Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2023-003321
First-tier Tribunal No: EU/51642/2023
EA/12618/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 05 September 2024

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

MAGDALENE IVUEGBE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Ivuegbe, in person
For the Respondent: Mr Thompson, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 7 August 2024

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Secretary of State appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal(Judge Dunne) (hereinafter referred to as the “FtTJ”) who allowed the appeal against the decision made to refuse her application for pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme in a decision promulgated on 31 May 2023. .

2. The First-tier Tribunal did not make an anonymity order and no grounds have been advanced on behalf of the appellant to make such an order.
3. Although the appellant in these proceedings is the Secretary of State, for convenience I will refer to the Secretary of State for the Home Department as the respondent and to the appellant before the FtT as “the appellant,” thus reflecting their positions before the First-tier Tribunal.

The background:

4. The background to the appeal is set out in the evidence and in the decision of the FtTJ. The appellant is a citizen of Portugal born on 7 April 1978. On 11 November 2022, the appellant made an application under the EU Settlement Scheme as an EEA national seeking pre-settled status.

5. On 6 March 2023, the appellant’s application was refused. The FtTJ did not set out all of the refusal letter in his decision as he considered that the appellant was only seeking pre-settled status. The decision letter considered both settled status (EU11) and pre settled status( EU14).

“Careful consideration has been given as to whether you meet the eligibility requirements for settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme.
The relevant requirements are set out in rule EU11 of Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules. Consideration has been given as to whether you qualify for settled status on the basis of completing a continuous qualifying period of five years’ residence in the UK and Islands.

A five-year continuous qualifying period means that for five years in a row, you were any combination of the following: a relevant EEA citizen; a family member of a relevant EEA citizen; a family member who retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with a relevant EEA citizen; a person with a derivative right to reside; a person with a Zambrano right to reside; 1 of 5 32 a family member of a qualifying British citizen; a family member who retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with a qualifying British citizen, and in the UK and Islands for at least six months in any 12-month period. An exception to that is one period of up to 12 months absence from the UK and Islands for an important reason (for example pregnancy, childbirth, serious illness, study, vocational training or an overseas work posting or because of COVID-19). Other exceptions due to the impact of COVID-19 are set out in the definition of "continuous qualifying period” in Annex 1 to Appendix EU, or an absence of any length: on compulsory military service; or on a posting on Crown service, including as a member of HM Forces; or as a spouse, civil partner, durable partner or child, accompanying a person on Crown service, including as a member of HM Forces; or spent working in the UK marine area (as defined in section 42 of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009).

However, whilst there is evidence that you have resided in the UK periodically in October 2019, February 2020, July 2021 and December 2022 and March 2023, this is a period of less than five years. You have not provided sufficient evidence to confirm that you were resident in the in the UK and Islands prior to the specified date, as defined in Annex 1 of Appendix EU (i.e. 2300 GMT on 31 December 2020). Therefore, you do not meet the requirements for settled status on the basis of a continuous qualifying period of five years.

Careful consideration has been given as to whether you meet the eligibility requirements for pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme. The relevant requirements are set out in rule EU14 of Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules. Consideration has been given as to whether you qualify for pre-settled status on the basis of completing a continuous qualifying period of less than five years’ residence in the UK and Islands. However, you do not meet the requirements for pre-settled status on the basis of a continuous qualifying period for the same reasons you do not meet the requirements for settled status on this basis because whilst there is evidence that you have resided in the UK October 2019, February 2020, July 2021 and December 2022 and March 2023, you have not provided sufficient evidence to confirm that you are currently completing a continuous qualifying period of residence in the UK and Islands.

We attempted to contact you numerous times by email, telephone and text between 22 February 2023 and 27 February 2023 to ask for the evidence specified above, but what you have provided is not sufficient because we cannot accept your Hello Fresh or Beko letter as this does not prove UK residency and is unverifiable. Your other evidence submitted does not confirm residency for the full qualifying period.

It is considered that the information available does not show that you meet the eligibility requirements for settled status set out in rule EU11 or for pre-settled status set out in rule EU14 of Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules. This is for the reasons explained above. 2 of 5 33 We have also considered whether you meet any of the other eligibility requirements under Appendix EU. However, from the information and evidence provided, or otherwise available, you do not meet any of the other eligibility requirements. Therefore, your application has been refused under rule EU6.

6. The appellant appealed that refusal and asked for the appeal to be determined on the papers rather than an oral hearing. A skeleton argument was provided on her behalf and a witness statement accompanied by some documentation.

7. The respondent issued a respondent’s review:

The grounds of the RFRL are maintained. The R relies on the RFRL (RB, RFRL, Pages 32-36). 7. The R has considered the A’s witness statement (AB pages 1-2), in which the A has stated she came to the UK in September 2019.

The R submits the A has failed to provide valid evidence that they were residing in the UK between June 2020 and 31st December 2020.

Whilst the R acknowledges the letter provided from Hello Fresh or Beko dated May 2020 and November 2020 (AB pages 22 and 23). As previously outlined by the caseworker in the RFRL, we are unable to accept these documents as proof of residency.

The R submits, the A has failed to provide any evidence dated within the six months before their application date. Whilst the R acknowledges the bank statements and payslips (AB pages 7-21) provided, it is noted the documents ae all dated after the date of application.

In view of the evidence provided the R is not satisfied the A has provided sufficient evidence to confirm that they are currently completing a continuous qualifying period of residence in the UK and Islands. 11. The R therefore maintains the A does not meet the eligibility requirements for pre-settled status set out in rule EU14 of Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules.

Decision of the First-tier Tribunal:

8. The appeal was heard by FtTJ Dunne on the 24 May 2023 on the papers.

9. He set out at paragraph 3 that the application was made on 11 November 2022. “The basis of the application is that the appellant came to the UK in September 2019. Her evidence is that she has lived in the UK continuously since. On 28 February 2020 she was granted a National Insurance number. I have seen payslips that appear to show she is working in the healthcare sector although no further details have been provided”.

10. At paragraph 6 he set out his reasons for allowing the appeal:

“I struggle to understand the respondent’s reasons for refusing the application. The respondent accepts there is evidence that the appellant was living in the UK in October 2019, February 2020, July 2021, December 2022 and March 2023. There is other evidence (albeit which the respondent regards as carrying less weight) that she was also residing here in May 2020 (the Beko letter) and November 2020 (the Hello Fresh letter). Unless it is envisaged that the appellant was repeatedly changing her country of residence between these times the inevitable inference is that she was continuously residing in the UK from October 2019 until the date of her application. It is unrealistic to expect the appellant to provide documentary evidence of her residence on every day (or even every week or month) of that period. 2 EU/51642/2023 7. I find that the appellant does meet the definition of “relevant EEA citizen” for the purposes of rule EU14 of Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules, in that she has been resident in the UK for a continuous period which began before 31 December 2020”.

11. The FtTJ allowed the appeal under the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeal) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

The appeal before the Upper Tribunal:

12. The respondent sought permission to appeal and permission to appeal was granted by FtTJ Athwal on the 16 June 2023 for the following reasons:

“The grounds assert that the Judge erred by failing to engage with the requirements of Appendix-FM for demonstrating pre-settled status, she had not established continuous residence. The Judge failed to take this into consideration. It is arguable that the Judge has failed to adequately consider whether the residence was continuous”.

13. The written grounds advanced on behalf of the respondent state as follows:

Ground One Making a material misdirection in law

14. It is submitted, that in allowing the appeal, FtTJ Dunne has failed to fully engage with the requirements of Appendix FM for demonstrating pre-settled status. Whilst accepted, that the appellant has provided acceptable evidence of being in the UK in October 2019, February 2020, July 2021, December 2022 and March 2023, it is asserted that such piecemeal evidence is not indicative of the fact she was continually resident during the relevant period. The requirement for the appellant to demonstrate that she has resided in the UK prior to the specified date (see guidance below), has not been met. The FtTJ has erred in neglecting to consider, that the only acceptable evidence provided by the appellant realistically demonstrated only a four month period between October 2019 and February 2020, as such there is no evidence as indicated in the Respondents Review, that she has resided in the UK at all, in the six months prior to the specified date.

15. Furthermore, it is a requirement in proving residency, that you cannot be absent from the UK for more than six months except in exceptional circumstances as detailed in the guidance, it is therefore asserted that the appellant cannot be said to have demonstrated residency.

16. In allowing the appeal, the FtTJ appears to have been wrongly impressed by post specified date (31/12/2020) evidence, and as such his conclusion is flawed to the extent that it is unreliable.

17. Furthermore, the FtTJ ignored the attempts made by the SSHD to contact the appellant in order to obtain sufficient proof of residency, which should in circumstances where individuals are genuinely resident be easy to supply, as indicated in the guidance (below for ease of reference). The appellant has offered no explanation for why she is unable to supply the required documentation, and as such the fact she is able to show she was in the UK for one month in 2019 and one month in 2020 (not within 6 months of the specified date), is not indicative of her residence, and to find otherwise for the reasons given is bordering on the perverse and is materially misdirected in law.

18. The grounds set out the guidance relating to submitting documents as proof of residence.

19. The appeal came before the Upper Tribunal. The appellant appeared in person, and the respondent was represented by Mr Thompson , Senior Presenting Officer. There had been an earlier hearing which had been adjourned as the appellant’s legal representatives came off record shortly before the hearing and she required the assistance of an interpreter. At this hearing, the appellant appeared in person and had the assistance of a court interpreter who appeared through CVP. Introductions were made to the appellant by the interpreter, and both confirmed they were able to understand each other. All parts of the hearing were interpreted to the appellant by the interpreter so that she was able to understand what was being said and neither the interpreter nor the appellant raised any issues as to the appellant not being able to follow and understand what was being said during the hearing.

20. Mr Thompson raised a preliminary issue where he sought to amend the grounds of challenge. He submitted that there had been an earlier appeal brought by this appellant against the decision of the respondent to refuse her application for settled and/or pre-settled status. This had been heard “on the papers” by FtTJ Jepson and in a decision promulgated on 28 February 2023, he dismissed her appeal. Mr Thompson provided a copy of the decision. He referred to the home office records which showed that the appellant had had another appeal under EUSS, on the papers and the issue was whether the appellant qualified for settled or pre-settled status. He submitted that the decision of FtTJ Dunne made no reference to this earlier decision and that the principles of Devaseelan applied, and that the FtTJ should have considered the decision of FtTJ Jepson applying those legal principles but there was no evidence that he had done so. He therefore submitted that he sought to make an application to amend the grounds to include the consideration of this issue and that the FtTJ erred in law by failing to have regard to an earlier decision of the FtT on the same issues as set out in the decision of Judge Jepson in his decision.

21. Mr Thompson properly accepted that this was a very late application, and that the appellant was not legally represented. However he submitted that this issue arose during the course of preparation and that an earlier decision had been made that was relevant in establishing an error of law. It was brought to his attention that the directions set out that evidence that had not been before the FtT would not be considered unless an application been made under Rule 15 (2A) of the Upper Tribunal (Procedural Rules) 2008. Mr Thompson therefore made an application at the hearing for that evidence to be admitted.

22. After seeking time to clarify his position on instructions, Mr Thompson submitted that it was not being asserted that Judge Dunne had a copy of the previous decision but that there was a duty on the respondent and also on the appellant to ensure that Judge Dunne had a clear view of all the relevant evidence and that the appellant would have been fully aware of her immigration history and having made a previous application but had not made the judge aware of it. She had been previously represented for that hearing on the papers. Therefore the amended ground of challenge should be admitted because the ground and the evidence that the respondent was seeking to admit was material to the considerations.

23. There was some discussion as to whether or not this was a mistake of fact and whether the principles in E and R applied and in the context of Ladd and Marshall. Mr Thompson accepted that the evidence in the form of the decision did not meet the first principle in Ladd v Marshall on the basis that the document was in existence, but by reference to the other principles , this was evidence that would have an important influence on the result and there is no reason to disbelieve the decision that had been made by Judge Jepson and therefore he invited the tribunal to apply its discretion to depart from the principles. He submitted that whilst this was a paper hearing it did not remove the need for a full disclosure of the relevant facts.

24. By reference to the amended ground, Mr Thompson submitted that applying Devaseelan principles, Judge Dunne should have had regard to the decision of Judge Jepson, and this was a material error of law. On the alternative basis of a mistake of fact, he submitted that paragraph 18 of judge Jepson’s decision was relevant and that there was no explanation for her absence or evidence to address the absence prior to December 2020. Thus the evidence before Judge Jepson was insufficient. Having reached that decision, the decision of Judge Jepson was relevant to the factual and legal issues before Judge Dunne.

25. Ms Ivuegbe accepted that there had been a previous decision by Judge Jepson and that he had dismissed her appeal on 28 February 2023, and that she had informed her legal representatives. She accepted that there was no reference to that decision in the skeleton argument or any of the accompanying documentation. She further referred to having reapplied on the same basis as she was advised that she would be able to do so.

26. As to the other grounds of challenge, Mr Thompson relied upon the written grounds and that based on the evidence before Judge Dunne, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate continuous residence in the sense that she had not demonstrated that she had been resident in the UK during the relevant period prior to the specified date. He submitted that the Secretary of State accepted there had been evidence of residence for October 2019 – February 2020, but beyond that no evidence had been provided until February 2021. Therefore there was a period of 10 months ( from February 2020 – to the specified date in December 2020) where there was no evidence to demonstrate her residence. The letters from Beko and Hello Fresh had been considered in the decision letter but for the reasons given they were not sufficient to demonstrate residence in the UK during that period of time. That was set out by reference to the applicable guidance. Therefore he submitted whilst the FtTJ relied upon evidence after the specified period ( 2022 and 2023) the FtTJ had failed to give adequate reasoning as to why he placed weight on that evidence rather than the absence of evidence in the relevant period.

27. Ms Ivuegbe was asked what she wished to say about the appeal. She stated that she had been present throughout that period, but she had a baby and was not able to work. The child was born in March 2019 in Portugal. She accepted that she had provided the evidence recorded in the decision of Judge Dunne. In addition she stated that when her child was 3 years of age he was able to attend school and she could work and obtained the payslips which were before Judge Dunne and that since then she had been fully employed.

28. At the conclusion of the hearing, I indicated to both parties that I would consider the issues raised and reserve my decision to be given in writing.

Analysis:

29. Dealing with the preliminary issue of the amendment of the grounds and the admission of the decision of FtTJ Jepson, having had the opportunity to hear both parties I am satisfied that the grounds of challenge should be amended to include the additional ground which relies upon the absence of consideration of the decision of Judge Jepson. In reaching that conclusion I have taken into account that this was a late application and that the appellant now is not legally represented. The decision of Judge Jepson was not before FtTJ Dunne when he reached his decision. The respondent’s bundle does not contain any reference to the document. Neither does the respondent’s review. However I am satisfied that there is no prejudice to the appellant in admitting this document and amending the ground of challenge given that the appellant accepts there was a previous decision made. I also observe that there is a document contained in the Upper Tribunal papers which refers to a reference number EA/12618/2011, which is a reference to the earlier appeal of Judge Jepson. It is unclear to me why neither party sought to provide the decision to Judge Dunne so that he would have that decision as his “starting point” applying the principles in Devaseelan.

30. Therefore having permitted the grounds to be amended and the admission of that previous decision, it is necessary to consider whether that ground is made out.

31. I am satisfied that FtTJ Dunne erred in law as submitted by Mr Thompson. It is clear that both parties were aware that there had been a previous decision made by FtTJ Jepson in relation to an application made by the same appellant and which referred to an earlier application for settled status and/or pre-settled status under EUSS. However neither party produced it to the FtT. It is not the fault of the FtTJ that he did not take that decision into account as his “starting point” and no blame can be attached to him for failing to address that decision. However as a result of that decision, the FtTJ failed to take into account a relevant consideration in the current appeal which was that there was a previous decision in relation to this appellant on essentially the same legal point relied upon in the current appeal. As a result the FtTJ erred in law by not applying the legal principles set out in the decision in Devaseelan which state that earlier findings made are the “starting point” of the further consideration. FtTJ Dunne would not be bound to reach the same conclusion if there was fresh evidence upon which he could depart, but the decision would have been his ”starting point”, and this had not taken place in his analysis of the evidence.

32. I am satisfied that the error was material to the outcome decision of FtTJ Dunne. There was no accompanying documentation, but the decision of Judge Jepson which is available sets out the issues between the parties. His decision referred to an application made by the appellant which had been made on 25 May 2021. That application had been refused by the Secretary of State in a decision taken on 28 July 2021, on the basis that there had only been evidence of periodic presence in the UK between October 2019 -February 2021 but that it did not demonstrate continuous presence for 5 years and therefore EU 11 was not satisfied. As regards pre-settled status, the respondent considered that sporadic documentary evidence had been provided which suggested periods of absence and that the most recent evidence before the date of withdrawal in December 2020 was dated February 2020 which indicated the appellant was away from the UK for over 6 months and therefore EU 14 could not be met. Reference was made at paragraphs 9 and 12 that the respondent had made a number of attempts to contact the appellant for clarification which were unsuccessful. The FtTJ considered the evidence that had been provided for the appeal but found that there was insufficient show that the appellant had been in the UK for a continuous period of 5 years prior to the specified date of 31 December 2020 (see paragraph 16). The FtTJ also found that the documents provided were limited in number and scope and at the earliest in time seem to be from 2019 and any such evidence at best showed periodic presence in the UK. Judge Jepson referred to the appellant describing the evidence as limited due to her being a lodger, but the FtTJ found that it could reasonably be expected that more evidence would be presented, and he was surprised that there was nothing from the landlord/occupant of the address and/or any tenancy agreement as applicable.

33. The FtTJ set out the law as regards pre-settled status and by reference to the definition of “continuous qualifying period” as defined within Appendix EU and concluded that the appellant had not put forward any explanation for an apparent absence ( see paragraph 19). Reference was made to a furniture delivery in July 2020 but that in his view that document alone was not enough to show presence in the UK as it did not necessarily demonstrate a person is present. The FtTJ referred to the intervening period from 2019 and February 2020 until February 2021 and reached the view that had the appellant been present on a continuous basis, far more documents would likely have been received (see paragraph 20). The FtTJ was not satisfied that she had been present in the UK for any continuous period of time and that on the documentary evidence available, her time in the UK had been sporadic; the gaps existed between the evidence submitted of some length. He also referred to documents such as flight receipts and HMRC documents, but none had been included in the papers before him. He therefore concluded that the appeal should be dismissed as the appellant had not met the rules.

34. In the light of the contents of that decision, it has been demonstrated that failure to consider that decision as a starting point was material to the outcome, as the present FtTJ would be required to assess the evidence by reference to that earlier decision and by reference to any other evidence that was before him. For the reasons set out above, that decision had not been provided to him by either party, and whilst no blame can be attached to the FtTJ, a relevant consideration in law applied, that is the application of the principles in Devaseelan.

35. For that reason, I am satisfied that it has been demonstrated that the decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.

36. Having reached that conclusion it is not necessary to consider whether the alternative applied and whether the error could be characterised as a mistake of fact following the principles of E v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 49. I remind myself of the principles in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1WLR 149. A Tribunal should not normally admit fresh evidence unless it could not have been previously obtained with due diligence for use at the trial, it would probably have had an important influence on the result and was apparently credible. As noted by the Court of Appeal in the decision of E and R [2004] QB1044, in considering whether to admit new evidence it should be guided by Ladd v Marshall principles, subject to any exceptional factors. In this case the first principle is not satisfied as the documentation now sought to be admitted could have been obtained for the hearing before FtTJ Dunne as it was in existence and cannot satisfy the first test in Ladd v Marshall . As to the other principles in play, the evidence demonstrates an established fact, that is there had been a previous decision of Judge Jepson which meant that the Devaseelan principles applied and was objective and uncontentious evidence that there had been a mistake or unfairness which played a material part in the reasoning in that the FtTJ in error failed to have regard to the decision. Whilst the fresh evidence that gives rise to the mistake of fact does not meet the first limb it seems to me that both parties were aware of the decision but neither sought to place that decision before the FtTJ and as a consequence this places the case in an exceptional category whereby the fresh evidence should be admitted. Thus in the alternative, the decision of the FtTJ is challengeable on the basis as set out in E and R whereby the tribunal should take account of new evidence demonstrating that mistake or unfairness.

37. As regards the original grounds of challenge, the FtTJ stated that he struggled to understand the reasons for refusing the application. However it is clear from reading the decision that when seen in the light of the applicable legislation that the application for pre-settled status was refused because the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to confirm that she met the eligibility requirements for pre-settled status set out in EU14 of Appendix EU to the immigration rules. EU 14 had to be read alongside the definition in Appendix 1 of the definition of a relevant EEA national and also the definition of “continuous qualifying period”. The decision letter set out the evidence provided from October 2019, February 2020 and July 2021 and December 2022 and 2023, but there was a period of over 6 months, in fact 10 months between February 2020 and the specified date of 31 December 2020 for which there was no explanation or evidence. This was the gap identified in the decision letter, although I accept, not as clearly as it should have been. The decision that it was also clear that the evidence of the Beko letter and the Hello Fresh letter was unverifiable did not prove UK residency which is in line with the guidance annexed to the grounds and the FtTJ erred in placing reliance on that evidence.

38. The FtTJ also erred when considering that it was an inevitable inference to be drawn that she was continually residing in the UK. As the grounds set out, the FtTJ did not take account of the requirement for there not to be an absence of over 6 months between February 2020 ( the last evidence available) and the specified date in December 2020 which was a period over 10 months. There was no explanation given in the papers before Judge Dunne as to why there was no evidence of continuous residence during that period. It is also made out that the FtTJ placed reliance on the post decision evidence of 2022 – 2023, rather than considering the relevant period between February 2020 and the specified date in the context of the Rules relevant to the length of time for absence which on the face of it fell well outside the 6 month period.

39. As set out above FtTJ Dunne was also unaware of the previous application made and the appeal against that decision. Had he been made aware of that previous decision, he would have been required to apply the principles in Devaseelan, and for that decision to be his “starting point”, given that the appeal also related to the lack of evidence for the relevant period from February 2020 until the date of withdrawal.

40. For those reasons, the decision of the FtTJ demonstrates the making of an error on a point of law and is therefore set aside.

41. As to the remaking of the decision, I have reached the conclusion that the appeal should be remitted to the FtT for a hearing. The previous appeal was heard “on the papers” and the appellant has now appeared in person. I note that the decision of Judge Jepson referred to evidence that the appellant relied upon to establish residence had not been put before FtTJ Jepson as set out at paragraph 21; there was a reference to flight receipts and HMRC documents. They appeared to be referred to in the appeal form but for some reason that is unexplained they had not been included in the papers before FtTJ Jepson. He also referred to a furniture delivery note at paragraph 20, which again had not been put before Judge Dunne and it is not in the papers before the Upper Tribunal. Similarly an explanation for the lack of evidence had been put before Judge Jepson but had not been put before Judge Dunne with any particularity. Consequently there is the prospect of evidence that was available which has not been considered in reaching a decision. In fairness to the appellant, all the relevant evidence should be before the First-tier Tribunal when considering the appeal. It will be for the appellant to provide all the documentary evidence that she relies upon to establish her residence during the relevant period before the FtT. It is a matter for the appellant as to whether she seeks a decision to be made “on the papers” or by attending the First-tier Tribunal in person for an oral hearing. In addition, the respondent should make available any evidence that was sent to the respondent in respect of both applications made and any on appeal, to ensure that all relevant documentation is taken into account. This includes the decision of FtTJ Jepson.

42. For the reasons set out above, the respondent’s grounds are made out and therefore the decision of the FtTJ involved the making of an error on a point of law. The decision is set aside. The appeal is remitted to the FtT for a hearing.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law; the decision is set aside and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a rehearing at Bradford with a Benin interpreter.

Tribunal Judge Reeds
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

14/8/24