Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2023-001681
First-tier Tribunal No: DC/50283/2021
LD/00101/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3rd March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

JETMIR SOKOLI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms H Foot of counsel instructed by OTB Legal Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. In this matter the Appellant appeals against the Respondent’s decision to deprive him of his British citizenship pursuant to section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 on the grounds that it was obtained by means of deception.
2. At the hearing I had heard evidence from the Appellant and from his witnesses. I had been provided with extensive written and oral submissions by both parties. I had reserved my decision which I now provide.
3. The documents that I have been provided with include a 537 paged bundle and skeleton arguments from each of the parties.
Background
4. The Appellant was born in Albania on 14 June 1983. He had entered the United Kingdom on 29 October 1999. He was then aged 16. He is now aged 42.
5. Upon entering the UK, the Appellant gave a false date of birth and said that he was born in Kosovo which was untrue. In view of the upheaval in Kosovo at the time, he was granted Exceptional Leave to Remain and thereafter he was granted Indefinite Leave to Remain (“ILR”). He then applied for and was naturalised as a British Citizen. The Respondent states that the Appellant obtained that naturalisation fraudulently. The Respondent therefore made a decision to deprive the Appellant of that British citizenship.
6. There is a substantial procedural history to this matter, including a previous appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal had allowed the Appellant’s appeal by consent and the matter was remitted for rehearing here at the Upper Tribunal.
7. A chronological overview to this matter is that the Appellant was born in Albania on 14 June 1983. He entered the United Kingdom aged 16 on 29 October 1999. He claimed asylum, falsely stating that he was born in Kosovo on 14 June 1984. His claim for asylum was refused on 28 March 2000. In view of the Appellant being under the age of 18, he was granted Exceptional Leave to Remain (“ELR”) on 14 June 2001.
8. The Appellant applied for Indefinite Leave to Remain on 19 January 2005 on the basis of his false date of birth and his claim to be from Kosovo. On 14 June 2006 the Appellant applied for citizenship by naturalization. On 13 November 2006 he was naturalised as a British citizen.
9. On 13 September 2018 there was a referral to Respondent requesting review of the Appellant’s citizenship. On 3 January 2019 the Respondent informed the Appellant that deprivation of his citizenship was being considered. The Appellant’s solicitors entered into correspondence thereafter with the Respondent setting out mitigating circumstances.
10. On 2 November 2021 the Respondent issues a notice of deprivation of the Appellant’s citizenship. The Appellant appealed against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal.
11. Following a hearing, in a decision dated 16 April 2023 First-tier Tribunal Judge Ford allowed the Appellant’s appeal. The Respondent sought and was granted permission to appeal against FTT Judge Ford’s decision.
12. Following a hearing before Upper Tribunal Judge Rintoul on 9 August 2023 the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside. A remaking hearing then took place before Upper Tribunal Judge Rintoul on 27 September 2023. By way of a decision dated 19 October 2023 Upper Tribunal Judge Rintoul dismissed the Appellant’s appeal.
13. On 13 December 2023 the Appellant sought permission to appeal directly from the Court of Appeal. Permission to appeal was granted by Asplin LJ by way of a decision dated 14 April 2024.
14. On 25 June 2024 the Court of Appeal allowed the Appellant’s appeal by consent and remitted the matter for rehearing at the Upper Tribunal.
15. The Appellant’s second ground of appeal was that in dismissing his appeal, the Upper Tribunal had failed to take into account and accord appropriate weight to material factors in the proportionality assessment, including the Appellant’s minority on arrival in the UK and the length of time which had elapsed since he most recently committed fraud.
16. On 6 October 2025 the matter came before hearing before me. The matter was adjourned until this hearing by the consent of the parties because issues arose in respect of the Respondent challenging the expert evidence and for which cross examination was necessary, but the expert had not been asked by the parties to attend that earlier hearing.
17. In her helpful skeleton argument, Ms Foot refers to some of the other background the Appellant’s case. She states:
“25. As to A’s circumstances material to Article 8 ECHR, A has been working for RX Global Ltd for almost 15 years in various roles, currently as a Senior Cloud Engineer [133-134]. His current salary is around £67,600 per annum plus bonuses.
26. A was previously in a relationship with Natalie Entwistle, a British citizen, since February 2020. She was Head of Marketing at World Retail Insights Ltd and earns around £60,000 per annum plus bonuses. She has been made redundant [150-151]. A has a daughter with Ms Entwistle, [redacted], born on 6 June 2024, who is also British. Whilst they are no longer in a romantic relationship, A and Ms Entwistle successfully co-parent [the child] and share caring responsibilities for her. A financially supports Ms Entwistle, which enables her to pay her bills and rent [34-35; 137].
27. In 2019, A was diagnosed with a dormant tumour at the back of his head. He suffers from intense headaches and has been diagnosed with anxiety disorder and panic disorder [50-51; 54]. He has suffered from regular anxiety attacks since arriving in the UK [35-36; 54]. He attended A&E for anxiety in 2010, experiencing suicidal thoughts, and again attended A&E for anxiety in 2020 and 2023 [46-47].”
18. The Respondent’s decision is dated 2 November 2021 and appears in the bundle at pages 167 to 179. There is no real dispute by the Appellant of the use of false details by him. The real issue before me is whether it is necessary for the deprivation decision to have been made and whether a correct proportionality assessment has been undertaken by the Respondent. Since the Respondent’s decision, the Appellant’s former partner, Ms Entwistle became pregnant and she gave birth to a child. The Appellant spends time with that child. The child was born on 6 June 2024.
Summary of the Evidence
19. I provide a summary of the written and oral evidence before me. It is not a complete recital of all of the evidence which is not necessary and would not be proportionate.
20. Three witnesses gave evidence before me. First to provide evidence was Dr John Cordwell, Consultant Forensic Psychologist. He had provided his oral evidence via remote means.
21. He adopted his report of 30 July 2025 as part of his evidence. Within that report Dr Cordwell said:
5.0.1 “Regarding his mental health difficulties, Mr. Sokoli demonstrated current symptoms of a generalised anxiety disorder and symptoms of a panic disorder in accordance with the ICD-11. These are both of a moderate nature. Mr. Sokoli has experienced symptoms of panic and anxiety since aged around 13/14 years old. Mr. Sokoli does not currently present with symptoms of depression, although it is likely that he has experienced a period of depression in late 2010. Although Mr. Sokoli has experienced a number of traumatic events in his early life, he does not present with any ongoing symptoms of PTSD in accordance with the ICD-11”.
5.0.2 “…Mr. Sokoli has also demonstrated an ability for emotional strength and resilience, and an ability to develop meaningful and adaptive structures in his life to help to manage and tolerate his experiences of anxiety, for example friendships, relationships and work. Whilst Mr. Sokoli has, and continues to struggle with anxiety, he has more broadly been able to succeed and achieve in many aspects of his life and has not on the whole been pervasively debilitated by his mental health difficulties.”
5.03 “…He has a diagnosis of an anxiety disorder, that in my opinion began aged 13/14 years old. Mr. Sokoli also described that after arriving in the UK, and for a number of months he experienced feelings of being unsafe and of increased anxiety, and experienced distressing thoughts and memories of living in the civil unrest in Albania and memories of his difficult journey to the UK. These experiences and the subsequent emotional consequences in my opinion would have impacted his judgement at the time of claiming asylum in the UK. Furthermore, bearing in mind all of these experiences as a child, Mr. Sokoli was instructed by the agents to inform authorities, at any point of his travel to the UK of specific information, i.e. that he had travelled from Kosovo; and that he was instructed to provide a false name and date of birth.”
5.04 “In my view Mr. Sokoli has struggled with significant symptoms of anxiety and panic across his adolescence and adult life. As noted above, it is my view that Mr. Sokoli’s experiences of anxiety and feeling unsafe on arrival, and the sense of fear of the agents that facilitate his travel impacted his readiness to disclose the full truthful information about himself. Furthermore, Mr. Sokoli has struggled with significant symptoms of generalised anxiety and panic across his time living in the UK. At assessment, Mr. Sokoli stated that he has not disclosed his correct factual information to the Home Office, and he stated that this was underpinned by strong feelings of anxiety, particularly at the sense of uncertainty and lack of predictability this might have caused for him and the associated emotional distress…”
5.05 “Mr. Sokoli said that he did not disclose the correct information to the Home office at key points, for example in 2004 and 2006 because “I was anxious of what might happen and what the consequences might be. I thought that it was better to not say anything than to trigger a situation where things were uncertain and unpredictable in my life”. Given his generalised anxiety, Mr. Sokoli struggles significantly with uncertainty and things being unpredictable, stating “uncertainty is hell”. Mr. Sokoli also stated that since 2010 onwards he did not disclose that his information was incorrect to the Home Office because “I was frightened that things would collapse around me and that I would get into trouble. I was frightened that I would have another psychological breakdown and experience the things that I did in 2010. I never wanted that to happen again” and “Mr. Sokoli said, “2010 was a horrible period in my life, I never want to go back there and experienced what I did again. I have tried to set up my life so that I try not to experience anything like that again”. In my opinion Mr. Sokoli’s experiences of generalised anxiety has impacted and affected his judgement in disclosing the correct factual information to the Home Office
5.06 “Regarding the impact of the removal of his Citizenship, in my opinion Mr. Sokoli would experience a deterioration in his mental health, i.e. an acute exacerbation of his anxiety and likely a recurrence of symptoms of depression. Mr. Sokoli’s sense of identity and self-worth is largely constructed on his ability to achieve and succeed as a competent member of society, which for him is dependent on being able to work successfully, engage in social and emotional relationships with others, and to be able to contribute to and support his family and daughter practically, finically and emotionally. In my view, given Mr. Sokoli’s anxiety disorder and experiences of panic, he would struggle with the increased perception of uncertainty and lack of predictability in his life circumstances, and anticipated expectation of his general circumstances being unsafe, i.e. his inability to know that he can work, afford to live in the UK and support his ex-partner and child. Without this stability and predictability, he would begin to find his anxiety emotions more unmanageable. These experiences would be very distressing for him, and he would likely find them intolerable.”
5.07 “Regarding Mr. Sokoli’s ability to give evidence at a hearing, given his anxiety disorder and associated symptoms of panic, it is my opinion that that Mr. Sokoli may experience some difficulties participating in the Tribunal proceedings without some reasonable adjustments being made for his psychological needs. Mr. Sokoli would not meet the threshold for being regarded as a ‘seriously ill person’ as understood in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 or meet the threshold for being regarded as a vulnerable witness in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 1A. However, Mr. Sokoli has a diagnosis of generalised anxiety disorder and panic disorder, and he is experiencing ongoing current symptoms. These experiences of anxiety may impact his ability to give clear and succinct evidence at the Hearing. “
22. Various recommendations were made in respect of vulnerability and I adopted those for the hearing including that the advocates speak clearly openly and without “aggressive” cross examination. There were also regular breaks for the Appellant during the hearing. I have also taken these matters into account in respect of the Appellant’s evidence and that any inconsistency or unreliability of what he said might be explicable by his vulnerability.
23. In his oral evidence Dr Cordwell said in cross examination in summary that the Appellant had been assessed by him for 3 hours. He said he had used various assessments within that time period to come to the decisions in his report. He agreed that the matters were from self reporting by the Appellant. He referred to paragraph 3.2.1 of this report. Dr Cordwell confirmed that he was not a psychiatrist and was a psychologist. He said he was a “PHD doctor and not a medical doctor”. At page 49 of his report, he set out that the Appellant did not meet the tests for there being a depressive disorder. As for the Appellant’s anxiety, Dr Cordwell said it could be caused by many different factors in experiences of life. Originally it was his childhood trauma and as an unaccompanied child.
24. After that part of the cross examination, Ms Foot said that it was necessary for the Secretary of State to put questions to Dr Cordwell about the matters raised in the Respondent’s skeleton argument which challenged Dr Cordwell’s views.
25. Ms McKenzie sought time to prepare further questions so I put the case back at her request.
26. Once the matter resumed, Ms McKenzie then asked further questions in cross examination. It was said that there were no active problems being suffered by the Appellant with anxiety. It was confirmed that there were no recent health consultations in respect of the referred to ‘generalised anxiety disorder’. The GP records did not show that the Appellant had presented to his GP with anxiety. There was an entry for Accident and Emergency records for a panic attack. Medical records did not say that the Appellant presented to his GP with anxiety.
27. Dr Cordwell noted that it was said that the Appellant had lied about various information. He said that as he understood it, the Appellant’s narrative about his experiences in Albania were broadly consistent with the information in the documents. He said, “the narrative when he arrived in the UK aged 16 is not as descriptive as in July. He was an unaccompanied child and I would imagine fear of threats and he was facilitated or instructed to give certain information on his arrest to the home office.”
28. Mr McKenzie put to Dr Cordwell that the account in the report was not what the Appellant had told the Home Office in January 2019. Dr Cordwell acknowledged that the Appellant was an adult in 2019 but that he was not aware of the specific questions asked of the Appellant at that time.
29. It was put to Dr Cordwell that if he was not aware of the questions being asked then how was it that he knew that the Appellant was genuinely fearful. Dr Cordwell said that he knew this from the Appellant’s description of matters. Dr Cordwell said that if the Appellant was deprived of his citizenship, he would struggle with much anxiety. The Appellant would struggle with his low mood. Loss of citizenship would lead to a loss of safety, security and social security in UK.
30. Dr Cordwell was asked about paragraph 5.06 of his report and how it was that the Appellant had been managing for so long with his anxiety until now and he had been able to live and work without therapy since 2010. Dr Cordwell said that the Appellant said that had managed his anxiety through work, exercise and with friends and family. He had coping mechanisms, including through them.
31. Dr Cordwell said that if the Appellant lost his citizenship, then it would lead to uncertainty and unpredictability for the Appellant. He said that “the Appellant has order, structure and process. As a coping mechanism, family relationships could help the Appellant, including his relationship with his ex partner and with his child. “
32. Further questions were put to the Appellant following Ms Foot reminding the Secretary of State of what was said in her skeleton argument.
33. Ms McKenzie then put to Dr Cordwell that that he had clearly been biased in his report by saying things such as that the Appellant was “genuinely fearful”. Dr Cordwell denied this and said he had acted as an expert witness and as a professional that he did believe that he was biased and lacking in objectivity and independence.
34. In respect of the actual effect of losing citizenship, it was explained to Dr Cordwell that once citizenship was revoked, there would be some form of temporary form of leave for a short initial period. Dr Cordwell said that this would be an uncertain and unpredictable time for the Appellant.
35. Asked about whether he knew that the Appellant would still likely receive Indefinite Leave to Remain and would therefore be able to lawfully seek or keep employment and that therefore he would have work and responsibilities, Dr Cordwell said he did not know how that would operate as he did not know about the effect of ILR compared with British citizenship.
36. Asked if it was just the label which had changed from British Citizenship to ILR, Dr Cordwell said he thought that ILR was a more fragile status than being British.
37. Dr Cordwell then said that if it was just the label that changed then this should moderate the sense of loss of British citizenship. The Appellant would still perhaps feel a loss of pride and of his contribution to the UK and to its economy and a loss of sense of identity.
38. Ms Foot asked Dr Cordwell if in the event that the Appellant is deprived of his citizenship and a period of weeks followed of him not having any leave to remain and not able to legally work or rent a home, what the psychological consequences of that might be. Dr Cordwell said that the Appellant will struggle with an increase in his anxiety and there would be a sense of loss and low mood and depression; albeit admittedly with which he had not struggled with for years.
39. The Appellant then provided evidence. He adopted his 3 witness statements as part of his evidence. I made all of the recommended suggested special measures for the Appellant in view of his vulnerability.
40. In cross examination, the Appellant said in respect of paragraph 3.2.2 of Dr Cordwell’s report that the support from friends and family included from his 2 sisters who are in the UK. They also have families. He sees his sisters and their families very frequently. This was said to be weekly.
41. In respect of seeing his friends, he said he saw them less frequently now that his daughter had been born. He saw some friends 2 weeks prior to the hearing. There was no re-examination.
42. In his latest witness statement (July 2025) the Appellant referred to seeing his daughter (she lives around 45 miles away with her mother, Ms Entwistle). His headaches continue and he had been anxious and stressed prior to a presentation at work. Finances were said to be tight. I take all of the witness statements into account when assessing the case as a whole, there being little utility in repeating everything setting out amongst the many documents in this case.
43. The next witness to provide evidence was Ms Natalie Entwistle. She adopted her witness statement and a letter at page 137 of the bundle as part of her evidence. She referred to having been made redundant from her job. She said she had no intention to become a ‘welfare family’. She said her daughter attends nursery. She said that she owns her home with shared ownership. She received a payment of around £2000 for her redundancy. Ms Entwistle said that she was no longer in a romantic relationship with the Appellant. She said she could wholeheartedly say that the Appellant had anxiety. Constructively to manage, the Appellant goes for walks and sees his family and friends and he is “always on the phone” with family or friends. She said that ‘even silly’ things like distraction with chess. She said the Appellant makes great strides with work, but he cannot travel and he cannot go on certain work trips and he worries about that. She said the “major concern is the impact for us and I do not want something dramatic to happen and I know that the finances are not there to create for a safety net to stay there for what is required.”
44. Ms Entwistle said that she has family in the UK including both of her parents and one brother in Cheshire. Her brother has 2 children of her own. She said her parents could not assist her as they did not have ‘a penny’.
45. I heard closing submissions from both parties, which I refer, where necessary, within my consideration and analysis below.
The Law
46. After the hearing, the Supreme Court provided its judgment in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kolicaj [2025] UKSC 9. I had considered whether to resume the hearing or to seek written submissions from the parties. I decided against such an approach because (i) the Supreme Court decision will be well known to both parties and if they had sought to make written submissions then they knew they were at liberty to do so and (ii) in any event the Supreme Court’s decision is clear and I can apply it without difficulty.
47. In Kolicaj, Lord Sales (with whom Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Briggs and Lord Stephens agreed) said at paragraph 88:
“In my view, however, it is clear from the terms of the December 2020 submission and from the terms of the Notice that the Secretary of State properly considered the exercise of the discretion arising under section 40(2). The December 2020 decision set out a number of matters which were relevant to the exercise of discretion, rather than to the question of satisfaction of the precondition. These included the discussion of whether deprivation would be in accordance with the policy in the May 2020 submission, the impact of section 55 in relation to the decision and the application of the HRA and article 8 of the European Convention. The Court of Appeal was right to allow the Secretary of State's appeal on this point. This ground in Mr Kolicaj's cross-appeal falls to be dismissed.”
48. In Amjad Ali Chaudhry v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 16; [2025] KB 395 the Court of Appeal considered the test to be applied by the First-tier Tribunal when hearing an appeal from a decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department made pursuant to section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981, to deprive a person of British citizenship.
49. Lord Dingemans (as he then was) and with whom LJJ Edis and Underhill agreed made clear that:
“58. For the detailed reasons set out above I would answer the issues as follows: (1) the proper approach to appeals under section 40A of the BNA 1981 from decisions of the Secretary of State made pursuant to section 40(3) of the BNA 1981 is: (i) it is for the FTT to find, in the event of a dispute, as a fact whether there was fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact for the purposes of section 40(3) of the BNA 1981 ; (ii) the decision of the Secretary of State on the causation issue whether the registration or naturalisation was obtained by the impermissible means is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds, in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed PSC in para 71 of Begum (No 1) ; (iii) the exercise of the Secretary of State's discretion to make an order depriving a person of citizenship status is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed PSC in para 71 of Begum (No 1) ; and (iv) it is for the FTT to consider whether the Secretary of State had acted in breach of other relevant legal obligations, including those arising under section 6 of the 1998 Act.
50. In Mujaj (Deprivation: child’s best interests) [2025] UKUT 00349 (IAC) it was said that in a deprivation appeal affecting the children’s best interests are to be considered.
“In a deprivation appeal affecting children, a tribunal must approach the question of the children's best interests in the following way:
(i) First, it must identify whether the best interests of any child were relevant to any issue in the appeal. In a deprivation decision, the section 55 duty is mainly relevant to the exercise of discretion and to the article 8 assessment. Kolicaj [2025] EWCA Civ 10 at [37];
(ii) Second, it must identify which of those issues are to be determined by the tribunal according to public law principles;
(iii) Third, it must identify all of the respondent's reasons for her decision, whether in the initial deprivation decision or in a subsequent review or reconsideration, and take them into account where it is procedurally fair to do so;
(iv) Fourth, with regard to those issues that are to be determined according to public law principles, it must determine whether the respondent complied with her section 55 duty;
(v) Fifth, if she did not, it must then decide whether the error was material and requires the decision to be set aside; and
(vi) Sixth, when deciding the issues that are for the tribunal to decide for itself, it must make its own findings about the best interests of any relevant child and take them into account as a primary consideration in accordance with established principles. Here, whether or not the respondent complied with her section 55 duty is unlikely to be relevant.”
51. I note too that Ms Foot also refers in her skeleton argument as follows:
“In Hysaj (Deprivation of Citizenship: Delay) [2020] UKUT 00128 (IAC) (19 March 2020), the UT said at [110]:
“There is a heavy weight to be placed upon the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the system by which foreign nationals are naturalised and permitted to enjoy the benefits of British citizenship. That deprivation will cause disruption in day-to-day life is a consequence of the appellant’s own actions and without more, such as the loss of rights previously enjoyed, cannot possibly tip the proportionality balance in favour of his retaining the benefits of citizenship that he fraudulently secured.””
Consideration and Analysis
52. I assess the child’s best interests, independently, before asking if they are capable of being outweighed by other considerations in accordance with Zoumbas v SSHD [2013] UKSC 74 and Kaur (children’s best interests / public interest interface) [2017] UKUT 14.
53. I must have and do have the best interests of the Appellant’s child at the forefront as a primary consideration pursuant to section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. The child is entitled to expect there to be proper consideration of her Article 8 ECHR rights too. These are extremely important considerations noting the Appellant’s child’s British status. I also take into account that Ms Entwistle, whilst not in a romantic relationship with the Appellant, wishes for the Appellant to remain in the UK and to assist her and the child and to maintain that ‘family life’ with her. It is not the fault of the child, as young as she is, that the Appellant did what he did and which has led to this hearing.
54. It is in the child’s best interests to remain with her primary carer. That is her mother. Ms Entwistle. That is not going to change. Nor will it change that Ms Entwistle will allow the Appellant to see the child. That too will continue. Whilst the child might not be able to go nursery for a few weeks during the limbo period, that is of no identifiable consequence because the child is aged just around 18 months. I doubt very much that the child will be unhappy with being able to spend more time with her mother (and her father) even if she is unable to attend nursery if the nursery fees really cannot be paid. I doubt too that the Appellant will be so displeased with reading this decision that he will refuse to visit his daughter.
55. Therefore, the reality is that the best interests of this child are that she continue to live, as she does, with her mother. Her father will continue to visit her. Her father will be upset that he will lose his British citizenship, but that is life and all parents go through challenges and life events with children. It can make children more resilient. The limbo period will be just a matter of weeks.
56. I assess the Appellant’s evidence with Dr Cordwell’s recommendations in respect of vulnerability firmly in mind. I accept that the Appellant continues to have a non-romantic relationship with Ms Entwistle. I accept that they both had a child together and I accept that the Appellant spends time with the child. He enjoys spending time with his child and the child enjoys spending time with him. I accept too that Ms Entwistle admirably seeks to work, as she did before her redundancy. As she put it, she does not wish to be a ‘welfare family’. The evidence was that the Appellant has siblings and nephews/nieces in the UK and Ms Entwistle has a brother and her parents in the UK too. They all seem to be on good terms, albeit and as it so to be expected, their family members are involved in their own lives too. Ms Entwistle is British and so is the child.
57. I did not find Dr Cordwell’s evidence to be in the category of being deliberately misleading or showing the bias which the Secretary of State submitted. I do conclude though that Dr Cordwell in a 3 hour interview with the Appellant had a limited insight to the Appellant compared to the much more detailed insight that I have been able to gain of the case, including with oral evidence and critiqued consideration of the written and oral evidence by the Respondent.
58. One aspect of Dr Cordwell’s case which showed his limited understanding was that he did not appreciate that ILR would mean that (1) the Appellant would be able to continue to remain living in the UK and (2) it would also mean that the Appellant would get all the immigration benefits of that ILR. That includes that the Appellant would be able to secure employment (or state benefits if he could not secure employment), lawfully to rent or to own a home and freedom of travel across the UK with re-entry to the UK if went abroad.
59. Therefore, whilst Dr Cordwell referred to the anxiety, low mood, PTSD etc in more concerning terms, his report and his oral evidence, at least initially, was far too pessimistic. The reality, in view of the unchallenged evidence, is that the Appellant will be in a limbo stage for at most between just 6 to 8 weeks if he is deprived of his British citizenship. He would be permitted to remain in the UK during that limbo period, but in effect without formal leave. He would then likely obtain ILR.
60. Therefore, I have to assess how much of an impact that limbo period (6 to 8 weeks at most) will impact this case. I undertake a general overview first and my impression of the Appellant and Ms Entwistle. I note the vulnerability.
61. I do not doubt that the Appellant will be feeling anxious, worried and concerned about the effect of his fraud and deception seeking British citizenship and when he lied about his country of nationality. Although not clear, my judgment is that he is embarrassed by what he did too. I get the distinct impression that he feels he has let down Ms Entwistle. I accept that the Appellant was under the age of 18 when under the control of agents or family members (or both) when he made his claim for asylum. His immaturity is a mitigating factor. I accept that it was some 7 years later in 2006 that the Appellant applied for naturalisation, having arrived in the UK in 1999. I accept that he felt it was difficult to now turn back to the way things were when he was 16. I accept that by 2006 the Appellant had forged a new life and found it traumatic to look back to that earlier part of his life. I accept and note too that from 2006 to 2025 has been a period of some 19 year and in that time the Appellant has no recorded offences against him. This too is mitigation and a positive factor. He has built a nice life for himself with well paid employment earning over £60,000 plus bonuses. Again, I accept that it is difficult and anxiety-inducing for him to think that he will “lose it all”. It is to the Appellant’s credit that he has not had any criminal convictions recorded against him and has been working and paying taxes such as income tax. His latest witness statement shows that his employers like him and have promoted him.
62. In my judgment the factors against the Appellant are weighty because the public interest is weighty. The Appellant was aged 16 when he arrived in the UK and I accept he cannot realistically be seen to have been complicit in what occurred to enable him to attain ELR at that time. In my judgment however, not even the series of traumatic events begins to explain why the Appellant did not tell the truth when he made his naturalisation application in 2006 (or even the prior ILR application when he was aged closer to 21). He says, in reality, that he could not find the strength to admit matters because of traumatic experiences such as witnessing death or being on a dingy or a risk of psychological breakdown, but in my judgment, nonetheless, the requirement and need for him to do so was manifest. He had years to own up to what he did but failed to do so. He caused the deception issues after he was aged 18. Whist it is not the Appellant’s daughter’s fault that the Appellant has done these things and I must consider her best interests as a primary consideration as I have done above, I must look at the realistic situation. The child was only born in 2024 and is still very young. There is no evidence that there will any effect on the child by the decision to deprive the Appellant of his citizenship because it will make no difference to her if her father’s settled status is via ILR or via British citizenship. It is just a label. Her father will still be there for her.
63. Whilst I accept that the Appellant’s experiences of generalised anxiety might have affected him and affected his judgment in disclosing the correct information to the Home Office, these are no where near sufficient factors for me to conclude that the public interest is reduced to such an extent that this appeal ought to be allowed.
64. Nor when I combine the Appellant’s achievements in terms of his work, career and education with the above matters is there sufficient to dislodge the public interest considerations. I accept there is some re-balancing of that public interest, but the effect of the matters on the Appellant’s side in the proportionality balance, including that he arrived in the UK when he was aged 16, the many years which have elapsed since then, his daughter, the lack of recorded criminal convictions, the trauma suffered by the Appellant, his depression, PTSD, the fear he has of losing his identity and the ‘intolerable toll’, are not even cumulatively anywhere near sufficient either.
65. As I have stated above, that includes because in reality the Appellant merely needs to get over the 6 to 8 week period (at most) whilst he is in the limbo period. As I have dealt with above, this well resourced, hardworking and well connected family man (both on his side and on Ms Entwistle’s side) will assist him to do so. Even if really cannot do things himself and look after himself.
66. I do not accept that the Appellant would suffer an acute exacerbation of his anxiety and likely a recurrence of symptoms of depression just because of the limbo period. As I have concluded above, in my judgment, Dr Cordwell was clearly unaware that the deprivation of citizenship (1) would not likely lead to deportation of the Appellant because this Appellant has no criminal convictions and (2) in any event the Appellant is likely to achieve ILR which will not be that different to his citizenship in terms of work and/or being able to claim state benefits. I do not accept that losing British citizenship will mean losing identity in this case because the Appellant will still retain ILR and will still very much be a part of the UK as a person with settled status.
67. Nor do I accept that not being able to work for the limbo period for a few weeks will lead to “severe consequences for his daughter and Ms Entwistle”. In my judgment the reality is that I cannot envisage that this child born in 2024 would feel worse off spending time with her parent(s) rather going to nursery for a few weeks. Nor can it be imagined that Ms Entwistle will not get support from her family, even though they are in Cheshire. Even if that was the case, the social services and state benefits are wide open for her and for the child because mother and child are British. As I say though, it is fanciful to think that Ms Entwistle would allow just a few weeks of time away from nursery or of ‘doing without’ to mean her child should suffer.
68. In my judgment, whilst there might be some limited impact on the Appellant’s mental health, the situation Dr Cordwell envisaged of deportation or a permanent loss of leave to remain is not what will likely occur here. The issue is just the limbo period. It will not be a happy time for the Appellant, but it will be something he will be able to endure without any real difficulty knowing that Ms Entwistle and their daughter will be there for him. If the Appellant’s employers refuse to ‘wait’ for the Appellant during his limbo period, in my judgment this well trained and well experienced Appellant will have little difficulty in obtaining future employment. That might not necessarily be as highly paid as his current work, but he will likely get work.
69. What has been most concerning is that the Appellant continued with the lies, fraud and deception when he was an adult and when he sought British citizenship. I accept that the Appellant ‘felt’ he had no choice to continue with his original lies and deception. I can see that the Appellant was living a good lifestyle, with all the benefits that his leave to remain brought for him and that things would get even better with British citizenship. I accept that the Appellant would have been in a somewhat “conveyor belt” of Applicants who were ‘automatically’ achieving British citizenship if they had come to the UK as teenagers from Kosovo. The truth though is that the Appellant was never from Kosovo. He had lied about in his claim for asylum and then lied for many years when an adult to obtain ILR and British citizenship.
70. I conclude that there can be no doubt that the Appellant’s mood, anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation. PTSD and the like feel all the worse because he considers is on the precipice of losing things. I can understand that losing a job which pays so well can have that effect.
71. In my judgment, there was a fundamental error in the thinking and analysis of Dr Cordwell that the Appellant would lose everything by the deprivation of the Appellant’s British citizenship. He would not. Whilst, as I have stated above, the Appellant would face a period of limbo for just 6 to 8 weeks, the Appellant would likely soon achieve ILR. That will bring with it all of the advantages that ILR brings. For real purposes, here it will be the same as British citizenship. In my judgment it is fanciful to suggest that the Appellant would actually lose anything of significance. Whilst it is argued he will lose his identity; it is difficult to see why even subjectively. The Appellant will not be required to tell his family or more distant friends that he will now have ILR instead of British citizenship. Travel through airports might take a little longer, but not significantly. Similarly, employers are well used to their employees having settled ILR status instead of British citizenship and there is no law preventing employers from employing those with ILR over British nationals.
72. What therefore might the effect be of that 6 to 8 week period? How in particular will it affect the child? There is a risk that the Appellant will feel down and depressed when dealing with that time period. He might not be ‘himself’. That though is not surprising. People deal with bad news in different ways. In this case the Appellant is fortunate to have Ms Entwistle as support, but he also has his own siblings and their children. It appears to me that the Appellant will continue to have the warmth and comfort of that regular support from all of those people and importantly the Appellant will also have his daughter. He clearly loves her and likes spending time with her. He will have more time to do that during those 6 to 8 weeks too. He has friends whom he sees regularly.
73. The Appellant has much to look forward to in terms of his ILR status after the limbo period. He has his daughter and the support of her mother. He has his siblings. He will be able to seek work and to use his considerable experience as an employee, even if his current job does not remain open for him.
74. I do not accept the evidence, if this was its implication, that Ms Entwistle or the child will be destitute. In my judgment, Ms Entwistle is a proud and hardworking person. She is determined to find work and to get over her redundancy. She has a home and she has the support of her family to assist her both in emotional terms but also with assistance, albeit the distance to Cheshire will make it more difficult. This is a family who will provide support and rally around the child which means that they indirectly will rally around the Appellant.
75. At worst, Ms Entwistle is entitled to and will be lawfully permitted to seek the assistance of state benefits. I appreciate that she does not want to do that, but that safety net is there for her and for the child.
76. The Appellant has not been convicted of any offences in the UK. He has worked hard and enjoyed income of over £67,000 per annum in his work plus benefits and bonuses. Those are positive mitigation points that I take into account in the proportionality account. I also note that between 2006 to now has been a period of some 19 years. It is a long time. That is also a mitigating factor which I assess positively in the proportionality balance. I do have to take into account though the strong public interest in depriving those of citizenship obtained by fraud. I have referred to the Appellant’s mental health. I factor it in as I have stated. I also do note that the Appellant has a benign tumour to the brain. He appears to have had this for some years. He gets headaches and becomes anxious about this too. He gets medical treatment and will continue to do so.
77. It is possible that the 6 to 8 week period of limbo might be shorter because this is not a deportation case involving criminal offences.
78. In respect of the Appellant, if he really cannot continue to rent his home lawfully during the limbo period or to retain his job, he has the support structure of his siblings to assist him. I cannot begin to imagine that they would not rally around him for that short 6 to 8 week period, especially since there is currently very frequent and regular contact with the siblings. I accept that his family will not likely have a spacious room for him, but there was no evidence provided to me to suggest that there is no space for him on a sofa or sofas in different homes for that very short period. Nor do I see any evidence to suggest that some form of hostel at cheap cost might not be fundable for that short period of time, whether by the Appellant himself or by his family or by money lent to him from his family.
79. In my judgment, the effect on the Appellant’s child is minimal. She is so young that she will not understand the difference between British citizenship and ILR and nor will she appreciate or begin to understand the short 6 to 8 week limbo period will be without ILR. As I have said above, whilst I accept that the Appellant will feel affected during that limbo period, in my judgment that will be easily ameliorated when acknowledging that it will be for a very short period of time.
80. I therefore conclude that the Appellant used fraud. He sought asylum as a child, but then as an adult, well into his adulthood, he made applications for ILR and naturalisation. The Appellant lied throughout. The lies were clear and unacceptable. If the Appellant was seeking to continue to ‘blame’ the Respondent for not making sufficient checks with Tirana in respect of his true Albanian nationality then I reject that. It tends to show a failure by the Appellant to acknowledge that the situation he finds himself in is of his own making.
81. No evidence was provided to me that the Appellant’s child will not be able to seek assistance of the local authority either. It was said in respect of section 17 Children Act 1989. As was explained in Muslija UKUT [2022] 00337:
“The time period between deprivation and the issuing of a decision is identified by the respondent as being between six to eight weeks. During such time the appellant’s wife is permitted to work. She accepted before us that she could seek employment. She expressed concern as to the impact her limited English language skills may have on securing employment but confirmed that she could secure unskilled employment. She confirmed that her husband could remain at home and look after their children. The appellant accepted that his wife is named on the joint tenancy and will continue to be able to lawfully rent their home upon his loss of citizenship and status. In addition, the children can access certain benefits through their citizenship. Two safety nets exist for the family. If there is an immediate and significant downturn in the family’s finances such as to impact upon the health and development of the children, they can seek support under section 17 of the Children Act 1989. If the family become destitute, or there are particularly compelling reasons relating to the welfare of the children on account of very low income, the appellant’s wife may apply for a change to her No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF) condition.
82. Ms Foot contends that whilst the public interests is high, when considering the proportionality exercise, there is the ‘more’ in this case which Hysaj identified. As I have set out above, I have considered that submission in some detail. I reject it.
83. In my judgment the Appellant’s network of family and friends means that there is no more than a negligible risk to the Appellant’s mental or physical well being and so there is no more than a negligible risk to the child as a result.
84. When conducting a careful proportionality assessment for myself, there is nothing more than negligible which arises to seek to outweigh the public interest. The reasonably foreseeable consequences are that the Appellant will likely feel down about what he has caused, but those effects will be very short lasting and will be ameliorated by the support of Ms Entwistle, her family and by the Appellant’s own family. The Appellant will get lots of warmth and solace from his relationship with his child and he will see that he much to look forward to rebuilding his life on an honest basis. He will likely soon achieve leave to remain, including ILR after the deprivation of his citizenship.
85. Therefore, when balancing the severity of the effects of deprivation on the child and on the Appellant against the public interest objective of maintaining the integrity of the naturalisation process, the public interest far outweighs those factors. Deprivation is not a disproportionate measure in the circumstances of this case.
Conclusion
86. Therefore, I conclude that there was fraud by the Appellant when making his application for naturalisation as a British citizenship. Indeed, this is admitted by the Appellant in any event. The Appellant’s fraud had caused the Secretary of State to naturalise him as a British citizenship and the Respondent was unarguably entitled to conclude that was so because the Appellant was not entitled to such naturalisation as he had used fraud. On public law principles the Respondent did not act in a way in which no reasonable Secretary of State could have acted. The Respondent did not take into account irrelevant matters or disregard something which she should have given weight and nor has she been guilty of some procedural impropriety.
87. The real issue raised by the Appellant before me is whether the Appellant has acted in breach section 6 of the Human Rights Act. I undertake that assessment for myself, including with much more recent evidence and events compared to when the Respondent’s decision was made in 2021.
88. I have considered section 6 of the Human Rights Act, and I have carefully considered proportionality in respect of Article 8 ECHR. I give due weight to the findings, evaluation and policies of the Secretary of State. I undertake that proportionality assessment for myself, especially since there have been events since the Respondent’s decision which was made some years ago. Including that the Appellant has had a child born to him in 2024 following a relationship with Ms Entwistle (but that relationship has ended). I also take into account the psychological report and the psychological effects on the Appellant.
89. Despite the helpful submissions by Ms Foot, this appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision
The Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision to deprive of him of citizenship is dismissed on all grounds.

Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
24 February 2026