Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2023-002814

First-tier Tribunal No: DC/00003/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 13th of March 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LINDSLEY
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL

Between

MOHAMMED ASJAD ARSHAD
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Naik KC and Mr D Sellwood, of Counsel instructed by Duncan Lewis & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 May 2024

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant says that his name is as above and that he was born on 22nd April 1980 in Bury, in the UK, although this is contested by the respondent. A Pakistani passport was issued in this name on 24th July 2001 but this passport was retained by the respondent on the basis that it was counterfeit. A birth certificate with these details, giving his mother as Noor Begum was also retained by the respondent on the basis that it was counterfeit. Criminal charges in relation to these documents were dismissed by the Court in December 2002 after the prosecutor offered no evidence.
2. A new Pakistani passport was issued in his above name in March 2003. In 2003 the appellant obtained a new copy of his contended British birth certificate, which this time named his mother as Nasreen Akhtar. The appellant states that a Mr Khan (the uncle who is said to have raised the appellant in the UK) applied for the right of abode for the appellant in May 2004 but this application was refused in August 2004 as Mr Khan did not provide a birth certificate or British passport for the appellant. In the context of this application Mr Khan informed the respondent that the appellant lived in Pakistan between 1991 -1995 and 1996 and 1998.
3. In July 2012 the appellant applied for indefinite leave to remain based on his long residence in the UK as a stateless person giving documentary evidence of his residence between 1998 and 2012. In 2013, in response to questions from the respondent, he denied that he had ever left the UK or lived in Pakistan as per the information given by Mr Khan, and said he had lost his birth certificate and Pakistani passport. On 22nd May 2013 the respondent accepted that the appellant had lived in the UK for a continuous period of 14 years, at least from 1999, and granted him indefinite leave to remain under paragraph 276B of the Immigration Rules as then in force. In October 2013 the appellant applied to naturalise as a British citizen, and this was granted on 11th December 2013.
4. On 7th November 2014 the respondent wrote to the appellant stating that it was suspected that he had obtained his citizenship by fraud and that they were considering depriving him of his citizenship under s.40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 on the basis that they believed that another person held the identity he was using. On 29th April 2015 the appellant was issued with a nullity decision on the basis that he had falsified elements of his identity when he applied for British citizenship.
5. On 9th March 2016 the appellant was convicted of 16 sexual offences, and in April 2016 he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment with 8 years of extended licence conditions.
6. On 6th April 2018 the respondent withdrew the nullity decision following the judgement in Hysaj & Ors v SSHD [2017] UKSC 82, but on the following day the respondent wrote to the appellant inviting him to make representations as to why he should not be deprived of his citizenship. On 15th December 2020 the respondent made a decision to deprive the appellant of his citizenship pursuant to s.40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 (henceforth the 1981 Act) both on the basis of the contended identity fraud and on the basis that the appellant had failed to declare the 14 sexual offences he had committed prior to applying for naturalisation as both matters were material as had they been known he would have denied citizenship on good character grounds.
7. The appellant’s appeal against the deprivation decision was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a determination promulgated on the 9th May 2023.
8. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge CN Lane on 23rd January 2024 on the basis that it was arguable that the First-tier judge had erred in law as set out in the grounds and that they also raised matters of general importance.
9. The matter came before us to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law, and if so whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside. It was agreed that as the proposition in the fourth ground would be considered by a Presidential Panel at a hearing on 7th June 2024 (in the appeal UI-2023-004316) that it would be appropriate for the parties to make submissions in writing after that decision was promulgated, unless it proved unnecessary to deal with that ground at the error of law stage as other errors were made out and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal had been set aside. If other errors led to the decision being set aside it was agreed that it would make sense to await the decision of the Presidential Panel before any remaking hearing. Following the hearing a draft decision was written by the Panel in May 2024 addressing all grounds bar the fourth ground finding that they were not arguable. In the event it was subsequently agreed by all that it would be prudent to wait for the judgement of the Court of Appeal in Chaudry v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 16 for the written submissions relating to ground four. The decision in Chaudry was published on 24th January 2025, and submissions were received from both parties by 25th February 2025. At this point in time we were therefore able to produce our finalised decision addressing the fourth ground.
Submissions – Error of Law
10. In the grounds of appeal, a skeleton argument and in oral submissions from Ms Naik it is argued in summary as follows. Ms Naik added oral submissions in relation to the first three grounds, leaving the fourth for written submission as outlined above and the fifth ground as argued by the appellant himself.
11. Firstly, it is argued that the respondent’s policy guidance was not properly applied in the decision to deprive the appellant of his citizenship. It is argued that the appellant was granted indefinite leave to remain by the respondent because he was satisfied that the appellant had lived in the UK for more than 14 years and that his identity was not relevant to this grant, and further the issues around whether this was his true identity were already known at that point in time to the respondent. If the respondent had believed the appellant was the person he had said he was born in Bury in 1980 he would have been a British citizen by birth and would not have been granted indefinite leave to remain as a stateless person. It is clear from the GCID notes that, contrary to the findings of the First-tier Tribunal, the respondent did note that the appellant had been refused the right of abode when the grant of indefinite leave was considered and granted. It is argued that there was no evidence of any significance going to show that the appellant’s identity was arguably fake which came to the respondent after the grant of citizenship. It is said that it was evidence with respect to criminality which triggered the deprivation proceedings but the conducive route to deportation under s.40(2) of the 1981 Act was not used. As a result, it is argued, it is clear that the provision in the Chapter 55 guidance that any fraud must be material was not properly applied, and the provision that evidence which was with the respondent but disregarded or mishandled should not in general be used to deprive someone of their nationality unless the public interest requires this was equally not applied.
12. Secondly, it is argued, that the First-tier Tribunal failed to apply the obiter dictum at [29]-[30] of Aziz v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1884, namely that the justification for depriving someone of their citizenship might fall away if they can establish that there is no prospect of the Secretary of State deporting them. It is argued that this applies in fraud cases and not just conducive to the public good deportations, like Aziz, pursuant to s.40(2) of the 1981 Act. The appellant will be liable to automatic deportation as a foreign national criminal if he is deprived of his British citizenship, as is clear from Zulfiqar v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 492, as he will be a foreign criminal subject to automatic deportation on the facts of his case. It is therefore clear that part of the logic of depriving him of his citizenship must be to deport him. However his statelessness means that he could not be removed to any country within a reasonably foreseeable period of time and thus would be at real risk of being left in limbo without any immigration status. It is argued that the consideration that there would be no real prospect of deportation was material and ought to have been set out in the decision. The respondent ought to have started with the finding of statelessness at the time of the grant of indefinite leave to remain. In these circumstance the respondent ought properly to have considered whether to exercise her discretion under s.40(3) of the 1981 Act given this factual matrix and did not, and further this was unlawfully not considered in the context of the Article 8 ECHR consideration. Ms Naik submitted that the judge had erred in failing to recognise the existence of this public law error in the respondent’s decision.
13. Thirdly, it is argued, that there was a failure to take into account material evidence that the appellant will have “limbo” status, i.e. be without any leave to enter or remain, if he is deprived and that he could not be deported to Pakistan due to his criminal convictions in accordance with the expert evidence of Mr Umer Gilani (a Pakistani lawyer) that was before the First-tier Tribunal. It is argued that this was relevant to arguments that this action amounts to a disproportionate interference with his right to private life as protected by Article 8 ECHR because he would be likely to have an extended period of limbo status and because this would not be as a result of the appellant trying to thwart deportation, so this is not a context where the decision in SSHD v AM (Belarus) [2024] UKSC 13 bites. It is argued that this evidence was not given weight by the First-tier Tribunal on an irrational basis, as it was not correct to say that the expert did not consider the appellant’s Pakistani passport or the contentions for the respondent that he had lived for periods in Pakistan, and the evidence contended that as a convicted sex offender, even if he were accepted to be entitled to Pakistani citizenship, the appellant would not be accepted back by the Pakistani authorities.
14. Fourthly, it is argued, that there was an error of law in determining the condition precedent (i.e. whether the appellant did commit fraud) on public law grounds in accordance with Ciceri (deprivation of citizenship appeals: principles) [2021] UKUT 238, because, it is argued, that this was wrong as the Court of Appeal in Shyti v SSHD [2023] EWCA 770 noted that there were compelling counter-arguments, and, it is argued, both Ciceri and Chimi (deprivation appeals; scope and evidence) Cameroon [2023] UKUT 114 are wrongly decided on this point. In accordance with revised directions the appellant provided further written submissions dated 30th January 2025 with respect to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chaudry v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 16. It is argued that Chaudry supports this error of law submission as it found that contrary to the position in Ciceri and Chimi that it was for the First-tier Tribunal to find as a matter of fact whether there was fraud. It is argued that the First-tier Tribunal applied a more restrictive approach to this issue, and failed to determine the precedent fact for itself and found instead, taking a public law approach, that the assertion that the appellant had committed fraud was one that could be reasonably held on the evidence, as is evident from paragraphs 28, 33 and 34 of the decision. It is argued that this error of legal approach is material notwithstanding the fact that it is accepted that the appellant was not found to be a credible witness by the First-tier Tribunal and that he was found not to be of good character as ultimately neither of these issues amount to a conclusion as to whether he committed the contended fraud. It is argued that this point means that the decision should be set aside in its entirety and return for a de novo hearing before the First-tier Tribunal. It is argued that if the Panel does not agree with these written submissions the oral hearing should be reconvened for further oral argument.
15. Fifthly, it is argued, that the decision in Walile (deprivation, self-incrimination, anonymity) India [2022] UKUT 17 is incorrectly decided because if it were correctly decided then the Secretary of State would have powers to conduct a criminal interview without any regard to the PACE Act 1984 and its codes because even a single incriminating question is considered to be a criminal interview. It was therefore wrong to find that a person who has committed criminal acts should have revealed these in answer to a question on their naturalisation application asking if they had ever committed activities which may mean they are not of good character. It is not an answer that the person does not have to apply for citizenship because it is for the respondent to be satisfied that a person is of good character so the onus is on the respondent.
16. The respondent did not file a Rule 24 notice but Mr Ojo made it plain that all grounds of appeal were opposed.
17. Mr Ojo argued that whatever the position with the identity fraud point made in the first ground the respondent had clearly also relied upon the fact that the appellant had dishonestly claimed to be of good character on both his application for indefinite leave to remain and in his application for British citizenship when he had already committed some of the sex offences that he was later convicted of in 2016. As a result there was no error of law made out in ground one as it was material to both grants that the appellant should be of good character and he had fraudulently claimed to be of good character when he palpably was not due to his serious offending. Mr Ojo also argued that it was clear from the decision that the respondent had the Chapter 55 guidance in mind, and that there were further enquiries with respect to identity which led to new and stronger evidence that the appellant had lied about his identity. That evidence postdated the grant of indefinite leave to remain and citizenship, which meant that this was not a case of going back to old evidence which had been mishandled or disregarded at the time of the grant of indefinite leave to remain.
18. With respect to the second ground Mr Ojo argued that applying Aziz statelessness could exceptionally be relevant if deportation was an ultimate aim of deprivation of citizenship under s.40(3) of 1981 Act. He argued that there was no acceptance that the appellant was stateless at any point by the respondent, he had simply been recorded as such as a result of some maladministration in some of the notes. Further, even if the appellant’s argument that Zulfiqar meant that the appellant must be treated as a foreign criminal once deprived of his citizenship and subjected to automatic deportation was correct there was no issue of limbo here as the appellant was in prison until 2026, and the decision letter dealt with the matter in the alternative suggesting a proper timetable for consideration of removal or a grant of discretionary leave once deprivation had taken place.
19. With respect to the third ground Mr Ojo argued that there was a failure by the expert to take into account the fact that there was evidence that the appellant had lived, studied and obtained qualifications in Pakistan, even if the expert report did make mention of the Pakistani passport. It is argued that the position of the First-tier Tribunal Judge with respect to not giving this evidence weight was properly open to her when considering the Article 8 ECHR appeal.
20. In accordance with directions the respondent made written submissions dated 25th February 2025 drafted by Mr E Terrell with respect to the fourth ground following receipt of the written submissions of the appellant and in light of the decision in Chaudhry. The respondent argues that there is no material error made by the First-tier Tribunal. It is argued that there were two matters going to character which led to the respondent’s decision to deprive citizenship to the appellant: firstly the false identity it is contended he used; and secondly the fact that he had undisclosed sexual offences. In these circumstances no rational decision-maker could have found that the appellant was of good character. It is argued that the appellant did not argue that the concealment of the offending was not fraud, a false representation or concealment of material facts but argued that it was not material, and it is argued that the First-tier Tribunal effectively found that the failure to declare the criminal convictions was dishonest and material at paragraphs 49 to 50 of the decision. It is argued that there is therefore no error with respect to the treatment of the condition precedent. With respect to the identity issue it is accepted that, in light of Chaudhry, a wrong public law approach was taken to this issue. Whilst the findings at paragraphs 31 to 33 of the decision were not made for the First-tier Tribunal to determine for itself whether the appellant had committed fraud the nature of these findings, made having heard oral evidence, means that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal would inevitably have been that fraud had been shown on the balance of probabilities. No aspect of the respondent’s case is identified as being found to be doubtful in any way. It is argued that therefore this ground of appeal should fail. If however the Upper Tribunal finds an error made out on this basis the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal as it is likely that other findings of fact can be preserved and that the Upper Tribunal will be able to determine the appealmore quickly.
21. With respect to the fifth ground Mr Ojo argued that Walile was correctly decided and therefore lawfully relied upon by the First-tier Tribunal, and there was no error of law made out in this ground. The law with respect to self-incrimination was not relevant to the completion of immigration application forms as the appellant was not compelled to apply for indefinite leave to remain or citizenship.
Conclusions – Error of Law
22. We find that the first ground does not disclose an error of law for the following reasons. It is clear that the First-tier Tribunal properly understood that the question was whether the respondent had made any public law errors when concluding that the appellant had committed fraud when making his naturalisation application as set out at paragraph 19(i) of the decision. It is clear that this fraud was contended to have two strands: firstly fraud relating to the appellant’s identity and secondly fraud relating to his having declared himself to be of good character, as set out at paragraphs 35 and 36 of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The first ground does not identify errors of law in the decision of the respondent or that of the First-tier Tribunal in concluding that the appellant had committed fraud by maintaining on his application form at question 3.16 that he is of good character when he had in fact committed serious sex offences of which he was later found guilty.
23. The only ground which puts the legality of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal finding that the respondent had properly relied upon fraud in relation to good character in question is the fifth ground, drafted by the appellant himself, which argues that the Upper Tribunal Presidential Panel decision in Walile is wrongly decided. Walile held that: “(1) An applicant for British citizenship who commits a criminal offence before the application is decided by the Secretary of State cannot rely upon the privilege against self-incrimination as a reason for not informing the Secretary of State of the crime.” We, like the First-tier Tribunal, find that the decision of the Presidential Panel in Walile is correct for the reasons it sets out at paragraph 32 of that decision. An application for naturalisation, or indeed indefinite leave to remain, is not the same as an interview investigating a crime and is not part of any legal proceedings. The appellant was not compelled in any way to apply for naturalisation. If he did not wish to incriminate himself he could have simply made no application. It was also properly open to the respondent to ask about good character when considering an application to naturalise a person as a British citizen, and then to rely upon the response being accurate, particularly as the naturalisation guidance booklet warns that if incorrect or fraudulent information is given that deprivation action might be taken.
24. This means that we are satisfied that the respondent properly found that the condition precedent of fraud for the deprivation was met, and that there is no material public error of law in his decision, or that of the First-tier Tribunal on this point. For completeness however we continue to consider whether the treatment of the second strand of contended fraud, relating to the appellant’s identity, discloses any public law errors.
25. The respondent properly identifies his policy in Chapter 55 with respect to the meaning of false representations and fraud at paragraph 10 of the decision. The history of the contended false representation by the appellant that he is Mohammad Asjad Arshad is set out in from paragraphs 13 to 17 starting from the 2002 British passport application, going on to the 2004 rights of abode application and the ILR application in 2012 and the naturalisation application in 2013. It is clear from paragraph 18 of the decision that additional checks were carried out by HMPO after the appellant had naturalised because he applied for a British passport. These checks revealed more than the fact that there was no record of his claimed birth, which had been previously established, but new information that there was another person with the same name and date of birth as those claimed by the appellant whom the HMPO concluded was the genuine owner of the identity and to whom they had already issued a passport. Further evidence came to the respondent via Bedfordshire Police who confirmed that the appellant and the genuine holder of the identity had been in contact between February 2014 and April 2019 which provided evidence of a conspiracy between the two, with the appellant changing only the serial number and mother’s details from those given on the other man’s genuine birth certificate. Further, as detailed at paragraph 28 of the decision, additional information came to the respondent after the grant of citizenship from G4S, one of the appellant’s employers, that he had written on a job application form that he had attended the Pakistan Air Force college between 1993 and 1996 and additionally lived in Pakistan during the period 1996 to 1998, which contradicted the appellant’s history given at the point of his ILR application that he had lived continually in the UK. (We note that the contradiction provided by this evidence appears to be even more stark than the respondent thought, as an earlier page of the same document states that the appellant underwent schooling in Pakistan from 1986.)
26. We are satisfied that significant additional information regarding the appellant’s fraudulent use of the identity of Mohammed Asjad Arshad came to the respondent’s notice after he was granted his indefinite leave to remain and British citizenship as a result we do not find that this is a case where the policy guidance at paragraph 55.7.10.2 that: “Evidence that was before the Secretary of State at the time of application but was disregarded or mishandled should not in general be used at a later stage to deprive of nationality.” is relevant. Therefore we conclude that it is not the case that the respondent erred in law in misapplying this part of the guidance. The judge in the First-tier Tribunal did not err in failing to hold otherwise.
27. We note that there was never a statelessness application made by the appellant, and that there was never therefore a consideration of his circumstances vis a vis the 1950 Statelessness Convention. At the point of the indefinite leave application it is clear that the appellant was not found to be British (as he would not have been granted indefinite leave to remain if he had been) but the respondent proceeded on the basis that he had no operational nationality. We find that pragmatically, and in the light of his proven period of residence, he was recorded as being stateless on his Pass Notification Letter for his Life in the UK Test as the case worker dealing with his ILR application set his country to “stateless as no documentation supplied defining country”, as is recorded in the GCID notes of 23rd October 2012. On consideration of all of the evidence we find that the position at the point of the grant of indefinite leave to remain is that the respondent accepted the appellant was genuinely unable to establish where he was born, the claim to have been born in Bury in 1980 having been rejected, but no more. We find that this position was properly found to be untrue as a result of the subsequent information that came to light after the appellant was naturalised, as set out above, particularly given the evidence of collusion between the appellant and the genuine holder of the identity and evidence of his having lied about time spent abroad. We do not hesitate in finding that a material deception as to the appellant’s identity is established in the decision of the respondent as outlined at paragraph 24 above, and that this was material in his grant of indefinite leave to remain and British citizenship and thus that the guidance at Chapter 55 was properly applied.
28. With respect to the second ground it is common ground, in light of Mr Ojo’s submissions, that Aziz in the Court of Appeal means that the justification for depriving someone of their citizenship might fall away if they cannot subsequently be deported even in case where, unlikely Aziz, the deprivation is pursuant to s.40(3) of the 1981 Act on the basis of fraud and not conducive to the public good under s. 40(2) of the 1981 Act. We therefore find that the First-tier Tribunal did err in law to the extent that it is found at paragraph 54 of the decision that Aziz does not support this proposition. It is also common ground between the parties that if deprived of his citizenship the appellant will be subject to automatic deportation proceedings as a foreign criminal in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Zulfiqar.
29. We find that the decision of the respondent ought ideally, perhaps at paragraph 35 of the decision when considering the issue of discretion to deprive the appellant of his citizenship, have engaged with the statutory framework for automatic deportation, and thus articulated that once concluded these deprivation proceedings would be followed by automatic deportation proceedings in the light of the appellant’s serious criminal convictions and his becoming a “foreign criminal” under the UK Borders Act 2007. There is evidence of the appellant’s links with Pakistan in the G4S job application materials along with the fact that he held a genuinely issued Pakistani passport in an assumed identity which might have led to a conclusion that the appellant is, was or could apply to be a Pakistani citizen. However the respondent states at paragraphs 43 to 44 of the decision that the fact of having naturalised as a British citizen may have led to loss of the appellant’s Pakistani citizenship and thus the deprivation of citizenship may lead to statelessness, which we take to mean that in fact no weight was placed on the prospect of the actual deportation of the appellant from the UK as a material motive for the deprivation. Further it is explicitly stated that the deprivation decision was justified by the seriousness of the fraud and the public interest, as set out at paragraph 44 of the decision, where it is said that it is taking place given: “the need to protect and maintain confidence in the UK immigration system and the public interest in preserving the legitimacy of British nationality.” Ultimately we conclude that as a legitimate justification for deprivation is provided along with an observation that this may well leave the appellant de facto without a nationality (and thus practically unremovable) we find that deportation was not a material motive of the respondent in making this deprivation, and so do not ultimately concluded that the First-tier Tribunal, or the respondent in the decision under appeal, erred in law as argued for in this ground. That analysis is supported by the uncontested fact that the respondent sought to treat the appellant’s British citizenship as a nullity before anything was known about his criminality.
30. We now turn to the third ground. In the Article 8 ECHR consideration of the appeal by the First-tier Tribunal “little weight” was attached to the expert report of Mr Gilani which concluded that there would be no likelihood whatsoever of the appellant being accepted back in Pakistan even if he were a Pakistani citizen as the Pakistani government had a policy not to admit convicted sex offenders. We find that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in finding that Mr Gilani did not consider “case-specific documents”, and in stating that he did not consider the Pakistani passport. It is clear from paragraph 3 of the report that Mr Gilani did consider that the appellant was in possession of a Pakistani passport issued in London. It is also clear from this paragraph that Mr Gilani was aware of the factual matrix, that whilst the appellant claims to have been born in the UK and not to know his parents’ details this is disputed by the respondent, but also in turn that the respondent does not have a specific location for his birth in Pakistan or details of his parents. We find that this is a fair summary. We find the key evidence contained in the report is as follow:” Pakistani state authorities have a formal policy of not facilitating, by any way or means, the deportation of those overseas Pakistanis who have been convicted of sexual offences. This means that they generally do not entertain requests for issuance of travel documents made by such convicted persons.” Thus ultimately, even if it established that the appellant was originally or even remained a Pakistani citizen, the Pakistani authorities’ policy is not to facilitate his return. The First-tier Tribunal gives no other reasons for not giving weight to the report, which on the face of it provides compelling evidence that the appellant will remain in the UK, and that the Article 8 ECHR consequences of deprivation ought to have been considered in this light.
31. We now move on to consider whether this error is ultimately material. We find it is not, notwithstanding the failure to consider the evidence of Mr Gilani rationally. The First-tier Tribunal primarily concludes at paragraph 65 of the decision that deprivation will not lead to any adverse consequences with respect to him being left in limbo without immigration status because the appellant is serving a custodial sentence which means he cannot be released from prison until 2026, and also finds that it is open to him to obtain identity documents. Neither of these findings were the focus of any particularised challenge: and we find that even if the appellant is not deportable to Pakistan for the reasons given by Mr Gilani given the respondent’s recitation of evidence of his previous residence and studies in that country it was rationally open to the First-tier Tribunal to find that he could obtain previously held identity documents, as this would not be affected by the evidence that he would not be accepted back in Pakistan by the Pakistani authorities or that they might refuse to issue him a new computerised national identity card. We also note that in the decision under challenge, at paragraphs 45 and 46, there is an assurance of action on future steps within a short period. The respondent sets a timetable for further action after the deprivation proceedings, including deportation proceedings which we have noted in this decision would have to be commenced and which are indicated at paragraph 46 of the decision to commence when the appellant has less than 18 months of his custodial term to run. The decision also provides for the timely consideration of the possibility of a grant of limited leave to remain. We find that the decision that the deprivation of citizenship would not be a breach of the appellant’s Article 8 ECHR rights is therefore sufficiently reasoned and not materially affected by the lack of proper engagement with the evidence of Mr Gilani.
32. As a result of our conclusions that grounds 1-3 and 5 are not arguable the only basis on which this decision could be found to be unlawful is that argued for in ground 4. to Whether there was in fact fraud is an issue which it is accepted by both parties has been decided by the Court of Appeal in Chaudhry should be determined as a precedent fact by the First-tier Tribunal itself and not simply subjected to public law review for errors. We find that we can deal with this ground on the basis of the helpful written submissions and no further oral hearing is needed. Clearly the First-tier Tribunal did not take the correct approach on this issue as it had understandably directed itself in accordance with Ciceri and Chimi, and of course did not have the benefit of the decision in Chaudhry. The sole question is whether this error is material. For the reasons argued by Mr Terrell, and which are reflected also in our conclusions on ground one, we conclude that this error is not material. The appellant does not contest that he did not include his extensive serious criminal record on his application form which required him to list any activities which might indicate he was not of good character. We therefore find that it is inevitable that any rational First-tier Tribunal would have found that fraud was made out as a matter on precedent fact. We also agree with the submission that whilst the prism of reasonableness in the respondent’s decision-making is used when considering whether the appellant did commit identity fraud paragraphs 26 to 34 of the decision in fact involved a very detailed examination of all of the evidence by the First-tier Tribunal Judge, and the explanations of the appellant that he was not fraudulently claiming this identity are not found to be credible or consistent with the documentary evidence. In light of these conclusions we find that it is inevitable that the First-tier Tribunal would have concluded that fraud was shown on the balance of probabilities in relation to the appellant’s identity. It follows that we find that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains no material errors of law.

Decision:
1. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law.
2. We uphold the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal.

Fiona Lindsley

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5th March 2025