12 months, made subject to a 5-year Restraining order and mandated to complete the ‘Thinking skills’ programme
◦ On 14 January 2014 you were convicted of ‘Failing to provide a specimen for analysis’; ‘Using vehicle while uninsured’ and ‘Driving otherwise than in accordance with a licence’ and were sentenced to 1 days’ detention in the court house and Disqualified from driving for 18 months
◦ On 17 November 2015 you were convicted of ‘Harassment – Breach of restraining order’ and were sentenced to 13 weeks’ imprisonment suspended for 18 months, mandated to complete the ‘Building better relationships’ programme and ordered to pay £200 costs
◦ On 28 June 2017 you were convicted of two counts of ‘Battery’, one count of ‘Harassment – Breach of restraining order’ and one count of ‘Destroy or damage property’ and were sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 26 weeks’ imprisonment suspended 18 months; rehabilitation activity 30 days, electronic tagging and curfew 3 months
◦ On 23 March 2018 you were convicted of ‘Harassment – Breach of restraining order’; ‘Commission of further offence during operational period of suspended sentence order’ resulting from offence on 28 June 2017, and were sentenced to 12 weeks’ imprisonment on each count to be served consecutively (24 weeks’ imprisonment total)
◦ On 8 January 2020 you were convicted of ‘Engage in controlling/coercive behaviour in an intimate/family relationship’ and ‘Battery’ and were sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment on count 1 and 3 months’ imprisonment on count 2 to be served concurrently (15 months’ imprisonment total).
8. Since the date of the Deport Decision and the Appellants conviction and imprisonment on 8 January 2021, there are two further entries:
• 29 January 2021 Appellant was convicted by Greater Manchester Magistrates Court of breach of a non-molestation order on 18 September 2021, pursuant to the Family Law Act 1996, to which he pleaded guilty, and for which she was imprisoned for 12 weeks and made the subject of a restraining order – protection from harassment to 23rd September 2023, and ordered to pay a victim surcharge of £128.
• On 26 May 2023 the Appellant was convicted by Nottingham Magistrates on the charge of pursuing a course of conduct which amounted to harassment on 8 April 2023 – 30 April 2023, pursuant to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, to which he pleaded guilty. Appellant was sentenced to an eight week period of imprisonment, ordered to pay costs of £85, made the subject of a restraining order – protection from harassment to 25 June 2024. In order to pay a victim surcharge of £154.
9. The level of protection to which the Appellant is entitled under the 2016 Regulations is the middle level of protection as it was found by the First-Tier Tribunal Judge that the Appellant had established a right of permanent residence in the United Kingdom, which was preserved by the Upper Tribunal in its error of law decision. That means a decision can only be made on serious grounds of public policy or public security in accordance with regulation 27(3) of the 2016 Regulations.
10. ‘Serious grounds of public policy or public security’ are not defined in the 2016 Regulations and to justify a decision on serious grounds there must be stronger grounds than would be applicable for a person who does not have a right of permanent residence. Caselaw shows a wide range of offenses that could meet the serious ground threshold depending on the seriousness of the offence and the degree of involvement in those types of criminal activity.
11. Whether or not the serious grounds of public policy or public security threshold has been met will depend on the specific facts of the case.
12. As the decision under appeal relates to conduct that occurred prior to 11 PM 31 December 2020 the applicable provisions are those in the 2016 Regulations even though the UK left the EU. Had the Deport Decision been based upon the two incidents at [8] above, only domestic law would have applied meaning the Appellant would not have the protection of EU law in Directive 2004/EC/38 as transposed into UK law in the 2016 Regulations – see Vargova v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] UKUT 00336 (IAC).
13. Regulation 27 of the 2016 Regulations reflects the content of Directive 2004/38/EC which provides criteria governing the expulsion of the nationals and their family members who are settled in other Member States.
14. Regulation 27 can be summarised as follows:
27(1) the decision to deport must, in this case, have been taken on the grounds of public policy and/or public security.
27(5)(a) if grounds of public policy and public security are demonstrated, the decision must nonetheless comply with the principle of proportionality;
27(5)(b) the decision must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the appellant;
27(5)(c) the personal conduct of the appellant must represent a “genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat” affecting one of the fundamental interests of society;
27(5)(d) matters isolated from the particular facts of the case and/or generalised considerations do not justify a decision to deport;
27(5)(e) a person’s criminal convictions do not in themselves justify the decision;
27(6) a wide variety of factors must be taken into account, including age, health, length of residence, and social and cultural integration;
27(8) public policy and public security requirements involve consideration of the fundamental interests of society, including in particular the considerations set out in Schedule 1 to the Regulations.
15. There is also a requirement for such decisions to take account of the person’s age, state of health, family and economic situation, length of residence in the UK and the extent of the links with the country of origin.
16. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the burden is upon the Secretary of State to discharge the burden of showing the Appellant presents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interests of society and that the decision to deport is in accordance with the 2016 Regulations and, if so, whether the decision would be proportionate in all the circumstances.
17. The question the Secretary of State needs to answer is whether there is conduct or behaviour that sufficiently engages the public policy or public security test and, in particular, she must show there is a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat, taking into account all the relevant factors in the particular case . This means there must be evidence of a real risk, which need not be imminent, that a person is likely to reoffend.
18. I accept that preventing crimes of domestic abuse and violence relate to a fundamental interest of society, namely the protection of members of society from the same.
19. The Appellant attended the hearing, with family members and support, although they did not give oral evidence, and claims that he will not reoffend in the future as he has in the past. Whether weight can be given to such a claim depends upon an assessment of the evidence in the round.
20. I accept that the Appellant cannot be deported solely on the basis of his conviction in 2020, although his previous convictions, recorded above, are relevant to assess whether it establishes a pattern of conduct and, if it does, whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a finding there is no real risk of the same in the future and/or whether if there is, the other factors relied upon by the Appellant are sufficient to enable me to find that deportation will not be proportionate under EU law.
21. In relation to the offence for which the Appellant was sentenced at Nottingham Crown Court on 30 March 2020 the Sentencing Remarks of the judge, whose name is not given, read:
Stand up please. Over the last few years you have made your wife's life a misery. At the root of that lies your persistent drunkenness, your jealousy regarding her, your refusal to trust her, and your consequent disrespect for her as a person completely. If it is true that your relationship is at an end then well and good.
On your past history, however, I am by no means certain that even though you have signed the divorce papers you will accept that fact. This is not the first time that you have appeared before a court because of your behaviour towards her. Some may say that in the past you have been treated leniently. I am afraid that the time for that has gone.
This was a persistent course of conduct over some months. You contested the allegations in the Magistrates Court and you were convicted of them. That means that you can have no credit for any guilty plea.
Your attitude to your conviction is illuminating. Quote, "The judge supported her. Not that the judge was satisfied on the evidence that I was wrong. Not that I'm prepared to accept that I was wrong." Rather, as always, that it was somebody else's fault. That is something that you will have to come to terms with whilst you are in custody. And if you are now considering your future you will have further time to do so, and I hope to good effect.
But these offences are so serious that a custodial sentence cannot be avoided I am afraid. Taking clearly the controlling behaviour as the lead offence, the sentence on that count is one of fifteen months' imprisonment. For the common assault, which I have used as the lead offence, there will be a concurrent sentence of three months' imprisonment. So the sentence in total is fifteen months.
You will serve up to one half of that sentence before you are released. You will then be subject to licence and indeed supervision in the community. I hope that your son can find it in his heart to forgive you. You will only have yourself to blame if he cannot. You can go down. Statutory surcharge applies of course.
22. The Appellant produced a witness statement for the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal. In relation to his criminal conviction, he writes:
Criminal convictions
13. I sincerely apologise for my past offences and I know that I have broken the trust placed in me when I breached my licence conditions, but I can assure the court that this will not happy again in the future. I understand that sometimes I can suffer from anger but I only ever contacted my ex-wife to find out about my daughter.
14. I am a family man, I love my children more than anything in this world and I just wanted to make sure that she was ok. I greatly apologise for anything that I have said or done in the past, but I would never truly harm anyone.
15. I would like to be granted another chance to prove that I just want to live in the UK with a normal life. I want to be here for my daughter when I get the chance to build my relationship with her again. I want to be here for my son when he gets out of prison. I hope that I can start a fresh and begin to create a better life for myself.
16. I am extremely remorseful for any pain or suffering that I have caused.
17. Whilst in prison, I have had time to think about my actions and reflecting on these has actually caused for me to suffer with my mental health in prison. I have tried and successfully self-harmed. I just remember thinking after I did that, what would my children think about me if I died in prison. This is what has made me want to deal with any of my issues and ensure that I start fresh when released.
23. When the Appellant had his appeal heard before the First-tier Tribunal one of the issues considered was the question of integration. Those findings are preserved, as noted above, and it is relevant to note the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s finding at [27] of that determination, where she wrote:
27. This pattern of behaviour on the part of the Appellant, recorded since 2007, is indicative I find of the Appellant’s rejection of societal values. That is because (i) he does not respect court orders as evidenced by his repeated breaching of them (ii) he repeatedly offends in the same manner against the same victim notwithstanding being punished by the criminal courts for doing so and being warned by the Respondent as to the effect that this will have on his ability to remain in the United Kingdom; and (iii) he blames his victim for his own conduct.
24. The First-tier Tribunal Judge’s findings in this regard have been supported by the Appellant’s own conduct. The First-tier Tribunal decision was promulgated on 5 August 2022 and is based upon a finding that the Secretary of State had not established that the Appellant would reoffend sufficient to satisfy the relevant test. That aspect was found to be infected by material legal area as the First-tier Tribunal only focused on risk to the Appellant’s ex-wife who was the subject of his adverse behaviour, as noted in the sentencing remarks, whereas the Secretary of State’s grounds related to the risk posed by the Appellant to a much wider group within society. The faith put in the Appellant by the First-tier Tribunal Judge was also seriously undermined as evidenced by the fact he was convicted of a further offence against a different partner in 2023.
25. The Secretary of State in the Deport Decision at [36 – 39] refers to an OASys report.
26. A copy of the report has been provided in the bundle of evidence and is dated 24 July 2020.
27. In relation to the question of whether there is a pattern of offending, which is relevant to whether it has been established there is a real risk of similar conduct in the future, it is written at 2.12:
2.12 The current matters are viewed as an established pattern of offending behaviour. Mr Rewers has 8 previous convictions at a total of numerous 16 offences on record between 2008 and 2018, with four offences against the person. During interview Mr Rewers confirmed all previous assaults were against the victim.
It is also of note Mr Rewers breach the Restraining Order he received in 2013 on 3 separate occasions, most recently in 2018, wherein he received 12 weeks custody. When discussing the breaches of the Restraining Order, Mr Rewers stated on each occasion, he and the victim had decided to attempt reconciliation.

28. In relation to identifying offence analysis issues contributing to the risk of offending and real harm, in paragraph 2.14, it is written:
2.14 The relevant triggers to the current matters are Mr Rowers’ inability to effectively manage his emotions and behaviour during conflict with his victim and their 18 year old son. It is also my assessment Mr Rewers’ repeated misuse of alcohol impaired his ability to effectively manage his emotions, behaviour and use appropriate thinking skills.
29. In relation to identifying whether relationship issues contribute to the risk of offending and harm, it is written at paragraph 6.12:
6.12 Relationships are a relevant contributory factor to the current matters, as the victim is Mr Rewers’ estranged wife. It is my assessment Mr Rewers relationship with his 18-year-old son is also a relevant contributory factor to the problems Mr Rewers has been experiencing with the victim: in terms of communication and inability to find a solution to change his behaviour. Crown Prosecution Service documents state Mr Rewers has subjected his wife to domestic abuse for approximately 8 years and he is described as being extremely volatile and violent. During interview Mr Rewers appeared to accept his relationship with the victim has ended, as she informed me he had signed and returned the divorce papers he received whilst on remand.
Several breaches of Restraining Orders, first one in 2008 recent non-molestation order dated 13.12.2019 – 28.5.2020.
30. It is recorded that the Appellant accepts that he began to abuse alcohol heavily when he and the victim began to argue frequently when discussing their relationship and their son’s behaviour, but that he voluntarily engaged with the Alcohol Misuse Team within HMP Nottingham and that, as at that time he had been in custody for approximately 10 weeks, he was no longer alcohol dependent.
31. In the section of the report headed “Risk of serious harmful analysis (Layer 3) identify risk of serious harm to children whose identity is known”, it is written:
Mr Rewers has a long history of domestic abuse, both physical and psychological abuse towards his wife, as well as the impact of this abuse on his children.
Previous KPC completed:
Children known historically, last referral the NSPCC helpline was contacted by telephone on 21.01.2020 at 14:37 raising concerns for an 11 year old and an 18 year old due to physical abuse and parental behaviour.
Outcome: analysis:
• No concerns raised by school/agency checks.
• Father a perpetrator of domestic violence and controlling behaviour towards (redacted) has been convicted of this offence and is currently in prison.
• (Redacted) denies she has ever hit (redacted).
• (Redacted) been convicted for the offence has reduced the risk of domestic violence in the household and this in itself is a protective factor for the children – (redacted) shown strengths to end the relationship and has been supported throughout via Women’s Aid. Case was closed.
June 2017 DV incident in which a child sustained injury, assessment completed in case closed, no current involvement.
32. The nature of the risk posed by the Appellant is described as domestic violence – physical, emotional, psychological harm - coercion and control, sexual harm -R.10.2.
33. The risk is said likely to be the greatest when the Appellant is intoxicated, in dispute with his wife, struggling with his emotional well-being, or when a relationship is ended - R 10.3.
34. Circumstances said to be likely to increase risk are when the Appellant is intoxicated, when he is in dispute with his wife, if the Appellant is struggling with his emotional well-being, when the relationship is ended - R 10.4.
35. Factors which are said to be likely to reduce risk are the Appellant being in custody - R 10.5.
36. As a result of the full assessment, in relation to the risk of serious harm posed by the Appellant, it is written at R10.6:

Risk
Risk in Community
Risk in Custody
Children
High
Low
Public
High
Low
Known adult
High
Low
Staff
Low
Low
Prisoners

Low

37. A high risk of serious harm is defined as there being identifiable indicators of risk of serious harm. The potential event could happen at any time and the impact would be serious.
38. The same assessment appears in the section of the report entitled “Likelihood of serious harm to others” with current concerns being recorded as control issues and breach of trust.
39. At the start of the hearing the Appellant was read to the content of [36-39] of the Secretary of State’s decision by me, in which it is written:
36. The consequences for those involved in, or touched by, domestic violence is enormous. Your offender manager refers to your ‘repeated victimisation’ of Ms Rewers and the ‘physical and emotional impact’ of your offending (OASys, s.2.5).
37. Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) documents describe you as being extremely volatile and violent (OASys, s.2.8). Your offender manager has stated you have ‘significant problems’ in relation to your thinking and behaviour skills, problem solving skills and temper control as well as problems with impulsivity and aggressive and controlling behaviour (OASys, s.11). ‘By the nature of the index offence Mr Rewers is demonstrating reckless, manipulative and predatory behaviour.’ (OASys, s.7.5)
38. You have continued to commit domestic violence related offences despite completing court mandated programmes on ‘Thinking skills’ in 2013 and ‘Building better relationships’ in 2015.
39. You have been assessed by your offender manager as having a high risk of posing serious harm in the community to a known adult (Ms Rewers), children and the public.
40. The reference to completion of mandated programmes is a reference to (i) a sentence imposed by Nottingham and Newark Magistrates on 23 December 2013 when the Appellant threatened to damage or destroy property for which he was committed to the Crown Court for sentence in custody and where, on 13 January 2014 he was sentenced, which included requirement to attend the ‘Thinking Skills’ programme, which would have been impose in the hope that it would enable the Appellant to change his behaviour, and (ii) 17 November 2015 in relation to a sentence imposed by Nottingham Magistrates for the offence of harassment – breach of restraining order – on conviction, for which the Appellants was given a suspended sentence of 13 weeks wholly suspended for 18 months with a requirement of undertaking the ‘Building Better Relationships programme, and a rehabilitation activity requirement. Neither of which appears to have had any positive impact upon the Appellant so far as his offending behaviour is concerned.
41. The Appellant was asked by me whether he had undertaken any other courses or done anything to addresses offending behaviour, and the cause of the same, to which he stated he had not.
42. In relation to why the Appellant behaves as he has, and the risk of a repeat of such behaviour in the future, I find there is a credible real risk as identified in the OASys report, especially as the Appellant has undertaken no work with professionals specialising this area. It is also not known whether a further contributing factor may be the Appellant’s belief that he is right and that others should not argue with him, and that if they do, he is entitled to react as he has.
43. I find, having has the benefit of discussing these matters with the Appellant directly, that the problems identified in the OASys report, even though it is dated 2020, in relation to causation and an explanation for the Appellant’s behaviour are very much still present in his personality today.
44. I find there is no satisfactory explanation for why the Appellant thought it was acceptable to behave in the way he did. It may be that he has a toxic masculine ideology based on cultural beliefs or types of behavioural roles associated with the status of a male in Polish society, but he now lives in United Kingdom. The Appellant also states he is a Catholic, but the teachings of the Catholic church and its values do not appear to be any importance to him if he finds himself threatened or in a situation in which somebody, in his opinion, dares to challenge him.
45. I am satisfied that the Secretary of State has established on the facts that the Appellant poses a real risk now and in the future of reoffending in the same or a similar manner to that he has in the past. It is not the case that the only victim is his ex-wife and the problems associated with the breakdown of that long relationship and marriage, as evidenced by the 2023 conviction against the new partner the Appellant had at that time.
46. In relation to whether the higher threshold of seriousness has been breached, it may be the view in some societies, as it appears to have been previously in some sectors of the United Kingdom, that domestic violence/domestic abuse was not serious. Fortunately, that view no longer prevails.
47. The consequences of domestic abuse include mental, emotional, physical, social and economic detriment to a victim/survivor and their family and children and can lead to wider cost to society including to the police, health and other services.
48. Damage to health can include physical and sexual violence which in some cases can lead to attempted suicide or suicidal ideation (Aitkin and Munro, 2028).
49. Impact on mental health can lead to victims feeling helpless, insecure and broken. Victims may be cut off from support networks such as family and friends. Depression, isolation, need for intervention and/or differing forms of treatment are likely consequences.
50. The cost of domestic abuse to society is in terms of millions of pounds annually and includes costs relating to physical and emotional harm experienced by survivors, particularly emotional harm.
51. Even if the Appellant has dealt with his previous alcohol abuse, there is insufficient evidence to allow me to find that he has addressed the triggers to his behaviour, such as his inability to manage his emotions and behaviour during conflict.
52. There is also evidence of the Appellant, despite being the subject of a five-year restraining order in relation to his ex-wife made on 23 December 2013, having been convicted of breaches of the same resulting in his being sentenced to 12 weeks imprisonment as noted above. The Appellant was made the subject of a non-molestation order by the Nottingham Family Court. I have seen a copy of the interim urgent order that was made. The Appellant was asked whether he went to the Court on the date provided but stated he did not. As far as this Tribunal is concerned that order would have been continued as a final order following the Appellant having been given the opportunity to attend court to state his case in relation to the same.
53. As well as the offending behaviour referred to in the documents it is also important to consider the Applicant’s motives and reasons which appear to relate to control and coercion of partners and adverse reaction to being challenged, as noted above. What is clear from the evidence is that if the Appellant is in a situation of conflict i.e. arguing with a partner who says something that he does not like he will retaliate. Even if he realises he said something bad he claims he will say sorry, but it was clear he would not let matters go and will continue with the conflict, perhaps until he feels he has won. When this was specifically put to him by Ms Simbi the Appellant seemed unable to comprehend the point that was being made, in that in a situation of conflict such as those she was describing he should have just walked away. The problem is his personality and character mean that he will not, leading to real risk of harm identified in the OASys report and consequences for the victim which have been shown to cross the higher threshold of seriousness, both in nature and frequency.
54. The threat posed by the Appellant is not just limited to domestic situation with a partner as he has been found to pose a high risk to the general public.
55. The next thing to be considered the issue of the proportionality of the decision. This has to be considered in relation to the proportionality of the interference with the Appellants right to free movement under Directive 2004/EC/38.
56. Regulation 27 (5)(a) of the 2016 Regulations specifically provides that any decision to remove “must comply with the principle of proportionality”. Regulation 27 (6) states “before taking a relevant decision on the grounds of public policy or public security in relation to a person who is resident in the United Kingdom the decision-maker must take account of considerations such as the age, state of health, family and economic situation of the person, the person’s length of residence in United Kingdom, the person social and cultural integration into the United Kingdom and the extent of the person’s links with his country of origin”.
57. In relation to these issues, I find as follows:
a) age: the Appellant was born on 2 February 1981.
b) Health: the Appellant claimed to have asthma which at [56] the Deport Decision is said not to have been evidenced, but which does not, in any event, establish a bar to his removal from the U.K. as treatment for asthma is available and accessible in Poland.
There is reference by his Offender Manager to an incident in 2013 when the Appellant poured petrol over himself and threatened to set himself alight in response to his ex-wife wanting to end their relationship, and in May 2020 to the Appellant reporting thoughts of self-harm whilst at HMP Nottingham; although it is recorded at [58] of the Deport Decision that he was not claiming to be currently having thoughts of self-harm and had not indicated he was receiving treatment from any health professional for any mental health issues, which remains the position before me today.
The appellant pouring petrol over himself and threatening to set himself alight because his ex-partner stated she wanted to end the relationship is an example of his emotional immaturity/instability and lack of possession of adequate thinking skills when faced with a situation which he does not like. There is, however, no suggestion of a repeat of the same or any credible risk of self-harm if he is deported from the UK. There is insufficient evidence to warrant a finding that the Appellant’s health, physical or mental, will result in a breach of Article 3 ECHR if he is removed from the UK, or sufficient to make Respondent’s decision disproportionate.
c) Family situation: although there was support for the Appellant before the Tribunal it was not made out his family situation is sufficient to make removal disproportionate. The Deport Decision notes the Appellant was estranged from his wife who was the victim of his domestic violence offending and that there is reference to divorce in the documents. The Appellant has two children with his ex-wife, M, born on 9 July 2021 and therefore an adult, and J, born on 26 January 2008 now aged 17. At [64] of the Deport Decision is reference to the earlier injunctions prohibiting contact with the Appellant’s ex-wife and daughter, including reference to a 12-month Order made by the Nottingham Family Court on 2 March 2021 with no evidence of any variance of the order. It is therefore not made out the Appellant’s family situation, singularly or collectively with other matters, makes the decision to deport disproportionate.
d) Economic situation: it is not disputed the Appellant has been in the UK since he arrived in 2004 although the evidence of his employment does not demonstrate continuous employment. The Appellant became self-employed in 2015. I accept, like many Polish men, the Appellant has a desire to work and is probably a hard worker, but it was not made out his employment skills and experience gained in the UK will not prevent him obtaining work in Poland from which he can support himself financially. The Polish economy is doing very well at this present time with availability of jobs. The Appellant was able to set up a business in the UK and there is merit in the comment at [68] of the Deport Decision that he could do the same in Poland.
e) Length of residence in the UK: the Appellant claimed to have entered the UK on 1 September 2024 aged 23 and to have lived here continuously since that date exercising treaty rights.
f) Social and cultural integration: it is not disputed that as a result of the length of time the Appellant has been in the UK and the fact he has been employed and operated a business here that he has established links and social ties to the UK. It is not made out, however, that he could not maintain friendships and social ties he has formed from Poland, especially with those in the Polich community in the UK. It is also relevant when assessing the issue of integration to consider the Appellant’s criminality, with specific reference to the nature and frequency of his offending which demonstrates disregard for the laws, court orders, and his unacceptable subjective view of what is accepted in society, particularly in a domestic setting, and of UK values. There is merit in the Secretary of State’s view at [75] of the Deport Decision that on balance these matters outweigh elements of integration provided by employment history and length of residence. I also note the Offender Manager’s view at paragraph 7.1 of the OASys that the Appellant has specific significant problems in relation to community integration. I find that the Secretary of State has established when weighing up the available information that the Appellant has not demonstrated he is socially and culturally integrated in the UK.
g) Links with country of origin, Poland: the Appellant claimed that in Poland he would not have anywhere to go, he did not know anybody and had had no contact with family there since 2004. However, the Appellant spent his childhood and early adulthood in Poland and it has not been made out he will not be familiar with the culture, society and language. Even though he may encounter hardship in reintegrating it has not been established he will face undue hardship or insurmountable obstacles that will prevent reintegration. The Secretary of State specifically put the Appellant to proof of his claim to have no contact with family in Poland since 2004 which he has not provided. It is therefore an unverified claim that he has no family ties in Poland.
58. I find on balance the Secretary of State has established when weighing up the Regulation 27 (6) factors that deportation will be proportionate. The Appellant has failed to establish that it is necessary for him to remain in the United Kingdom. It is not made out there was anything specific to his relationship with his children that would make it disproportionate to remove him, even if this meant he could only maintain a long-distance relationship unless the children visited him in Poland.
59. It is also necessary to consider the question of rehabilitation - see Regulation 27(5)(a) of the 2016 Regulations.
60. As noted above, the Appellant was asked by me at the start of the hearing whether he had attended any courses or undertaken and work to try and deal with the causes of his offending but he stated he had not. This reflects the view at [85] of the Deport Decision which records he had not stated at that time whether he had attended any offence-related courses whilst in custody. I refer above to the court mandated programs on thinking skills in 2013 and building better relationships in 2015 which provided the Appellant with opportunities to rehabilitate himself, but the evidence is that despite this he continued to offend and had not been deterred, as evidenced by his recent conviction in 2023.
61. One of the barriers to successful rehabilitation in the United Kingdom appears to be the Appellant’s own attitude to his offending. It is not made out that if he sought it, he would not be able to work towards rehabilitation in Poland. Neither has the Appellant established that he needed to remain in the UK to become rehabilitated.
62. I find for the reasons set out above, that the Secretary of State has established on the evidence that the Appellant presents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat, to the required standard, to one or more of the fundamental interests of UK society and that his deportation is justified in accordance with the 2016 Regulations, as saved. The Secretary of State has also established that the Appellant’s personal circumstances, given the threat he poses, do not make his deportation disproportionate in accordance with the principles of regulation 27(5) and (6).
63. The Deport Decision goes on to consider Article 8 ECHR with reference to family and private life.
64. The Appellant relied upon a claim to have a genuine and subsisting family life with a partner and his two children in the UK as well as a private life.
65. In relation to his son M, who it is recorded has also been convicted of an act of domestic violence again his partner, he is an adult with no evidence of a relationship of the required degree to establish ongoing family life between Appellant and his adult son recognised by Article 8 ECHR.
66. In relation to his daughter J, section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 mandates that consideration must be given to the best interests of the child.
67. The evidence shows that the Non-Molestation Order made by the Nottingham Family Court on 2 March 2021 prohibited contact with J for a period of 12 months. The Appellant was asked about the order and his evidence given in relation to the continuation of that order. The terms of the Order indicate the view of the Nottingham Family Court was that it was not in the child’s best interests for the Appellant to have contact with his daughter.
68. Having analysed the Appellant’s offending history and periods of imprisonment the Secretary of State’s assessment at [118] of the Deport Decision is that J’s mother is her primary carer, with contact between the Appellant and J being affected by circumstances, represents the current situation.
69. Even if the Appellant has established a genuine and subsisting relationship with J it will be necessary to establish whether it will be unduly harsh for child either to remain in the UK whilst the Appellant is deported, the ‘stay scenario’ or to return with him to Poland, the ‘go scenario’.
70. J’s family, friends, schooling and other contacts are within the UK. I accept, although evidence is limited, that it will be unduly harsh to expect her to go to Poland with the Appellant as it is highly unlikely her mother would wish to do so and her mother is her primary carer.
71. In relation to the ‘stay scenario’, the evidence does not support a finding that it will be unduly harsh upon J if the Appellant is deported. I accept there may be an emotional impact upon J but she is now a young woman who is nearly and adult with a degree of maturity which will enable her to understand what has occurred and the reasons why. I find there is insufficient evidence to establish the threshold of undue harshness will be reached.
72. In relation to private life, it is accepted the Appellant has a private life in the UK but is not made out he is socially and culturally integrated in the UK or that there will be significant obstacles, let alone very significant obstacles, to his integration into Poland. There is insufficient evidence of a strong private life sufficient to tip the balance in his favour.
73. It is also relevant when considering the proportionality of any interference with a protected right to consider the strong case made out by the Secretary of State for why the Appellant should be deported, which gives very considerable weight to the public interest.
74. I find it is not made out there are very significant circumstances or very compelling circumstances that outweigh the public interest in deportation. As noted at [140] of the Deport Decision:
◦ You are a persistent offender; you have nine convictions for eighteen offences committed between 14 May 2008 and 27 November 2019.
◦ Your offences relate to five offences against the person (2008-2020); four offences against property (2008-2017); two offences relating to Police/Courts/Prisons (2009-2018) and seven Miscellaneous offences (2014-2020).
◦ Your index conviction is part of an established pattern of similar offending relating to incidences of domestic violence perpetrated against the same victim, your estranged wife.
◦ You have been assessed by your offender manager as a high risk of posing serious harm to the public, a known adult and children.
◦ You have been assessed by your offender manager as a medium risk of re-offending but this is considered not to adequately reflect your risk of reoffending in the light of the full circumstances of your criminal record.
◦ You have been assessed such that you are subject to the highest level of Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA level 3) and are being managed at MAPPA level 2.
75. It is not made out the Appellant has a strong Article 8 claim sufficient to outweigh the above circumstances. I therefore find the Secretary of State has established that any breach of a right protected by Article 8 ECHR caused by the Appellants deportation is proportionate. Although I acknowledge the Appellant’s submission that in his opinion he has changed and that in the past his actions were something to do with him and his former partner, and that the same will not happen again, there is insufficient evidence to allow me to find that such a claim is credible. As noted above, he reoffended in 2023 against a different partner in a similar manner to the index offence.
76. Having sat back and considered all the evidence of the round, I find the Secretary of State has established the Deport Decision is lawful.
77. On that basis I dismissed his appeal.
Notice of Decision
78. Appeal dismissed.

C J Hanson
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 April 2025