UI-2023-001320

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 20 Aug 2025
• Promulgation date: 23 Sep 2025
• Publication date: 10 Oct 2025
• Last updated on: 10 Oct 2025

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2023-001320

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01323/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 23rd of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEITH

Between

Mr Omer Iqbal
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Bazini, Counsel, instructed by Farani Taylor Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30th April and 20th August 2025


DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the remaking of the appellant’s appeal, against the respondent’s refusal on 19th July 2022 of his human rights claim, in the context of a deportation order having been made against him on 10th December 2020. The appellant, a Pakistani national, is a ‘foreign criminal,’ as defined in Section 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This Tribunal had previously set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, but with preserved findings. The earlier decision is annexed to these reasons.
2. The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud and facilitating acquisition of criminal property (money laundering) offences and sentenced on 12th March 2020 to concurrent prison sentences of six years and five years, respectively. The trial Judge found that he played a leading role (in contrast to his suggestion that he had not and was merely negligent). The offences resulted in what were described as ‘catastrophic’ financial losses, including of life savings, suffered by elderly and vulnerable people, in a so-called ‘boiler room’ fraud. I also should add, to avoid any confusion and because of an initial suggestion by his Counsel that he had previously been of good character, that the appellant had previously received a caution for theft: shoplifting in 2012, shortly after his arrival on a student visa in 2010, although that is, of course, a minor matter. Nevertheless, the index offences, said to have been committed between 2013 and 2016, followed from the earlier 2012 offence which also involved dishonesty.
3. Hearings to remake the appellant’s appeal took place on 30th April and 20th August 2025, following previous adjourned hearings. There has been a significant delay since the earlier decision was promulgated on 18th September 2023. All these delays are regrettably the responsibility of either the appellant or his former legal representatives (without criticism of Mr Bazini). In making that comment, this has not led me to draw any adverse inferences concerning the merits of the appellant’s appeal, but that delay has had implications and a need to have listened to the recording of the hearing where the substance of the evidence was heard on 30th April 2025. To put matters in context, following the error of law decision, this Tribunal had retained re-making and had issued directions for remaking the appeal at a resumed hearing. The appellant or his representatives had not complied with any of the directions and the appellant disinstructed his previous solicitors. I do not comment on where the blame for the lack of compliance lies. There was a second occasion of an adjourned hearing, where despite his case being that neither he nor his family could return to live in Pakistan permanently, their country of origin, the appellant’s wife and stepdaughter were, at the date of a rescheduled hearing in Pakistan, where they were visiting his wife’s gravely ill father, and had not appreciated that they might need to give evidence.
Directions concerning the medical expert
4. At the last re-making hearing on 30th April, part-way through one of the witnesses’ evidence, it became apparent that there had been an earlier report of an expert psychotherapist, Saiqa Sarwar, which had not been included by the appellant in the bundle, but had apparently been included in a version of a bundle before the First-tier Tribunal. As a result of that, this Tribunal asked to see a copy, which was provided, in light of which the respondent had significant concerns about the reliability of the expert reports. I had borne in mind the authority of TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48 relating to potential criticisms of witnesses, including expert witnesses, and consequently, I adjourned the hearing to provide Ms Sarwar an opportunity to respond. I gave directions on 2nd May 2025, that the appellant’s solicitors should file a position statement from Mr Sarwar setting out what documents she was provided in producing the two reports and to provide copies of those documents, including any letters of instruction. Following that, the respondent then had leave to confirm their position on the contents of the reports, and following on from that, the expert had leave to respond to those concerns, and the appellant had leave to tender the expert as a witness at the hearing.
5. In relation to those directions, Ms Sarwar confirmed the documents that she had been provided in writing her reports. On further enquiries from this Tribunal as to any written instructions, she confirmed that her instructions were only conveyed verbally, either from the former solicitors or from the appellant himself. The respondent filed and served submissions which contained substantial criticisms of Ms Sarwar’s reports. On additional enquiries from this Tribunal, Ms Sarwar was asked if she wished to reply, as per the directions, to the respondent’s criticism. The appellant’s solicitors indicated that there was no further response from her. In the circumstances, the respondent invites me to place no weight on her reports. While she has been given an opportunity to address the criticisms, she has apparently remained silent. I do not know why, or if she resiles from the contents of her reports. Mr Bazani was unable to assist me further.
Other preliminary matters and the hearing
6. A final preliminary point is in relation to the oral witness evidence. In breach of the directions that I gave in the error of law decision that the witness statements on which the appellant seeks to rely shall stand as complete evidence-in-chief, they were not complete, and as a consequence, Mr Bazini needed to conduct significant examination-in-chief. I note this also in the context of Mr Bazini’s submission in closing submissions that the respondent had not disputed aspects of the witness evidence. Mr Hulme did the best he could in circumstances where there was an element of his having to think on his feet in responding to the oral evidence-in-chief, of which he had no prior notice. That being said, for reasons set out later, the respondent’s position on the appellant’s family’s ill-health had been clear.
7. In terms of bundles for the hearing, the appellant has adduced multiple different bundles for the hearing, including at least two ‘supplementary bundles,’ so it will not assist if I refer to a page number in a particular bundle. Suffice it so say, I have reviewed all the bundles which have been provided to me.
8. The appellant, his wife and stepchildren gave oral evidence. The appellant adopted two written statements; and his wife and children one each. I also considered other letters of support from family members and a friend in the UK, as well as correspondence from the National Probation Service, amongst others (which I have still considered while not referring to them all).
The parties’ respective submissions
9. I turn to each party’s respective submissions, before setting out the Tribunal’s findings.
The appellant’s position
10. As already noted, Mr Bazini made no further comment on the respondent’s criticism of Ms Sarwar’s reports.
11. Nevertheless, the appellant relied on significant mental health issues from which each family member suffered, and because of which they were dependant on each other as a family unit, could not be separated, and could not live in Pakistan. The appellant’s wife is a British national but was born and brought up as a child in Pakistan, where she continues to have family members. The appellant has two step-children: a stepson, born on 10th December 1996 and a stepdaughter born on 10th September 1995. They are British nationals. The wife’s and children’s health issues had originated in the children’s biological father dying in a road traffic accident in 2007. As a result, they suffered significant mental health issues. Shortly after the appellant married his wife in 2013, there was a second road traffic accident during which the appellant’s wife was said to be significantly physically injured. This was a trigger for further PTSD for herself and for her children. The appellant’s wife was also made redundant around the same time, in 2013, when she became financially dependent on the appellant.
12. Moreover, the appellant was imprisoned because of the index offences from March 2020 to March 2023, during which the family barely coped financially, practically, or emotionally. The stepson dropped out of his university course and suffered from anxiety. He was only now, on the appellant’s release from prison, retraining as an energy assessor. The stepdaughter had similar ongoing mental health issues. Both had always lived with their parents and had never been financially independent. The wife and stepdaughter had internet selling businesses via Etsy, but these were small scale businesses while the appellant was in prison, because the appellant could not assist them. On his release and with his help, the wife’s business had expanded substantially.
13. The appellant referred to having been sexually abused as a child in Pakistan, which he had only discussed with his wife, for which he was now receiving counselling on release from prison.
14. The family could not relocate permanently to Pakistan for a number of reasons. The appellant’s wife had not lived in Pakistan since she was a teenager. She had ongoing mental issues and relied on the appellant for support. Pakistan was a very different culture from the UK, and she would not be able to carry out her increasingly successful business on Etsy from Pakistan. Moreover, she could not leave her two children, who although adults, were particularly vulnerable.
15. Moreover, if the appellant’s wife were to return with her husband to Pakistan, her relatives would be bound to ask why. She had hidden the fact of her husband’s conviction from them, despite it being reported in a number of UK newspapers. The appellant gave oral evidence that as a result of his conviction, he had been ordered to repay £150,000 on the basis of a confiscation order (the amount which he was assessed as having fraudulently benefitted and retained). He reached an agreement with the Crown Prosecution Service for repayment of around £48,000, failing which he would have to serve a longer prison term. The appellant had obtained the monies by borrowing from moneylenders in Karachi. This had been arranged by his mother in Pakistan and brother in the UK. It was a condition of the loan that he remain in the UK. He otherwise feared his creditors.
16. If the appellant and his wife returned to Pakistan, they would have no practical family support and could not reintegrate. They would be shunned by the wife’s family, who had limited financial means, and her parents were elderly. The appellant’s mother, his sole relative in Pakistan, planned to emigrate shortly to join the appellant’s sister in Germany, where she had enrolled as a student. Despite his degree in engineering and telecommunications and work experience in finance in the UK, he would not be able to find a job. He had never worked in Pakistan. All his friends had left Pakistan to find work. The stepchildren would be unable to cope living permanently in Pakistan, which they had only visited, given their own mental health issues.
17. The appellant’s wife and step-children could not cope living without the appellant in the UK, just as they had barely coped while he was in prison. He was the key support for the entire family. He helped his wife with her business, driving her to and from meetings, and doing packing. His wife would otherwise have to care for her children alone when her health was fragile. He was also able to support the family with earnings acting as a film extra and participating in testing facial recognition software.
18. On a wider point, the appellant was at low risk of reoffending, was remorseful and rehabilitated.
The respondent’s position
19. The respondent does not say that those witnesses have none of the health issues as contended, but that those are exaggerated and the family’s desire to remain in the UK as a single unit, is of choice rather than because of their inability to cope. I should place no weight on Ms Sarwar’s reports. Without them, the medical evidence was scant, beyond the oral evidence.
20. On the stepson’s own evidence, he had not sought or received treatment since 2015, before the appellant was imprisoned. The stepdaughter’s access to medical treatment was sporadic and there was limited medical evidence in relation to the appellant and his wife. It was feasible, and no where near unduly harsh, for the appellant to return to Pakistan either with or without his wife and adult step-children. He was highly qualified and could find work. He had not lived in Pakistan for more than half his life, having entered the UK in 2010 aged 24. His connections to Pakistan were sufficient that he was able to raise a loan of £48,000, and there was no reason, beyond the appellant’s bare assertion, that his creditors insisted that he remain in the UK. The couple had a thriving and growing Esty business, which could be continued in Pakistan. The children could cope in the UK, either alone or with their mother. While separation would require adaptation, the stepdaughter had her own internet sales business and was working towards a qualification in computer coding (Java). The stepson was studying for his energy assessor qualification and working for an estate agent. Both had health issues, but there was no reliable evidence that they could not cope alone, even if the family were very close. Alternatively, they could live with their mother in the UK or with their parents in Pakistan.
The Law
21. I have considered, but do not recite in detail the provisions of Sections 117B to C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 200. I have borne in mind the principles set out in HA (Iraq) & Ors v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 and NA (Pakistan) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 662 when considering the question of very compelling circumstances, first through the lens of Exceptions 1 and 2 (Sections 117C(4) and 117C(5) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 respectively).
22. For the purposes of Exception 2, framing a ‘comparator’ child is impermissible (§31 of HA(Iraq)). “Unduly harsh" does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. It poses a more elevated threshold. 'Harsh' in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore, the word, “unduly" raises an already elevated standard still higher. (§21 of HA (Iraq))
23. I bear in mind that given their ages, neither of the appellant’s stepchildren is a qualifying child in any event (by virtue of Section 117D(1)), as it applies only to those under the age of 18 – the children were already in their mid-teens when their parents met in 2011, and one was an adult and the other nearly an adult when their parents married in 2013.
24. There is no exceptionality requirement, but the circumstances in which the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test will be met is rare (§50 of HA(Iraq)). I need to consider all relevant circumstances, weighed against the very strong public interest in deportation.
25. Noting Unuane v United Kingdom (2021) 72 EHRR 24, as Mr Bazani invited me to, I need to consider the nature and seriousness of the index offences; the fact that the appellant has lived in the UK since 2010; that he has not reoffended since his release in 2023 and that he was a compliant prisoner; the fact that his wife and stepchildren are British nationals; that his wife did not know of his index offences until he was interviewed in 2016; the family’s situation, including the length of the marriage since 2013 and that it is a close family unit; any difficulties which the appellant’s wife and stepchildren will face in Pakistan; and the social, cultural and family ties in the UK and Pakistan. I need to consider the issue of the appellant’s rehabilitation (although it may rarely be of great weight, see: §36 of Kapikanya v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 987) and whether the appellant has acknowledged his guilt and responsibility, without the risk of ‘double-counting.’
26. The proportionality test in Section 117C(6) is not simply whether deportation of the appellant would be disproportionate in a general sense, balancing the appellant’s Article 8 rights against the public interest, but whether he has satisfied the statutory test in Section 117C(6).
Findings
27. I set out first the preserved findings, at §§22, 23 and 29 of the FtT’s findings dated 23rd February 2023. These are as follows:
“22. In giving evidence at his appeal hearing the Appellant maintained his stance that he was unaware of what was going on and contacted his solicitor, he remained evasive about his role and sought to minimise it. However the Judge had the advantage of hearing all of the evidence and the Appellant's case was clearly rejected by the jury. With the higher standard of proof that applies that applies in criminal cases I accept the sentencing Judge’s assessment of the Appellant's role in the fraud and that undermines the assessment made in the OASys Assessment which appears, in part, to be based on a false premise.
23. Given the observations of the Judge, the reference to the advice that the Appellant had given about the viability of the scheme and the message about scammers not being scammed (passed off by the Appellant in evidence as banter) I do not accept the Appellant's assertions of his innocence and naivety. That he seeks to maintain his denials also undermines the OASys Assessment findings and does not inspire confidence in the Appellant's conduct going forward. The submission that the Appellant has taken responsibility for his actions is not borne out by his evidence.
29. This case is a good example of the wider effect that serious criminal offending can have. These are not limited to direct victims of the fraud, the losses they suffered are bad enough, but the Appellant's family have suffered too. That the Appellant appeared to give no thought to the consequences for them either is troubling. The Appellant appears not to have thought about the cultural consequences either, whether for himself or his family.”
28. In considering the expert medical evidence, I am conscious of the need to do so in the round, but I must start somewhere.
29. Of note, there were two reports dated 3rd November 2022 and 30th May 2024, with virtually identical wording. The expert’s subsequent explanation for this was that little had changed. The second report, although lengthy, was merely by way of an update, and set out the significant mental health issues based on GAD-7 and PHQ-9 scores as well as the telephone assessments with the appellant and his wife.
30. However, in response, the respondent raises a number of concerns, as set out its written submissions. The first is that the expert is a psychotherapist and not a psychiatrist. Doubts as to the expertise of psychotherapists were set out in Dosti and Others v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 04021 at §11 where it is stated that there was some doubt as to whether an accredited psychotherapist was an appropriate person to give an expert report in the psychiatric health of a claimant.
31. Second, the report did not specify Ms Sarwar’s qualifications for commenting on the availability of medical treatment in Pakistan.
32. Third, relying on headnotes (3) to (5) of HA  (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111, Ms Sarwar did not have full medical records for any of the appellant, his wife or the two children. Prior to a first assessment on 3rd November 2022, the most recent medical document for the appellant had been dated over two years earlier, on 31st January 2020. Neither the 2022 nor 2024 reports contained a section setting out the documents before the expert. Ms Sarwar claimed later, in response to this Tribunal’s orders requiring her to clarify what documents she had on relied on in producing the 30th May 2024 report, to a ‘Talking Therapies” letter which called into question of when she had completed the report.
33. Fourth, Ms Sarwar had not given a neutral report. She had engaged in inappropriate advocacy on behalf of appellant. It had been drafted on the basis that the appeal should be allowed, as set out, for example, in the 2024 report, p. [7], which stated:
“I write in detail below why Omer’s appeal against the deportation order should be granted ....”
34. No letters of instruction had been provided, only oral instructions from either the instructing solicitors or from the appellant. Ms Sarwar had not complied fully with her professional obligations of objectivity, see headnote (1) of HA.
35. Fifth, although purporting to be extensive, the second report was virtually identical to the first. It was not sufficient for Ms Sarwar to claim that this was because there had been no changes in presentation. The summaries of the ‘PHQ-9’ scores in 2022 and 2024 were virtually identical, with the report stating that the appellant and his wife were experiencing serious depressive symptoms. It was not clear how that conclusion could be reached for the appellant’s wife in May 2024, when the reports suggested that the wife was last examined in November 2022. The 2024 report repeated, as a fact, that the daughter and son were not familiar with the culture in Pakistan, which did not account for the daughter visiting Pakistan with her mother from 4th November 2024, at time when Ms Sarwar had apparently considered the Talking Therapy correspondence of 19th November 2024.
36. Sixth, the report was inconsistent with oral evidence that the appellant’s wife had been present for the assessment on 30th May 2024 while the report recorded only the appellant’s presence.
37. Seventh, the PHQ-9 and GAD-7 tests were based on self-reported comments, as was a PCL-5 assessment. This Tribunal had expressed significant reservations about the nature of these tests in HA at §§134 to 139. “It is wholly possible to provide whatever answers someone wants to in order to appear as ill, or as well, as the person wants to.”
38. Eighth, the report contained contradictory findings as to the appellant’s suicidal ideation. They indicated that the criterion for suicidal ideation was met, in both 2022 and 2024. Yet at §9 of both reports, the expert stated: “Currently in England Omer does not feel suicidal as he has his wife who is his only support in this country”. The report also contradicted the medical evidence for the appellant’s wife, describing her as meeting the test for suicidal ideation on 4th November 2022. Only weeks later, the appellant’s wife’s GP reported her on 18th January 2023 as having “no suicidal thoughts” and “no risk of self harm.”
39. Ninth, in both reports it was recorded that the daughter was taking her medication to manage her anxiety, Propranolol, but that did not sufficiently reflect that this was only from “time to time” (confirmed in a letter from her GP dated 24th November 2022).
40. Tenth, in relation to the findings of the appellant’s ties to Pakistan; the availability of medical treatment there; the expert’s recommendations; and the appellant’s claimed history of abuse and PTSD, Ms Sarwar had not referred to (and presumably not considered) the appellant having made numerous trips to Pakistan since first entering the UK, up to 2019, when he was initially imprisoned and then was the subject of a deportation order (after which, if he left the UK voluntarily, he could not return for a lengthy period).
41. Ms Sarwar had assumed in 2022 that the appellant’s sister and mother would move from Pakistan to the UK on a permanent basis, as his sister was intending to study for a second master’s degree and his mother would be joining her as her dependent. By 2024, the appellant’s sister and mother were intending to move to Germany. By the date of this hearing, the sister was studying in Berlin but wanted to settle in before her mother joined her. The appellant’s mother still lived in Pakistan.
42. Eleventh, Mr Sarwar has relied on the account given by the appellant and his wife, in providing the diagnoses and opinion. Noting headnote (2) of JL (medical reports - credibility) China [2013] UKUT 00145, the more a diagnosis is dependent on assuming that the account given by the appellant was to be believed, the less likely it is that significant weight should be attached to it.
43. Without criticism of Mr Bazini, he had no substantive answer to any of these criticisms, and I accept that they are unanswerable.
44. The reports were based on unrecorded oral instructions, in part from the appellant. The reports made no reference to medical records. In response to directions from this Tribunal, Ms Sarwar listed a limited number of documents, which were mainly not medical documents at all and of the ones that were, they were not the full GP records, only very limited letters from doctors. Of those provided, they appeared to raise questions about Ms Sarwar’s assessment, such as the appellant’s wife being suicidal in later 2022, but apparently only a few weeks later displaying no such risk, without any explanation.
45. The reports were based on scoring methodology, such as namely PHQ-9 and GAD-7 as to which this Tribunal had expressed reservations because the scores reflected what those interviewed chose to say. The explanation that the scores were identical in 2022 and 2024 because the situation remained unchanged was unsustainable, on the basis that the 2024 report suggested appellant’s wife had not been interviewed or assessed in 2024.
46. The reports were also clearly advocating on behalf of the appellant and his family. The 2024 report stated:
“I write in detail below why Omer's appeal against the deportation order should be granted due to compelling circumstances involving his wife and stepchildren….”
“It would not be deemed appropriate to expect the children to leave the country as they are not familiar with the culture and have not adapted to such big settlement changes before.”
“It would be unreasonable to expect Omer to continue his life alone in Pakistan….”
“If Omer is deported back to Pakistan, it is evident his mental health will become worse. He will encounter unjustifiably harsh consequences which could increase the risk of suicide.”
“Omer expressed that he is aware of his negligence which has led him to serve this sentence, and describes this as a life lesson... He expressed that he failed to do due diligence in the contractual business with Zulfiqar which was due to being new to the country and was not aware of the due diligence he was required to do and blindly trusting Zulfiqar to have pure intentions."
47. What is also apparent from the last reference is the appellant’s continuing denial, as recently as May 2024, of any dishonest intention, despite being convicted of index offences involving his dishonesty. One needs only to consider again the sentencing remarks of the Judge, cited in the respondent’s decision to refuse the human rights claim, who stated:
“Omer Iqbal, you undoubtedly had a leading role…You were his business partner [Zulkhair Ali’s], you advised him as to the viability of the fraud. …You were closely involved in the administration.”
48. It is even more concerning that Ms Sarwar did not apparently assess the appellant’s implicit denial of dishonest intent, when considering the reliability of the PHQ-9 and GAD-7 tools, produced without full medical records.
49. The reports provide only limited comments on the availability of medical treatment for the appellant and his family in Pakistan. This is limited to Ms Sarwar’s comment that CBT for the appellant may be more effective in the UK than Pakistan, due to Pakistan being the main trigger for his PSTD and because he would be returning alone, without support.
50. On a final point, the 2022 and 2024 reports do not include any statement from Ms Sarwar that she understands and acknowledges her professional obligations to this Tribunal as an expert witness, namely to provide information and express opinions independently; to consider all material facts; to be objective and unbiased; to avoid advocacy; and to be fully informed.
51. Without hesitation, I attach no weight whatsoever to Ms Sarwar’s reports, for the reasons already outlined. The reports were plainly not objective or independent, were not based on full medical records, crossed the line into advocating for the appellant and his family, relied heavily on PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores, purportedly updated, when the second report suggested that the appellant’s wife had not been examined on the second occasion, and with inconsistencies to the background medical records, such as was available. Ms Sarwar has been invited to answer those concerns but has not responded.
The remainder of the evidence and my findings
52. I do not recite all the witness and documentary evidence which I have considered except to explain my findings. I have considered each of the family members, but have not done so in isolated way, but merely to organise the findings.
The appellant’s wife
53. The appellant and his wife have been married since 2013, during which time he initially had only limited leave. He applied for indefinite leave to remain on 2nd June 2019, which was granted on 20th November 2019, while he was on trial for the index offences, for which he was convicted barely a week later on 29th November 2019, and sentenced on 12th March 2020.
54. Nevertheless, despite the appellant having only limited to remain, until shortly before his conviction, the appellant’s wife described the stabilising and central role that the appellant played in their family, after the loss of her first husband. I have no doubt of the reliability of this oral witness evidence, which is attested to by her children.
55. She describes renting a home with her husband and her children. She had previously leased a warehouse for her business, but the business had reduced in size, and she no longer had that lease. Nevertheless, she has a successful business, with an annual turnover in a region of £60,000, on two ‘Etsy’ websites. The business had started on small scale, after she was initially made redundant in 2013, had struggled during the appellant’s imprisonment, but has since developed with the appellant’s help on his release in 2023. He helps packing goods to be delivered and drives her to business meetings, which she would not otherwise be able to do because of her fear of driving following her car accident in 2013. The business concerned is an online reselling business, including patterns and decorative arts.
56. Whilst I do not accept Mr Hulme’s submission that I can take judicial notice that it is possible to sell items via Etsy in Pakistan, I do not accept the appellant’s wife’s evidence, which is no more than a bare assertion, as to why she would not be able to set up such an online business in Pakistan. She has spoken about the cultural and social barriers that would prevent her from integrating in Pakistan but she does not explain how such barriers would prevent an online business from being established and thriving, even if, as she points out, that currently, her client base is in the UK and the EU. She is clearly a person of significant initiative and business acumen. Notwithstanding her mental health issues I have no reason to doubt that she would successfully establish a business in Pakistan, just as she maintained the business in the UK, albeit on a smaller scale, in very difficult circumstances when the appellant was in prison, and she and their children had their own medical issues. I also find that she would continue her business in the UK if she remained in the UK without the appellant, sufficient to support herself and the children, despite the assertion that they barely coped.
57. Regarding the medical issues, the documentary evidence for the appellant’s wife, beyond Ms Sarwar’s report, is scant. The documents refer to the appellant’s wife having attended a ‘Healthy Minds’ or initial assessment for CBT, via the local health authority on 22nd February 2017. There is a follow up letter of 9th March 2017, describing panic and agoraphobia, with a recommendation of telephone CBT, for which the appellant’s wife was put on a waiting list. Medical correspondence of 15th April 2016 refers to indigestion (dyspepsia), after stopping taking omeprazole (a medication for heartburn and indigestion). Further correspondence of 25th March and 11th June 2022 refer to emergency department discharge summaries. These record the wife’s chest pain, intermittent palpitations and burping and burning. No abnormalities were detected and on the second occasion, she was prescribed omeprazole. Other documents relate to the appellant’s wife’s attempts to conceive a child.
58. Two further documents are a letter from the wife’s GP of 18th January 2023, while the appellant was in prison, referring to her social anxiety, which might prevent her from attending a Tribunal, the trigger for which was an accident, and a telephone diagnosis of mixed anxiety and depressive disorder, with no suicidal thoughts or risk of self-harm. There had previously been Bursitis (joint inflammation) in December 2022. The final (and most recent letter) is from ‘Talking Therapies’ dated 23rd May 2024, indicating that the wife presented with anxiety and worry and would benefit from a CBT support group.
59. The gaps in the periods of time, and the detail in the documentary medical evidence, are stark. Nevertheless, I am (just) prepared to accept the appellant’s wife’s evidence that she has ongoing trauma, social anxiety and panic attacks, but not such that she would not be able to run a business, either on her own or with her husband’s support. There is a pattern over the years of intermittent social anxiety and agoraphobia, but also with minimal medical intervention. During the same period, she has been able to run a successful online business, despite her anxiety and agoraphobia. I accept the respondent’s challenge that the claims about ill-health are, to an extent, overstated. This is not to say, as Mr Bazini indicated I must conclude, that the witnesses are being deliberately untruthful. Rather, that the appellant’s wife has, to a degree, exaggerated the impact of her conditions on her. By way of example, the wife refers to the therapy and counselling sessions she has attended being ‘crucial to her’ – the records for these are 7 years apart, in 2017 and 2024, with no further evidence.
60. There is the separate question of whether the appellant’s wife could return to Pakistan, where she had lived up to and including her teenage years. She visited her elderly father in Pakistan for a month in November 2024 accompanied by her daughter. Her description of this visit, which post-dated her written witness statement, was limited to a bare assertion that she could not to live there, and she described her family’s small presence and limited financial means. In summary, of her family members living in Pakistan, her father is elderly, ill and living on a pension, whilst her mother is a homemaker. She also has a sister, who is a teacher, and a brother who has schizophrenia and other significant mental health issues. They in turn substantially rely upon financial remittances from another sibling who lives in Qatar.
61. I have no other evidence as to what specific direct barriers, beyond the appellant’s wife’s mental health issues, she would face on integration in Pakistan. On the one hand she has referred to an absence of assets and limited means to support herself. On the other, I bear in mind her ability whilst her husband was in prison to continue and upon his release substantially expand a thriving business. The other point that she has raised and both she and her husband are consistent on is that they have concealed the appellant’s convictions from her family members because of shame. A consequence of that is that they would not receive any family support. Whilst that may be correct, first there is the (obvious) question of whether they would, as the appellant’s wife contends, feel obliged to disclose that fact, if they returned as a couple. The second issue is even if she felt so obliged, why nevertheless she and her husband could not reintegrate as a couple. I bear in mind her travel there as most recently as last November for a month, albeit in a temporary basis. However, beyond general assertions as to ‘cultural barriers’ and why she could not ‘bear to live there,’ she would be returning with her husband to a society with which she is recently familiar and where she was brought up. She would be accompanying her husband who is relatively highly educated, with a degree in engineering and telecommunications and practical experience in the UK IT and financial industries. There is the separate question of what pressure, if any, he would face from moneylenders which I will turn to in discussing his circumstances. There is also finally the additional issue as to the consequences of the appellant’s wife leaving the two adult children in the UK, which I also address later in these reasons, but which I have considered as a potential barrier.
The appellant
62. The appellant has referred to some form of unspecified sexual abuse from which he suffered by a relative of his father, when he was young, (between the ages of six and ten), which he had buried away mentally and had not disclosed or discussed, other than with his wife, and for which he was not treated until his release from prison. He suffers PTSD as a result. In the context of a late disclosure of that abuse (as to which there is no criticism), it is understandable why there is only more recent medical documentary evidence. Before his imprisonment, there is a letter from his GP addressed to his then solicitors dated 31st January 2020, referring to anxiety and palpitations, for which he was prescribed standard medication (propranolol and mirtazapine), from December 2019. The letter referred to his awaiting the outcome from the ‘criminal justice system’ with a custodial sentence ‘a possibility’ and a statement that ‘this will adversely affect his mental health and worsen his pre-existing anxiety and depression.’ Presumably, this correspondence was intended to support the appellant in any pre-sentencing considerations. There is no reference to mental ill-health when the appellant’s general health was assessed in the context of his trying to conceive (a letter from doctors of 1st October 20218). The OASys report of 28th August 2021 recorded that he had sought CBT due to stress relating to his arrest, the investigation, and his trial, but by the time of his OASys assessment he was in a ‘much better place’.
63. On his release from prison, there is a letter from ‘Talking Therapies’ dated 29th April 2024, recording that the appellant would benefit from CBT, that he reported symptoms of severe depression, anxiety and PTSD, which he wanted to learn how to manage in the context of childhood trauma. There is a follow-up letter from the same NHS therapy centre dated 19th November 2024, indicating that CBT therapy sessions would begin on 28th November 2024.
64. I am prepared to take the appellant’s case at its highest that there was some form of sexual abuse when the appellant was a young child from a member of his father’s family, although the appellant now claims to have no relatives apart from his mother living in Pakistan, and she is planning to emigrate to Germany imminently. There is no risk of any re-triggering of trauma from any family member, although the appellant points to Pakistani society in general, which he said he could not longer trust and was the context of his leaving to study in the UK, aged 24.
65. However, the appellant regularly visited Pakistan up to 2019, before his imprisonment, so while he has raised the issue of it being a possible trigger which would exacerbate his PTSD, this did not prevent regular visits to Pakistan, before he feared that he might not be able to return to the UK. I do not find that he is being deliberately untruthful about his PTSD, but as with his wife, I find that the appellant is exaggerating the effects of his ill-health on him. In contrast, he minimised any ability to integrate in Pakistan. He claimed that his university degree in engineering and telecommunications would not help him find jobs in Pakistan, because he had had no relevant work experience. It was merely a paper qualification. However, he also accepted that he had made no enquiries about the ability to find work in Pakistan. Aside from his degree, he had worked in IT and in the finance industry in the UK. I am conscious that his conviction may have implications for job hiring in the UK but, but I have been provided with no reliable evidence of what impact, if any, it would have upon his return to Pakistan, particularly in light of his repeated assertions to third parties that at its worst, he was guilty of ‘negligence’ in not having carried out due diligence into a business partner. He is a man of clear aptitude and application, with a dedication to helping his wife in her business and establishing and carving out a role for himself. His other work includes as a film extra. He has not lived in the UK for most of his life and clearly continues to have connections to Pakistan, having been able to raise a substantial loan in that country via his mother and brother.
66. There remains the outstanding question of the loans from moneylenders in Pakistan and the appellant’s oral assertion that a condition of the loans is that he must remain in the UK and not return to Pakistan. The evidence is just that. To Mr Bazini’s response in closing submissions that this aspect of the evidence was not challenged, the respondent’s position has been clear - the appellant has the means and connections to re-establish himself. Any further cross-examination was only ever likely to evince a further bare assertion, and there is not a ‘straitjacket’ which obliges me to accept this part of the evidence (applying §69 of TUI). As Mr Hulme pointed out in closing submissions, I have not seen any copies of any loan agreements, and there is no reason to expect why, if the appellant returned to Pakistan and were to reestablish himself financially, with his wife, provided he repaid the loan, that there would be an additional condition that he must remain outside Pakistan. I am not satisfied that the loan itself would amount to any significant obstacle, let alone a very significant obstacle. For the reasons already stated, I also do not find that the health conditions of the appellant and his wife would present very significant obstacles. The extent to which the couple are already ‘insiders,’ in Pakistan, in the sense of SSHD v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, is exemplified by the appellant’s ability to obtain a loan arranged from Pakistan via his mother and brother, his wife’s travel for a month to visit her elderly father, and their respective qualifications, work experience and business acumen. I address the issue of the children’s continuing dependency later.
The appellant’s stepson
67. The appellant’s stepson lives with his sister in the family home, as he has always done. He previously aborted his studies when the appellant was in prison, although he has restarted them, having worked in the meantime in a property viewing business. His studies are for energy efficiency qualifications.
68. The son accepts that he has not received any treatment for any mental health issues since 2015, including when the appellant was in prison, although Mr Bazini suggested that he perhaps ought to have sought treatment, particularly where the son described in oral evidence symptoms of disassociation and a lack of interest in anything, when his stepfather was in prison. However, I accept Mr Hulme’s submission that beyond that evidence, the son’s assertion that he would be unable to cope without his mother and father, if they moved to Pakistan, because he has never lived outside the family home, despite being aged 28, is just that – a bare assertion. I reach that conclusion conscious of his potential predisposition, because of his father’s death and mother and sister’s traffic accident in 2013, to PTSD. What was also telling, in his oral evidence, was when he was asked why he had not moved out from the family home, he indicated that in his ‘culture’ it was not ‘the norm’ to move out from the family home until he was married. This is more consistent with the family being one that regards itself as a single family unit unless and until the appellant’s son has established himself and is ready for marriage outside the family home. That is not indicative, despite the significant emotional dependency between him and his parents, of an inability to live outside the family home which might, to use the words of NA (Pakistan) be “severe” or “ bleak” when considering whether the effect on him (or his parents, despite their worries for the children) would be “unduly harsh” for the purposes of Section 117C(5) of the 2002 Act.
The appellant’s stepdaughter
69. There are slightly more medical records for the appellant’s stepdaughter than for the other family members. There are partial GP records for the period to 14th October 2022, and a letter from the GP dated 24th November 2022, when the appellant was in prison, in which they state that the daughter suffers from anxiety and has consulted them on many occasions for this, with a trigger being her stepfather’s imprisonment. The letter refers to her taking propranolol (a standard anxiety medication) for this “from time to time.”
70. Once again I am prepared to accept as consistent and credible that she too along with her brother and mother suffered from PTSD in the context of her biological father’s death in a road traffic accident and a subsequent road traffic accident in 2013, in which she was injured. However, notwithstanding the seriousness of both incidents, I also bear in mind the period since 2013 and the fact that she is engaging in further education, to train to become a website designer, with her own small Etsy business. When asked why she or her brother would not be able to cope and live outside the family home (she is 29, nearly 30), she gave as an example that when she travelled to Pakistan with her mother for a month in November 2024, her brother had smoked a lot. She reiterated her emotional dependency on her parents. Whilst she had entered briefly into a relationship in 2019 (not mentioned in her statement or oral evidence-in-chief but in response to a question arising out of note on her GP records which referred to stress caused by a relationship break up) this had been brief and in reality she had never had any form of independent living. She did however describe always having some form of business or work, including an earlier bridal business.
71. The practical difficulty in evaluating the evidence, as with the other witnesses is that any documentary evidence is scant, as are any details in relation to what happened when the daughter visited Pakistan, or her work history (bearing in mind she has always worked and is now nearly 30). I do not accept that there is sufficient evidence to find that if she and her brother were to remain in the UK without their mother and the stepfather that they would be unable to cope on a practical-day-to-day basis, notwithstanding the close emotional relationship she has. I have no doubt that separation from her parents will be a significant adjustment, but it would not be close to being “bleak” or “severe.” I find this in the context that, like her brother, notwithstanding any mental health issues, she is clearly a person of initiative and practical business application. I accept that the two children may have limited income at this stage and relatively limited assets, noting that the family home in which they live is rented. I note further the emotional support that they derive from their parents including their stepfather, but I am not satisfied that the consequence of that absence would result in them being unable to cope. This is not the case of two relatively young adults (28 and 29) who would fall apart emotionally or practically on either the stepfather’s deportation or alternatively in both parents moving to Pakistan. I find that their concern and anxiety about the matter is genuine, but overstated.
Conclusions in relation to Exceptions 1 and 2 and then ‘very compelling circumstances’
Exception 1
72. Applying the law to the findings, the appellant has not lived for most of his life in the UK. He is currently 41 and did not arrive in the UK until aged 24. I accept that he is integrated in the UK, notwithstanding his offending, bearing in mind his engagement with rehabilitative work on licence. After his release, people with whom he engages and works speak warmly of him. He is clearly somebody who can relate well to people, even if he used that skill dishonestly to deprive elderly and vulnerable people of their life savings. There are not very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Pakistan, for the reasons set out. It follows that the appellant does not meet Exception 1.
Exception 2
73. Whilst the appellant has a genuine relationship with his British citizen wife who is herself a Pakistani citizen and was brought up in Pakistan, and in a genuine and subsisting relationship with two adult children, the effect of deportation on them, either if he returns alone to Pakistan without his wife, or with her, would be unduly harsh, also for the reasons set out. It also follows that the appellant does not meet Exception 2.
Very compelling circumstances
74. I have considered whether there is any aspect of the family’s circumstances that amount to very compelling circumstances over and above Exceptions 1 and 2 either because of a particular aspect relevant to the Exceptions, or outside them.
75. On the one hand I bear in mind the fact that the appellant has lived for a lengthy period in the UK since 2011. He did so, initially with limited leave and subsequently indefinite leave to remain, so there is no question overstaying. He has played a significant and genuine role in supporting his wife and two stepchildren, all British citizens, and there is significant emotional dependency between all four. The rupture between the appellant and his stepchildren or from all three if the appellant were to return to Pakistan would be a significant challenge, not least because although the appellant himself does not significantly financially contribute because the main business is that of his wife, she relies upon him emotionally and she says (although I have no details) that they struggled financially whilst he was in prison. I place some weight on rehabilitation on the basis that those who assessed him regarded him as being at a low risk of reoffending, (albeit with the nuance that the assessment assumed that he did not play a leading role in the fraud, when he did). He was a compliant prisoner. Also, his wife did not know of his offending until he was arrested.
76. Against these factors is the serious nature of the offending which I do not recite once again, which is reflected in the prison sentence, and which is why the appellant must show very compelling circumstances. The appellant was not previously of good character although the prior shoplifting caution was a minor matter. Moreover, I return to Exceptions 1 and 2, which he does not meet, I conclude, by a long way. The evidence does not begin to support the assertions of very significant obstacles to integration, nor that the effect of deportation would be unduly harsh. There is no aspect either of family life or private life, through the lens of either exception, or additionally, which amounts to very compelling circumstances. The family is undoubtedly close; there is significant emotional dependency and long-standing cohabitation. However, there is not an inability to live apart, or to not cope, or for such a rupture to result in bleak or severe circumstances. The family has a strong desire to remain as a unit, until the son, at least, marries. That is not sufficient to meet the statutory test under Section 117(6).
77. On a wider proportionality assessment, and noting Section 117B, the decision to refuse the human rights claim is proportionate. The appellant can speak English and is currently financially independent from the state, so as not to a burden on the taxpayer. His private life was largely developed while his leave to remain was precarious, but the remainder of the Section 117B provisions do not lessen the weight of the appellant’s family life. Nevertheless, the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest. In the appellant’s case, it is overwhelming, for the reasons already set out, when considering Section 117C.
Notice of decision
88. The appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds fails and is dismissed.


J Keith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
15th September 2025
ANNEX – ERROR OF LAW DECISION



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2023-001320

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01323/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEITH
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVEY

Between

Mr Omer Iqbal
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr N Paramjorthy, Counsel, instructed by Paramount Chambers
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 September 2023


DECISION AND REASONS
1. These written reasons reflect the oral decision which we gave to the parties at the end of the hearing. The appellant appeals against the decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal, Judge Parkes, who, in a decision promulgated on 23rd February 2023, dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal on 19th July 2022 of his human rights claim. This was in the context of the respondent’s decision to make a deportation order on 10th December 2020, under the automatic deportation provisions of section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007. The appellant is a “foreign criminal” as defined in section 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The appellant, a Pakistani national, born on 30th January 1986, entered the UK as a student, aged 24 on 9th October 2010. He was later granted further leave to remain based on his marriage to a British citizen. On 7th June 2019, he applied for indefinite leave to remain, which was granted on 20th November 2020.
The index offence
2. In the meantime, on 20th March 2020, the respondent became aware of the appellant’s conviction and sentencing on 12th March 2020 on two counts: count (1) - conspiracy to defraud, for which he received six years’ imprisonment; and count (2), entering into an arrangement to facilitate the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property, for which he received a sentence of five years’ imprisonment. The sentences were to run concurrently, and he was also made the subject of a confiscation order. As the Judge recorded at paragraphs [15] to [16] of his decision:
“15. Starting with the Appellant's convictions at Southwark Crown Court the sentencing remarks of the trial Judge are page 217 of Home Office bundle. The Appellant was one of 4 Defendants involved in conspiracy using a fraudulent investment company and what the Judge described a ponzi scheme. None of the money put up by members of the public was invested as they had been told it would and losses were, in some cases severe, one person lost £300,000 of a retirement fund. The Judge described the effect as catastrophic for some of them. The Defendants were sentenced on the basis that the sum obtained was around £1.1 million.
16. The remarks specific to the Appellant are at page 221 of the Home Office bundle. In his remarks the Judge described the Appellant as having a leading role and being the business partner of the main Defendant - the Appellant had advised him as to viability of the fraud and Judge referred to an email the Appellant had sent, the Appellant was closely involved in the administration with another Defendant. The Appellant's sentences were reduced by 12 months from the starting point because of his good character.”
3. The Judge considered an OASys report at paragraph [17] to [23]:
“17. The Appellant relies on the OASys Assessment that has been provided. Dated the 28th of August 2021 references are to the page numbers in the Appellant's bundle part 1. On page 104 the Appellant's risk of re-offending is 4% within 1 year and 7% within 2 years. As the author noted in section 2.1, page 105, the Appellant "was part of a well organised criminal group" involved in boiler room fraud. The losses were put at £754,270, no money was returned. Phone evidence indicated the Appellant's "substantial involvement" and one message to a co-Defendant read "don't worry they aren't scamming the scammers".
18. At 2.7, page 106, the Appellant remained in denial maintaining he thought he was doing a legitimate job. Contrary to the Judge's observations, and he heard all the evidence, the report suggests that the Appellant did not play a leading role. At 2.11 the Appellant took no responsibility for his part. At 2.12 there was no indication that the Appellant had committed similar offences in the past or would do so in the future but as the offence was committed over several months there was an established pattern of offending.
19. In 4.10, page 110, the Appellant limited his involvement to 5 months although the indictment ran from July 2013 to June 2016. He said that when he realised something was wrong, this was his evidence at the hearing too. At 5.6 it was stated that the offence was not linked to the risk of serious harm, given the losses suffered to the victims it is not clear how that assessment was made and contrasts with the observation in 11.10 about their losses.
20. At 6.11 the Appellant reported a good childhood with no problems, which is not now his position. At 10.8 the Appellant was engaging with mental health services for CBT due to stress related to his arrest and the trial. The predictor scores for the Appellant were low but then his previous good character would not have indicated his involvement as being likely. The Appellant remains in prison and is due to be fully release shortly.
21. He has been permitted intermittent periods outside the prison and allowed to work with an offer of a job. It is clear that the Appellant is well thought of in the prison and references speak highly of him. The Appellant's courses include a victim empathy course, but the Appellant has not yet been fully released and so the conclusions to be drawn from his courses and behaviour in prison are limited.
22. In giving evidence at his appeal hearing the Appellant maintained his stance that he was unaware of what was going on and contacted his solicitor, he remained evasive about his role and sought to minimise it. However the Judge had the advantage of hearing all of the evidence and the Appellant's case was clearly rejected by the jury. With the higher standard of proof that applies [that applies] [sic] in criminal cases I accept the sentencing Judge's assessment of the Appellant's role in the fraud and that undermines the assessment made in the OASys Assessment which appears, in part, to be based on a false premise.
23. Given the observations of the Judge, the reference to the advice that the Appellant had given about the viability of the scheme and the message about scammers not being scammed (passed off by the Appellant in evidence as banter) I do not accept the Appellant's assertions of his innocence and naivety. That he seeks to maintain his denials also undermines the OASys Assessment findings and does not inspire confidence in the Appellant's conduct going forward. The submission that the Appellant has taken responsibility for his actions is not borne out by his evidence.”
4. The Judge considered that the appellant's relationship with his British spouse was established when he was in the UK precariously, albeit that issue was not relevant to an assessment under section 117C. He had two stepchildren (biological children of [his wife]) but both were adults, born in 1995 and 1996 (para [24]).
5. The Judge analysed the appellant’s wife’s claim that she suffered from depression, anxiety, and panic attacks and that she would be unable to cope without the appellant. He further analysed the claim that the wife would not be able to go to Pakistan to live as she had not been there since she had been a teenager, although from her evidence, he recorded that she had in fact visited Pakistan in 2019 for a few months.
6. The appellant’s stepchildren also gave evidence about the impact that the appellant’s deportation would have on them (paragraph [28]). The Judge concluded that the couple's return would be difficult and would entail adjustments for both of them, but the evidence did not show that there would be very significant obstacles to their doing so, noting that the appellant was well educated and had skills which he could use to obtain work. There was no evidence that the couple could not relocate away from the appellant’s wife's parents in Pakistan if the parents were unhappy with the appellant. There were not insurmountable obstacles on the appellant’s wife's part. Mere embarrassment as a result of the appellant’s conviction was not a relevant consideration.
7. The Judge noted that as the statutory guidance made plain, the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in deportation (para [33]) and whilst there were factors in the appellant’s favour, the public interest in his deportation was strong particularly where the appellant remained in denial about his involvement and responsibility. The Judge concluded at para [34] that the appellant’s personal circumstances would not meet the elevated threshold of compelling circumstances over and above those applying to foreign criminals with shorter sentences.
The grounds of appeal and grant of permission
8. The appellant challenges the Judge’s decision on two grounds.
9. Ground (1) is that the Judge erred in failing to direct himself to and apply the “very compelling circumstances” test of section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act. The Judge referred at para [31] to very significant obstacles and had barely referred to the statutory test at para [9]. The Judge had failed to apply, in the appellant's favour, the following factors: the mentoring role that he played in his stepchildren’s lives and their best interest’s; the fact that the appellant’s wife’s family in Pakistan were unaware of the appellant’s conviction; and the appellant’s wife’s depression, anxiety and panic attacks. The meaning of the Judge’s reference at para [33] to the ”statutory guidance” was unclear. The Judge had also failed to consider adequately what the impact would be if the appellant’s wife and the appellant were separated.
10. Ground (2) - the Judge had failed to take into account adequately the very low risk of the appellant reoffending. The Judge’s conclusion that the OASys Report was based on a false premise (para [22]) was inadequately explained. The Judge had failed to take into account the work that the appellant had carried out while on licence from prison; the fact that he was well thought of in prison; and that he had undertaken a course in victim empathy. The Judge had also failed to take into account factors such as the appellant’s length of lawful residence and integration into UK society and the disruption to the entire family of returning to Pakistan.
11. A Judge of the First-tier Tribunal, Judge Grey, granted permission on 31st March 2023. The grant of permission was not limited in its scope.
The Hearing before us
12. We checked and confirmed with the parties that there was no Rule 24 reply. On behalf of the respondent, Ms Everett acknowledged that some of the Judge’s reasoning was brief, particularly with regard to the analysis of the appellant’s private life but ultimately what she sought to persuade us was that any brevity of reasoning was not material. Put simply, the evidence was slim. For example, in relation to any evidence of the appellant’s lack of access to medical treatment for PTSD and also in relation to the family life, where even if the appellant’s stepdaughter may have mental health difficulties and even if the appellant’s wife may have some vulnerabilities, the evidence was not such that the Judge’s decision was unsafe. Ultimately it was not a fair criticism to say, as Mr Paramjorthy contended, that there was simply a recital of the evidence without an ultimate explanation for why the “very compelling circumstances” test was not met. The Judge had clearly reached that conclusion, which was open to him.
13. Turning to the appellant’s challenges and the two grounds, when we asked Mr Paramjorthy whether there was particular evidence he wished to direct us to in relation to the appellant’s PTSD which had been specifically raised in the appellant’s skeleton argument before the Judge, about what would happen in the event that the appellant would not be able to access the treatment for PTSD in Pakistan, he was unable to refer us to particular evidence on the point. He also accepted, contrary to para 16(i) of the grounds, that the appellant was not of good character before the index offence, having previously received a caution for shoplifting in 2012. He also acknowledged, contrary to para 16(ii) of the grounds, that the index offence was very serious. However, turning to the core of this challenge, he submitted that the Judge’s analysis of the effect of deportation on the appellant’s family life, either in the so-called “stay” or “go” scenario, was simply deficient. The Judge had recited aspects of the evidence at paras [20] to [28] but when one came to the reasoning on “very compelling circumstances,” there was merely a recital that serious criminal offending can impact on wider family members and, in Mr Paramjorthy’s pithy phrase, it was simply “tough”. While the Judge had referred at para [33] to the appellant being responsible for his own actions and was not the victim of circumstances, the Judge failed to consider, in the proportionality assessment, the mental ill-health of the appellant’s wife and adult stepdaughter. This was illustrated by the first sentence of para [33], where the Judge had stated:
“Similarly, I do not see why the position of the Appellant's family, who may be affected by their association with him would have any bearing on the assessment.”
Discussion and conclusions
14. We conclude that there was no error in the Judge’s assessment of the OASys Report. The Judge plainly was conscious of the expertise of the OASys assessor and specifically the conclusions reached on the risk of offending. However the Judge went on to explain why he had concerns about whether that report was based on what he termed a false premise, particularly because of the suggestion that the appellant did not play the leading role. The Judge was also concerned about the appellant’s continued denial of responsibility. These concerns were adequately explained and open to the Judge.
15. We also do not accept that there was any error with regard to the Judge’s assessment of the impact of the appellant’s PTSD. Whilst reference was made to it in the appellant’s skeleton argument, Mr Paramjorthy was not able to refer us to and did not rely on any argument that any treatment would not be available in Pakistan for the appellant’s particular mental health issues.
16. Where, however, we find the Judge did err and where we do not accept Ms Everett’s submissions on materiality is in relation to the impact on the appellant’s wife and the children. On the one hand we are very conscious of the danger of what is sometimes referred to as “island hopping” between the evidence; see the authority of Volpi and Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464. We are also conscious that the Judge will have had the opportunity to consider evidence in far greater detail than we have. We are also conscious that in passages of the judgment to which we have already referred, particularly at paras [20] to [28] there is a recitation and discussion of the appellant’s case about the impact that the appellant’s deportation will have on the appellant’s adult stepchildren. However, having discussed those parts of the appellant’s case, we accept the submission that there is a substantial recital of the evidence and then a lack of explanation as to how that then features in the proportionality assessment itself. This is demonstrated in the passage to which we have already briefly referred, namely that the position of the appellant’s family would not have any bearing on the proportionality assessment (para [33]). Conscious as we are of not taking phrases in isolation, we then came on to consider the wording at para [34] and the fact that there was a proportionality assessment on both sides of the equation, including the lack of an adverse immigration history, the genuineness of the family life, the reference to good character but also against the appellant, a denial of involvement and responsibility. However, when the Judge concluded that the evidence does not show that the family’s circumstances would meet the elevated threshold of compelling circumstances, we accept that the reader of the judgment is left wondering why. We do not go so far as to say that the evidence could only be read as meaning that the very compelling circumstances test is met, rather, the appellant has clearly put the case that there would be an impact on the appellant’s wife and stepdaughter, for example, in the “stay” scenario, of the wife and adult stepchildren being separated from the appellant in Pakistan. The reader is left wondering what the Judge has concluded and more importantly why the situation would not amount to very compelling circumstances. It may well be, having considered the evidence, that a remaking Judge will consider that the evidence is too slight, but we are conscious that such an assessment is necessarily nuanced, and we are satisfied that the Judge’s conclusion in relation to the appellant’s family life is not safe and cannot stand. We therefore set that part of the Judge’s decision aside.
17. We preserve the Judge’s conclusions in relation to the appellant’s offending at paras [22] to [23], relevant to the assessment of the proportionality of refusal of the appellant’s human rights claim relating to his private and family life. We also preserve the Judge’s finding the appellant, his wife, and his stepchildren as to their bonds (para [29]).
Disposal of the appeal
18. We canvassed with Mr Paramjorthy and Ms Everett the issues of any preserved findings and whether re-making should be retained in this Tribunal, or remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal in the context of paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and the Court of Appeal’s decision in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512. There is no suggestion that the appellant was deprived of a fair hearing, nor, given the potential narrowness of the extent of the necessary fact-finding, is it such that remaking such should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. The evidence, as already indicated, appears to be limited, even if the appellant now seeks to adduce further evidence. Many of the facts (previous lack of good character, seriousness of the index of offence, but also the genuineness of the family relationships) are not disputed. We also discussed with Mr Paramjorthy (and he agreed) that there would be no further evidence on the appellant’s PTSD, as distinct from the appellant’s wife’s illness and that of his stepdaughter.
Directions
19. The following directions shall apply to the future conduct of this appeal:
20. The Resumed Hearing will be listed at Field House on the first available date, time estimate 2 hours, in person, no interpreter needed, to enable the Upper Tribunal to substitute a decision to either allow or dismiss the appeal.
21. The appellant shall file and serve a single paginated, indexed (with bookmarks) and text-searchable electronic bundle, containing only the evidence in relation to remaking, and a hard-copy of the same, no later than 4 pm, 21 days before the Resumed Hearing. As Mr Paramjorthy will be acting via “direct access,” we agreed that the parties are not required to file documents using CE-file but may instead do so via email. The data resolution of the bundle may be reduced so that it can be emailed as a single file, as per relevant UTIAC guidance. The bundle shall also include any updated witness statement on which the appellant seeks to rely, which shall stand as his evidence in chief in full and which, if he gives oral evidence, shall only be on the basis of cross-examination and re-examination.
22. Skeleton arguments shall be filed and served, provided the same is filed no later than 4pm, 14 days before the Resumed Hearing.
23. The parties agreed that there is no need to anonymise the appellant’s name, but that there is equally no need to name the appellant’s wife and stepchildren.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains errors of law and we set it aside, subject to preserved findings.
We preserved the Judge’s findings at paragraphs [22], [23] and [29].
The Upper Tribunal shall remake the decision on the claimant’s appeal at a Resumed Hearing.
No anonymity directions are made.


J Keith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


18th September 2023