Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2023-004239
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/54996/2022
IA/07360/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27 July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEACH

Between

RAYMOND CHIMA ANI
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Obasogie, Solicitor from Bridges Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 July 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 15th September 2023, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State made on 22nd July 2022, refusing his human rights application.

Background to the appeal

2. The appellant is a Nigerian national who arrived in the UK on 30th September 2019 with leave to enter as a visitor valid until 27th January 2020. On 9th February 2022, the appellant made a human rights claim.

3. The appellant applied for leave to remain on the basis of his relationship with a partner who is present and settled in the UK and on the basis of his parental relationship with his stepchildren in the UK. The appellant stated that he and his partner would face insurmountable obstacles in continuing their family life outside the UK. The appellant further stated that he would face very significant obstacles in reintegrating into Nigeria.

The First-tier Tribunal decision

4. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The Judge was not satisfied that the appellant’s claimed family life was as strong as stated by the appellant [28]. He noted that the appellant was in a relationship with two different women and that the appellant had lied to Immigration regarding this. He found that the appellant’s relationship with his current partner had only continued for a matter of months. The judge found that the appellant had a parental relationship with his stepchildren but that they also had a parental relationship with their birth father [29]. He found that the appellant knew that he was expected to leave the UK as he entered the UK with a visit visa, that he entered a relationship when he had no status in the UK [31] and that the appellant only sought to regularise his status after he was detained [30]. The judge found that it was not an insurmountable obstacles case [32], that the appellant’s partner could return to Nigeria with the appellant or remain in contact with the appellant if he returned without her, that the stepchildren could live with their father and that the appellant could return to Nigeria to make an entry clearance application [33]. He further found that the appellant and his partner could find employment in Nigeria, that they had family there and that the family could relocate to Nigeria [33]. The judge noted that the appellant’s partner coped with her children as a single parent between 2019 and 2021 [34]. He further found that the appellant had been in the UK for a relatively short period of time, that he had economic and social ties in Nigeria and that the appellant had previously worked in Nigeria [35].

The appeal to the Upper Tribunal

5. On 2nd October 2023, the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The First-tier Tribunal found that it was arguable that the judge had not clearly considered the health problems of the partner when assessing the proportionality of the decision. The First-tier Tribunal stated that the judge was entitled to find that there was no evidence to suggest that the biological father would not continue to have an active role in his children’s lives and that the judge had properly applied the statutory framework under section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and a number of relevant factors when assessing proportionality. The First-tier Tribunal did not, however, limit the grant of permission and permission was granted on all grounds.

The grounds of appeal

6. The appellant put forward three grounds of appeal.
Ground 1
7. The appellant submitted that the judge failed to take proper account of the effect on the appellant’s stepchildren when assessing proportionality. The grounds submitted that the judge placed insufficient weight on the letter from the children’s school which stated that the appellant played an active part in their lives. The grounds further submitted that the judge failed to take account of the letter from the appellant’s eldest stepchild. The grounds asserted that the judge erred in finding that the stepchildren maintained a parental relationship with their birth father.
Ground 2
8. The appellant submitted that the judge failed to take account of the evidence of the partner’s health needs and the impact of those on her ability to now care for her children without the support of the appellant.
Ground 3
9. The appellant further submitted that the judge had failed to take proper account of the best interests of the children when assessing proportionality.
The Rule 24 response
10. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 16th October 2023. The respondent submitted that it was clear that the judge had placed little weight on the relationship as a whole when making the proportionality assessment regardless of the appellant’s partner’s medical issues.
The hearing

11. I heard submissions from both parties and indicated at the end of the hearing that I reserved my decision. The submissions are fully set out in the recording of the proceedings.
Error of law decision
12. I bear in mind that an appellate Tribunal should be wary of setting aside a decision by a lower Tribunal. In doing so I apply what was held in in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26]. I further bear in mind what was said in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] and what was held in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 at [72].
13. Mr Obasogie applied to submit new evidence. A Rule 15(2) application was made on 25th June 2026. The new evidence was a GP medical discharge letter, dated 28th November 2020, regarding the appellant’s partner, medical records for the appellant dated 12th May 2026, photographs and proof of cohabitation. Mr Obasogie submitted that these were relevant documents for the Upper Tribunal to consider. I noted that this was an error of law hearing, that some of those documents could have been before the First-tier Tribunal because they pre-dated the decision and that there was no explanation as to why they had not been before the First-tier Tribunal. I found that the documents could be submitted if I found that there was an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal decision and did not admit them in support of the error of law hearing.
14. Mr Obasogie submitted that the First-tier Tribunal erred in failing to properly assess the impact that removal would be likely to have on the appellant’s stepchildren given they no longer have contact with their birth father. He submitted that the Judge also failed to assess the impact on the appellant’s partner given her health needs. Mr Obasogie submitted that the Judge had failed to place sufficient weight on the evidence from the Head of the children’s school and on the letter from the eldest stepchild. He further submitted that the Judge failed to make proper reference to the best interests of the children.
15. In his submissions, Mr Simpson submitted that the two pieces of evidence relied upon did not take the matter further as the letter from the Head simply stated that the appellant dropped and collected the children and played an active role in their school life. He said that the second piece of evidence was a short statement from one of the children to which the Judge did not have to give great weight. Mr Simpson submitted that the Judge had taken account of the children’s relationship with their birth father and the fact that the loss of contact with him was only temporary. He submitted that the decision did not show that the appellant’s partner had given evidence to state that she could not care for the children without the support of the appellant. Mr Simpson further submitted that the Judge had taken clear account of the best interests of the children.
16. The Judge correctly refers to Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and to the 5 step process in Razgar v SSHD [2004] UKHL 27 [20, 21]. He finds that the appellant’s relationship was not as established as the appellant claimed [28]. There was no challenge to that finding in the grounds for permission to appeal other than repeating the evidence which was given before the Judge. The grounds do not identify any errors in the Judge’s findings regarding the credibility of the account of when the relationship developed. The Judge finds that the relationship had ‘probably only continued for a matter of months and not years’ [28] and that this was pertinent to the assessment of proportionality. The Judge accepts that the appellant has a relationship with the partner’s children [29] but that they also had a relationship with their birth father. He found that the interruption to that relationship was likely to be transitory and was not a significant interruption. The appellant attempted to challenge this finding in the grounds for permission to appeal but that challenge really only amounted to repeating the evidence which was given at the hearing. It did not set out why the Judge was wrong to make the finding he did with regard to the relationship between the children and their birth father.
17. The Judge has given clear and careful consideration to the relevant factors under Section 117B and to the assessment of whether there were insurmountable obstacles in the appellant and his partner continuing their family life outside the UK. He has given cogent reasons for those findings.
18. The main thrust of the appellant’s grounds for permission to appeal were with regard to the partner’s medical conditions and the letter from the eldest child. The Judge found that the partner coped without the appellant between 2019 and 2021 [34]. The Judge recorded the dates of the partner’s brain haemorrhage; one was in November 2020 i.e. prior to the date when the Judge finds it is likely that the relationship began and the other was in February 2022.
19. In the appellant’s witness statement (one page of which is missing from the bundle) the appellant makes no reference to the partner’s health conditions or any reference to her needing him present as a result of her health conditions. Nor is there are any reference to the GP informing the partner that she should not work because of her health conditions; the statement refers to the appellant being unhappy that his partner is the one supporting the family but that is as a result of cultural reasons and not because of her health needs. The partner’s first statement is also missing the first page. It also makes no reference to any particular health needs. She makes reference to the appellant being supportive with household chores because he is not working and playing a parental role to the children but does not state that she cannot manage without him as a result of her health needs. There was no medical evidence in the appeal bundles before the First-tier Tribunal other than a letter relating to the appellant. The appellant has not provided any evidence to show that the evidence before the Judge was that the partner could not cope without the appellant because of her health needs or to show that her GP had advised her that she should not work as a result of her health and that she was only, therefore, working (at risk to her health) because the appellant had no status in the UK. The Judge cannot be criticised for failing to make findings on evidence which was not before him.
20. The appellant’s eldest child provided a letter in which she stated that their father (by which it is assumed she means the appellant) played an important role in their lives and that they would be devastated if he had to leave. There was also a letter from the Head of the children’s school which stated that the appellant dropped the children off and collected them and that he played an active role in their school lives. That letter made no reference to the comparative level of involvement in the children’s lives by the birth father. Nor did it explain what was meant by playing an active role in their school lives. The letter does not really take matters significantly further. The Judge considered a number of different scenarios when assessing the proportionality of expecting the appellant to leave the UK. One of those scenarios was the children relocating to Nigeria with the appellant and his partner [33]. The Judge found that it was not disproportionate to expect them to do this. The failure to specifically refer to the letter from the school and the child’s letter is not therefore a material error of law given that the Judge found that one scenario which would be proportionate was for the family to relocate to Nigeria as a whole where they would not, therefore, be separated from either the appellant or their mother.
21. Whilst the Judge does not make specific reference to the best interests of the children, it is clear from a reading of the decision as a whole that the needs of the children were a primary part of his consideration of proportionality. He makes clear reference to their relationship with the appellant and their relationship with their birth father. The Judge clearly has in mind the potential effect on the children if the appellant had to leave the UK.
22. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error of law.

Notice of decision
The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error of law.

The decision shall stand.

F Beach
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
16th July 2026