Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2022-005040

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/10373/2017

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 1st of May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NAIK

Between

NP
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms R Chapman, instructed by Birnberg Peirce & Partners
For the Respondent: Ms A Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 February 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which dismissed his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his human rights claim, further to a decision to deport him under section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007. We have granted the appellant anonymity in this case, upon his request, and despite the objection by the respondent, given the concerns about him being identified which form the basis for his protection claim. In addition before the hearing commenced, at the outset I confirmed with both parties that they were content for me to hear this appeal. There were no objections from either side.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Jamaica, born on 31 October 1994. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 5 December 1999, aged 5, with his mother. She was subsequently granted indefinite leave to remain and the appellant was granted leave in line with her on 16 June 2008, aged 13. On 19 January 2015, then aged 20, the appellant was convicted of attempted robbery and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. He was also convicted of affray and sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively. He was given a four-month sentence for battery to run concurrently. The former was the index offence which led the Respondent to make a deportation order on 18 May 2016 by virtue of section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007 which was served on 7 June 2016.
3. Prior to this time the appellant had formed a private and family life with LD, a British citizen born on 30 March 1998, who gave birth to their daughter, CD, on 17 March 2015. In response to a decision to deport him, dated 21 January 2016, the appellant made representations on human rights grounds, on 15 February 2016, on the basis of his family life in the UK with LD and CD, referring also to the fact that all his close family, namely his mother, brother and sister, were settled in the UK. The respondent refused the appellant’s human rights claim, in a decision of 23 May 2016, and certified the claim pursuant to section 94B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The appellant was subsequently detained under the Immigration Act 1971.
4. By way of a pre-action protocol letter challenging the certification, the appellant made further submissions on 4 August 2016, raising protection grounds for the first time, and further human rights grounds. In response the respondent notified the appellant, in a decision of 5 August 2016, that there was a presumption that section 72 of the NIAA 2002 applied to his claim and invited a response. The appellant was also interviewed about his protection claim. In a decision of 12 August 2016 the respondent treated the appellant’s submissions as an application to revoke the deportation order previously issued against him, certified that the presumption in section 72 applied to him, refused his protection claim and certified the claim under section 94 of the NIAA 2002, refused his human rights claim and maintained the certification under section 94B, and refused the application to revoke the deportation order.
5. Following submissions made on behalf of the appellant in a further pre-action protocol letter of 17 August 2016, the respondent made a decision on 30 August 2016 refusing the submissions under paragraph 353 of the immigration rules, but then subsequently withdrew the decision of 18 May 2016 in light of Kiarie & Byndloss v SSHD [2017] UKSC 42. The respondent then made a new decision on 2 October 2017 maintaining the basis of the previous decision and providing the appellant with an in-country right of appeal on protection and human rights grounds. The appellant appealed against that decision.
6. On 7 November 2017 the appellant was involved in a serious road traffic accident, when he was run over deliberately, as a consequence of which he suffered brain damage and was left blind in his left eye, with difficulties utilizing his right hand and foot and he struggled to manage everyday tasks. He was discharged from hospital on 6 April 2018.
7. On 21 December 2021 the respondent issued a supplementary refusal letter, addressing the change in the appellant’s circumstances following the accident.
8. The appeal before us relates to those two decisions.
Respondent’s decisions
9. In the first decision of 2 October 2017, the respondent concluded that the appellant had failed to rebut the presumption under section 72 that he had been convicted of a particularly serious offence and that his continued presence in the UK constituted a danger to the community, and certified that the presumption applied to him, so that he was unable to benefit from the Refugee Convention. The respondent rejected the appellant’s claim to be at risk from criminal gangs in Jamaica in breach of Article 3 ECHR. The respondent noted the appellant’s claim to have been threatened by the gang members when he went to Jamaica in 2012 or 2013 for his grandmother’s funeral, after one of the gang committed a robbery witnessed by the appellant and thought that the appellant had told the police. He said that a man called AE had tried to kill him and was convicted of the offence and he was a witness at his trial. The respondent did not accept the appellant’s account as there was no evidence that he was in Jamaica at the time and gave no weight to the documentary evidence he produced in support of his claim, which consisted of a handwritten note sent by his mother and a letter from a case progression officer in the Supreme Court’s Office in Kingston. The respondent considered that there was a sufficiency of protection and an internal flight alternative available to the appellant in Jamaica in any event and did not accept that he was at risk on return.
10. The respondent rejected the appellant’s Article 8 claim raised based on his private and family life. She rejected his claim with regard to his British citizen daughter CD born 17 March 2015 on the basis that no evidence had been produced to show that the child lived at the same address as him, nor that there was a genuine and subsisting parental relationship between them. The respondent noted that CD was born after the appellant’s incarceration on 16 February 2015 and that her mother was her sole carer and provider during his imprisonment, although it was accepted that there had been “low level” contact during prison visits. The respondent did not accept that it would be unduly harsh for CD to remain in the United Kingdom following the appellant’s deportation and it was not accepted that his removal would have a significant impact on her family life or that it removed her main carer or provider and that her best interests would be served by remaining in the family unit with her mother. Alternatively that the child could relocate to Jamaica with the appellant and her mother. The respondent rejected the appellant’s claim in respect of family life with his partner LD the mother of their child who was born when she was aged 17 and with whom he had been in a relationship for two years. It was not accepted that they were in a genuine and subsisting relationship due to a lack of evidence provided. Hence the respondent concluded that it would not be unduly harsh for her to remain in the United Kingdom on the appellant’s deportation or alternatively for her to relocate to Jamaica if she wished to maintain her family life with the appellant.
11. The respondent did not accept that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated into the UK despite living here since 2001 on account of his various criminal convictions since 2010 as a minor, in addition to the index offence as an adult. It was further noted that he had family in Jamaica whom he had previously visited in 2007. It was said he had arrived in the UK aged 7 (although in fact he had just turned 5) in December 1999 and had spent 14 years in the UK (in fact 16 years) and had spent some formative years of his life in Jamaica and he was now 21 years of age and he would be able to reintegrate there without undue hardship with or without support from any extended family members. Finally the respondent concluded that there were no ‘very compelling circumstances’ such that he should not be deported given that he had been sentenced to a very serious offence of robbery and sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment.
12. That decision was supplemented by the decision of 21 December 2021 in which the respondent considered a psychological assessment from Dr McNulty dated 23 March 2020 following the appellant’s traffic accident in which he suffered multiple skull fractures which required extensive surgery and left him blind in one eye and with significant physical and cognitive impairments. The respondent considered that the appellant’s deportation would not be in breach of Article 3 or Article 8 in relation to the appellant’s health as he could access relevant medication and treatment in Jamaica.
Appeal in the First-tier Tribunal
13. The appellant’s appeal came before a First-tier Tribunal Judge on 26 July 2022. It was accepted before the judge by reason of the medical evidence that the appellant was a vulnerable witness and he did not give oral evidence for that reason. The judge heard from the appellant’s brother, his mother and his sister. His current partner, SJ, who was at that time pregnant with twins with a due date of 15 August 2022, also attended and adopted her witness statement. The appellant’s former partner LD provided written witness evidence only.
14. The judge had before him the Home Office appeal bundle and the appellant’s bundle of documents including witness statements from the appellant, his mother, sister and brother and expert reports from Dr Anderson dated 5 July 2022, Dr McNulty dated 23 March 2020, Country expert Dr Luke de Noronha date 19 May 2022 a witness statement from the appellant’s solicitor dated 18 August 2026 exhibiting documentary evidence from the Supreme Court in Jamaica and a hand written note. He also had a supplementary bundle containing witness statements from the Appellant’s former partner LD and his current partner SJ who is a British citizen.
15. In light of the appellant’s severe injuries from the accident and the report from Dr McNulty finding that it was functionally unlikely that the appellant would be able to reoffend due to his physical disabilities as a result of the accident, and considering that the appellant had no recorded arrests or convictions since the time of his injuries, the judge found that he had rebutted the presumption in section 72 that he posed a danger to the community. However it was not accepted that his protection claim was credible. The judge had regard to the appellant’s evidence of the incident when he went to Jamaica in 2012 or 2013, his claim that he had stayed in Jamaica for over a year because his passport ran out, and his claimed fear of retribution from the man AE who had shot at him and who had been convicted after he gave evidence at his trial. The judge also had regard to the documentary evidence relied on in that regard, namely a statement from a solicitor employed by Birnberg Peirce and partners explaining how she had tried to obtain papers from the court file in relation to the case against AE, and an online obituary for Gladys Maxine Stoddart who had died in the USA on 4 February 2012. He noted the appellant’s explanation that he had been visiting his grandmother in the USA when she passed away and he had flown her back to Jamaica with his mother and sister where they attended the funeral. The judge identified inconsistencies and discrepancies in the appellant’s evidence in regard to the events and did not accept that he had given a credible account. He therefore concluded that the appellant was not at risk on return to Jamaica.
16. With regard to Article 8, the judge found that, whilst the appellant had been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life and had become socially and culturally integrated in the UK, he had not shown that there are very significant obstacles to his integration in Jamaica. With regard to the medical reports and the evidence from the appellant’s family members about his health, he found that the evidence of his medical state did not sit well with the evidence of his relationship with his daughter and with his partner SJ. He found that the evidence of the appellant’s family, that he could not undertake everyday tasks without assistance, was contrary to the evidence that he spent considerable time with his daughter, interacting with her and taking her to the park. He considered that the evidence suggested that the appellant had made a far greater recovery from his injuries than had been suggested. With regard to the country expert report, the judge considered that it appeared to have been prepared on the basis that the appellant had no remaining family or means of support in Jamaica, whereas his father was there and his mother owned a property there. The judge also noted that there was no evidence that the appellant was receiving any current care for his physical injuries, or for any mental health issues. He concluded that the appellant was unable to meet the private life exception to deportation. As for the family life exception, the judge accepted that the appellant had a level of involvement with CD and accepted that it would be unduly harsh for her to live in Jamaica, but he did not accept that it would be unduly harsh for her to remain in the UK whilst he was deported. With regard to ‘other compelling circumstances’, the judge rejected the argument that the treatment proposed by Dr Anderson in his report reached the requirement to succeed on this ground and he concluded that there were no very compelling circumstances.
17. The judge accordingly dismissed the appeal on all grounds, in a decision promulgated on 15 August 2022.
18. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Permission was refused by the First-tier Tribunal, but renewed to the Upper Tribunal. The grounds of appeal were put on the basis that the First-tier Tribunal Judge had erred in law:
(i) in failing to take account of material considerations with regard to: the evidence from the appellant’s solicitor and the documents from the Supreme Court in Jamaica relating to the case of AE; the country expert evidence report and the evidence before the expert when he prepared the report; the medical evidence from Drs. McNulty and Anderson and the family evidence as to the appellant’s care and that in relation to his current partner and the then forthcoming birth of twins.
(ii) in failing to provide proper or sufficient reasons for his findings in respect of the appellant’s care needs, the support required to facilitate his caring of his daughter and how this interacted with his findings on whether it would be unduly harsh for her to remain in the UK without him.
(iii) in making irrational findings as to the appellant’s recovery from his injuries and in turn whether there are very significant obstacles to his integration in Jamaica, and his reliance on the written evidence of LD to undermine the conclusions of Drs. McNulty and Anderson.
19. Permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell on the following basis:
“The grounds of appeal raise arguable issues which should be considered by the Upper Tribunal. It is arguable in particular that the judge failed in either [26] or [28] of his decision to come to grips with the evidence concerning the documents from the Supreme Court in Jamaica and that he failed to give adequate or accurate reasons for rejecting the expert evidence about the obstacles which the appellant would encounter on return to Jamaica.”
20. UTJ Blundell also noted the delay between the appeal being determined and coming for consideration by the Upper Tribunal.
Hearing and Submissions in the Upper Tribunal
21. The appeal was listed for an oral hearing in the Upper Tribunal and came before ourselves. Both parties made submissions.
22. Ms Chapman submitted, with regard to the first ground, that the judge erred in the way he dealt with the evidence about the case in Jamaica. She submitted that the judge was wrong to find at [31] that the documents supplied by the appellant did little to further his case and was wrong to find that the letter from the Supreme Court was not supported by any evidence of how it had been produced or obtained, when there was such evidence in the form of the statement from the solicitor. That was relevant to the appellant’s subjective fear of persecution in Jamaica. With regard to the evidence of the appellant’s injuries, Ms Chapman submitted that the judge erred by minimising the evidence before him and focussing on the evidence that was not there, rather than on the unchallenged evidence of the medical experts that was before him. She referred to sections of Dr Anderson’s report which she submitted the judge had failed fully to take into account in his conclusions and she submitted that the judge was wrong to prefer the evidence of LD. With regard to the second ground, Ms Chapman submitted that the judge made unsustainable findings arising from the appellant’s ability to care for his daughter, which ignored evidence that he was only able to care for her when supported by his family, and failed to give proper consideration to the evidence of all the experts. There was no evidential basis for the judge to be able to find that the appellant’s father could provide the necessary support for him in Jamaica. The evidence was that the appellant could not cope on a daily basis without the support that was provided in the UK by his family with whom he lived and his partner SJ.
23. Ms Nolan submitted that the judge had taken all the evidence into account and had referred to all the witnesses and the medical and expert reports. The judge was fully aware of the history behind the evidence of the case in Jamaica and referred to it at [26] but he found, for reasons given at [30], that there were inconsistencies and discrepancies in the appellant’s account of his trip to Jamaica. The judge was entitled to find that the documents from the Supreme Court did not further the appellant’s case. The full copy of the solicitor’s statement was not available before the judge and the letter from the court did not refer to a trial in Jamaica. The judge, having considered all the evidence in the round, was entitled to find that the appellant’s protection claim was not credible. As for the challenge to the way the judge treated the medical evidence, Ms Nolan submitted that weight was a matter for the judge. He was not required to cite all the evidence but that did not mean that he had not considered it in full. Ms Nolan relied on the case of Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 in that regard. It was open to the judge to find that the medical evidence did not give a full picture and he was entitled to find, as he did at [43], that there was no independent expert as to the appellant’s current health condition. The judge was aware that the experts had the GP records when they wrote their reports. He was entitled to give the weight that he did to LD’s evidence. The judge was right to say that the expert report considered the appellant had no family in Jamaica. He had full regard to the country expert report at [52] and [53]. There was no failure to provide adequate reasons.
Analysis
24. The appellant’s first ground asserts that the judge failed to take account of material considerations. The first part of the ground challenges the judge’s decision on the appellant’s protection claim. The assertion made is that he erred in his consideration of the evidence in relation to the Supreme Court case in Jamaica which in turn impacted upon his adverse credibility findings on the events which occurred in Jamaica and upon his conclusions on the risk on return to Jamaica.
25. In our determination the judge erred in this respect. Whilst the judge had regard to the documents which were before him, and he referred to the documents at [26] and [28(b)] of his decision, in our view his consideration of the evidence and thus his assessment was flawed. The judge found that the documents he had were of little assistance to the appellant. He concluded at [30] that there were discrepancies in the appellant’s evidence which had been identified by the respondent including, at [28(c)], concerns about the documents related to the court case in Jamaica. The respondent had been concerned first that there were no details of how or from whom the handwritten note had been obtained (despite the evidence that had been submitted to her in the form of a two page statement from the appellant’s solicitor dated 18 August 2016 and the two pages exhibited thereto sent further to the second letter before claim dated 17 August 2016 challenging the decision to maintain the section 94B certificate) and secondly that the exhibited letter from the case progression officer at the Supreme Court dated 16 August 2016 showed only that the appellant had been involved in an investigation by the police in Jamaica. The judge considered that those concerns had not been addressed or adequately explained by the appellant. It is those conclusions that are challenged in the grounds.
26. The grounds contend that the solicitor’s statement explained where the letter had come from and the judge was wrong to find that it did not. However that explanation was only apparent from the second page of the statement, and para 5.2(ii)of the renewal grounds accepts that that page was missing in the respondent’s bundle of evidence before the judge. It was stated there that it had been submitted to the respondent along with the letter before claim in 2016, but was omitted by her in the bundle before the judge. Having only the first page before him, the judge observed at [26] that it was unclear what progress had been made in obtaining the court file. The judge referred to the oral evidence of the appellant’s mother that she gave money to the appellant’s father to obtain the file. We find that had the judge seen the second page of the solicitor’s statement on which Ms Chapman relied before us, that it addressed both the provenance of the Court letter and the fee paid to obtain the letter from the Court by the appellant’s mother, it is clear that this was capable of materially affecting the judge’s conclusion on this issue. Furthermore, that the Supreme Court letter supported the appellant’s case (as advanced in his asylum interview) to have been the complainant NP in a criminal case described as Regina v AE (that full name is on the letter but anonymised here) on the charge of Illegal Possession of a Firearm and Shooting with Intent under the Court reference number 2013/GC/00307 and the alleged event took place on 20 February 2013. We note that in the appellant’s claim (as recorded in his asylum interview) was that he was the inadvertent witness to a robbery hear his house, the police interviewed him, and the gang responsible believe that he was an informant and shot at him. Hence his claim was that the risk arose as a result of him being interviewed by the police, his fear was based on the claim that he was suspected of being an informant and he was then targeted by the gang as a result. Whilst there is no evidence before the judge of any trial or subsequent conviction, the basis of the risk arises on the basis of being a suspected informant which is borne out by that documentary evidence and indeed the appellant left the country after the incident to return to the UK in 2013. Hence whilst the judge cannot be said to be at fault for not addressing that part of the evidence, it cannot be said in fairness that the finding can stand and that it was not material to the outcome. Despite the judge’s findings as to how or why the appellant found himself in Jamaica in 2012-2013 [30], none of these concerns can properly undermine the materiality of the evidence going to the matter in issue, namely the risk to the appellant. In the decision letter dated 12 August 2016 the respondent noted that the appellant had been absent from the UK in Jamaica by his own admission between 13 July and 25 August 2005, 17 April to 9 May 2007 and between 2012 and 2013. This was not disputed. Indeed as a person holding indefinite leave to remain granted on 22 April 2008, if the respondent disputed this record of travel no doubt she would have done so by reference to records of exit and entry.
27. In our view the missing page of the solicitor’s witness statement should have been before the judge and we note it was not disputed that it had been submitted to the respondent. That it was omitted from the Respondent’s bundle and not corrected by either party is a matter of concern. It was not clear from Ms Chapman’s submissions whether it was contended that this had been in the appellant’s bundle before the judge, although from our examination it does not appear it was. Ms Nolan’s submission was that the documents do not further the appellant’s case and it was “unclear” whether the missing page was before the judge. In any event that page is now before us and it addresses two of the issues that the respondent disputed and in respect of which the judge had concerns. In our view there should have been an application to formally admit that evidence before this tribunal from the appellant’s representative under rule 15(2A) as it was relied on as a central issue under ground one, namely the judge’s approach to the evidence corroborating the appellant’s account. Given that this evidence goes to a critical aspect in a protection claim with which the judge understandably in the circumstances “failed to come to grips with”, and the reasoning is central to the judge’s findings at [31], we admit this single page of evidence under rule 15(2A) of our own motion in the interests of procedural fairness and our obligation to have ‘anxious scrutiny’ to properly evaluate the protection claim.
28. The challenge to the judge’s findings on risk on return to Jamaica focussed on the documentation issue above. The judge’s reasoning was focussed on the appellant’s claim about events in 2012 to 2013 in Jamaica. The expert report addressed the question of risk on return on the basis of the appellant’s case being true. We note the opinion of the expert as to the potential risks to the appellant if returned to Jamaica from former gang members supports his claimed risk. There was no reference by the judge to the expert evidence in his assessment of that risk in light of his rejection of the factual basis underpinning it. Hence as we have concluded that the judge was wrong to have rejected the factual basis of the protection claim in the circumstances of this case, that claim and risk arising requires re-determination in light of the expert evidence and country evidence. We note that the witness statement from the appellant’s solicitor exhibiting the evidence from Jamaica was produced in 2016 and refers to the appellant’s mother stating that he gave evidence at a court hearing against the person who shot him, hence in any re-determination it is a matter for the appellant whether he seeks to adduce any other evidence now available to further seek to corroborate and particularise his account as to his conduct, to address the concerns raised by the judge at [26] as to what progress if any arose from the court case of 2013 and inquiries in 2016, or at all.
29. The second part of the first ground and the remaining grounds all challenge the judge’s Article 8 findings and in particular his assessment of the medical evidence, his reasoning and the impact of the appellant’s medical condition on his ability to care for himself and for his daughter. The judge was concerned about the lack of any evidence before him from medical professionals currently treating the appellant, which would provide independent evidence of the appellant’s physical condition. At [43] he noted that there was no evidence of the medication the appellant claimed to be taking. At [55] he noted that the only independent medical evidence that he had of the appellant’s injuries, or the physical impact upon him of the injuries, was the discharge report quoted in Dr McNulty’s report which stated that the appellant was fully independent in self-care and could make simple meals. The judge noted that the follow-up care from the hospital appeared to have stopped and that there was no documentary evidence to show what that care was. There was no documentary medical evidence about the fit the appellant was said to have suffered in 2021 or the medication he was taking in that regard, and no evidence that he was receiving any current care for his physical injuries or any mental health issues. At [68] the judge noted that there was no evidence before him of rehabilitative or other care currently received.
30. In regard to the latter, the grounds criticise the judge for failing to take account of the appellant’s mother’s evidence that they were unable to secure treatment in the form of rehabilitation because of his immigration status. His conclusion was that there was no independent evidence, distinct from the expert medical evidence relied on by the appellant, to support his ongoing needs and the judge had concerns about gaps in that evidential picture which he concluded had not been satisfactorily explained. It was Ms Chapman’s submission that, in focussing on those matters and the evidence which was not there, the judge had failed to have full regard to the expert medical reports which were before him, from Dr McNulty and Dr Anderson, which provided evidence of the appellant’s injuries and the impact of those injuries both psychologically and physically, and which were inter alia based upon the appellant’s GP records with which both experts had been provided (and which the judge had accepted were before them). Ms Chapman submitted that the judge minimised the evidence before him when reaching his conclusions as to the appellant’s mental and physical condition. She took us through the medical reports and the observations of the medical experts, pointing out salient sections of the expert reports. She made it clear that there was no suggestion that the judge ignored the evidence, but her submission was that he did not take it properly into account in reaching his conclusions as to his physical and mental condition and in his reasons for rejecting their conclusions.
31. Whilst the judge had quoted from the reports at [38] to [42] and he was aware that both experts had seen the appellant’s GP notes (and noted that reasons had been given for not having produced those notes at the hearing), he still maintained however at [43] that he had not seen any independent expert evidence, such as a report from a treating consultant or the appellant’s GP notes and went on at that point to cast doubt on the appellant’s physical health condition to be blind in his left eye (despite this being noted by Dr McNulty, by reference to the contemporaneous Croydon hospital discharge report that the appellant was partially blind in his left eye, at 8.1.3), that he had lost function in one arm to the extent that the is unable to perform simple tasks such as making a cup of tea or pouring cereal into a bowl, (again despite this being consistent with Dr McNulty’s report which in turn at 8.1.5 quoted from the University College Hospital neurological rehabilitation service, that the appellant “amongst other physical injuries and physical impairments, [he] suffered from impaired mobility”). The appellant’s case was not that he had a treating clinician or a consultant to address the consequences of these permanent injuries. The discharge report noted above, stated both that the appellant was fully independent in self-care, can make simple meals, whilst also stating that he had a reduced ability to use his right wrist and hand, had slow information processing and reduced higher executive functions, which is physical and specifically brain damage as a result of the accident.
32. Hence in our view the judge failed to properly address the evidence both from those medical professionals who had seen, examined and treated the appellant at the time of the accident, as well as the very detailed reports from 2022 and 2020 from Drs Anderson and McNulty respectively, experts instructed by the appellant’s solicitors who also saw and assessed the appellant. In the circumstances there was no proper reason for the judge to have the concerns that he did about the absence of evidence from any other medical professionals involved in the appellant’s ongoing care to reach the conclusions he did and he was not entitled to accord the limited weight that he did to the conclusions of the expert medical reports for the reasons he gave.
33. With regard to the evidence of the family members the judge concluded that there was a level of inconsistency between some of the witness evidence and the medical reports, and within the family’s evidence itself. At [45] the appellant’s mother’s evidence that the appellant was ‘like a child’ and needed constant attention and supervision, and that he was unable to do simple tasks around the kitchen. This not inconsistent with the evidence from the Croydon discharge summary, which was then amplified and updated in more detail from Dr McNulty the expert psychologist in his 23 March 2020 report and Dr Anderson in his Neuropsychological assessment on 5 July 2022. The judge’s conclusion at [46], was that he found that that evidence did not sit well with other parts of the evidence, particularly the evidence of the appellant’s care responsibilities for CD and his new relationship with SJ, was not in our view properly reasoned in light of all the medical evidence including from those who treated him at the time of his injuries which did not solely originate with the appellant’s experts and that expert evidence itself. Even if the judge had been entitled to conclude that there was a degree of exaggeration as to the appellant’s capacity by the family members, this cannot properly undermine the overall conclusions of the medical experts as to the limitations on his functionality both physical and mental, and noting that the appellant himself did not give evidence but was himself assessed by those independent experts.
34. Third with regard to the appellant’s relationship with his daughter CD, the judge considered that the evidence from his now former partner LD about how he interacted with their daughter was inconsistent with the accounts given in the medical reports and by the family members about his limited abilities. Again we find that the judge’s conclusions were not properly reasoned. The judge erred by giving more weight to LD’s evidence than that of Dr Anderson who was an expert and had assessed the appellant and was in a better position than LD to comment on his recovery and physical and mental condition. In our view the judge failed to take account of the evidence that the appellant was supported by other family members in providing such care to his daughter. We note the statement of the appellant’s sister which, at [5], referred to her being with the appellant at the weekends when he looked after his child CD. The judge was required to assess the evidence of LD in light of the expert medical evidence and give cogent reasons for departing from it or consistent with his documented injuries. We find that he failed to do so.
35. As for the appellant’s new relationship with SJ, that was referred to by the judge at [49] and [56], where he noted in particular at [56] that Dr Anderson had not been aware of the relationship when he prepared his report. At [57] the judge found that Dr McNulty’s opinion that the appellant was not able to look after himself without assistance was inconsistent with the fact that he had entered into a new relationship and one in which his partner was then expecting twins. Again we find that the judge was required to give cogent reasons for reaching this conclusion on the evidence before him and he failed to do so and his findings are inadequately reasoned and/or are irrational.
36. In the circumstances we find that the judge’s findings failed to engage fully with the evidence, and that the findings were unsustainable and inconsistent with the evidence before him when properly considered. Again even if there was some basis for the judge’s conclusions that there was some degree of exaggeration by the appellant’s family members in their evidence as to his condition and abilities, this cannot properly undermine the expert medical evidence as to his injuries set out above and their consequences which were required to be properly considered by the judge in any event.
37. The main focus of the challenge in the grounds to the judge’s findings under the private life exception 1 on the basis of very significant obstacles to integration in Jamaica was in relation to the appellant’s medical condition and his ability to care for himself in Jamaica as a result. We have found above that the judge failed to give adequate reasons to conclude that the appellant’s condition was not to the extent claimed, in light of the accepted medical facts, and as further articulated in detail in the expert medical evidence.
38. As for the other obstacles relied upon by the appellant, we note that these included a lack of accommodation and family in Jamaica and various other issues such as the lack of employment prospects and social security benefits. However these were all matters considered by the judge at [50] to [54] and [58] to [60], with particular regard at [50] to [54] to the report of the country expert Dr de Noronha. At [51] and [53] the judge observed that the report had been prepared on the basis that the appellant had no remaining family in Jamaica and that Dr de Noronha was unaware of the presence of his father or the time spent by the appellant in Jamaica in 2012-2013, and was unaware that his mother had a property in Jamaica. Those were matters considered by the judge at [58] and [59]. The grounds, at [5.4] to [5.6] and [9.3], criticise the judge for giving less weight to Dr de Noronha’s report on that basis. They assert that those were matters of which Dr de Noronha would have been aware, and that in any event the statements from the family members made it clear that there was no contact between the appellant and his father and no possibility of support from him, that the appellant’s mother’s house had not been lived in for years and that he would still require assistance with everyday needs. However the judge was, in our view, entitled to have regard to these matters given the findings of fact by the judge in respect of that which are not challenged. Dr de Noronha had not referred to those matters in his report and the judge was therefore entitled to consider that they had not been taken into account. Hence it was open to him to accord less weight to the country report concerning the situation the appellant would be returning to in Jamaica.
39. However in light of our findings above in relation to the errors by the judge in relation to the medical evidence, the judge therefore also failed to give adequate proper reasons in respect of those factors in his assessment of whether the private life exception to deportation was met. Hence those conclusions cannot stand. That medical evidence and the support the appellant requires were all directly relevant to the question of the appellant’s ability to reintegrate in Jamaica now and any very significant obstacles to that. The judge had concerns about the evidence from the appellant’s family members that they were seeking to exaggerate the appellant’s condition and abilities, but in light of the above errors as to the medical evidence his conclusions cannot be sustained in any event. The fact remains that the appellant is a disabled man, with partial vision in one eye, a visible head injury, a reduced ability to use his right wrist and hand, slow information processing and reduced higher executive functions. The issue of whether the appellant faces very significant obstacles to integration in Jamaica in light of the medical evidence properly assessed will need to be determined inter alia in light of the evidence, including any updated country expert evidence available.
40. Fourth and of critical importance, the judge’s findings on the family life exception to deportation, where the judge addressed the “unduly harsh” test are flawed in their reasoning. The grounds challenge the judge’s findings in that regard at [5.10], as to his findings (i) regarding arrangements for the care of his then expected twins and the impact on CD, and (ii) LD’s evidence that she needed the appellant’s help in caring for CD because of her own mental health issues. At [62] to [66] the judge considered the evidence of the appellant’s relationship with his daughter CD who stayed with him at his mother’s house for weekends and weeks at a time (per LD’s evidence at [13] when she was unable to care for CD on account of her mental health) and the impact that his deportation would have on CD. The judge found, properly, that it would be unduly harsh for CD to relocate to Jamaica with the appellant. However when considering whether it would be unduly harsh for CD to remain in the UK without the appellant, in light of the nature and extent of their relationship and the periods of time they spent together, at [64] to [66] he failed to give cogently reasoned findings on the impact on CD if she remained in the UK without him. We note that the judge had considered that the appellant looked after CD for extensive periods of time (with support from his family), when LD was unable to. The judge in considering the appellant’s evidence and that of LD when making his findings at [62-64], failed to in any meaningful way address the impact on CD of permanently losing her current established and direct relationship with her father in assessing whether this was unduly harsh. The judge’s finding that the appellant did not specifically address in his statement how his new relationship and having baby twins would impact on the time he was able to spend with CD was unduly speculative and in light of the application under rule 15(2A) dated 26 February 2025 (which we admit) before us now, a letter from the appellant’s solicitor that the twins did not survive the pregnancy, further demonstrates that this was not a matter that the judge could properly or in fact should properly have taken into account at that stage in determining the issue before him. We note that in the rule 15(2A) application that SJ is now pregnant again, but we do not presume to speculate on the impact that may have on CD or the relationship she may develop with her sibling yet to be born.
41. As for the judge’s findings on “very compelling circumstances”, the grounds at [5.11] and [5.12] repeat the challenges previously made in regard to the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s medical condition and care needs, the access he would have to mental health facilities in Jamaica, and the challenges to the assessment of the expert reports which we have addressed above. In our view in light of our findings above, and the remittal de novo required to be undertaken in this case, these issues can if so advised be revisited as at the date of any remaking in line with the approach of the Court of Appeal in NA(Pakistan) v SSHD [2017] 1 WLR 207, without requiring any determination at this stage on whether there was an additional error of law on that issue in addition.

Notice of Decision
42. In light of our findings which go to the credibility assessment made by the judge, given the nature of the error of law including the protection claim this needs to be revisited and fresh findings of fact made and given the passage of time since the original determination, and that SJ is now expecting a child due in July or August 2025. Accordingly in and in line with the Senior President of Tribunals Practice Statement of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber for the First-tier and Upper Tribunals dated 13 November 2014 at para 7.2 (b), given the nature or extent of the judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be remade such that it is appropriate to remit de novo to the First-tier Tribunal with no findings preserved.
43. Therefore we conclude that the appeal will therefore be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for the decision to be re-made on all grounds with regard to the protection claim, Exceptions 1 and 2 and/or consideration of whether there are any ‘very compelling circumstances’ over and above the Exceptions.

Signed: S Naik KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 April 2025