Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2023-004806

First-tier Tribunal No: DC/50263/2022
LD/00067/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19th June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL

Between

ISSAM MAHMOUD AHMAD
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Jegarajah, instructed by AMZ Law
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 June 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Haria (“the judge”). By her decision of 4 September 2023, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to deprive him of his British citizenship on the basis that it had been obtained by fraud.
2. The appellant was born on 15 May 1973. He was registered as a British citizen on 4 October 2004. Registration was under section 4B of the British Nationality Act 1981 (“the 1981 Act”). Amongst other things, that section entitles a British Overseas Citizen (“BOC”) to register as a British citizen if “the Secretary of State is satisfied that the person does not have … any citizenship or nationality” apart from their BOC status. The appellant was formerly a BOC. In his application for naturalisation, he declared that he had never held any other citizenship or nationality. That having been accepted by the Secretary of State, he was registered as a British citizen.
3. In 2005, the appellant was issued with a British passport as a British citizen. Ten years later, he sought to renew that passport. Her Majesty’s Passport Office (“HMPO”) was concerned that the appellant might have been a Lebanese citizen and that he had failed to declare that citizenship when he applied for registration. Correspondence was entered into and on 30 January 2017, the respondent’s Status Review Unit wrote to the appellant at his home in the Democratic Republic of Congo to explain why it was thought that he had obtained citizenship by fraud. It suffices for present purposes to record that the material part of the letter began with this sentence:
The Secretary of State is in possession of a letter from the Lebanese authorities which confirms that both you and your father are Lebanese nationals.
4. On 19 December 2018, the respondent made a formal decision to deprive the appellant of his British citizenship on the basis that it had been obtained by fraud (s40(3) of the 1981 Act refers. The respondent made reference to the enquiries she had undertaken with the Lebanese authorities and to salient provisions of Lebanese nationality law. She concluded that the appellant’s father and grandfather had been Lebanese nationals and that the appellant had also been registered as such prior to his application for registration as a British citizen. The respondent concluded, therefore, that the appellant had presented misleading information which led to the decision to grant citizenship.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal in December 2022. Time was subsequently extended by a Legal Officer and I need not say anything further about the delay.
6. The appeal was heard by the judge, sitting at Hatton Cross, on 24 July 2023. Ms Jegarajah represented the appellant then, as she does before me. The respondent was represented by a Presenting Officer. The appellant was in the DRC and the appeal proceeded on the basis of submissions only. Before she heard from the advocates, the judge directed them to the decisions in Chimi (deprivation appeals; scope and evidence) [2023] UKUT 115 (IAC) and Shyti v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 770. The judge also directed Ms Jegarajah to produce a family tree, which she duly did, as well as amending the skeleton argument in light of the authorities.
7. In her reserved decision, the judge made reference to Chimi, Shyti v SSHD and Begum v SSHD [2021] UKSC 7 before embarking on a detailed analysis of the evidence. She noted, amongst other things, that documents produced by the appellant referred to his father and his grandfather having been “Lebanese since more than 10 years”. The judge considered a document from the Country Policy and Information Team (“CPIT”), which set out the respondent’s understanding of Lebanese nationality law. Since it was accepted on all sides that the appellant was born outside Lebanon (in Monrovia, Liberia), the judge made reference to the part of the CPIT which stated that
A child whose father is a citizen of Lebanon is considered to be a Lebanese citizen. All children of Lebanese descent born outside of Lebanon must be registered at the Lebanese embassy or the child’s Lebanese citizenship will not be automatically granted. […] Children born to Lebanese fathers are entitled to Lebanese citizenship only if entered in the Civil Acts Register in Lebanon.
8. At [42], the judge rejected the appellant’s claim that the references to his father and grandfather being Lebanese was a mistake; the judge considered it more likely that the appellant’s Liberian birth certificate accurately recorded his parent’s nationality as Lebanese. At [44], the judge held as follows:
The respondent at paragraph 12 of the deprivation Decision considers the appellant’s father’s birth certificate and notes that both of the appellant’s father’s parents (the appellant’s grandparents) nationality is recorded as Lebanese and taken together with the appellant’s own birth certificate which records his parent’s nationality as Lebanese the respondent reasonably concludes that the appellant should on the basis of this information have at least explored the possibility that he was also a Lebanese citizen.
9. At [48], having made further reference to Begum v SSHD, the judge found that the respondent had acted reasonably and “did not materially err” in her conclusions. So it was that the appeal was dismissed.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
10. Ms Jegarajah settled four grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The grounds may be summarised in this way:
Grounds one and two. The respondent failed to draw relevant evidence to the attention of the judge, thereby rendering the proceedings unfair or otherwise tainted by a failure to have regard to material evidence.
Ground three. The judge had relied on matters which the respondent had not, thereby rendering the hearing procedurally unfair.
Ground four. The judge had misdirected herself in law by applying the approach in Begum v SSHD to an appeal against a decision under s40(3).
11. It was as a result of the fourth ground that the appeal was initially listed to be heard before a panel comprising a High Court Judge and an Upper Tribunal Judge. The hearings before Ritchie J and UTJ Rimington and then Julian Knowles J and me were both adjourned for reasons which need not be set out, however. In the meantime, the Court of Appeal had heard and determined Chaudhry v SSHD [2025] EWCa Civ 16; [2025] 2 WLR 696, in which guidance was given on the correct approach in cases of this nature.
12. The case was listed for case management before me and a deputy judge earlier this year. Ms Jegarajah submitted that we should find that the judge had erred in law in the manner contended in the fourth ground. Mr Wain, who appeared then as he does now for the Secretary of State, indicated that the respondent intended to defend the appeal on the basis that any such error was immaterial to the outcome. We declined to determine the question posed by s12(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 at a mention hearing, and we set the matter down for a full hearing to determine that question.
13. I have a consolidated bundle from the appellant’s solicitors. Ms Jegarajah filed a skeleton argument in April 2024, and another on 17 March 2025. The respondent has also filed two skeleton arguments, the first of which was settled by Mr Terrell on 25 October 2024, the second of which was settled by Mr Wain on 11 March 2025.
14. I heard detailed submissions on the fourth ground of appeal. I do not propose to rehearse those submissions. I will instead refer to what was said in the course of my analysis.
Analysis
15. I invited the parties to begin their submissions with ground four. It was appropriate to do so because of Chaudhry v SSHD. Mr Wain accepts, as he must, that the law which the judge applied was incorrect. Chaudhry disapproved Chimi and held that the first task in a deprivation appeal such as this is “for the FTT to find, in the event of a dispute, as a fact whether there was fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact for the purposes of section 40(3) of the BNA 1981”: [58], per Dingemans LJ (with whom Edis and Underhill LJJ agreed).
16. Mr Wain nevertheless submits orally and in his supplementary skeleton argument that the error into which the judge fell was not a material one. He submits that the judge would have been bound, given the findings she made, to reach the same conclusion if she had considered the question accordance with Chaudhry. He notes that the judge considered all of the evidence adduced by both parties and directed herself in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed [2002] Imm AR 318. Whilst Mr Wain accepts that the judge ultimately asked herself whether the decision of the respondent was rational and reasonable, he submits that the judge would have dismissed the appeal if she had confronted the question posed by s40(3) of the 1981 Act for herself. The judge rejected what was said by the appellant about the reference to his father and grandfather being Lebanese and there was no finding in the appellant’s favour that he had not concealed a material fact in his application for registration as a British citizen.
17. Whilst these submissions were ably made, I am unable to accept them. I agree with Ms Jegarajah that the prism through which the judge considered the case was incorrect, and that it is simply not possible to know what conclusion she would have reached if she had had the benefit of Chaudhry v SSHD. The judge directed herself impeccably on the law as it stood at the time. The decision is replete with reference to Chimi and Begum. Whilst there are references which suggest that the judge was considering the evidence for herself on the civil standard (the reference to it being “more likely than not” at [42] is one such example), it is quite clear from the ultimate conclusions reached by the judge that she asked herself whether the respondent’s decision was reasonable, and whether it was otherwise vitiated by public law error. That exercise is wholly different from considering and making findings of fact on the civil standard. As Ms Jegarajah observed at one point in her submissions, the appellant was entitled to an appeal on the merits but what she got, through no fault of the judge’s, was a judicial review.
18. Mr Wain highlighted in his skeleton argument that there were no favourable findings of fact in the judge’s decision. I note, however, that there is also no clear resolution of the principal factual questions which arise when determining the case in accordance with Chaudhry. I have been unable, in particular, to discern any clear findings of fact as to whether the appellant’s father and grandfather were or are Lebanese citizens; whether the appellant was a Lebanese citizen; and whether, if so, he intentionally mispresented the latter fact in his application for naturalisation. The penultimate of those questions brought with it some complexity, and required the judge to consider the applicable foreign law, including whether the appellant had indeed been registered in the Lebanese Civil Acts Register. The judge did not answer any of these questions on the civil standard because she directed herself correctly in accordance with the law as it stood at the time.
19. I am also concerned by the conclusion which the judge reached at [44]. I have already reproduced that paragraph in its entirety, and I asked Mr Wain about it at the hearing. The judge held in that paragraph that it was reasonable for the respondent to have concluded that the appellant should have ‘explored the possibility’ that he was a Lebanese citizen before stating in his application for registration that he had no citizenship other than as a BOC. As I suggested to Mr Wain, however, the question posed by s4B of the 1981 Act was whether the appellant did not have any other citizenship or nationality, not whether he might be able to obtain any such citizenship. As Ms Jegarajah observed, it is imperative that the terms of the statutory language are borne in mind, and the judge was not assisted in that regard by the fact that the respondent consistently suggested that the appellant had been registered under section 4b of the 1981 Act, whereas the provision is actually s4B.
20. It follows that ground four is made out. The judge misdirected herself in law and failed, as a result of that misdirection, to make relevant findings of fact on the civil standard. As I announced at the hearing, that finding requires me to set aside the decision of the FtT as a whole. I did not hear argument on the remaining grounds but I make the following observations on those grounds.
21. In relation to the first two grounds, I agree with the premise of Ms Jegarajah’s argument but not with its conclusion. It is well established in the authorities that the Secretary of State is obliged to draw relevant policy material to the attention of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber and that a failure to do so may vitiate the outcome of a hearing. As submitted in Mr Terrell’s original skeleton argument, however, it is not apparent that the policy which the respondent did not disclose (presumably because it pre-dated the hearing by a matter of days) was materially any different from the policy material which was within the respondent’s bundle.
22. The document on which Ms Jegaragah relies in these two grounds is entitled Registration as a British citizen: other British nationals. It contains a section at p33 which concerns applicants of Lebanese origin. It is in these terms:
The following general principles guide the consideration of applications from people of Lebanese descent:
◦ […]
◦ where an applicant or their grandparent would be regarded as Lebanese then the applicant would be regarded as Lebanese unless there is evidence that their father was not Lebanese
◦ […]
In order to proceed with applications from people of Lebanese descent confirmation will be required of the father and the paternal grandfather’s dates and places of birth and confirmation of their nationality.
Where people who appear to be Lebanese nationals under the principles outlined above either hold or have acquired another nationality they will still be regarded as Lebanese nationals unless:
◦ the person was born outside Lebanon
◦ they would only be regarded as a Lebanese national on the basis that their father or grandfather was Lebanese
◦ they have not been registered as a Lebanese national and
◦ they acquired another nationality (at birth or subsequently)
23. Ms Jegarajah submits that the appellant cannot ever have been entitled to Lebanese citizenship because he acquired another nationality, in the form of his British Overseas Citizenship. As presently advised, however, I agree with the submission made at [21](c) of the respondent’s skeleton argument. The bullet points must be read conjunctively, and Ms Jegarajah is in error in reading them disjunctively. On the Secretary of State’s case, the appellant would still be regarded as a Lebanese national because he was born outside Lebanon, his father and his grandfather are Lebanese, he has been registered as a Lebanese national and he subsequently acquired BOC status. In other words, because the third requirement is not satisfied, the appellant is still to be regarded as a Lebanese citizen.
24. Ultimately, therefore, whilst the respondent should have drawn this material to the attention of the judge, I do not presently consider that her failure to do so had any material bearing on the outcome of the appeal.
25. As for the third ground, Ms Jegarajah submits the hearing was procedurally unfair because the appellant was not afforded an opportunity to address the judge’s concern that the documents stated that the appellant’s father and grandfather were “Lebanese since more than 10 years”. Whilst I accept that this was not a point raised explicitly by the respondent, it is evidently not the case that the appellant had no opportunity to deal with the point. There were only a few documents before the judge. The consolidated bundle before me runs to 104 pages. In a case in which it was alleged that the appellant was entitled to Lebanese citizenship throughout because his father and his grandfather were Lebanese, this was the most obvious of points and it was not incumbent on the judge to raise it during the hearing. (WN (DRC) [2004] UKIAT 00213 refers).
Relief
26. After I had announced that the decision of the FtT would be set aside, Ms Jegarajah invited me to remit the appeal to the FtT for consideration afresh. Mr Wain accepted that that was the proper course in the circumstances. I agree.
27. Ms Jegarajah invited me to emphasise the importance of s4B of the 1981 Act in my decision. I hope to have done so. She also sought a direction that the respondent should disclose the material from HMPO to which she referred at [9] of the decision under appeal (“Given the evidence supplied by HMPO…”).
28. As I observed at the hearing, however, it should not be necessary for there to be any such direction. Rule 24(1)(d) of the FtT Procedure Rules 2014 imposes the clearest possible obligation on the respondent to provide any such material. The direction which I make, therefore, is simply that the respondent must comply with rule 24(1)(d) and disclose any evidence supplied to her by HMPO which informed the decision under challenge. Any such evidence must be disclosed no later than 28 days after this decision is sent to the parties.
29. I note that additional evidence in the form of a letter from a Liberian lawyer was supplied to the Upper Tribunal after working hours yesterday. There was no application by Ms Jegarajah to rely on that material, and that will be a matter for the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was vitiated by legal error and is set aside in full. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be considered afresh by another judge. I make the direction at [28] above.

Mark Blundell
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 June 2025