Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2022-005964
PA/00093/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

AAM (Egypt)
(anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms A. Smith, Counsel instructed by Wilson Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Mr N. Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Respondent (the Appellant before the First-tier Tribunal) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Respondent (the Appellant before the First-tier Tribunal), likely to lead members of the public to identify the Respondent (the Appellant before the First-tier Tribunal). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a national of Egypt born in 2001. He seeks protection in the UK.

2. The factual claim advanced by the Appellant is largely the same as that relied upon by the claimant in MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216. Like MAH the Appellant left Egypt when he was only 14. Both boys travelled across Europe under the control of people traffickers and spent time in several European countries before arriving in the UK to claim asylum. Both boys told the Home Office that their fathers had been arrested by the Egyptian authorities in a crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood; their respective families had dispatched them to seek safety abroad, fearing that they too would be detained, questioned and subjected to torture. In both cases protection had been refused, and an initial appeal dismissed, on the grounds that the claims were vague and speculative. MAH was ultimately successful, the Court of Appeal accepting that on a proper application of the applicable standard of proof, his claim to be a refugee was made out. The Appellant is hoping for the same.

3. The complication in the Appellant’s case is that since he arrived in this country he has committed a series of crimes. He has been diagnosed with significant mental health issues, and has struggled with alcohol and substance misuse. His record reveals a chaotic and anti-social lifestyle such that there is today a strong public interest in him being deported.

4. The legal framework applicable in this appeal is therefore as follows:

• The Appellant is defined by section 32(1) Borders Act 2007 as a ‘foreign criminal’ because he has been sentenced to at least 12 months imprisonment

• His deportation is conducive to the public good, and the Secretary of State must therefore make a deportation order against him: ss32(4) and (5) BA 2007

• The Appellant can resist deportation on the grounds that it would be contrary to his rights under the Refugee Convention: s33(2)(b) BA 2007

• The claim is one to which s72 NIAA 2002 applies. In order to rely on the protection of the Refugee Convention the Appellant must therefore rebut the presumption that he is a danger to the community. The burden lies on him, and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities

• Regardless of my findings in respect of the Refugee Convention, the Appellant can in the alternative resist deportation on the grounds that it would be contrary to his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights: s33(2)(a) BA 2007

• To this end the Appellant relies on Article 3. It is for him to establish that there is a real risk that if returned to Egypt he will be detained and subject to ‘torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’

• In the alternative the Appellant relies on Article 3 in another respect. He submits that there is a real risk that his removal would result in a rapid, serious and irreversible deterioration in his mental health, causing him intense suffering, and/or there is a risk of completed suicide

• In the event that the Appellant is unable to make out his claim under either the Refugee Convention or under either limb of Article 3 ECHR, he submits further and in the alternative that his removal would nevertheless be a disproportionate interference with his Article 8 ECHR rights. In assessing this claim I must have regard to the public interest considerations, and the wider framework set out in Part 5A NIAA 2002.

Case History and Present Proceedings

5. The Appellant arrived in the UK in the back of a lorry when he was 14. He claimed asylum on 7 November 2016. The Respondent recognised that the Appellant was very young, and accordingly granted him Discretionary Leave on the basis that he was an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child. He was however refused protection. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. In July 2017 the matter came before Judge Callow sitting at Hatton Cross. By the date of that hearing the Appellant was 16 years old. He did not give oral evidence. Judge Callow drew apparently significant adverse inference from this. He found the Appellant’s credibility to be undermined by his failure to claim asylum in a safe third country and a delay in claiming once he was in the UK. The appeal was dismissed.

6. The Appellant subsequently got new representatives. On 14 February 2000 Wilson Solicitors LLP made further submissions on protection and human rights. By a decision of 28 January 2022 the Respondent refused to grant leave, but indicated that he was prepared to treat the submissions as a ‘fresh claim’ under paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules. That is to say the Respondent accepted that the Appellant had produced ‘fresh’ material, and that taken at its highest it created a realistic prospect of success before a properly directed Tribunal.

7. The resulting appeal was heard by the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Parkes) on 16 August 2022, and dismissed in a written decision promulgated on 13 September 2022. Judge Parkes concluded that taken overall, the evidence did not justify departing from the findings made by Judge Callow, and the appeal was dismissed.

8. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal by First-tier Tribunal Judge Hatton on 4 October 2022 and on 12 October 2023 the matter came before me. My written decision of that date is appended to this judgment, but in brief summary I found that the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Parkes was flawed for a failure to lawfully apply the principles set out in Devaseelan (Second Appeals - ECHR - Extra-Territorial Effect) Sri Lanka * [2002] UKIAT 00702. In respect of the Appellant’s claim that he cannot be removed because of his poor mental health, the Respondent accepted that this had not been adequately addressed, and I was invited to set aside, and remake, that part of the decision.

9. I directed that the matter be relisted before myself on the first available date at Field House, so that I could remake the decision I had set aside. The Appellant subsequently applied for more time, in order to prepare reports; this was granted. There was then, unfortunately, a significant delay in getting the matter back into court, for which the Appellant and Respondent both have my apologies.

10. At the resumed hearing the Appellant appeared by video link from HMP Nottingham where he is presently detained pending a suitable address being identified to which he can be released on licence. He was assisted by an interpreter speaking the Arabic language. It is not in issue that the Appellant is to be treated as a vulnerable witness. He has been diagnosed with significant mental illness including: severe Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), and severe anxiety.

11. I was provided with a composite bundle of 506 pages, and both parties provided supplementary bundles. This written material falls into three main categories: the Appellant’s own evidence, medical opinion relating to his mental health, and country background material, including expert commentary on the Appellant’s particular case.

12. Having heard live evidence from the Appellant the hearing before me concluded with Ms Smith and Mr Wain making helpful oral submissions with reference to the written materials. I reserved my decision which I now give, in accordance with the statutory framework that I have summarised above.

‘Serious Criminal’

13. The following summary of the Appellant’s criminal convictions is from Ms Smith’s skeleton argument:

15. A has received a number of convictions for various offences. On 28 December 2020 A was convicted of using threatening, abusive, insulting words or behaviour and fined £80. On 31 December 2020 A was convicted of breaching the conditions of permission to enter restricted zone in the channel tunnel and possession of a controlled drug Class B. He was sentenced to one day courthouse detention. On 5 January 2021 A was convicted of 3 offences of criminal damage and sentenced to fines of £50 each. On 8 January 2021 A was convicted of using threatening, abusive, insulting words or behaviour and criminal damage and had to pay £50 compensation. On 25 January 2021 A was convicted of possession of controlled drug Class B and fined £100.

16. On 2 February 2021 A was convicted of an assault on an emergency worker and was sentenced to 12 weeks imprisonment suspended for 12 months. On 6 April 2021 A was convicted of offences of theft, using threatening, abusive, insulting words or behaviour and criminal damage and possession of controlled drug Class B for which he was fined £120 and ordered to pay £100 in compensation and £80 fine for the drug possession.

17. On 6 April 2021 A was convicted of 2 counts of possession of an offensive weapon and affray and on 2 November 2021 A was sentenced to 12 months detention. These are the index offences that triggered enforcement action.

18. On 27 September 2021 A was convicted of 3 counts of Criminal damage and one of burglary for which he was sentenced to 12 weeks detention to run consecutively to the index offence on 2 November 2021. On the same date A was convicted of affray and 6 sentenced to 26 weeks detention to run consecutively. The total sentence received on 2 November 2021 was 12 months and 38 weeks detention.

…

22. On 11 November 2023 A was convicted of robbery and sentenced to 27 months imprisonment. On the same occasion A was also sentenced to 4 months imprisonment for making false representation for gain to be served concurrently. On 27 March 2024 A was detained under immigration powers at his conditional release date. He was granted FTT bail on 5 April 2024 and subsequently released on 10 April 2024. He was subsequently recalled to prison on 24 April 2024.

23. On 27 December 2024 A was convicted on 2 counts of assault by beating of an emergency worker and sentenced to two 12-week sentences of imprisonment, to be served concurrently. On 12 May 2025 A was detained under immigration powers.

14. The Appellant has therefore been convicted of at least 19 separate offences, the most serious of which is robbery, for which he received a sentence of 27 months imprisonment on 11 November 2023. Given the length of that sentence I am satisfied that the Appellant is a ‘serious criminal’ as defined by section 72 Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002:

72 Serious criminal

(1) This section applies for the purpose of the construction and application of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention

(2) A person is convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime if he is—

(a) convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence, and
(b) sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months

…

(5A)A person convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime (whether within or outside the United Kingdom) is to be presumed to constitute a danger to the community of the United Kingdom.

(6)A presumption under subsection (5A) that a person constitutes a danger to the community is rebuttable by that person.

…

(9) Subsection (10) applies where—

(a) a person appeals under section 82 of this Act or under section 2 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68) wholly or partly on the ground mentioned in section 84(1)(a) or (3)(a) of this Act (breach of the United Kingdom's obligations under the Refugee Convention), and

(b) the Secretary of State issues a certificate that a presumption under subsection (5A) applies to the person (subject to rebuttal).

(10) The Tribunal or Commission hearing the appeal—

(a) must begin substantive deliberation on the appeal by considering the certificate, and
(b) if in agreement that a presumption under subsection (5A) applies (having given the appellant an opportunity for rebuttal) must dismiss the appeal in so far as it relies on the ground specified in subsection (9)(a).

15. The parties are agreed that I must proceed on the basis that the Secretary of State has certified this claim as one to which s72 applies: AQ (Somalia) [2011] EWCA Civ 695. The Appellant is therefore presumed to constitute a danger to the community. The effect of that presumption is that he is not entitled to protection against refoulment under the Refugee Convention. It is however open to the Appellant to rebut that presumption, and that is the first issue I need to address.

16. Ms Smith asks me to evaluate the risk posed by the Appellant in the context of what we know about his circumstances. He left Egypt in difficult circumstances as a child. He made the journey to the UK alone. Since his arrival here he has struggled with significant mental health problems, and as he has explained, living without status has made it impossible for him to progress his life, by for instance studying or getting a job. He has expressed his determination to achieve some stability in his life, if and when his status is settled. He is not presently using drugs or alcohol (both problems identified in respect of earlier offending) and once he leaves prison he will have the benefit of the Leaving Care Team, and the probation officers who will be monitoring his the terms of his licence.

17. I have had regard to all that Ms Smith has had to say. I accept that mental ill health, and the substance misuse that has followed, has played a significant role in the Appellant’s offending. This appears to be accepted by all concerned. The Appellant’s evidence that he has turned to drugs such as cannabis and cocaine to cope with his mental distress is not challenged. That this drug abuse has in turn fuelled the Appellant’s offending is clear. For instance, when sentencing the Appellant on 2 November 2021 HHJ Enright said this: “it does seem to be the case that this offending was caused by substance abuse on an intense scale which overtook this young man’s life”; this is confirmed by Marian O’Reilly, his Personal Advisor at Cambridgeshire Leaving Care Team in her most recent letter. The probation service has consistently identified drug and alcohol use as being factors that increase risk, and it is clear from the various reports I have been given on the Appellant’s mental health that when he is not ‘using’ he is much better, has remorse for, and insight into, his offending and is able to approach the difficulties he faces with a positive attitude.

18. The difficulty is that none of that detracts from the fact that the Appellant keeps committing crimes. In 2022 the Probation Service reported being encouraged by his abstinence from drugs whilst in prison, and his stated commitment to stay clean and out of trouble; since then he has been convicted of a further four offences. The most recent evidence from HM Prison and Probation Service is the letter dated 8 July 2025 from Alexandra Potter, Specialist Probation Practitioner, and whilst this spells out the terms of his licence, it does not say anything to support the Ms Smith’s case that he is rehabilitated. I accept that he is on that road, and in the longer term I hope it will be possible to say that he has got over this chaotic, anti-social and harmful period in his life. But on the evidence before me, it is not yet possible to say that he is able to rebut the presumption of serious criminality.

19. It follows that the Appellant is not entitled to seek to avoid deportation by relying on the Refugee Convention. The Appellant nevertheless maintains that his deportation would result in a real risk of him suffering ill-treatment that would violate the United Kingdom’s obligations under Article 3 ECHR, and it is to that risk that I now turn.

Risk on Return

20. The Appellant seeks to resist the deportation decision on the ground that he would be at risk of serious harm at the hands of the Egyptian authorities, who would suspect him of involvement in the Muslim Brotherhood.

21. I am not the first judge to have evaluated this matter. As I mention above, the Appellant’s first appeal against a refusal of asylum was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Callow in 2017. I must therefore apply the guidance in Devaseelan (Second Appeals - ECHR - Extra-Territorial Effect) Sri Lanka * [2002] UKIAT 00702.

22. Those principles are well known. In the situation where the Tribunal is asked to determine issues that have already been considered by an earlier tribunal, that earlier decision should always be the starting-point. It is the authoritative assessment of an appellant’s status at the time it was made. Facts happening since the first decision can however always be taken into account by the second tribunal and if those facts lead the second tribunal to the conclusion that, at the date of his determination and on the material before him, the claimant makes out his case, so be it. The previous decision, on the material before the first tribunal and at that date, is not inconsistent. Where, on a second appeal the appellant relies on facts personal to himself that were not brought to the attention of the first tribunal but they could have been, the decision in Devaseelan prescribes that these should be viewed “with the greatest circumspection”. That guideline should not however be read to detract from the obligation on all Tribunals to conscientiously decide the case in front of them having regard to all of the evidence: SSHD v BK (Afghanistan) [2019] EWCA Civ 1358.

23. Judge Callow’s decision is therefore my starting point, and I treat it as an authoritative determination of the appeal as it was at that date.

24. Judge Callow noted that the Respondent had identified some inconsistency in the Appellant’s evidence about what he had been told and when, but he had declined to give evidence to speak to, and explain those inconsistencies. He had delayed in claiming, and had further failed to seek protection in any of the safe European countries he had passed through on his way to the United Kingdom. Judge Callow was not, in these circumstances, satisfied that the Appellant had discharged the burden of proof, even to the lower standard, and the appeal was dismissed.

25. The case before me is very different from the appeal as it stood before Judge Callow. As I set out below, I am today assisted by a significant quantity of new evidence, from independent sources including clinicians, and country expert Mr Miles. Those reports were not available to Judge Callow and Mr Wain accepts that I am entitled to take them into account. I also have a lot more evidence from the Appellant himself. Judge Callow noted that “no explanation” had been given by the Appellant for his decision not to give live evidence in his own appeal; such an explanation has now been offered, along with considerably more detail about the Appellant’s life before he came to the UK. There is now a 55-paragraph witness statement, in which the Appellant gives his personal history from early childhood. He sets out what he knew about his father, and what he remembers about events in Egypt before he left. I bear in mind that this evidence, personal to the Appellant, should, in accordance with Devaseelan, ordinarily be viewed with the “greatest circumspection”. The adduction of such evidence should not usually lead to any reconsideration of the conclusions earlier reached. The force of the reasoning underlying that guidance is however “greatly reduced if there is some very good reason why the Appellant’s failure to adduce relevant evidence before the first Adjudicator should not be, as it were, held against him” [Devaseelan at paragraph 42].

26. Ms Smith submits, and I accept, that there are very good reasons here. The Appellant was only 16 when the appeal came before Judge Callow. In his witness statement he explains that he was feeling extremely anxious, “overwhelmed and frightened” at the prospect of having to appear in court, and when he was advised that it was not compulsory to give evidence, he took the opportunity not to. This evidence is today supported by a good deal of medical opinion relating to the Appellant’s mental health. Just one of those opinions was offered in a report submitted with the ‘fresh claim’. It is a psychological assessment undertaken by Consultant Psychologist Dr Alicia Griffiths. Dr Griffiths concludes that the Appellant meets the diagnostic criteria for severe Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder and severe anxiety. Dr Griffiths was able to draw out from the Appellant a long history of abuse at the hands of various actors including his father. She concluded that he would have been suffering from these mental disorders at the date of his interview and appeal before Judge Callow, and that this would have impacted on his ability to focus and give detailed evidence. It is in light of that evidence that I evaluate the Appellant’s claim to have been “overwhelmed and frightened”. I accept that the evidence he now gives has been produced in very different circumstances. His current representatives are obviously aware of his precarious mental health and have taken what steps there are available to them to facilitate the giving of the witness statement etc. In those circumstances I am prepared to admit and consider the Appellant’s new evidence, and bear in mind the reasons that it was not made available to Judge Callow.

27. The evidence of the Appellant is to be found in seven separate documents dated between 2016 and 2025. The earliest of these are the ‘Statement of Evidence Form’ (SEF) and witness statement submitted to the Respondent on the 15 November 2016. The most recent is a witness statement dated 23 July 2025. The account set out in these documents is as follows.

28. The Appellant grew up in a village called Abu Seir, near Samaanoud in Gharbia governate. He lived with his mother, father and younger sister. His father and mother farmed the land. His father “was angry all the time”. He would beat the Appellant, sometimes with a stick, and sometimes for no reason. The Appellant recalls that his father was away from home quite often. He would go away for days, sometimes weeks, at a time and when he came back the Appellant would sometimes hear him talk about protests that he had attended, and the actions taken by the police against them. At his interview the Appellant told the officer that his father was “constantly” at such demonstrations [Q79], mostly in the nearby town of Rabea Aladawia. His father was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. He and his friends wanted Mohammed Morsi to be the leader. The Appellant can recall that his father was very active in the local community. He worked on charitable projects such as helping poor people who wanted to get married, attended local mosques and did other things to help people.

29. Sometime in 2013 – he thinks it was the summer – the Appellant was at home with his family when a police vehicle turned up. It was a blue van. The van had some Muslim Brotherhood members who had been arrested in it. Four or five uniformed officers came into the Appellant’s house. They told his father that he was wanted, and arrested him. They took him away for about 2 months. The Appellant later learned that he had been held in Al-Gharbiya prison during this time.

30. What the Appellant’s father told him when he returned home after this period of imprisonment has been the subject of some scrutiny in this appeal. That is because in his original witness statement, made on 15 November 2016, he had said that after his release his father had told him “everything that happened to him”. This has been contrasted unfavourably with what the Appellant subsequently said, when interviewed on 24 April 2017. Asked about what his father had told him on his release the Appellant then replied [at Q120]:

“He just said he was imprisoned for two months, that is all, he did not say much"

31. Both the Respondent, and the First-tier Tribunal, had found this to be a significant discrepancy: indeed it is the only inconsistency in the Appellant’s evidence identified in the original ‘reasons for refusal’ letter. With respect to these other decision makers, I am not so satisfied. I attach little, if anything, to the phrase “he did not say much”. I note that only four questions earlier in the same interview the Appellant had explained [at Q116]:

“They questioned him and interrogated him and he denied all of the allegations and then they released him but then they said he committed some crime and they wanted to arrest"

32. He plainly had said something. Further, the Appellant has subsequently clarified that the “everything” he had been referring to in his witness statement was what his father had said about how he had managed to secure his release with the assistance of a lawyer. I bear in mind that he is reporting a conversation which took place when he was 14 years old. I do not find there to be any significant inconsistencies in what the Appellant has said.

33. The Appellant states that some time after his father’s release a further incident occurred. The Appellant was out and when he came home, he found that the police had broken down the door to the family home. His mother had been in at the time. They had burst in looking for her husband; when she told them that he was not there they had left. After this incident the Appellant’s father sat him down and explained to him that he had only managed to get out of prison because he had paid a bribe - the papers the lawyer had used to secure his release were forgeries. He told the Appellant that he was going to have to go into hiding. I note that this narrative receives some criticism in the Respondent’s second refusal letter, issued in response to the Appellant’s ‘fresh claim’ on 28 January 2022, in that it observes: “it is not entirely clear how the authorities now apparently know that your father used bribery/forged documents to be released”. It is of course correct to say that the Appellant cannot speak directly to that matter. What he can say is that the authorities came to the family home looking for his father, and that his father suspected that this was because they had discovered that he had used unlawful means of escaping from custody. That chronology makes sense, and I do not think it appropriate, given the lower standard of proof, to reject it simply because the Appellant cannot confirm his father’s suspicions, or verify what the authorities knew or didn’t know.

34. After his father had gone into hiding, the authorities came again. They confiscated the Appellant’s family home and land. The Appellant had again been out at the time. He was working for a lorry driver then. He had called his mum on a mobile phone and she had told him what had happened. His mum said that the “government had locked the house” and that when he came back from work he would have to go to his grandmother’s house. She lived about 20 minutes away in another village.

35. While the Appellant was at his grandmother’s house the plan to get him out of Egypt crystallised. His uncle told him that his father had made all the necessary arrangements. His father came to the house. The Appellant states that this is the first time he had seen his father since he had gone into hiding, and it was the last time he ever saw him. He thinks that his father came to say goodbye to him. The Appellant recalls how his father had shaved his beard. His uncle took him to Samaanoud and it was from there that he embarked on his journey, under the control of agents.

36. I have read all of the documents in which the Appellant has set out this historical account. I am satisfied that it is internally consistent, and that the Appellant has given as much detail as can be expected of someone who was so young at the material time.

37. I now turn to consider whether it is an account that is consonant with the country background evidence. I am assisted in that matter by the helpful, detailed and expert evidence of Mr Hugh Miles. Mr Miles is a country expert well known in this jurisdiction. He is a fluent Arabic speaker who has lived and worked in Cairo for many years. He has since 2004 covered Egyptian affairs for numerous journalism outlets including the BBC, Al Jazeera, MSNBC, the Telegraph and the Guardian. He has published two award-winning books about the Arab world and since 2010 has run his own consultancy company who provide intelligence to “blue-chip clients in diverse sectors including defence, law, finance and manufacturing”. He is the founder and editor of the Arab Digest. Much of Mr Miles’ expertise comes not from his academic work or investigative journalism, but from his long experience of living in Egypt. He is in “day-to-day contact with Egyptians in all walks of life” and closely follows the press there. I mention here, because it is relevant to my consideration of the Appellant’s ‘health claim’, that Mr Miles is also familiar with the Egyptian health care system, since his sister-in-law is a GP in Cairo, and his wife is a psychiatrist, and the manager of Medecins Sans Frontieres in Cairo. I accept that Mr Miles is a suitably qualified expert and that he understands his obligations towards the Tribunal. I reject the submission made by Mr Wain that his evidence can only attract a little weight because it is “not underpinned by reference to other background material”. Mr Miles evidence is, in large part, fully referenced. Where it is not, and Mr Miles is commenting on matters within his own knowledge, for example that Islamists are known to wear beards, I am satisfied that this is wholly appropriate. He is the expert. He has achieved that status by living in, working in, studying and writing about Egypt for over twenty years.

38. Mr Miles was provided with a good deal of information about the Appellant’s case. Having reviewed that evidence Mr Miles answered specific questions put to him by the Appellant’s solicitors. His main report is dated 11 February 2020, and he has since provided two addendums, dated 30 July 2022 and 25 July 2025. Insofar as is relevant to this part of my determination, Mr Miles gives evidence to the following effect. It is plausible, in light of what Mr Miles knows about Egypt, that:

• The Appellant’s father would have undertaken charity work in Samaanoud as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Before they were banned in the crackdown the Brotherhood provided a “comprehensive network of charitable social services”

• The Appellant’s father attended demonstrations in support of deposed President Morsi in Rabaa Al Adawiya (transliterated as Rabea Aladawia in the asylum interview). Mr Miles is aware that there were many such protests in that location, and that many such protests took place during 2013

• The Appellant’s father would have witnessed the police attacking people on such demonstrations. This was, in Mr Miles’ experience, a common occurrence. There was a massacre at a protest in Rabaa Al Adawiya in August 2013 that is consistent with what the Appellant was told by his father about the police actions against protestors

• A ‘low level’ supporter, as the Home Office have characterised the Appellant’s father to be, would have been arrested. Mr Miles states that he is personally aware of many “low level members and peripheral supporters of the Brotherhood who have been arrested”. Mr Miles agrees that Egyptian prisons are “full of all levels of supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood”

• The Appellant’s father could have secured his release through the payment of a bribe and/or false documents. Mr Miles writes: “when someone is arrested in Egypt it is normal that they try and improve their situation or secure early release through forgery, bribery or manipulation of any influential connections”.

• That the Appellant’s father would have shaved his beard when he was on the run. A beard is a sign of political sympathy with the Islamists and so shaving it off would go some way to concealing such an affiliation

• The Appellant’s father would, following his escape from prison, hide in the “mountains”. It is known that the Brotherhood have hide-outs in the Sinai mountains

• The Egyptian authorities would seize control of the family property. Mr Miles is aware of many other instances in which this has happened and the Respondent’s own CPIN refers to asset seizure

• The Appellant’s father would only have provided him with limited information about his activities with the Brotherhood. Mr Miles explains [at his §62]:

“I have had extensive dealings with the Islamist political opposition and in my experience it is normal for someone in the Muslim Brotherhood or similar group not to share full details of their activities with even close family members out of the very real fear that they might be targeted by the authorities and forced to give information. I find it plausible therefore that an Egyptian man in the Appellant’s father's position would keep his clandestine political activity as secret from his young son"

39. I have considered the Appellant’s evidence alongside that of Mr Miles. In doing so I have kept at the forefront of my mind that the Appellant has been convicted of crimes which include an element of dishonesty, and that someone who is prepared to commit – for instance - burglary is obviously someone who also might be prepared to lie to gain an immigration advantage. I have also kept in mind that my starting point must be the negative decision reached by Judge Callow. I am nevertheless satisfied, on the lower standard of proof, that the historical account he has given is true to the best of his knowledge and belief. I accept it because it is detailed, internally consistent, and entirely in keeping with the country background material about Egypt.

40. I now turn to the question of risk.

41. The Respondent’s case is that even if made out, the facts do not disclose a risk. Two reasons were originally advanced in support of that contention.

42. The first was that there has been a rapprochement between the Muslim Brotherhood and the then Egyptian government. Mr Miles bluntly rejects this as entirely unevidenced. He states that the Egyptian government are fundamentally opposed to any reconciliation with the party, who having been democratically elected, they had deposed in a coup. On the contrary, Mr Miles states that all that has happened since 2017 is that the crackdown against the Brotherhood has intensified. In the absence of any credible evidence to the contrary, I accept his assessment as correct, and I note in this regard that this point is not repeated as a reason for refusal in the letter that followed the ‘fresh claim’ in 2022.

43. The second reason given in 2017, and affirmed in the 2022 letter, is that any risk based on these facts would be entirely speculative. The Respondent submits that even taking his evidence at its highest, the Appellant simply does not know enough about his father’s activities to confirm one way or the other whether he is at risk. I have considered that matter carefully.

44. I have given consideration to the fact that there are obvious gaps in the Appellant’s knowledge. It is true that the Appellant has been asked a lot of questions, to which he has been unable to give an answer. At his asylum interview, for instance, he could not say what “duties or actions” his father was responsible for within the party [Q78], whether his father had been “involved in any decision making for the demonstrations” [Q82], whether he had any responsibility for other members [Q83], whether he had an ID card [Q89], or whether he had any training [Q91]; the Appellant was also unable to name any of his father’s friends from the Brotherhood [Q87]. I have however borne in mind that these gaps are, in the view of Mr Miles, perfectly normal. He considers it to be entirely plausible that a father involved in the Brotherhood would limit the information he gave to his family, and in particular his young son.

45. I have further weighed in the balance that the Appellant’s entire case is based on what he has been told, by his uncle and parents. There is a possibility that his father was not in the Brotherhood, that he was never arrested and detained following widespread anti-coup demonstrations, and that he is faking being in hiding because he maintains his opposition to the Egyptian state, and because he managed to obtain his release from prison using unlawful means. The Egyptian security forces might have kicked down the front door for entirely unrelated reasons. It might be the case that none of this is true, and there is a possibility that this family conspired to spin a false narrative to the young and impressionable Appellant in the hope that it would assist him in gaining asylum in Europe. On the other hand, I think it more likely than not that the Appellant has been told all of these things, over a period of years, because they were happening, in real time, to his family, and because they are in fact true.

46. Applying the lower standard of proof I accept that the Appellant’s father is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, that he took part in extensive protests against the government, that he was detained and imprisoned, that he managed to secure his release from prison by corrupt means, that he has since fled to the Sinai mountains alongside other members of the Brotherhood, and that his home and land have been confiscated by the state.

47. Having reviewed those alleged facts, Mr Miles is of the view that the Egyptian authorities would still be actively seeking the Appellant’s father. Partly because he is a Brotherhood activist, but also because of his escape. Mr Miles believes that in such circumstances they would be “seeking him dead or alive”. In his 2025 addendum report Mr Miles writes that the human rights situation in Egypt remains “dire”. The authorities have continued to carry out widespread arbitrary arrests and detentions of perceived and real critics, political opponents and human rights defenders; thousands remain in prolonged pretrial detention. Enforced disappearances remain routine. Reports of torture and other ill treatment are rampant: deaths in custody, often linked to torture, are consistently reported. The Muslim Brotherhood are the primary targets of this “severe and widespread crackdown”. In light of this evidence I have no hesitation in accepting that the Appellant’s father remains at risk of persecution for his political beliefs in Egypt. But this is not his appeal.

48. The question remains what would happen to the Appellant if he were to be returned. It is the Appellant’s claim that he would be arrested as a means to punish his father, or to draw him out of hiding. Mr Miles stated in 2020 that he considered it plausible that the authorities would arrest the Appellant in lieu of his father, and in his most recent addendum he states that this remains, unequivocally his view. He cannot confirm that this would be the case, but there is a risk. Relevant to my quantification of that risk, Mr Miles points to the following matter. Family members of senior Muslim Brotherhood members in Egypt remain at significant risk of harassment, intimidation, and even arbitrary detention and prosecution. This is a documented tactic used by the authorities as a means of collective punishment and to exert pressure on individuals they perceive as being involved with the Brotherhood, particularly those who live in exile. It is not uncommon for homes to be raided. Human rights organisations have documented numerous examples of family members, even those with no direct political involvement, being “held as a form of leverage”.

49. It is correct to note that many of the examples cited by Mr Miles and the organisations to which he refers relate to high ranking or prominent members of the Brotherhood, and that we have no real means of knowing what rank the Appellant’s father might have been. I have also had regard to the Respondent’s point that there are a great many ordinary Egyptians who are either members or supporters of the Brotherhood and that not all of these people have faced the kinds of abuses outlined in the materials before me. Having had regard to the particular facts established here, I am satisfied that the Appellant's father would be a person of particular interest to the authorities. It is apparent from the Appellant's own recollection that his father was heavily involved in community organising for the Brotherhood in his area, and attended a great many protests against the government. I take it from that that he had a degree of involvement above that of ordinary supporter. I must also give weight to the established fact that he managed to get out of jail and go into hiding. The authorities therefore have a very clear idea of who he is. In those circumstances I am satisfied that there is a real risk that should this man’s son, now 24, return to Egypt after a period seeking asylum abroad, that he would be detained in order to ‘flush out’ his father, or as Mr Miles puts it, as a means of “collective punishment” of the family. There is no dispute, on the evidence before me, that such detention would carry with it an unacceptably high risk of torture or other ill-treatment. Accordingly I allow the appeal on Article 3 grounds.

Human Rights

50. It follows, in light of my decision above, that I need not deal with the remaining grounds. For reasons I explain below, I consider this appropriate not only because any findings would be superfluous, but because the fluctuating nature of the Appellant’s mental health – at the heart of both the Article 3 health claim and his Article 8 grounds – mean that the UK can only uphold its Treaty obligations in this case if a detailed assessment of the Appellant’s mental health is undertaken at the time of any proposed removal.

51. The evidence about the Appellant’s condition is extensive, with no fewer than four specialist reports and other correspondence, going back to 2020. There can be no doubt that he is a deeply traumatised and troubled young man, whose mental health has been severely impacted by his experiences, and long-term substance abuse. Although this did not need to form any part of my reasoning in respect of risk, I have little hesitation in accepting that those mental health issues would exacerbate the effects of any punitive measures he would be subjected to by the Egyptian authorities on return. I accept Mr Miles’ view, supported by various human rights organisations, that the Appellant would be very unlikely to receive any treatment or support in detention. As I say, I accept that he is unwell. Whether however he is a “seriously ill” person, such that a discrete Article 3 health claim or an Article 8 private life ground could succeed, appears to dramatically vary.

52. When he was assessed by Clinical Psychologist Dr Alicia Griffiths in February 2020 the diagnostic tools she employed showed him to be suffering from severe depression, anxiety, and PTSD: at that time she assessed his risk of suicide as being unpredictable. When she saw him again, in July 2022, the Appellant “presented somewhat differently”. The Appellant told her that whilst he had been in prison he had received support from kind people who had encouraged him to think positively about the future; he had started to pray and his symptoms of PTSD, in particular the nightmares, had got much better. The Appellant told her that although he still experienced fear and anger, he was much better placed to deal with those emotions. This positivity led Dr Griffiths to assess the Appellant’s depression and anxiety as moderate, and she recorded that the diagnostic scoring of his PTSD had fallen from 68/80 to 39/80, a marked improvement. Although the Appellant had self harmed in the past, he had at that point no active suicidal thoughts.

53. The next assessment was undertaken by Dr Griffith’s colleague, Consultant Clinical Psychologist Dr Sarah Heke in August 2024. It appears that by then there had sadly been a serious deterioration in the Appellant’s mental health. He presented as being agitated, disinhibited and animated. Medical staff at HMP Swaleside, where he was being held, reported obsessive and erratic behaviour. Dr Heke established that the Appellant was experiencing fairly constant auditory hallucinations; she observed him “engaging in conversation” with these voices, some of whom were Egyptian, some of whom were Irish; he believed himself to be communicating with people in Russia and Afghanistan through a headset; he thought himself in contact with Interpol. Dr Heke recorded that the Appellant’s speech and thoughts lacked coherence. He was unable to give a consistent answer about when the voices had started, claiming initially that they had started when he had been given heroin “aged 12”, and then saying that they had only come after he came to the UK. Dr Heke concluded that he was suffering from complex PTSD, and the psychosis he was quite clearly experiencing was most likely drug induced. I note that the symptoms observed by Dr Heke are consistent with the concerns expressed by the youth casework manager from the South London Refugee Association who had, throughout 2023, noted the Appellant to be experiencing psychotic symptoms: this had resulted in him being referred to the prison mental health team. Prison records from 2024 show the Appellant to have been at that time experiencing “bizarre delusional ideas” such as not having legs but being able to walk.

54. The most recent medical evidence comes from Consultant Psychiatrist Dr Anthony Obuaya, who saw the Appellant in a remote consultation in March, and prepared a report dated 11 April 2025. The Appellant told Dr Obuaya that since being transferred to HMP Nottingham in November 2024 everything had changed for him. He had stopped using any drugs and alcohol, and with the support of the “caring” officers and staff in that prison he had started working, playing football, looking after himself and making the positive effort to stay away from any other prisoners who are using drugs. Dr Obuaya saw a man much changed from the very ill individual assessed by Dr Heke only a year before. The Appellant presented as being clean, orderly, pleasant and calm. He denied, and Dr Obuaya saw no evidence of, any disordered thinking, self-harm or psychosis. The Appellant gave every indication of wanting to improve his mental health, stay away from substance abuse and stay out of trouble.

55. Mr Wain points to this evidence to say that the Appellant cannot possibly discharge the burden of proof in respect of the health claim. The very positive assessment of Dr Obuaya must however be read in context of the evidence overall. As he notes, any assessment of the risk of suicide would need to be made in light of that history and the Appellant’s changed circumstances. What that history shows is that in 2020 he was suffering from “severe” depression and anxiety, and the most extreme symptoms of PTSD; by 2022 he was much improved, asserting a wish to escape from substance misuse and get his life back in order; 2023-24 saw a dramatic deterioration with the Appellant experiencing full blown psychosis and a complete inability to look after himself; now he is relatively well again. The Appellant’s risk of suicide is at present low, and I agree with Dr Obuaya that it is likely to remain so if the Appellant manages to remain abstinent from drugs and alcohol. I am however mindful that the Appellant went through a period of positive pro-social behaviour only three years ago, after which he sadly relapsed, re-offended and again became seriously unwell. In light of this history there is little utility in me conducting a detailed assessment of the health claim today. I do not need to do so, given my findings on the protection claim. In the event that my conclusions on protection are found to be wrong, any assessment of the health/private life claims would have to be undertaken afresh.

Summary Conclusions

56. The Appellant has not been able to rebut the presumption in s72 that he remains a ‘danger to the community’. The time may yet come when he may be able to do that, but on the evidence before me I am unable to accept that he can today discharge the burden of proof in that regard. His appeal nevertheless falls to be allowed on protection grounds because I accept that there is a real risk that if returned to Egypt the Appellant will face torture or other ill-treatment that would amount to a violation of the UK’s Treaty obligations under Article 3 ECHR. I have not therefore needed to address the Appellant’s Article 3 health claim, argued in the alternative, other than to note that the evidence about his mental health demonstrates that it has fluctuated dramatically in recent years. Should it become necessary for the Appellant to rely on that limb of his case, a fresh assessment would need to be made based on up to date evidence. In light of my findings on risk the appeal would also fall to be allowed pursuant to s117C(6) NIAA 2002. If however I am wrong about that risk, the Article 8 assessment would also need to be undertaken afresh, again based on up-to-date psychiatric evidence.

Decision and Directions

57. My decision is as follows:

i) The appeal is dismissed on Refugee Convention grounds

ii) The appeal is allowed on protection grounds with reference to Article 3 ECHR

58. There is an order for anonymity in force, made in light of the evidence relating to the Appellant’s mental health.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
12 September 2025