Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No.: UI-2023-000783

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/53656/2022
IA/05656/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 June 2023

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MONSON

Between

Kim thanh do
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs M. Hodgson, Counsel instructed by Deus Nexus Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr E. Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 May 2023

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals from the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Zahed promulgated on 10 January 2023 (“the Decision”). By the Decision, Judge Zahed dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent to refuse to grant her leave to remain as the partner of a British national under Appendix FM of the Rules or on the basis that requiring her to return to her home country of Vietnam would constitute a disproportionate interference with the family and private life which she had established in the UK as a visitor, and then as an overstayer.
Relevant Background
2. The appellant is a national of Vietnam, whose date of birth is 31 May 1960. On 16 November 2016 the appellant entered the UK on a multiple entry visit visa which was valid from 7 September 2015 until 7 September 2020. On 9 March 2022 the appellant lodged an asylum claim, which she then withdrew. On 25 May 2022 the appellant applied for leave to remain on the grounds of family and private life established in the UK.
3. On 15 June 2022 the respondent gave her reasons for refusing the appellant’s application. The application had been considered under the 10-year partner route in Appendix FM. It was accepted that the appellant met the definition of a partner and that the relationship was genuine and subsisting. However, the appellant did not meet the immigration status requirement, as she was in breach of Immigration Rules having stayed illegally in the UK after the expiry of her leave to remain as a visitor. EX.1 was held not to apply. The respondent had not seen any evidence that there were insurmountable obstacles in accordance with paragraph EX.2 of Appendix FM which meant that there were very significant difficulties which would be faced by the appellant or her partner in continuing their family life together in Vietnam which could not be overcome or would entail very serious hardship for her or her partner. She was a national of Vietnam and had spent the majority of her life there. She was in a position to educate her partner on the cultural way of life in her home country, should he choose to relocate with her. Furthermore, just as she had adjusted to living in a different country when she came to the UK, it was not considered unreasonable to expect her partner to adjust to living in Vietnam in order for them to continue their family life together.
4. The application was also refused under Rule 276ADE. It was not accepted that there would be very significant obstacles to her integration into Vietnam if she was required to leave the UK. She stated in her application form that she had family in Vietnam. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it was considered that her family would be in a position to assist her in re-adjusting to life in her home country. She had already demonstrated her ability to adapt to life in another country, which, on her arrival in the UK, was a completely new environment to her.
5. The respondent had also considered whether there were any exceptional circumstances which would warrant a grant of leave outside the Rules, but found that no such reasons existed.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
6. The appellant’s appeal against the refusal decision came before Judge Zahid sitting at Hatton Cross on 12 December 2022. The appellant was represented by Mr Bazini of Counsel, but there was no representation on behalf of the respondent. The appellant attended the hearing with her partner, Mr Malcolm Pitchers. Both of them gave oral evidence, with the appellant giving her evidence through a Vietnamese Interpreter.
7. The Judge gave an account of the hearing in the Decision at paragraphs [14] to [27]. The Judge gave a detailed summary of the evidence given by the appellant and the sponsor, and he also provided a summary of the closing submissions made by Counsel, which included that the sponsor would not be able to live in Vietnam given the high levels of pollution and humidity, and the sponsor’s medical condition of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD); that the appellant would not be able to obtain any family support in Vietnam; that the sponsor was a British citizen who had given 30 years’ service as a Councillor, and he continued to give 20 hours per week in service to the community; and that the sponsor was part of a close-knit family in the UK comprising his two children and five grandchildren, from whom he would be separated as a result of having to relocate to Vietnam.
8. At paragraphs [35] to [43], the Judge gave his reasons for finding that EX.1 did not apply.
9. At paragraphs [44] to [48], the Judge gave his reasons for finding that the appellant did not meet the requirements of Rule 276AD(1)(vi).
10. At paragraphs [49] to [57], the Judge gave his reasons for finding that, while Article 8 was engaged, the appellant’s removal from the UK would constitute a proportionate interference. Following TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) -v- SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1109 - which the Judge had expressly referenced at paragraph [30] - the Judge set out the factors weighing in favour of immigration control at paragraph [54], and the factors weighing in favour of the appellant at paragraph [55].
11. The “pros” identified by the Judge at paragraph [55] were:
(a) The appellant would be separated from her partner, if he does not go with her to Vietnam. This would be difficult for the appellant as she depends upon the sponsor for emotional support although the sponsor can continue to provide emotional support from the UK through modern means of communication.
(b) The appellant may experience some challenges with setting herself up in Vietnam. However, the sponsor can provide financial support during this period, and she would be living in a society and culture with which she is familiar.
12. The Judge reached the following conclusion at paragraph [56]:
“Balancing all the factors for and against the appellant, I conclude that her removal is proportionate given the fact that the appellant remained as an overstayer for over five years without seeking to regularise her stay and entered into a relationship knowing that she remained illegally in the UK. The appellant can apply to join her partner in the UK if she can succeed in meeting the Partner requirements. The appellant should not be able to seek to remain in the UK having remained in the UK illegally, and not being able to pass the English Language tests, simply by marrying a British citizen.”

The Grounds of Appeal
13. The grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal were settled by Mr Bazini. Aside from a complaint at paragraph [21] that the Judge had not taken into account at paragraph [55] the “strong public interest in the sponsor remaining in the UK and serving his electorate”, all the grounds related to the Judge’s findings under EX.1, and there was no error of law challenge to the Judge’s findings under Rule 276ADE(1)(vi).
The Reasons for the Grant of Permission to Appeal
14. On 17 March 2023 First-tier Tribunal Judge Cruthers gave reasons for granting permission to appeal. He observed that the 9 pages of grounds on which the appellant sought permission to appeal raised complaints about every paragraph of the decision under consideration which was related to the question of insurmountable obstacles pursuant to paragraph EX.1 of Appendix FM. Without restricting the grant of permission, he recorded his suspicion that there was little substance in at least some of the complaints made in the grounds. It was well-known that the severity of COPD varied markedly. He did not think it realistic to suggest that the Judge could have made proper findings on the severity of the sponsor’s COPD simply on the basis of a medication summary and the sponsor’s own evidence. In his judgment, the Judge was clearly right to take into account that there was no proper medical evidence before him in relation to the sponsor’s COPD:
“However, it may be that the Judge did err in some of the ways alleged. In particular, there may be some validity in those paragraphs of the grounds … that point to the Judge criticising an absence of evidence in certain areas without taking into account such evidence as was available in those particular areas. It may also be that criticisms could also be validly advanced as to the Judge’s paragraphs that address the question of Article 8 outside the Rules - his paragraphs [49] to [57].”
15. Judge Cruthers went on to observe that the appellant and sponsor should not take the grant of permission as any indication that the appeal would ultimately be successful. Apart from anything else, the test of success arising pursuant to EX.1 and paragraph EX.2 of Appendix FM were quite stringent as shown, for example, by Agyarko [2017] UKSC 11, 22 February 2017.
The Rule 24 Response
16. In a Rule 24 response dated 31 March 2023, Hannah Gilmour of the Specialist Appeals Team set out the respondent’ reasons for opposing the appeal. She submitted that the unnecessarily prolix grounds amounted to a disagreement with the findings of the Judge, and did not disclose any material error in his decision. The Tribunal was invited to note that it was not necessarily helpful for First-tier Tribunal judgments to rehearse every detail or issue raised in a case. This led to judgments become overly long and confused, and was not a proportionate approach to deciding cases: see Budhathoki (Reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC). She submitted that this was a well-reasoned decision where the First-tier Tribunal Judge had rightly engaged with the evidence and had applied relevant legal provisions/tests to reach a fair decision in the appeal.
The Hearing in the Upper Tribunal
17. At the hearing before me to determine whether an error of Law was made out, Mrs Hodgson confirmed that there was no error of law challenge in respect of the Judge’s findings on whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into the country of return. I asked her where this left the complaint raised in the grounds of appeal about the Judge’s findings on the withdrawn asylum claim. She acknowledged that the appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal was not that she had a well-founded fear of loan sharks, but only that she had a subjective fear of them. She submitted that this subjective fear had not been properly analysed by the Judge. The central complaint was that on some issues the Judge had placed weight on a lack of evidence rather than engaging with the evidence on the issue that had been placed before him. In addition, in some respects the Judge had made irrational findings.
18. She submitted that the central complaint was manifest in the Judge’s treatment of (1) the issue relating to the loan sharks; (2) the risk to the sponsor’s health posed by air pollution in Vietnam; and (3) the issue of how the couple would finance themselves in Vietnam - particularly if they had to live in a rural area to avoid air pollution. She submitted that the Judge’s assessment of whether EX.1 applied was also flawed because he had failed to consider section 55 with respect to the sponsor’s grandchildren; and he had failed to consider the sponsor’s ties to the community in the UK. She submitted that these matters were also relevant to the assessment of proportionality. The Judge had not shown that he had carefully analysed the evidence before him.
19. Mr Terrell confirmed that there was a written record of the appellant’s solicitors formally withdrawing the appellant’s asylum claim. The issue of alleged problems flowing from loan sharks had been resurrected in the supplementary bundle of evidence provided for the hearing, at which the Secretary of State had not been represented. Similarly, the risk posed by air pollution was also only raised for the first time in the supplementary bundle, and so this was also not an issue that had been addressed in the Respondent’s Review. In the circumstances, the way in which the Judge had dealt with these issues had been fully compliant with the Surendran Guidance as set out in WN (Surendran: credibility; new evidence) Democratic Republic of Congo [2004] UKIAT 00213. The Judge’s approach was also fully compliant with the guidance given by the Upper Tribunal in JA (Human rights claim, serious harm) [2021] UKUT 97. He submitted that Mrs Hodgson was attempting to re-argue the case, and to put forward new arguments that had not been run before the First-tier Tribunal Judge. The hearing before the First-tier Tribunal Judge had not been a dress-rehearsal.
20. In reply, Mrs Hodgson insisted that there had been a lack of reasoning. The Judge had not clearly shown that he had given sufficient weight to the evidence that was before him. In particular, there was nothing to show that he had in mind a distinction between industrial areas and non-industrial areas when considering the impact upon the sponsor of air pollution in Vietnam. As to the issue of availability of family support in Vietnam, there was evidence which contradicted the Judge’s finding. The evidence was that one of her sons was missing.
Discussion and Conclusions
21. In the light of the way that the appellant’s case has been presented, I consider that it is necessary to set out the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in T (Fact-finding: second appeal) [2023] EWCA Civ 475 as to the proper approach which I should adopt to the impugned findings of fact made by Judge Zahed:
56. The most-frequently cited exposition of the proper approach of an appellate court to a decision of fact by a court of first instance is in the judgment of Lewison LJ in Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5:
“114. Appellate courts have been repeatedly warned, by recent cases at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them. The best known of these cases are: Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1977] RPC1; Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360; Datec Electronics Holdings Ltd v United Parcels Service Ltd [2007] UKHL 23, [2007] 1 WLR 1325; Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33 [2013] 1 WLR 1911 and most recently and comprehensively McGraddie v McGraddie [2013] UKSC 58 [2013] 1 WLR 2477. These are all decisions either of the House of Lords or of the Supreme Court. The reasons for this approach are many.
(i) The expertise of a trial judge is in determining what facts are relevant to the legal issues to be decided, and what those facts are if they are disputed.
(ii) The trial is not a dress rehearsal. It is the first and last night of the show.
(iii) Duplication of the trial judge's role on appeal is a disproportionate use of the limited resources of an appellate court, and will seldom lead to a different outcome in an individual case.
(iv) In making his decisions the trial judge will have regard to the whole of the sea of evidence presented to him, whereas an appellate court will only be island hopping.
(v) The atmosphere of the courtroom cannot, in any event, be recreated by reference to documents (including transcripts of evidence).
(vi) Thus even if it were possible to duplicate the role of the trial judge, it cannot in practice be done.
115. It is also important to have in mind the role of a judgment given after trial. The primary function of a first instance judge is to find facts and identify the crucial legal points and to advance reasons for deciding them in a particular way. He should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties and, if need be, the Court of Appeal the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need not be elaborate. There is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case. His function is to reach conclusions and give reasons to support his view, not to spell out every matter as if summing up to a jury. Nor need he deal at any length with matters that are not disputed. It is sufficient if what he says shows the basis on which he has acted. These are not controversial observations: see Customs and Excise Commissioners v A [2022] EWCA Civ 1039 [2003] Fam 55; Bekoe v Broomes [2005] UKPC 39; Argos Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318; [2006] UKCLR 1135.”
57. More recently, Lewison LJ summarised the principles again in Volpi and another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at paragraph 2:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
22. In the skeleton argument placed before Judge Zahed, the only insurmountable obstacles identified were, firstly, that the appellant’s partner had ongoing employment in the UK and had his own private life here; and, secondly, that the appellant’s partner could not speak Vietnamese and so could not integrate into Vietnamese society. It was to this limited case on EX.1 that the Respondent’s Review was addressed.
23. However, at the hearing before Judge Zahed, at which the respondent was not represented, the appellant’s case on EX.1 was considerably expanded. It was submitted that the sponsor would not be able to live in Vietnam given the high levels of pollution and humidity there, and that the appellant would not be able to obtain any family support (although the latter point is arguably more relevant to a private life under Rule 276ADE, as the premise of EX.1 is that the sponsor would be with the appellant in Vietnam, and so they would be providing each other with family support).
24. It does not appear that Counsel for the appellant also advanced a fear of loan sharks as an insurmountable obstacle. This would be consistent with the fact that the appellant had withdrawn her asylum claim based on her fear of loan sharks, and also that the gist of her oral evidence was not that she feared loan sharks wherever she went in Vietnam, but that she had nowhere to live in Vietnam because she could not return to live in the former matrimonial home, “having divorced her ex-husband in November 2016 and fearing loan sharks from whom her ex-husband had taken money to repay bank loans” – and she did not have an alternative home to go to.
25. Nonetheless, the Judge cannot be criticised for erring on the side of caution, and for deciding to engage both subjectively and objectively with the appellant’s professed ongoing fear of loan sharks at paragraphs [36], [37] and [38].
26. The Judge held that the appellant had not shown that she was in genuine fear of loan sharks, and also that the appellant had not brought forward any documentary evidence in respect of her claims that her ex-husband took a loan from the loan sharks and that they had made threats against her and her family with regard to the repayment of the loan.
27. The first objection raised to these findings is that the appellant was not questioned on this issue, and therefore it was submitted that it was not open to the Judge to make an adverse credibility finding against her. As is illuminated in the guidance given by the Tribunal in both WN and JA, there was no obligation on the Judge to ask questions of the appellant in order to make an adverse finding about her credibility on a claim that had been raised late – after the Respondent’s Review - and in relation to which she could not be cross-examined. The mere fact that the appellant had withdrawn her asylum claim but was nonetheless putting forward a fear of loan sharks as an obstacle meant that she had to expect that the Tribunal would view this claim with a considerable degree of scepticism; and in observing that the appellant had not brought forward documentary evidence to show that her professed fear of loan sharks was well-founded, the Judge was simply stating the obvious.
28. The second objection is that the Judge failed to take into account the witness statement from the appellant’s daughter, which, it is submitted, corroborated the appellant’s claim. Just because the Judge did not make express reference to the witness statement from the daughter, does not mean that he did not take it into account. The Judge was under no duty to deal with every piece of evidence relied on by the appellant, and to explain why he regarded it as having little or no relevance or probative value. It was sufficient that he showed the basis on which he reached his conclusion that the fear of loan sharks was not shown to be well-founded, and he was fully entitled to base this conclusion on an absence of relevant and cogent evidence.
29. At paragraph [38], the Judge noted that there was no evidence from the appellant’s two sons or ex-husband as to the husband’s business and bank loan being in default. It is tolerably clear that the reason why the Judge attached considerable weight to the absence of evidence from the appellant’s two sons or ex-husband was because they had been in Vietnam at the material time that the alleged problems with loan sharks first arose, and so they could give direct evidence about that. In addition, they were still in Vietnam, and thus they would be able to give direct evidence of any ongoing problems with loan sharks, if there were any such problems.
30. Conversely, the appellant’s daughter has resided in the UK since 2004, as she makes clear in her witness statement. So, everything which she said on the topic of loan sharks in her witness statement was hearsay evidence derived from the appellant or from family members in Vietnam. Moreover, while the appellant’s daughter could be said to corroborate the appellant’s account of problems with loan sharks in 2016, she did not purport to cast any light on whether there were any ongoing problems with loan sharks. So, taken at its highest, the daughter’s witness statement did not support the appellant’s evidence that she had a genuine fear of loan sharks now, many years later.
31. The ultimate issue for the Judge to resolve was whether the appellant had discharged the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that the appellant’s professed fear of loan sharks posed any obstacle, let alone an insurmountable one, to her continuing family life with the sponsor in Vietnam. The Judge directed himself appropriately on this issue, and made adequate findings that were reasonably open to him on the evidence that was before him.
32. The Judge addressed the issue of air pollution in Vietnam at paragraph [39] of the decision. He noted that the GP summary showed that the sponsor took medicine daily to treat asthma, but that the appellant was not taking any medication specifically to address his COPD. The Judge held that there was no medical evidence to confirm that the sponsor would be unable to live in Vietnam. He found that it might be uncomfortable for him to live in a city in Vietnam, but that the appellant and her partner could live away from the industrial cities. He also observed that the sponsor could take medication to support his health in Vietnam. The Judge said: “I find that without medical evidence in the form of a medical report stating that the appellant’s partner’s medical condition was such that he would not be able to live in any part of Vietnam, the appellant has not proved that his medical condition amounts to an insurmountable obstacle to living in Vietnam.”
33. The case advanced in the grounds of appeal, and also by Mrs Hodgson in oral argument, is that the Judge should have inferred that the sponsor’s medical condition amounted to an insurmountable obstacle, from an analysis of the extensive background evidence on air pollution in Vietnam that had been provided in the supplementary bundle.
34. It is clear that the Judge had specific regard to this background evidence, as otherwise he would not have drawn the distinction between industrial cities and rural areas in Vietnam. The Judge was prepared to accept that it might be uncomfortable for the sponsor to live in an industrial city in Vietnam. His finding that it had not been shown that the sponsor would not be able to live in any part of Vietnam is adequately reasoned and it does not run counter to the background evidence, contrary to what is implied by a few snippets from the background evidence which are selectively quoted in the grounds of appeal.
35. The Judge dealt with the submission on family support at paragraph [35] of the Decision. He acknowledged the appellant’s evidence that she had lost contact with one son, but found that she was in contact with her other son who was married and living in rented accommodation. He also found that the appellant had an older sister living in Vietnam. The Judge found, on the evidence before him, that the appellant would be able to obtain support from her son and sister in Vietnam. He further found that the appellant was still in good health and would be able to work in Vietnam.
36. The objection raised to this paragraph is that the appellant’s daughter said in her witness statement that the son with whom there was contact could not afford to support their mother. However, the Judge was not bound to accept this hearsay evidence or to explain why he did not accept it. It was open to the Judge to attach more weight to the fact that there was an absence of direct evidence from the son confirming that he could not support their mother. Moreover, in finding that the appellant would be able to obtain support from one of her sons and also from her sister in Vietnam, the Judge was not necessarily implying that the form of support available from the son was going to be financial, rather than practical and/or emotional.
37. As regards the finding that the appellant could access support from her older sister, Mrs Hodgson raised the objection that the older sister was aged 70, thereby implying that it was unreasonable to expect her to provide support to the appellant on account of her age. This is merely to re-argue a finding that was reasonably open to the Judge. It was not irrational for the Judge to find that the older sister could support the appellant.
38. It was reasonably open to the Judge to find that the appellant had not discharged the burden of proving that she would be without family support on return to Vietnam for the reasons which he gave.
39. The remaining topics raised by Mrs Hodgson were addressed by the Judge at paragraph [40]. He noted the sponsor’s claim that he would miss his family if he had to live in Vietnam with the appellant, and that he had given 30 years of service to the community as a local Councillor and continued to do so. The Judge found that these matters did not amount to insurmountable obstacles to him living with the appellant in Vietnam. He took into account that the sponsor could visit his family in the UK and that they could visit him. They could also stay in touch using modern means of communication. He took into account that the sponsor was fully aware of the appellant’s immigration status when they met and when they decided to get married, and that he knew that her right to stay would not be automatic.
40. The Judge’s findings in paragraph [40] are adequately reasoned, and no error of law is disclosed. Mrs Hodgson objected that the Judge had not considered section 55. However, no reliance was placed on section 55 in either the skeleton argument or in closing submissions. It does not appear to have been suggested that the best interests of the grandchildren who were under the age of 18 were going to be imperilled by their grandfather living for a substantial part of each year in Vietnam with his Vietnamese wife. As I explored with Mrs Hodgson in oral argument, in the hypothetical scenario of the sponsor choosing to settle in Vietnam, he was not going to face a restriction on the amount of time that he spent in the UK each year on a return visit or visits, in order to enjoy direct contact with his children and grandchildren and/or to access medical treatment.
41. In conclusion, the error of law challenge to the Judge’s findings on EX.1 has no merit, for the reasons which I have given above.
42. There is also no merit in the error of law challenge to the Judge’s findings on proportionality. The sole complaint raised in the grounds of appeal with respect to the Judge’s balancing exercise was his stated failure to weigh in the balance the sponsor’s community ties. This complaint is utterly misconceived. The balancing exercise conducted by the Judge was rightly focused on the issue of the proportionality of the appellant being required to Vietnam on her own and making an entry clearance application to join the sponsor in due course. On this scenario, there was not going to be any severance of the sponsor’s community ties.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appellant’s appeal did not involve the making of an error of law. Accordingly, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands, and the appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
Anonymity
The First-tier Tribunal did not make an anonymity order, and neither party applied for an anonymity order in respect of these proceedings in the Upper Tribunal.

Andrew Monson
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 May 2023