Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2023-002914
UI-2023-002918

First-tier Tribunal No: DC/00054/2021
DC/00055/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 29th of April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

Yaqoub Suleiman Mohammed (1)
Salma Abdalla Awath (2)
Appellants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Mr Yaqoub Mohammed and Mrs Salma Awath, in person
For the Respondent: Ms S Simbhi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 5 November 2024
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. The appellants are husband and wife. They claim to be nationals of Somalia. On 29 June 2021 and 30 June 2021 the respondent served Notice of a decision to deprive the appellants of British citizenship under s40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981. Their appeals were allowed by First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) Judge Dixon. By a decision issued on 10 September 2024 (“the error of law decision”) I found an error of law in the decision of FtT Judge Dixon promulgated on 5 June 2023. By reason of the errors found, I set aside the decision of FtT Judge Dixon and gave directions for a re-making of the decision in the Upper Tribunal. This I now do.
The Background
2. As I set out in the error of law decision, the second appellant arrived in the UK in 2005 and claimed asylum. She claimed to be Salma Abdalla Awath, born in July 1975 in Kismayo, Somalia. On 17 October 2005 the second appellant was recognised as a refugee and she was granted Exceptional Leave to Remain. She was subsequently granted Indefinite Leave to Remain on 25 October 2010 and on 30 October 2021 she was issued with a certificate of naturalisation as a British citizen.
3. The first appellant was granted Indefinite Leave to Enter the UK on 26 May 2006 by the British High Commission in Nairobi for family reunion to join his wife, the second appellant who had by that time been recognised as a refugee in the UK. He arrived in the UK on 9 August 2006. He claimed to be Suleiman Mohammed, born in March 1971 in Somalia. On 30 October 2012 he too was issued with a certificate of naturalisation as a British citizen.
4. The appellants were referred to the Status Review Unit after it was discovered that before they had entered the UK as nationals of Somalia they had applied for Entry Clearance to the UK for a 6 month visit as nationals of Kenya.
5. In the application for Entry Clearance said to have been made by the first appellant in July 2004, he was said to be Yakub Mohamed Suleiman, born in February 1970 in Kenya. In support of the application, the respondent claims the first appellant provided a Kenyan passport that had a picture of the first appellant. In an application said to have been made by the second appellant, she was said to be Salma Awadh Abdalla born in June 1974 in Mombasa. The second appellant is said to have provided a Kenyan passport valid from 9 September 2003 to 9 September 2008 that had a picture of the second appellant. The respondent claims the appellants were interviewed and they would have been required to provide identification when they attended for interview. The applications for entry clearance are said to have been made for the appellants to visit the second appellant’s mother and to attend the wedding of the second appellant’s half-brother. The applications for Entry Clearance were refused by the respondent on 26 July 2004 because the respondent was not satisfied that the appellants’ social and economic circumstances were as claimed.
6. The respondent claims the following day the appellants made another application for Entry Clearance, again as nationals of Kenya. The applications were again refused.
7. As a result of the information that had come to light regarding the appellants’ identity, the respondent invited the appellants to make any representations they wish to, surrounding the allegation that they had acquired British citizenship by fraud.
8. The first appellant claimed the only application made by him for Entry Clearance was the application he made in 2005 at the British High Commission in Nairobi to enter the UK as the spouse of Salma Abdalla Awath. He claims that he has never made any other application for Entry Clearance. The second appellant claimed she arrived in the UK on 5 June 2005 with an agent and claimed asylum. She claimed that she had contacted an agent who took her to several places, filling in many forms on her behalf and arranged for different documentation, and that she had her photographs taken. She simply followed the agent’s instructions. She claims to have no knowledge of the Kenyan identity.
The Legal Framework
9. The British Nationality Act 1981 as far as is relevant here states:
“40. …
(3) The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of a citizenship status which results from his registration or naturalisation if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the registration or naturalisation was obtained by means of—
(a) fraud,
(b) false representation, or
(c) concealment of a material fact. …
(5) Before making an order under this section in respect of a person the Secretary of State must give the person written notice specifying—
(a) that the Secretary of State has decided to make an order,
(b) the reasons for the order, and
(c) the person’s right of appeal under section 40A(1) or under section 2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68). …
40A Deprivation of citizenship: appeal
(1) A person—
(a) who is given notice under section 40(5) of a decision to make an order in respect of the person under section 40, or
(b) in respect of whom an order under section 40 is made without the person having been given notice under section 40(5) of the decision to make the order, may appeal against the decision to the First-tier Tribunal. …
10. In my error of law decision, I referred to the decisions of the Upper Tribunal in Ciceri (deprivation of citizenship appeals: principles) [2021] UKUT 00238 (IAC) and Chimi (deprivation appeals; scope and evidence) Cameroon [2023] UKUT 00115 (IAC), and to the decision of the Supreme Court in R (Begum) v Special Immigration Appeals Commission [2021] UKSC 7.
11. Since the error of law decision, the Court of Appeal in Chaudhry v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 16 recently gave guidance on the approach to be adopted on an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal from a decision of the Secretary of State to deprive a person of British citizenship pursuant to Section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981. Chaudhry was a Pakistani national who had entered the UK in 1990 on a Pakistani passport and was subsequently granted indefinite leave to remain in 2000. His subsequent application for naturalisation as a British citizen was successful. The secretary of state deprived Chaudhry of British citizenship on the basis that he had obtained citizenship by false representation. The issue in the appeal before the Court of Appeal was the appropriate test to be applied by the FTT when hearing an appeal from the secretary of state made pursuant to s.40(3). The Court of Appeal considered the Supreme Court's judgment in R. (on the application of Begum) v Special Immigration Appeals Commission [2021] UKSC 7, (Begum No.1) and of the Upper Tribunal in Ciceri and Chimi. Dingemans LJ (with whom Underhill LJ and Edis LJ agreed) summarised, at [58], the proper approach to appeals under section 40A of the BNA 1981 from decisions of the Secretary of State made pursuant to section 40(3) of the BNA 1981 as:
(i) it is for the FTT to find, in the event of a dispute, as a fact whether there was fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact for the purposes of section 40(3) of the BNA 1981;
(ii) the decision of the Secretary of State on the causation issue whether the registration or naturalisation was obtained by the impermissible means is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds, in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1);
(iii) the exercise of the Secretary of State's discretion to make an order depriving a person of citizenship status is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1); and
(iv) it is for the FTT to consider whether the Secretary of State had acted in breach of other relevant legal obligations, including those arising under section 6 of the Human Rights Act . Although due weight would need to be given to the findings, evaluations and policies of the Secretary of State, the decision is for the FTT;
The Evidence
12. The appellants were assisted throughout the hearing by a Mckenzie friend, Mr Mbrak Abdullah. I was told at the outset of the hearing before me that only the second appellant would be giving evidence. Although the first appellant attended the hearing, he did not give evidence.
13. Prior to the hearing before the FtT the second appellant wrote a letter dated 24 November 2021 to the Presenting Officers Unit (Birmingham) providing a “Certificate of Identity Confirmation” and “Birth Certificate” to support her claimed name and nationality. She provided the ‘DHL’ shipment envelope in which she claims the two documents were set to her by Osman Abanur Mohamed from Somalia on 14 November 2021.
14. Before me, the second appellant confirmed that she has read her witness statement dated 7 April 2023 and that the content of the statement is true and correct. She confirms that she was s born on 3 July 1975 in Raskiamboni, Somalia and is from the Bajuni clan of Southern Somalia. She confirms she is married to Mr Yaqoub Suleiman Mohammed and they have three daughters. The second appellant refers to the difficulties her family experienced following the civil war in 1991. She states that following events in 1997 and after she had given birth to her eldest daughter [S], she, her daughter, and her mother’s friend, left Raskiamboni, with other Bajuni’s and headed to Mombasa, Kenya, where they were taken to the Kakuma Camp. She remained there for about two years. She found her husband at the Camp and then moved in with him. In October 1999 she gave birth to her daughter [SA] at the Kakuma camp. The family were returned to Raskiamboni after aid was stopped to the Camp in 1999. The second appellant claims the family left Somalia again in 2001 due to the difficulties in Raskiamboni. They headed to Mombasa again where they were taken to the Mombasa Old Town Islamic Centre. The appellants had to work at the centre to be able to live there with their children.
15. The second appellant claims she met her cousin Abdi Ahmed, who came from the UK and he informed her that her siblings Kawthar and Mohammed were both alive and safe in Europe. Abdi assisted her to contact her siblings. The second appellant states Abdi helped her to get in touch with an agent who confirmed that he was able to get her and her family to safety and to reunite her with her siblings in exchange for money. She was forced to sell her gold jewellery to fund the trip to safety, and that was topped up with funding she received from her sister and well-wishers. They had no Somali passports and/or identity documents, but the agent assured them that they would not need Somali passport as they were not necessary to get to safety.
16. The second appellant claims that in preparation for their travel, the agent asked the appellants many questions regarding their identity and history. The agent also took them to different places, where they had their photographs taken. The agent filled in many forms on their behalf. They were never allowed to question anything the agent said or did because they had no other legal way to travel to a safer country. The agent made all the arrangements for the documentation and travel.
17. The agent informed them that he will be “gone for a few months” as he needed to prepare for their documentation and travel. After many months, the agent returned and informed them that the preparation for their travel was increasingly becoming difficult and expensive and demanded more money. They could not afford to pay extra and it was decided that only the second appellant would be able to travel with the agent. The first appellant was unwell and unfit from injuries at that time.
18. The first appellant states that on 3 May 2005, she and the agent left Kenya. They arrived in the UK on the 4 May 2005 and she claimed asylum at the port of entry (Gatwick airport). She was not aware of the details of their travel, destination, and the passport used. The documents were in the agents’ possession and were handed over to the appellant shortly before getting off the aircraft. The second appellant handed the passport given to her by the agent at immigration control and claimed asylum. In her statement, the second appellant refers to the steps then taken by the first appellant and their daughters to secure entry to the UK under ‘the Family Reunion Policy’, and the birth of her youngest daughter [SM] in January 2010. The second appellant refers to the grant of British citizenship and the subsequent visit to Mombasa in July 2018 by the appellants in the hope of locating their relatives.
19. The second appellant confirms that since receiving the letter from the Status Review Unit in March 2020, they have been making efforts to obtain documents to confirm their identities. With the assistance of some members of the Somali community they have managed to contact Mr Osman Abanur Mohamed, a relative from her maternal family who is currently residing in Hawle Wadaag district, which is under the Mogadishu Municipality of the Banadir region of Somalia. She states Osman provided an affidavit to the local government confirming her identity and family background. Following checks and investigations by the local government and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Somali Police, the local government was satisfied about the second appellant’s identity and her Somali background. She was subsequently issued with a ‘Certificate of Identity Confirmation’ as well as a ‘Birth Certificate’ to confirm her identity. Unfortunately, they have been unable to locate any of the first appellant’s relatives in Somalia to provide a similar affidavit to the local government to confirm his identity.
20. The second appellant states she is suffering from Chronic Kidney Disease Stage 3 and is still undergoing tests. She has also been diagnosed with left knee tibiofemoral joint degeneration and knee osteoarthritis. She receives knee injections to manage the pain. The first appellant is suffering from hypertension and lumbar disc degeneration and relies on repeat medication to manage his conditions.
21. The second appellant claims that if deprived of their British citizenship, the appellants will be in the UK unlawfully during a period of limbo. She state they would not be able to support themselves and their children ‘due to lack of status in the UK’. The foreseeable consequences of deprivation are, the second appellant claims, that they would have a lack of settled status affecting their ability to continue to receive social benefits and NHS health care services for their medical conditions, would be unable to work, be unable to rent a property or have access to bank accounts, and provide for their family.
22. In her oral evidence before me the second appellant said that she believes the ‘Kenyan identity’ referred to, was created by their agent to facilitate travel to the UK to safety. She maintains that the appellants were not aware of the ‘Kenyan identity’ and they had no knowledge of it. She stated they did not make any application for Entry Clearance in Nairobi and they did not attend an interview. She believes the agent made the application because the agent assisted them. She had told the Home Office that she had been assisted by an agent when she made her claim for asylum. The second appellant stated they gave the agent some photographs when they were in Kenya. The agent was responsible for making all the arrangements. They do not know what he did, and just followed his instructions. The agent took them to a place where they could have photographs taken . The second appellant said they were introduced to the agent by her cousin. The agent asked about their names and identities and took them to different places, different buildings and offices. Some looked like official government buildings and some were plain offices. They were taken to have photographs taken. When the agent returned after six or seven months, he said it was difficult to get the whole family to Europe and that if they want to go together, they will have to pay extra. They did not have the money and as her husband was not well, they decided that she would travel with the agent. She left Mombasa with the agent who was in control of the documents. She did not see the documents. They flew to the UK form Nairobi and before they landed the agent gave her an envelope and said she should follow people and when stopped, she should present the envelope. She did not look inside the envelope. She followed other people to Immigration control and presented the envelope to the Officer. She was taken to an office at the airport and an interpreter was called. She informed the Home Office that the documents were made on their behalf and she believes the false documents were prepared by the agent.
23. In cross-examination the second appellant said that when they were taken to places where questions were being asked, the questions were about their names, family history and where they lived in Somalia. The agent was with them throughout, and she understood they were there to have documents prepared. She confirmed the appellants did not have any official Somali documents at the time. The second appellant was asked whether it had crossed her mind that the agent was arranging fraudulent documents. She said that she knew that he was obtaining documents, but did not know what documents, and what would be required to travel. She claimed that she did not know that a passport is required to travel. The second appellant said that her siblings had left about five years before her, and they had come to the UK with the help of an agent. When asked whether she was in contact with her siblings, she said that her cousin initiated contact when she was in Kenya. Her siblings told her she would need the help of an agent. The second appellant said that she did not have any Somali documents previously.
24. The second appellant was referred to her response dated 10 December 2020. She said that she thought she only had to provide the information requested. She decided to obtain evidence to support her claim to be a national of Somalia after she received the decision from the Home Office. The Home Office had made a decision that she is Kenyan and she had not been given any opportunity to prove that she is a national of Somalia. She did not say in December 2020 that she could prove her nationality because she thought she only had to respond to the questions asked. She accepted she knew that the agent was preparing false documents. She said that she had declared the use of false documents when she made her claim for asylum but did not declare that when she applied for British citizenship.
25. Although the first appellant did not give evidence before me, he did write to the respondent by letter dated 15 December 2020 responding to the Notice sent to him by the respondent. In summary, he maintains this he is Mr Yaqoob Suleiman Mohammed born on 3 March 1971 in Raskiamboni, Somalia. He claims he has not made any other application for Entry Clearance except the application made in 2005 to enter the UK as a spouse of Salma Abdalla Awath. He said he is not a Kenyan national and the alleged identity of Yakub Mohamed Suleiman born 6 February 1970 in Kenya is not known to him. He said he has never held a Kenyan passport or any other passport in that identity. He went on to say:
“However, I remember sometime in 2004 my wife through the help of a relative managed to contact an agent who promised to get us to a safe place in exchange for money. I remember that this agent filled many forms on our behalf, arranged for different documentations, and took me to several places where I remembered being asked questions and had my photographs taken. In the beginning this agent would visits (sic) us regularly, but then the visits became less frequent and then stopped for a long time. This is because he said he was busy preparing for our travel, and also helping other asylum seekers to get to a safe place.
I remember that after a long period of time, the agent come back to us and said that the preparation for our travel to a safe place was more and more becoming difficult and expensive. He kept on demanding for more money, but because we could not afford to pay the extra money he demanded, the agent then said that only one of us would be able to travel with him; as I was still unwell from the injuries I sustained in Somalia and suffered from blackouts, my wife had to travel with him to the UK.”
26. On 22 October 2024, the Tribunal received a Rule 15(2A) Application to rely upon a number of documents that were not previously before the FtT. The evidence relied upon includes:
a) Affidavit from Balad-Hawa Administration dated 04/02/2024
b) Mr Mohammed’s Certificate of Identity Confirmation
c) Mr Mohammed’s Birth Certificate
d) Statement of Miss Kawthar Awath dated 21/10/2024
e) Respondent’s letter to Miss K Awath dated 09/07/2024
f) Miss K Awath’s Case Documents
g) Example of a complete CRS Record
h) Example of Respondent’s letter dated 45/09/2024 (sic)
i) Evidence of Appellants’ current medical conditions
j) Evidence of Appellants’ recent Benefit Statements
Decision
27. In reaching my decision I have had regard to all of the evidence that is before me, whether or not I refer to it. I have also had the opportunity of hearing the evidence of the second appellant. For the avoidance of any doubt I have considered the documents I have been provided with regarding the second appellant’s sibling Kawthar Awath. Whatever decisions have been made by the respondent in respect of her are a matter for the respondent. I have determined the appeals before me on their own merits.
Was there Fraud, False Representations or a Concealment of a Material Fact
28. I must consider first whether there was in fact fraud or a false representation by the appellants as to their identity. I have already set out the evidence before the Tribunal and in particular, the evidence of the second appellant. I have had the opportunity of hearing the evidence of the second appellant. The first appellant chose not to give evidence before me for reasons that are neither explained nor apparent.
29. Insofar as is relevant to their identity, the appellants’ account is a simple one. They claim that having fled Somalia for a second time in 2001, they went to Mombasa, Kenya. They were introduced to an agent by the second appellant’s cousin, Abdi. They agreed to pay the agent to provide them with documents necessary to leave Kenya. The agent also took them to different places, where they had their photographs taken and filled in many forms on their behalf. After a number of months, the agent returned and demanded more money if the family all wished to travel together. It was decided that the second appellant would travel to the UK with the agent and she did so using documents prepared by the agent. She arrived in the UK on the 4 May 2005 and claimed asylum. The second appellant believes the ‘Kenyan identity’ referred to by the respondent was created by their agent to facilitate travel to the UK. The appellants both deny any knowledge of any Kenyan identity. The second appellant maintains they did not make any application for Entry Clearance in Nairobi and they did not attend an interview.
30. Having had the opportunity of considering all the evidence before the Tribunal, I have no hesitation in concluding the second appellant is not a credible witness. The information that she provided during the course of the hearing before me was scripted and she was keen to read out written material prepared in advance by her McKenzie friend. When pressed, her answers were very general and vague. There are aspects of the evidence that are simply incredible and I am unable to attach any weight to the documents now relied upon by the appellants to support their claims to be nationals of Somalia.
31. I reject the appellants’ account that they were not aware of the applications for Entry Clearance made on 26 July 2004 and 27 July 2004. The respondent has provided a copy of the application made by the first appellant on 26 July 2004. It has an image of the first appellant. The application refers to the applicant as ‘Yakub Mohamed Suleiman’, born on 6 February 1970 and confirms he is a Kenyan national. The application refers to a Kenyan passport (A8*****5). A copy of the relevant page of the Kenyan passport, with the first appellant’s photograph, has been disclosed by the respondent. The passport number matches the passport number shown on the application. The respondent has also provided a copy of the application made by the second appellant at the British High Commission on 26 July 2004. It has an image of the second appellant. The application refers to the applicant as ‘Salma Awadh Abdalla’ born on 2 June 1974 and confirms her nationality to be Kenyan. The application refers to a Kenyan passport (A7*****1). A copy of the relevant page of the Kenyan passport, with the second appellant’s photograph, has been disclosed by the respondent. The passport number matches the passport number shown on the application.
32. Both applicants were interviewed separately on 26 July 2004. The respondent has provided a copy of the interview record. The applicants were asked about the reasons for the visit to the UK. They both referred to the second appellant’s brother studying for a degree in Computer Science at the University of Birmingham and having graduated in 1998. They both said they wished to attend to attend his wedding. Although I am prepared to accept that there is a possibility that a well prepared agent might ensure that applicants attending an interview would provide consistent answers, I do not accept that someone other than the appellants were able to attend the interview. It is simply not credible and contrary to common sense that faced with applications forms with images of the applicants and passports with photographs of the applicants, the interviewer would not realised that the person being interviewed was not the individual making the application. There were two separate images of the applicants that the interviewer had before them. The applications made were rejected for reasons set out in a decision dated 26 July 2004. I do not need to address the reasons given. I find the applications were made by the appellants.
33. The applications for Entry Clearance were renewed by the appellants on the following day, 27 July 2004. Again, the respondent has provided copies of the relevant applications made by the appellants that refer to the Kenyan identity and passports. This time, the appellants were not interviewed, but unsurprisingly, the applications were again refused on 2 August 2004. The decision maker noted that there appeared to be no material change in the appellants’ circumstances since the previous application.
34. In her statement made in support of her claim for international protection dated 14 June 2005, the second appellant claimed that they left Raskiamboni for the second time in mid 2001 and headed to Mombasa, where they stayed at Mombasa Old Town Islamic Centre. She stated: “Earlier this year, I met one of our cousins (Abdi) who came from the United Kingdom and told me about my sister Kawthar and my brother Mohammed…” (my emphasis). She claimed the agent took some photos then arranged all the documentation including her travel to the UK. The second appellant’s account therefore in 2005 was that all the arrangements had been made by an agent during 2005. In her oral evidence before me the second appellant claimed the agent had returned ‘after six or seven months’. That account is at odds with the claims made by the first appellant and the documents before the Tribunal. In his letter dated 15 December 2020 the first appellant claims he recalls his wife having contacted an agent ‘sometime in 2004’. If the appellants engaged the services of an agent in early 2005, it is difficult to see how passports baring photographs of the appellants were issued on 29 December 2003 (first appellant) and 9 September 2003 (second appellant) and applications for entry clearance could have been made by the agent on 26 and 27 July 2004. The second appellant’s recollection of when the agent was involved is likely to have been more accurate at the time in 2005 when she made her claim for international protection. The appellants were, I find, aware that they had made unsuccessful applications for entry clearance to the UK in their genuine Kenyan identity, and had approached an agent to facilitate their travel to the UK adopting a false identity.
35. The evidence of the appellants is that they knew nothing at all about the applications made in the ‘Kenyan identity’. The name of the second appellant on the Kenyan passport and on the applications for Entry Clearance made in July 2004 is “Salma Awadh Abdalla” (my emphasis). As the respondent noted in the decision dated 30 June 2021, the use of the name ‘Awadh’ is curious. A ‘Statement of Evidence’ form was completed by the second appellant with the assistance of her representatives (Crimson Phoenix Solicitors) on 14 June 2005. The second appellant was asked to provide the names of her parents and siblings. Each time, the ‘Family name’ initially noted is “Awadh” and has then been corrected to “Awath”. Although her witness statement dated 14 June 2005 states her name to be ‘Salma Abdallah Awath’ the name at the end of the statement has again been corrected from “Awadh” to “Awath”. Notably, the declaration completed by the second appellant’s representatives on the SEF dated 14 June 2005 states; “I declare that I have assisted Salma Abdalla Awadh to complete this form …”. The second appellant therefore at some point has used the name ‘Awadh’ as forming part of her name in instructions she provided to her representatives. If an agent had used a variation of the second appellant’s name when making an application for a Kenyan passport and an application for Entry Clearance that the second appellant claims she knows nothing about, it is incredible that she would have referred to ‘Awadh’ when she was instructing her representatives.
36. I have considered the ‘Certificate of Identity Confirmation’ and ‘Birth Certificate’ that is relied upon by the second appellant alongside the other evidence before me. I attach very little weight to those documents as evidence of the second appellant’s identity. The documents were both issued on 10 November 2021 and the birth certificate in particular, is not a contemporaneous document issued at or about the time of the second appellant’s birth. In her letter dated 24 November 2021 the second appellant claims that with the assistance of some members from Somali community in UK, she has managed to get in contact with Mr Osman Abanur Mohamed, a maternal relative in Somalia. There is no evidence before me from Mr Osman Mohamed. It is said he provided an affidavit to the local government confirming the appellant’s identity and family background. A copy of that Affidavit and the information provided has not been provided. There is reference to checks and investigations by the local government and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Somali Police. I have no evidence before me from those agencies of the checks and investigations they completed. The ‘Certificate of Identity Confirmation’ sates: “The Mayor of Mogadishu hereby certifies that the person whose picture and thumb print appears below has the following details …”. The second appellant would have had to travel to Somalia on or before November 2021 when the document was issued for her thumb print to appear on it. If she did, there is no reason why the documents needed to be sent to her by DHL. Once issued, she would no doubt have simply returned to the UK with the documents with a clear explanation of how they were obtained. I simply have no credible and independent evidence before me as to how the local government was satisfied about the second appellant’s identity so that they were able to issue the documents now relied upon, a document, as I say that is said to be endorsed with the second appellant’s thumb print.
37. In her witness statement dated 7 April 2023, the second appellant claims, at paragraph [36], that unfortunately, they have been unable to locate any of the first appellant’s relatives in Somalia to provide a similar affidavit to the local government to confirm his identity. On 22 October 2024, the Tribunal received a Rule 15(2A) Application to rely upon a number of documents that were not previously before the FtT. The evidence relied upon includes a letter dated 4 February 2024 from the District Commissioner, Balad-Hawa District, Jubaland State of Somalia that states:
“I Abdirashid Abdi Arok …. hereby confirm and certify that based on the records at the Office of the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths, [the first appellant] was born in Raas Kamboni village …on 3 March 1971.
Following affidavits from Mr Mohammed’s relatives, checks and investigations conducted by both my Administration and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Police Service, it has been established that the last known address of Mr Mohammed’s paternal family members is in Sideedaad estate of Balad-Wawa District. Therefore, my Administration is satisfied of both his identity and his Somali background.
Subsequently, on 01 February 2024, my office issued Mr. Mohammed with a Certificate of Identity Confirmation and a birth certificate with serial number: 004319 as proof of his identity.
..”
38. I again attach very little weight to those documents as evidence of the first appellant’s identity. The first appellant did not give evidence before me and I have no evidence as to how those documents were obtained and when. The documents are dated 1 and 4 February 2024 but were not filed with the Tribunal until 22 October 2024. The second appellant previously claimed they have been unable to locate any of the first appellant’s relatives in Somalia to provide an affidavit to the local government to confirm his identity. The letter from the District Commissioner dated 4 February 2024 refers to Affidavit’s from the first appellant’s relatives. The identity of the relatives has not been disclosed and neither have the Affidavits. Again, I have no evidence before me of the checks and investigations carried out by the District Commissioner’s Administration or the CID of the Police Service. Furthermore, again, the ‘Certificate of Identity Confirmation’ has a ‘thumb print’ that is said to be that of the person in the picture. The ‘thumb print’ would have to have been provided by the first appellant before the document was issued. The first appellant would have had to travel to Somalia for that to have been provided. I simply have no credible and independent evidence before me as to how the District Commissioner was satisfied of the first appellant’s identity so that he was able to issue the two documents, one of which is a Birth certificate recording the first appellant’s birth on 3 March 1971 but issued many years after the first appellant had on his own account, left Somalia.
39. Having considered the wide canvass of evidence before me as a whole, I find that the appellants are not credible witnesses. I have no hesitation in concluding that the appellants dishonestly claimed to be nationals of Somalia throughout their dealings with the respondent. I find that the first appellant’s genuine identity is Yakub Mohamed Suleiman, born on 6 February 1970 in Mombasa, Kenya. I find that he was issued with a genuine Kenyan passport on 29 December 2003 by the Kenyan authorities in Nairobi, Kenya confirming his Kenyan nationality. I find that the second appellant’s genuine identity is Salma Awadh Abdalla, born on 2 June 1974 in Mombasa, Kenya. I find that she was issued with a genuine Kenyan passport on 9 September 2003 by the Kenyan authorities in Mombasa, Kenya confirming her Kenyan nationality.
Was British Citizenship Obtained by Impermissible Means
40. I must then go on to consider whether the appellants’ naturalisation as British citizens was obtained by means of that fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact. The respondent’s decision is to be reviewed by me, on appeal, on public law grounds. It is helpful to set out what is said by the respondent.
41. In the respondent’s decision dated 29 June 2021 directed to the first appellant, the respondent refers to the first appellant’s immigration history at paragraphs [8] to [13]. The respondent notes the matter was referred to the Status Review Unit after it was discovered that before he entered the UK in his Somalian identity, he had applied for Entry Clearance as a Kenyan national. Having concluded, correctly on the findings made by me, that the first appellant’s genuine identity is Yakub Mohamed Suleiman born on 6 February 1970 in , Mombasa, Kenya, the respondent went on to say:
“31. It is considered that you applied to enter the UK as a Somalian to join your wife who had been granted Refugee status under a Family Reunion policy, however had the Immigration Officer known that you were not a Somalian but a Kenyan and you had previously been interviewed and refused Entry Clearance in this identity, then it is considered that this application would have been refused. Instead you deceived the Home Office so that you would receive a grant of ILE. At no point did you provide the Secretary of State with an opportunity to consider your true circumstances, and it is on this basis that your deception is considered material to your grant of leave in the UK. This allowed you to accrue sufficient residency to naturalise as a British citizen, and had the case worker known at the point of considering your application, that you were not entitled to your grant of ILR then your application would have been refused. The fraud employed by you did have a direct bearing on the grant of citizenship you received.
32. Furthermore given that you have provided fraudulent details in your dealings with the Home Office throughout the entirety of your immigration journey, it is considered that you would not have met the Good Character requirement to naturalise and your applications for ILR and or Citizenship would have been refused.”
42. In the respondent’s decision dated 30 June 2021 directed to the second appellant, the respondent refers to the second appellant’s immigration history at paragraphs [8] to [31]. The respondent concluded that the second appellant’s genuine identity is Salma Awadh Abdalla born on 2 June 1974 in, Mombasa, Kenya. The respondent went on to say:
“43. It is considered that you entered the country and claimed asylum as a Somalian national, fabricating a tale of persecution failing to provide the Secretary of State with the accurate and true facts, but instead deceived the Home Office so that you would receive a grant of ELR based on being a Somalian national, and then ILR. At no point did you provide the Secretary of State with an opportunity to consider your true circumstances, and it is on this basis that your deception is considered material to your grant of leave in the UK. This allowed you to accrue sufficient residency to naturalise as a British citizen, and had the case worker known at the point of considering your application, that you were not entitled to your grant of ILR then your application would have been refused. The fraud employed by you did have a direct bearing on the grant of citizenship you received.
44. Furthermore given that you have provided fraudulent details in your dealings with the Home Office throughout the entirety of your immigration journey, it is considered that you would not have met the Good Character requirement to naturalise and your applications for ILR and or Citizenship would have been refused.
…
55. You have given fraudulent identity details (name, date of birth, place of birth and nationality) in all your dealings with the Home Office, from your original asylum claim up to and including your application for naturalisation. This is evidenced by your Kenyan Passport, Entry Clearance application and Interview. This was clearly done in order to subvert the immigration system and gain settled status to which you were not entitled. Your fraudulent representations regarding your place of birth/nationality meant you received a grant of ELR, and then ILR under Settlement Protection as a Somalian, your deception can therefore be seen to be material to the grant of settled status necessary to apply for citizenship. You continued this deception when naturalising and clearly had no intention of revealing the truth of your own volition. Further, you have failed to accept that you are Kenyan, and continue the deception despite being provided with the evidence. You signed the declaration on your naturalisation form after making false representations and ignored warnings that this was a criminal offence. All of which raises serious questions as to your good character. Had the caseworker been aware of these details there is no doubt your application would have been refused both because your deception was material and because of questions about your good character. Therefore, deprivation is both balanced and proportionate.
56. For the reasons given above it is not accepted there is a plausible, innocent explanation for the misleading information which led to the decision to grant citizenship. Rather, on the balance of probabilities, it is considered that you provided information with the intention of obtaining a grant of status and/or citizenship in circumstances where your application(s) would have been unsuccessful if you had told the truth. It is therefore considered that the fraud was deliberate and material to the acquisition of British citizenship.”
43. The appellants were both born in Kenya and are nationals of Kenya. They failed to disclose their true identity. They each acted dishonestly and made false representations as to their identity throughout. The second appellant, at the point of claiming asylum, claimed to be a national of Somalia when she is in fact a national of Kenya. The first appellant secured entry to the UK for ‘family reunion’ claiming he too, is a national of Somalia. The appellants maintained their claim to be nationals of Somalia adopting slight variations of their true name and a different date of birth throughout all of their various dealings with the Home Office over the years. They failed to disclose that they were born in Kenya and are nationals of Kenya at any stage.
44. It is in my judgment clear from those passages in the respondent’s decisions that I have set out that the appellants’ claim to be nationals of Somalia was material to the grant of leave to enter and remain, and the subsequent naturalisation of both appellants as British citizens. The conclusion reached by the respondent for the reasons set out in the decision was clearly within the lawful parameters of legitimate evaluative judgment on the facts of the particular case. No public error is identified or established.
The Exercise of the Respondent’s Discretion
45. In the respondent’s decision dated 29 June 2021 directed to the first appellant the respondent said:
“45. It is acknowledged that the decision to deprive on the grounds of fraud is at the Secretary of State’s discretion. In making the decision to deprive you of citizenship, the Secretary of State has taken into account the following factors, which include the representations made by you in your letter dated 15 December 2020 and concluded that deprivation would be both reasonable and proportionate.”
46. In the respondent’s decision dated 30 June 2021 directed to the second appellant, the respondent said:
“57. It is acknowledged that the decision to deprive on the grounds of fraud is at the Secretary of State’s discretion. In making the decision to deprive you of citizenship, the Secretary of State has taken into account the following factors, which include the representations made by you in your letter dated 10 December 2020 and concluded that deprivation would be both reasonable and proportionate.”
47. The respondent addressed the matters relied upon by the appellants. It is not suggested that there has been any procedural impropriety by the respondent in reaching the decisions. The respondent referred to and engaged with the representations made in reaching the decision. The Court of Appeal has been clear: deprivation of citizenship status will be the ordinary consequence of the statutory condition to s40(3) being made out: Laci v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 769.
48. In each case the respondent concluded that the effect of deprivation on the appellants and their family must be weighed against the public interest in protecting the special relationship of solidarity and good faith between the UK and its nationals and also the reciprocity of rights and duties, which form the bedrock of the bond of nationality. In each case, having weighed those effects, the respondent concluded that it is reasonable and proportionate to deprive the appellants of their British citizenship.
49. It is in the end, the respondent’s responsibility to decide whether deprivation of citizenship is reasonable and proportionate in all the circumstances. Standing back and looking at each of the respondent’s decisions, I do not accept that any material consideration has been left out of account in the respondent’s decision letters. The respondent was not required to set out or repeat all the relevant factors when addressing the discretion. The respondent carefully set out the background to the decisions identifying all the applications made by the appellants and the information that they provided at each stage. The respondent referred to the relevant guidance that was taken into account in the course of reaching the decisions. The appellants have not identified anything in the evidence before me or the submissions before me that the respondent had failed to have any regard to. There was, and is, in my judgment, nothing of any significance offered by the appellant by way of mitigation that the respondent should have had regard to when considering the exercise of discretion.
Has the SSHD acted in breach of other Relevant Legal Obligations.
50. The appellants rely upon Article 8 and 3 ECHR. The second appellant states she is suffering from Chronic Kidney Disease Stage 3 and is still undergoing tests. She has also been diagnosed with left knee tibiofemoral joint degeneration and knee osteoarthritis. She receives knee injections to manage the pain. The first appellant is said to be suffering from hypertension and lumbar disc degeneration and relies on repeat medication to manage his conditions. I have been provided with a print of the first appellant’s medical records held by his GP. The records confirm the first appellant’s current medication.
51. The second appellant claims that if deprived of their British citizenship, the appellants will be in the UK unlawfully during a period of limbo. She state they would not be able to support themselves and their children ‘due to lack of status in the UK’. The foreseeable consequences of deprivation are, the second appellant claims, that they would have a lack of settled status affecting their ability to continue to receive social benefits and NHS health care services for their medical conditions, would be unable to work, be unable to rent a property or have access to bank accounts, and provide for their family.
52. I can deal with the Article 3 claim very briefly. Focusing upon the test set out in AM (Art 3; health cases) Zimbabwe [2022]UKUT 131 there is quite simply nothing in the evidence before me capable of establishing that either appellant is very seriously ill or that any failure to treat the appellants conditions would lead to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their health.
53. As far as the appellants’ Article 8 claims are concerned, in summary, they claim reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation will be that the they will be left in ‘limbo’ and would be unable to access the necessary help and support they require and they will be unable to continue their family life together with their children in the UK.
54. In each of the decisions issued to the appellants’ the respondent states:
““.. Once deprived of citizenship you become subject to immigration control and so may be removed from the UK or prevented from returning to the UK if deprivation action occurs whilst you are abroad. Consideration may also be given on whether a limited form of leave be given. A decision on this matter will follow once the deprivation order is made.
.. In order to provide clarity regarding the period between loss of citizenship via service of a deprivation order and the further decision to remove, deport or grant leave, the Secretary of State notes this period will be relatively short:
 a deprivation order will be made within four weeks of your appeal rights being exhausted, or receipt of written confirmation from you that you will not appeal this decision, whichever is the sooner.
 within eight weeks from the deprivation order being made, subject to any representations you may make, a further decision will be made either to remove you from the United Kingdom, commence deportation action (only if you have less than 18 months of a custodial sentence to serve or has already been released from prison), or issue leave.”
55. The respondent’s decisions provide an assurance that the period between loss of citizenship via service of a deprivation order and a further decision to remove, or grant leave, will be relatively short. The respondent has indicated that a deprivation order will be made within four weeks of the appellant’s appeal rights being exhausted. The respondent has indicated that within eight weeks from the deprivation order being made, subject to any representations the appellants may make, a further decision will be made either to remove them from the United Kingdom, or to issue leave.
56. My consideration of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation can be limited to the relatively short period between loss of citizenship via service of a deprivation order and a further decision to remove or grant leave. It is not necessary or appropriate for the Tribunal to conduct a proleptic assessment of the likelihood of the appellants being lawfully removed from the United Kingdom. If a decision to remove the appellants is made by the respondent, that decision will itself carry a right of appeal; Aziz v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1884 and it is not open to me to consider the consequences of something that has not yet happened, and may indeed, never happen.
57. The appellants live in the UK with their children. The appellants’ children are British citizens, and there is no question of them being deprived of their British citizenship. Although I accept the appellants have an established family life with each other and their children, I do not accept the decision to deprive the appellants of British citizenship has consequences of such gravity as to engage the operation of Article 8. On the evidence before me, I find the deprivation of his British citizen status would not affect the appellants during the relatively short period between loss of citizenship and a further decision to remove or grant leave. The appellants will remain living with each other and their children during that short period whilst a decision is reached.
58. Even if the decision to deprive the appellants of British citizenship has consequences of such gravity as to engage the operation of Article 8, there can be no doubt the interference is in accordance with the law, and that the interference is necessary to maintain the integrity of British nationality law. The Court of Appeal in Laci v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 769 said, at [37 & 73], that it would only be in the most compelling circumstances that it would be right for the benefits of British citizenship to be retained notwithstanding the individual’s resort to dishonesty in the course of acquiring it. The inherent public interest in maintaining the integrity of British nationality laws in the face of attempts to subvert it through dishonest conduct, and also to maintain public confidence in the naturalisation process itself, must be a very strong one. On the very limited evidence before me, it is simply not possible to conclude that the effect upon the appellants’ private and family life, of the deprivation of their British citizen status, would be disproportionate to the clear public interest in that outcome.
59. Standing back, I find the respondent reached lawful decisions pursuant to section 6 of the Human Rights act 1998.
60. It follows that I dismiss the appeals.
Notice of Decision
61. The first appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision of 29 June 2021 is dismissed.
62. The second appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision of 30 June 2021 is dismissed.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25 March 2025