Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2022-006491
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00459/2022
HU/56507/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 10 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

AB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Sobowale, Counsel instructed by M & K Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 12 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and his wife and children are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and his wife and children. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
1. The Court of Appeal made an anonymity order at permission stage to protect the interests of the appellant’s wife and children. It was not suggested to me that the anonymity order should not continue, and I do continue that order. I do so referring to the appellant’s wife as CD, his older daughter as EF and his second daughter as GH. The reason I continue the anonymity order is that I consider the interests of the appellant’s wife and children in keeping their identities confidential due to CD’s health conditions, threats made against the family and the welfare of the children, together outweigh the public interest in identifying the appellant.
Background
Relevant history of the appeal
2. This is an appeal by AB, a national of India, now aged thirty, against the respondent’s decision of 5 October 2021 refusing his human rights claim consequent on the making of a deportation order. The appeal comes before me remitted from the Court of Appeal on Article 8 grounds only and de novo. The appellant previously succeeded on asylum grounds before the First-Tier Tribunal, but error of law was found by the Upper Tribunal and on remaking succeeded only on Article 8 grounds. When finding “very compelling circumstances”, the Upper Tribunal’s evaluation of CD’s ability to relocate to India was found to be flawed by the Court of Appeal – see Secretary of State for the Home Department v AB [2026] EWCA Civ 230.
Appellant’s immigration history and time in the UK
3. The appellant came to the UK when he was eleven in the most tragic of circumstances. In September 2004 (when the appellant had just turned 9) his father murdered his mother in the UK in an episode of arson which also killed his mother’s parents and a maternal aunt. His father was sentenced to life imprisonment. Initially the appellant came to the UK with relatives after the sentencing for the commemoration of his mother’s death. He returned to India but then was brought back to the UK during the currency of his visit visa. Shortly after the expiration of that visa a cousin applied for the appellant to stay in the UK with her, but the application was refused in December 2007 without a right of appeal. The appellant remained in the UK and reconsideration was subsequently requested, but the appellant’s representatives were told in January 2011 that he would have to make a fresh application.
4. A further application for leave was made in September 2012 when the appellant was seventeen, sponsored by a maternal uncle, whom the appellant had been living with for the vast majority, if not all, of his time in the UK. This application was refused in December 2013 with no right of appeal.
5. The appellant remained in the UK. He applied again for leave to remain after he was arrested in September 2016 and served with notice of liability to removal as an overstayer. He was successful in obtaining 30 months’ limited leave to remain on private life grounds, such leave expiring on 9 June 2019. He made a further application before that leave expired, which was refused in the decision under appeal.
6. The appellant met CD, a British citizen born in the UK who also has Pakistani nationality, in about October 2017, when she was aged twenty. Because of their different backgrounds and that the appellant was then of the Sikh religion, the relationship met with intense disapproval from CD’s family (which I describe further below). CD finally moved out of her family home in September 2018, and the couple were married on 27 November 2018. It is accepted that the couple are in a genuine relationship, and it is now accepted that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with his British citizen children EF, born in October 2019 and now aged six, and GH, born in September 2024.
7. It is also accepted that the appellant converted to Islam in February 2019. He subsequently changed his traditional Sikh name to a Muslim name.
Appellant’s criminal offending
8. The appellant’s first conviction was in June 2017 at the age of twenty-one for two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The only details come from the pre-sentence report for the index offence which indicates it comprised assault on strangers (a man and a woman) when the appellant was out celebrating his birthday and was drunk. He received a sentence of 16 weeks’ imprisonment suspended for 12 months with a rehabilitation activity requirement and an unpaid work requirement.
9. The two index offences of robbery were committed in July 2019. The victims were vulnerable women targeted on the street in broad daylight at a time when the appellant was under the influence of Class A drugs. The first woman was walking with her children in a pram when the appellant snatched her gold necklace causing her to fall to the ground and suffer cuts and grazes. The second offence was committed a week later against a grandmother in her late seventies who was waiting at a bus stop when the appellant pulled a gold chain from her neck. On 13 October 2020, the appellant was sentenced to 62 months’ imprisonment concurrently on each count (the sentencing judge indicated that the starting point was 70 months, reduced because of the appellant’s change of plea to guilty on the day fixed for trial). The appellant received no separate penalty other than points in relation to driving without a licence and driving whilst uninsured.
10. The appellant was released on immigration bail in early September 2022 (he had earlier spent six months at liberty post-conviction and pre-sentence due to an error) and returned to the family home where he has lived ever since.
The hearing
11. I had before me all the documents before tribunals in earlier proceedings, with a small number of additional documents mainly updating witness statements and medical records. Given the number of documents (over 1300 pages) the bundle was split into fourteen parts. Unfortunately this resulted in me and Mrs Arif missing many critical documents. It took some time for everyone to obtain all documents and to prepare for the hearing.
12. I heard evidence from the appellant, CD and CD’s sister which I summarise.
13. The appellant confirmed the truth of his updating witness statement and the one from the earlier proceedings. He said that his father was in prison in India and apart from his father his only other family he had in India was his father’s sisters, but he had no family he was connected with. His father still called him occasionally, but they last spoke about a year or maybe two years ago. His maternal uncle lived in the UK but they did not speak because of his relationship with CD. His uncle’s children, his cousins, were in the UK but he was not in contact with them; he had a terrible childhood with his uncle and so did not have much to do with his cousins. He had a good relationship with CD’s sister and her partner and CD’s sister supported them not financially but emotionally. When he was in prison CD was in contact with her sister, but not with her brother. He did not remember too much but he thought CD had been working part-time whilst he was in prison; he thought she worked for a bit but then stopped because of her health condition.
14. CD walked to the witness box slowly using a walking stick. She confirmed the truth of her witness statements. She said that she was receiving PIP (personal independence payment) the standard rate for daily living and the enhanced rate for mobility. The payments were backdated to February 2022, and the payment had been extended for another year. She was taken by Mr Sobowale to the report of Professor Afghan (paragraph 3.12) where she had reported that her husband’s family members and friends who were unhappy with the appellant converting to Islam had started threatening her saying that if they went to India, they would set their house on fire and kill her and their daughter. CD explained that the threats were from people in the UK and India; the threats had stopped because the appellant had changed his number. She said that originally the threats were made to the appellant on his phone, but when the appellant went to prison she had his phone; the threats were via voice calls rather than messages and she believed were from the appellant’s maternal family.
15. In cross-examination CD said that she was only in contact with one of her sisters and neither of them were in contact with their families as they both had been victims of honour-based violence. Neither she nor her sister had contact with their brother; he said that they were dead to him. She said that if she went to India she might be killed because she was Muslim or had converted someone to Islam. She had Pakistani nationality and the extremists would not like her being in India; she would not be safe, and she would have to leave the country of her birth. She felt she would not even be able to enter Pakistan as all the visa forms asked you to state who your parents were and where they were born.
16. CD agreed that she had support from the government and other organisations whilst the appellant was in prison, but she said it was only financial support although it did not pay all the bills, and it could not care for children. She said she could not have someone available 24 hours a day; the appellant cared for her and the children; he took the toddler on the school run because she always wanted her dad. She, CD, was bedbound some days, some days she had to be picked up and taken to the toilet even; she could not wash herself because she had palindromic arthritis which affected her entire body, one day it could be her shoulders, the other day her knees. She said she was about to have an assessment for her mental health and was waiting for physiotherapy as her pain had increased; she had a walking stick her back was so bad, and she had fibromyalgia which was all affected by stress, she was constantly crying and stressed and had panic attacks; she wondered whether it was worth her living anymore because of how much was going on.
17. CD said that she last went to Pakistan in 2015. Her parents had obtained dual nationality for her and she had kept it up to date, she had renewed the details when she got married so it showed the appellant’s name as her husband. She said that she had kept Pakistani nationality because her parental family had always known Pakistan as their motherland and it would be easier to be buried there if they were to die here.
18. CD said that the appellant had no contact with his family and she did not either; she had spoken to the appellant’s father once a very long time ago before the appellant went to prison. She had never been to India. She was asked about her relative who was a politician in Pakistan and how he could reach her in India and she said that they had their ways and links and he was a politician and money could do anything even in India. She detailed the man’s name, the position she thought he had and the party he belonged to in Kashmir. She said that she had not thought she needed to provide evidence about him as he was on Google everywhere. The only way she could have evidenced links with him would have been to find old photographs. She thought it would be difficult for her as a Pakistani national to visit India even though she was also British because her parents were born in Pakistan and so she had links to Pakistan. She had only looked at a basic application to go to India which asked for those details.
19. In re-examination and in answer to my questions CD said that she had been working 22 hours a week but had reduced her hours to 18 as it was really hard for her as she had to sit in one chair at a computer all the time. Work had provided her with an adapted keyboard and mouse, and she had got herself other things to help. She worked for an answering service chatting online with customers so she was on a pc with headphones on throughout her shift which was monitored so she could not take unscheduled breaks. CD told me that she could recall being off work due to illness for a week once and on another occasion for two days. She said she made herself work because they could not afford for her not to work. Some days she was bedbound. The appellant would always make breakfast and lunch. If she was all right she would prepare the evening meal with his help and if she was having a bad day he would put something in the air fryer, or her sister would help.
20. CD said that she took venlafaxine for depression and was also taking propranolol for anxiety and she swapped between naproxen and other painkillers. She agreed that she had been diagnosed with both palindromic rheumatism and fibromyalgia – she had been under the care of a rheumatologist for 5 or 6 months. She had been discharged from physiotherapy because they said they could not do anything now but had been referred back just in case and was being assessed for counselling again. She had never been referred to a psychiatrist. At the moment she had a stress related rash all over her body and was under the care of a dermatologist. When she went to counselling they told her that her stress was mainly due to her husband’s situation and there was nothing they could do about that and discharged her; she wanted to go again because she saw it as helping with the thoughts in her head even if it did not reduce her stress. The pains in her knees had started when the appellant was in prison and it had got worse since then.
21. I asked her about the threats from the Pakistani politician, and she told me he had made threats to harm her and her family, honour-based threats. She had heard from other people he was threatening her, and he had threatened her when she was leaving the family home for the appellant, he had made threats himself to her face when he came to the UK.
22. CD became very upset at times during her evidence particularly when describing her health and the effect on her of these proceedings and contemplating the appellant’s deportation.
23. CD’s sister adopted the contents of her witness statements. She said in cross-examination that CD was the only family member she spoke to, she had no contact with her parents or other siblings and she fully supported CD. She would only be able to help by giving advice if the appellant were sent back to India as she could not help financially as she had three children, the oldest a child of fifteen with special needs, autism, and learning difficulties. She had only been able to support by phone calls when the appellant was in prison. She would sometimes bring food over for the family now if she ordered from outside; they only lived about 7 to 8 minutes’ drive away.
24. CD’s sister thought CD’s life would be at risk in India because her husband was a convert. There was a relative who might cause issues, a politician in Pakistan (whom she named) who came to the UK on and off. Originally when it all started he made direct threats to CD, there were a few parties involved and threats because she was marrying someone who was not a Muslim. The relative was in Pakistan at the time of the threats but it was through third parties involved, social media fake accounts, text messages, it was a big community and word went round about what CD was doing. She knew the relative came to the UK once a year, but she was not sure the last time he had visited, she had not seen him herself since she stopped living at home.
25. After hearing evidence, I heard submissions from both representatives.
26. Mrs Arif submitted that neither the private nor family life exceptions were met. Emotional hardship and family separation were inherent in deportation cases. The length of the appellant’s residence and integration into the UK could not elevate the case into the very compelling category – there was a real distinction to be made between those who had lived in the UK for a long time lawfully and those who had not and she referred me to CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027. The appellant was a national of India, spoke Punjabi and had cultural familiarity with India and the absence of family support did not amount to a very compelling circumstance.
27. It was submitted that reduced weight should be given to family life; CD would have been aware of the appellant’s precarious immigration status and criminal history. The index offences were committed after their marriage. It was not disputed, she said that CD had the health conditions she claimed to have but the medical evidence did not establish the very high threshold required; treatment remained available to CD and CD was able to cope when the appellant was in prison. Professor Afghan’s report was a few years old, and it was predictive rather than analysing what had happened when the appellant was in prison; it did not explain why community services would not be available to assist in the absence of the appellant. Mrs Arif submitted I could and should give little weight to that report. She accepted that it was in the best interests of both children for them to remain in the UK and for their father to remain, but the independent social worker’s report did not confirm any serious detriment which would ultimately outweigh the public interest, she submitted. Relationships could still be maintained by contact and visits when feasible and there was help available which the children could access. The school did not say that only the appellant was able to support the family. The statutory scheme permitted the deportation of parents and recognised that there would be consequences; the consequences did not fall into the high threshold of exceeding what was ordinarily experienced.
28. So far as the inability of CD to relocate was concerned, there was no objective evidence to suggest that a British citizen, even a British citizen of Pakistani origin, would face difficulties entering India. Difficulty and uncertainty, delay and inconvenience did not render relocation impossible for Article 8 purposes; it would be speculative to raise administrative obstacles into determining factors. The credibility of the witnesses was undermined by inconsistent evidence from CD and her sister about the relative. CD said she received direct threats from the relative in the UK, whereas the sister’s evidence was that threats were made through a third party or family whilst he was in Pakistan. There was simply no evidence that the relative’s influence extended transnationally. I should, she submitted, assess risk rather than assertion even if it were a genuine subjective fear. Mrs Arif referred me to Lal v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1925 at [17] and to NC v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1379 at [25]. She submitted that speculative fears of harm could not outweigh the public interest.
29. Mr Sobowale relied on the skeleton argument prepared by his instructing solicitors, save he said for [58] (about visa processing between Pakistan and India being currently suspended) on which he accepted he could not rely because it ignored that CD was a British national. He invited me to accept that although the social worker’s report was old the picture of the relationship between the appellant and EF was one which was very close; there was real dependency and that had not changed and it was echoed by the observations made by both witnesses. At [17] of CD’s sister’s updated witness statement she explained why she considered the consequences for CD if the appellant were removed would be devastating and that was in essence, he submitted, why there were very compelling circumstances; the impact of separation would collapse family life. CD’s health concerns manifested when the appellant went to prison and things became worse after that. There was clear evidence of the progression of her health conditions. The nature of fibromyalgia was that CD would need help from the appellant with activities such as cooking and she required constant support; she could work because of that support but even then only part-time. CD received PIP including the enhanced rate for mobility and if the appellant’s support were removed there would be nothing which could replace that support on a day-to-day basis. There would be a very real consequence for the family unit in terms of the stress of working more hours and having to care for children – CD’s body’s reaction to stress was the biggest aggravating feature for her health and she could not improve things in the sense she was taking medication and having medical support but even with that she was not improving. We could all see that at the age of 29 CD was having to use a walking stick. If the appeal were to be dismissed the family unit would not have the capacity either physically or psychologically to cope with separation. CD was very direct and emotional that the stress of the entire process had in her view triggered her conditions. There was an underlying assumption that those left behind after a deportation would be able to pick themselves up and carry on with life, but there had been several periods when the couple thought they had come to the end of their ordeal and things had not improved. CD could not work full time because of her health, she could not care for her children alone and she could not control the way she responded to stress; CD would simply not be able to carry on with life and it was that which made the case meet the very high threshold. That was not speculation, it was foreseeable. She did not have family support to make up the gap and state support would not be available.
30. Mr Sobowale accepted that there was an absence of documentary evidence relevant to the threat from relatives abroad. The evidence from CD and her sister was not necessarily inconsistent, he submitted, as CD had said that she went through a period when she was receiving threats, she had not limited it to one interaction, that the sister was aware of a threat from Pakistan did not mean that no threats were made in the UK. Whilst limited weight could be given to a subjective threat he asked me to find that CD had a genuine fear of going to India and that she was particularly susceptible to stress. Although it might be that her Pakistani heritage would not ultimately prevent her from entering India there was an argument that because of the cold war between Pakistan and India, her heritage might make an application from her scrutinised in a way which would mean she would find it difficult to succeed.
31. He submitted that taking everything together although this was a high threshold, unusually the threshold was met because of the factual matrix.
32. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Relevant legal principles
33. Section 117A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides that when I am considering whether an interference with a person’s right to respect for private and family life is justified under Article 8 (2), I must have regard, in all cases to the considerations listed in section 117B, and in cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals, to the considerations listed in section 117C.
34. The potentially relevant parts of section 117B apart from the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration controls are subsections (4) and (5):
“(4) Little weight should be given to-
(a) a private life, or
(b) a relationship formed with a qualifying partner, that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully.
(5) Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person’s immigration status is precarious.”
35. In the case of foreign criminals, as the appellant, section 117C provides:
“(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C’s deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where-
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C’s life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C’s integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C’s deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”.
36. The principles as to the deportation of what has been called a “serious offender”, that is a person such as the appellant who has received a sentence of over 4 years’ imprisonment have recently been summarised in the case of Secretary of State for the Home Department v Lewis [2026] EWCA Civ 879 (see [18] – [23]). It is usually sensible first to see whether the case involves circumstances of the kind described in exceptions 1 and 2 and then to assess whether any of the factors falling within Exception 1 or 2 are of such force, whether by themselves or taken in conjunction with any other relevant factor not covered by the circumstances described in the exceptions so as to satisfy the very compelling circumstances test. Finally, the factors identified in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (see HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1176 at [51]) have an important role to play, albeit many but not all would be part of the consideration whether deportation would be unduly harsh or whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration into his country of origin. The weight to be given to certain relevant factors in the context of deportation has been determined by the legislature and that is permissible.
Factors relevant to the appellant’s private life and his reintegration into India
Length of residence and length of lawful residence
37. The appellant has lived in the UK for more than 19 years, significantly more than half his life, including all his adult life and all his teenage years. He has however only been lawfully resident during the currency of his visit visa and then for just under 5 years, during his 30 months’ leave between the end of 2016 and June 2019 and his leave under section 3C between June 2019 and the refusal of his application for further leave on the making of a deportation order. Nevertheless, I find it significant that he was brought to the UK by the adults in his life and in the tragic circumstances I have outlined above.
Social and cultural integration into the UK
38. Despite the appellant’s offending, I find he is socially and culturally integrated into the UK, having considered the test set out in CI (Nigeria) (see [57] – [62]). The appellant was twenty-one at the date of his first offences and by that time he had spent 10 years in the UK, had been educated in the UK, had been working in the UK and supporting himself and had formed social networks. He was completely socially and culturally integrated into the UK. The appellant has only been back to India once in 2017 or 2018 (see questions 5 and 6 of his asylum interview) to see his father now serving his prison sentence in India. He said he visited him to try and find out the truth of what happened with his mother.
39. I do not consider that the offending in 2017 or the index offending weakened or removed the appellant’s social and cultural integration. He met CD, a British citizen from an entirely different cultural background, between his offending in 2017 and the index offences, and they were married and CD was pregnant with EF when the index offences were committed. The appellant has continued to work when he has been able to do so.
Very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into India?
40. I am satisfied that the appellant has no family support in India and has been threatened by family members in India. The appellant’s father is in prison and the appellant said in his asylum interview (question 32) that his father’s family were against him as his father’s sisters were using the land his father gave them so the maternal family would not have it. He explained that one of the sisters had told him to get out because the land was not his. He also referred in that interview and elsewhere in evidence to his maternal family in India making threats against him and being unhappy that he was still in touch with his father and about his marriage to a Muslim woman and then his conversion. It is credible against the background of hostility in India between Sikhs and Muslims and hostility within a community to those who have changed their religion, that the family in India would not want to support the appellant after his conversion to Islam and indeed would threaten him. It is also credible that the family would not remain close after the appellant was brought to the UK after his mother’s death rather than being cared for by family in India.
41. I am also satisfied that the appellant would not receive support from his maternal family in the UK. The appellant has described in asylum interview and in his first witness statement a difficult relationship with his maternal uncle with whom he lived, describing physical abuse, being made to work in the uncle’s business after school and hence moving out of the uncle’s house at the age of 19. It is clear from the asylum interview that the appellant moved out because he felt that his maternal family were only looking after him so that they could take the money which the appellant considered was due to him because of his mother’s death. There is material in the documents to indicate that the appellant’s maternal family wrongly accused the appellant of burglary (it is not clear what stage this accusation reached but the appellant was obviously never convicted). I am entirely satisfied that the appellant is no longer in contact with the family in the UK and has no wish to be.
42. It will be difficult for the appellant on return to India given the length of time he has been away and that he would be unlikely to be able to settle in his home area given his conversion and the past threats. Practically he would have to move away and start again with nothing. I am not satisfied that he would experience threats outside his home area, he has changed his telephone number and there is no reason his family or others from the community would be able to locate him.
43. Despite the obstacles, I am satisfied that the appellant would be able to make a new start and form a private life, find work and develop friendships again in India. He is healthy, still relatively young, and he has worked in the UK including work as a butcher. He is able to speak Punjabi and English, and Indian society and culture will not be completely unfamiliar to him as he will have some memories of living in India and attending school there, even though he would be starting in a different community with a different religion from that of his childhood. I am not satisfied that the difficulties he would experience would be very significant obstacles to his integration into India, but he would face real difficulties.
Would the effect on CD of the appellant’s deportation be unduly harsh?
44. It was not disputed that CD has the following health conditions which are described in her witness statement and appear in her medical records:
Depression
Palindromic rheumatism
Fibromyalgia
Anxiety
POTS (Postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome)
45. The sciatica described in her witness statement is not referred to as such in recent medical records, but chronic pain, pelvic girdle pain and pain management are referred to and there has been no dispute that CD does experience pain to the extent her mobility is very limited. I am satisfied that she experiences sciatic type pain. At the date of the medical records, CD was being investigated and prescribed treatment for asthma although she now describes her condition as chronic airway inflammation caused by allergies. I am satisfied that she has that condition.
46. In her witness statement CD has described her conditions as having a significant and often devastating impact on her day-to-day life. She said there were days when she struggled to get out of bed due to pain, fatigue or dizziness and when her symptoms were particularly severe she could not carry out her own personal care or care for the children. The difficulties she experiences are consistent with the award of PIP indicating that on the majority of days she needs help with core daily living activities, the difficulties she described experiencing were not challenged and I am satisfied that she experiences them. I do not find her difficulties inconsistent with being able to work as CD describes. I accept her account of reducing her work to 18 hours per week and I am aware that it is consistent with a condition such as fibromyalgia which can be affected by stress and exertion, that CD may push herself to work as she knows the household needs the money, but the push to work will mean greater pain or difficulties coping at other times. In other words, it is not inconsistent with the functional effect of her conditions on her that she describes having only had a relatively limited time off work; her ability to function for some periods and in some areas does not mean that she is able to manage without support for the full day and full week which would be required to look after herself, the children and the household on her own.
47. I accept CD’s account of the stress of recent years worsening her health. That stress impacts on her physical health as well as her mental health can be seen from her voluminous medical records. During the time the appellant was in prison CD was seeing her doctor at least once a month for physical symptoms (such as headache, back and hip pain, blackouts, rashes) as well as mental health difficulties.
48. CD was not happy at home with her family even before she met the appellant. She described to Professor Afghan for the purposes of the psychiatric report not feeling that she was a wanted child, not being allowed to go to college or university, and being part of a family with very strict rules such as not being allowed to go out or meet friends from school. From the age of seventeen she described receiving unwanted marriage proposals mostly from extended family. I find it significant in the context of her history of physical illness that during 2016 CD was diagnosed with dissociative motor disorders, after describing and evidencing stroke type symptoms and having extensive investigations which revealed no organic cause for her functional difficulties. Before that in 2014 and 2015 she was visiting her GP frequently for abdominal pain, chest pain, and severe headache amongst other conditions. Again, investigations did not lead to any diagnosis of serious illness which those symptoms would suggest but CD was describing and evidencing clear functional limitations caused by her symptoms. When living with her parents she always refused the offer of antidepressants, her credible explanation being the stigma of being seen to have mental health difficulties and the likely reluctance of her parents to allow her to continue mental health treatment.
49. The significance of the above is that CD’s pattern of illness is long-lasting and did not for example begin with the threat of deportation against the appellant or even when she and the appellant met and she broke with her family.
50. I am satisfied as I explain below that CD has no reliable family support from her own family beyond her sister who gave evidence and the practical support her sister can give her is limited due to the demands of her own family which includes a disabled child.
51. I have used the phrase reliable family support because there is a mixed picture. It is evident that the relationship between CD and the appellant caused a serious break with her family. Police records support CD’s case of honour-based abuse against her. CD described in her first witness statement physical violence and threats from her family against her and the appellant if the relationship were continued, and being supported by the police to move out of the family home at Christmas 2017. She was persuaded to move back after her family apologised but the family stopped her seeing the appellant, she was threatened and there was an arrangement for her to go to Pakistan and be married. CD required police assistance and the involvement of the adult safeguarding team for her passport to be confiscated, and a ban imposed on her leaving the UK. Eventually CD could not bear living at home with her family any longer, and left to live with the appellant in September 2018 after they undertook an Islamic marriage.
52. However when the appellant applied in June 2019, before the index offence, to renew his leave to remain, the witness statements in support from the appellant and CD suggested that the family now accepted him as a son. The respondent made that comment in the decision letter and noted that no evidence had been received to advise that CD would not be able to receive additional support from friends or family following deportation.
53. CD was not cross-examined on this point during her evidence. She and the appellant clearly did become closer to her family at one point, as they moved back to the area in which CD’s family lived so that she could have support during her pregnancy with EF (an entry in her medical records for June 2019 refers to her indicating she wanted to move closer to her family for support with her pregnancy). Nevertheless, the medical records suggest she was not consistently supported. I say this because CD visited hospital late in pregnancy with EF with abdominal pain, which was thought to be early labour, describing herself as alone at home and having driven herself to the hospital. The doctor examining her was very concerned that she would be driving herself home and wanted her to stay in hospital although CD discharged herself against medical advice. In December 2019 CD was referred to as being tearful and anxious and having a lack of support and being about to meet with a family support worker.
54. There is similar evidence from other sources about the lack of support after EF’s birth. In the pre-sentence report of October 2020, the probation officer described the appellant referring to he and CD having no family support to cope with childcare and expressing his worries about how they would manage without him. In November 2020 EF’s health visitor wrote in support of the prison giving the appellant additional video time with EF to ensure she did not suffer emotionally, as CD was described as isolated with limited support from family. By June 2022 CD described to her GP having particular struggles with her mental health as she was working for her brother, but her family had rejected her, and she was trying to look for other jobs. The OASys report prepared in the summer of 2022 in anticipation of the appellant’s release on licence refers to the appellant reporting that he and EF had been disowned by their families. I note that the social worker’s report of December 2022 discussed the apparent contradiction of reconciliation in 2019 with CD who told her that family support was withdrawn again when her sister also entered into a love marriage and CD was blamed for her sister’s choices; at the stage of speaking to the social worker CD had only occasional telephone contact with her father.
55. Against the background of the history of undoubted honour-based violence from her family before CD finally left home, which included promises of reconciliation which were later broken, it appears perfectly consistent that there would subsequently be periods of reconciliation or partial reconciliation which did not survive arguments. Bearing that in mind, the evidence of limited practical support given by family to CD and the credible insistence of CD and her sister that at the moment there is no contact or support from other family I am satisfied that CD now has no other support but from her sister. I am satisfied that although there might be some reconciliation with family in the future, her family other than the one sister who supports her cannot be relied upon for meaningful or long-lasting support and CD’s sister is only able to give limited practical support.
56. Mrs Arif points out that CD managed whilst the appellant was in prison, but the medical records evidence that she experienced real difficulty and her mental and physical health worsened. I have already described frequent visits to the doctor; CD was described at one visit as presenting with EF, being in significant distress saying that she was struggling with EF, that she felt anxious, but she was “past the stage of wanting to die” and was triggered by seeing EF distressed. She was prescribed stronger medication. A couple of months later she was saying that she was overwhelmed and that she had suicidal thoughts, but EF was a protective factor. Her recurrent headaches were thought to be stress related in nature and she was advised to contact the health visitor and social services directly for support with EF. By July 2022 she was describing herself as burnt out, aching, exhausted and struggling to work 8 hours a week as she was then. Her medication was increased again and she was signed off as unfit for work. This medical evidence corroborates the appellant’s evidence to the independent social worker that at times on telephone calls to and from prison, CD would be desperate, crying and screaming in despair.
57. The real difference between separation through a prison sentence and separation by deportation is also that (apart from during COVID) CD and EF were able to visit the appellant in prison, have telephone and video contact, and, although I accept that the appellant was placed in immigration detention for a short period, the period of his release from prison was known and could be worked to. If CD remains in the UK and the appellant is deported, it is difficult to see how there could be meaningful visits to the appellant. Apart from CD’s fear of going to India (see below), the family will experience real financial difficulty and be reliant on benefits as CD will not be in a position to work as the appellant has looked after the children while she is working, and assisted her with household tasks and personal care. She will not be able to fund visits, and it is difficult to see how the appellant will be able to either. They will still be able to keep in touch by phone, but even that is likely to be difficult until the appellant finds a regular job to support himself as the appellant will be returning to India with no family support, no base to return to and needing to establish himself and find work in a new community.
58. Professor Afghan examined CD in January 2023. He diagnosed her with generalised anxiety disorder, panic disorder and severe depression, her vulnerability to depression being predisposed from her childhood experiences and the impact of psychological and social stress maintaining her symptoms of depression and anxiety. He describes CD as having a strong bond and connection with the appellant being cemented by the birth of EF and that the appellant’s deportation would be likely to have a devastating impact on CD’s mental health (paragraph 7.9) leading to her relapsing into severe depression and there being a strong possibility of her being actively suicidal. Mrs Arif criticises the report for being predictive, but that is what Professor Afghan was asked to consider; Mrs Arif says that he did not consider how CD coped when the appellant was in prison but the Professor refers to the clinical evidence that CD’s wellbeing improved soon after her marriage to the appellant and also that it improved after the appellant returned to live with the family. It was not the Professor’s place to consider what community support might be provided for CD, but any community support as the social worker explains in her report (paragraph 2.14) is likely to be relatively nominal and would not be able to replace a parent.
59. I consider I can rely and place weight on Professor Afghan’s report. It is old but the medical records since then evidence that CD has developed more physical conditions (such as palindromic rheumatism and chronic pain amongst others) and has had another episode of depression since his report. Her health is getting worse under the inevitable stress of prolonged proceedings. CD described a history of self-harm when living with her parents (which history she has previously reported to health professionals since leaving the parental home) and the description she gives of taking an overdose of painkillers when living with her parents is consistent with the timing of an episode of urgent admission to hospital with unexplained vomiting blood. I am satisfied given all the evidence I have described that she has a history of self-harm. I am satisfied given the evidence of the impact of stress on CD that the consequences of the appellant’s deportation are indeed likely to be devastating for her affecting both her physical and mental health. I have already indicated that I place weight on Professor Afghan’s report and I am satisfied that it is more likely than not as he concludes, that the appellant’s deportation would lead to CD relapsing into severe depression and that there is a strong possibility of her becoming actively suicidal.
60. “Unduly harsh” represents an elevated threshold. It is not simply uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable, or merely difficult. It emphasises that in the context of the public interest a decision which is harsh on an appellant’s partner or child is still justifiable. Harsh has been said to denote severity or bleakness and “unduly harsh” raises the threshold still higher. It will usually be harsh to separate a person from a long-term partner with whom they are in a genuine relationship and raising a family but I am satisfied beyond any doubt that if CD were to remain in the UK without the appellant the consequences for her given her history and her medical history would be unduly harsh. Indeed, I am satisfied that the consequences for her would be devastating, even beyond unduly harsh.
61. Would it be unduly harsh for CD to relocate to India to be with the appellant?
62. I am satisfied that CD did experience threats from the appellant’s family and from a politician relative and I am satisfied that CD genuinely believes that she and the children would be at risk in India. I find CD’s evidence credible. She did not cite simply the threats from the politician but also from the appellant’s family and the threat from society because she was Muslim and would be seen as the person who had converted the appellant to Islam. She did not exaggerate the threat from the appellant’s family; she was clear that the threats had stopped once the appellant changed his phone number. Both she and her sister gave identifying details about the relative who was a politician. I appreciate that there was some difference between the evidence given by CD and her sister about whether the threats were made by the politician face to face with CD but I agree with Mr Sobowale that the fact that CD’s sister was not aware of a threat being made when the politician was in the UK does not mean that it was not made, CD suggested that she received threats over a period as opposed to one occasion. Again, CD has not appeared to exaggerate by suggesting that the threats were recent as opposed to around the time when she was leaving the family home to be with her husband. That there were threats is again plausible in the context of a background where (as described to the panel of the Upper Tribunal) the politician was regarded as the head of CD’s family and CD was seen as bringing shame on the family.
63. I bear in mind CD’s history of generalised anxiety disorder and the past threats which I have accepted. This is against a background where the First-Tier Tribunal Judge found in favour of the appellant’s case for asylum. Of course, the judge was wrong, but the evidence the judge referred to does show that there are incidents of violence against Muslims in which on occasion state actors may be complicit or at least ignore and that there can be discrimination against minorities including Muslims. I find it perfectly credible that CD has a subjective fear of moving to India.
64. I am not satisfied that CD’s fears of violence are objectively justified. As the Upper Tribunal found in their earlier decision, as far as general risk is concerned overall in India individuals are free to choose their religion and that is generally respected by the government with sufficiency of protection available. Although there may be incidents of violence and the government’s protection may on occasion not be extended, there is no general or systemic risk to Muslims in India from the state or society. The appellant’s family would not be able to find the appellant or CD unless they were living in the same area. I do not doubt that CD fears that the politician relative will have influence in India, but it is difficult to see that a politician from Pakistan particularly a politician from Kashmir, which is disputed between India and Pakistan, would have influence over the state in India. Although the politician might know and have influence over individual Muslims, I am not satisfied that he would be able to find out where the appellant and CD were living in such a vast country as India, or even be motivated to do so now some years have passed since the incident of the appellant leaving her family.
65. As the Court of Appeal said when allowing the respondent’s appeal in this case, I must make an objective assessment of CD’s ability to relocate to India. That does not mean her subjective fear is irrelevant; I must consider the ways in which and the extent to which her subjective fear will or might impede re-integration.
66. In a person without mental health difficulties, subjective fear could be alleviated with the passage of time without incident and support from a partner. However stress and anxiety have an adverse effect on CD’s health as her medical record shows, so her subjective fear is likely to worsen her health. CD’s fears are not the only difficulties she would face in India. If she and the children relocate with the appellant, there is nowhere for them to go. I appreciate if the appellant returned voluntarily, he would be eligible, as the decision letter says, for the facilitated returns scheme, but the guidance indicates that would be the lower sum of £750 as he has completed his sentence and although family members are eligible, it is only family members without leave in their own right returning to their country of origin. CD has been working and receiving benefits in the UK and the appellant has cared for the family. Even if the appellant found a job at a level where he could obtain sufficient accommodation for a family, he would be working, and CD would have to manage on her own with the children while he is working, despite her fears and her mental and physical illnesses meaning that she herself needs care more often than not. I find that her stress and her fears would mean that she cannot work as she does in the UK. There would be no financial support from the State or other support to assist her as there is in the UK. There is public healthcare in India, but resources are known to be limited. CD sees her GP and other specialists frequently and is prescribed various medicines as I have set out. She has no doubt developed a trusting relationship with the doctors she sees in her GP practice. I am satisfied that she would not receive the same level of care in India without paying for such care and she and the appellant would not have the money available to pay for care, at least until the appellant has a good job and can afford more than basic support for himself and the family. She would also have to navigate a system completely unfamiliar to her in an unfamiliar country when obtaining care whether public or private, and start at the beginning in building relationships with professionals managing her care, which is obviously difficult for someone with mental health problems, particularly someone in CD’s position who is fearful.
67. I am satisfied that the combination of the family having nowhere to live initially, CD’s subjective fears for their safety which will add to her stress and anxiety and therefore worsen her illnesses, having to manage the children on her own during the appellant’s working hours (once he obtains work) whilst coping with her illnesses, not having the availability or continuity of medical care and medication that she has in the UK with likely difficulties in accessing available care because of her mental health problems and her fears, would, taken together, reach the elevated threshold of being unduly harsh on CD, going beyond being merely severe or harsh.
68. I am satisfied that it would be unduly harsh for CD to live in India with the appellant.
Would the effect on the children of the appellant’s deportation be unduly harsh?
69. The appellant has been the main carer for EF and now GH since leaving prison, now more than 3 ½ years. The independent social worker concluded that the appellant had a significant and positive involvement in EF’s life and a significant degree of responsibility for her welfare (of course GH was not born at the date of the report). I note that the letter from the school indicates that it is the appellant who consistently takes EF to school and collects her from school. Mrs Arif comments that the school did not say that only the appellant could support the family, but the school would not have the knowledge to make such a comment.
70. If the appellant were deported it would be very difficult for the children to continue family life with their father. I have explained that practically visits will not be possible, and even regular phone contact is likely to be difficult initially because the appellant has no base to return to, will have no money and will have to prioritise looking for work and shelter. GH is a toddler and it will be very difficult to maintain any meaningful relationship through irregular phone contact. EF is older but she is not old enough to understand what has happened to the family. I find that it is more likely than not that CD’s physical and emotional vulnerability will mean that she will not be able to manage her own needs and the increased emotional as well as the physical needs of the children. The independent social worker explains in her report that there may be some support from social services or similar, but it would be relatively nominal and not at the level that it would be able to replace a parent. Help say with taking EF to school, household chores or even for a few hours to assist CD with her own physical care is unlikely to be sufficient. It is very different from the appellant being in prison as CD would have no hope of his return and no appointments to visit. I have placed weight on Professor Afghan’s report and considering the deterioration he predicts in CD’s mental health, and my acceptance of his conclusion that she is likely to relapse into severe depression with the strong possibility of her becoming actively suicidal, I am satisfied the children’s needs are unlikely to be fully met in the absence of the appellant. The appellant described credibly to the independent social worker (see paragraph 2.12 of the report) that when CD became overwhelmed, she would become angry, tearful, and very depressed and would withdraw and need to rest for long periods. It is difficult to see how someone in that mental condition even ignoring her physical disabilities, could manage the needs of two young children in particular children separated from their father.
71. I find it would be unduly harsh on the children to remain in the UK without the appellant.
72. I find it would also be unduly harsh on the children to live in India with the appellant and CD; indeed I consider even beyond unduly harsh. There simply is nowhere for them to live in India and no funds to support them immediately upon arrival if they left with the appellant. Even if the appellant took advantage of the facilitated returns scheme those funds are very limited in the context where the family no know no-one (outside the appellant’s home area which is not safe for them) and have to use those funds for food, shelter, travel, finding a suitable area longer term to live and finding the appellant a job. If they waited to travel to India until the appellant had established himself in work and had funds sufficient to rent accommodation suitable for a family, they would be separated for an indefinite period with that creating much the same problems as their remaining in the UK. If they moved to India once they could be supported to a basic level, their mother would still have the problems set out above of fear for the family’s safety, stress worsening her illness and difficulty coping with their needs and her own needs whilst the appellant was at work. Whilst GH is only a toddler EF is approaching seven and old enough to realise the significance of moving to a different country away from her friends where she would have to start again in a new school and probably learn a new language. Her parents would have to navigate helping her integrate when CD would be living in an environment where she would be fearful, not able to integrate herself and her illnesses would not be managed in the way they are in the UK, and the appellant would be trying to cope somewhere unfamiliar in an area where he had never lived, in a country where he had not lived as even a teenager let alone an adult whilst managing all the family’s emotional, financial and practical needs. I find that cumulatively those circumstances would amount to profound undue hardship for the children, in particular EF who would appreciate the difference between the life she had left in the UK and the family’s struggles in India.
Very compelling circumstances?
73. The threshold is an extremely elevated one. There is a very strong public interest in the appellant’s deportation. To succeed and for deportation to be disproportionate the very compelling circumstances must be “over and above” those described in the private and family life exceptions. Following the guidance at [51] of HA (Iraq), I consider all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the factors identified by the European Court of Human Rights (in a slightly different order from HA (Iraq)).
Nature and seriousness of the offence; time elapsed and the appellant’s conduct since then
74. The offences of robbery were very serious, targeting two vulnerable women for their gold jewellery, the appellant being under the influence of drugs. This was not an offence meriting a sentence just over the 4-year distinction between medium and serious offending; without a guilty plea there would have been a sentence of 5 years and 10 months’ imprisonment. There is therefore a greater public interest in deporting the appellant.
75. When considering the risk the appellant poses to the public, the Upper Tribunal’s earlier finding was that the appellant had not rebutted the presumption in section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
76. Nevertheless, although the appellant following the Upper Tribunal’s earlier findings, is not rehabilitated, there is reason to consider he has made progress towards rehabilitation since the index offences were committed. The sentencing remarks indicate that the appellant had tried to get his life back on course by the stage of sentence. The OASys report found the appellant to be a low risk of re-offending and described the appellant as quite motivated to address his offending behaviour. The factors which were likely to reduce the risk he posed were said to be compliance with immigration bail and licence conditions, maintained abstinence from alcohol and drugs, constructive use of his time, improving problem recognition and problem-solving skills and avoiding old peers/associates. The appellant has now completed his licence period and the letter produced at the hearing before the Upper Tribunal panel from his probation officer indicates he was compliant during his licence period and there has been no evidence or suspicion of substance abuse. He has not re-offended.
77. Of course, the appellant has had the threat of deportation hanging over him and the lack of further offending in no way lessens the public interest in his deportation, it is rather that there is no increase to the public interest, beyond the strong interest there already is. There is everything to indicate that the appellant is moving towards rehabilitation and returning to the position in which society expects him to be.
The length of the appellant’s stay in the UK
78. 19 years from the age of eleven, almost two-thirds of his life.
Nationalities of persons concerned, family situation, whether the spouse knew about the offence when she entered into the family relationship
79. The appellant is Indian; his wife and children are British but also have Pakistani nationality. The appellant and his wife have been in a relationship for more than eight and a half years, and married for seven and a half years. I have set out above the difficulties they had in their lives before they met each other. This is significant for the strength of their family life because apart from the appellant’s sister there are no other relatives with whom they are in regular contact or who support them. The index offence was committed after the couple married.
The seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in India
80. See paragraphs 62-67 above. CD is disabled, needing help with daily living activities, with restricted mobility, anxious and depressed, with her illnesses likely to worsen through increased stress. She will be in a different culture and a follower of a minority religion, knowing no-one other than the appellant, with nowhere to live and the subjective fear that the family will be harmed. Her mental health and fears are likely to make it more difficult for her to access such medical care as is available. The appellant who is her carer will have to devote his energies to looking for work and then working to support the family rather than caring for her.
The best interests and well-being of the children in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which they are likely to encounter in India
81. The best interests of the children lie in their remaining in the UK with their father also remaining in the UK. I have set out at paragraph 72 why I have found it would be more than unduly harsh for the children to go to India with their father. There is nowhere for them to live initially, no funds to support them or very limited funds even if the appellant were able to take advantage of the facilitated returns scheme. Their circumstances will be extremely difficult until the appellant finds regular work at a level which will enable him to support a family of four with more than very basic shelter. In addition, they will encounter serious difficulties because the adults in their lives will be experiencing difficulties – CD’s mental and physical illnesses are likely to worsen, and the appellant is likely to be out trying to find work to support the family. The appellant whilst physically and mentally perfectly capable of coping, will be living somewhere unfamiliar in a country he has not lived since he was a child with no relatives or friends to assist him. The children would experience extreme difficulties.
The solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the UK and with India
82. The appellant has solid ties with the UK given his education, work and marriage in the UK to a British citizen. He has limited ties remaining to India, cultural ties and that he remains in occasional contact with his father in prison. The rest of the family’s ties are only to the UK.
Conclusion on very compelling circumstances
83. Drawing everything together, I have found it would be beyond unduly harsh, indeed devastating for CD to be separated from the appellant. The effect on her of separation and the separation from their father who has been the parent mainly responsible for their care, will lead to unduly harsh consequences for the children. CD will not travel to India, but I have found that it would be unduly harsh for both her and the children to go to India with the appellant, and the children would encounter very serious difficulties in India going beyond undue harshness. The best interests of the children lie very strongly in their remaining in the UK with the appellant.
84. Mrs Arif submits that I should give little weight to the appellant and CD’s family life because it was formed when the appellant was in the UK with precarious status and he had already offended. I do however give weight to their family life. I give weight to their family life because as I have noted above, the appellant was on a route to settlement, by the time CD left the family home for the appellant, the period of his suspended sentence was over without his having re-offended, and I take into account the unique circumstances in which the appellant was left in the UK as a child, and that his marrying CD against her family’s wishes and converting to Islam has meant that they are both subject to at best the disapproval and at worst threats from most of their family both in the UK and in India, so that apart from CD’s sister they have only each other and the children.
85. I have considered the appellant’s private life in the UK and of course he would face very real difficulties on return to India, but he has only lived in the UK with at best precarious status and I have already given weight to the sad circumstances in which he came to and remained in the UK in the context of his family life. I give little weight to his private life.
86. When considering whether the circumstances are over and above those described in exceptions 1 and 2 and are very compelling, I bear in mind the very serious nature of the crimes committed by the appellant and that whenever a foreign criminal has a British partner and children in the UK, deportation will either separate him from that family or will mean that British citizens will have to leave the UK to be with him, and of course that is just what deportation does. The nature of the statutory test in the case of serious offenders means that even if a foreign criminal’s deportation would be unduly harsh on his British citizen partner and children that is not sufficient to enable the foreign criminal to remain in the UK. All this emphasises the height of the bar that needs to be met for the interests of a foreign criminal’s family to outweigh the very strong public interest in his deportation.
87. I am however satisfied that that very strong interest is outweighed and there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in the exceptions. I have explained why I have given weight to the family life between the appellant and CD bearing in mind the circumstances I have described in paragraph 84 above. It would be profoundly unduly harsh for CD to be separated from the appellant given the likely consequences for her mental and physical health and unduly harsh for the children bearing in mind the likely devastating effect on CD which has implications for them over and above the loss of a meaningful relationship with their father. It is not an answer for the family to live together in India bearing in mind the seriousness of the difficulties CD and the children would encounter in India with real welfare issues for the children bearing in mind the lack of any support for the family. I find these circumstances are very compelling because of the effect I have described on the appellant’s British wife and children in the particular circumstances, going over and above the unduly harsh exception.
88. Consequently, the decision is disproportionate and breaches Article 8 ECHR.

Notice of Decision
On remaking, the appeal is allowed.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 August 2026