Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2023-004875
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/56002/2022
IA/08620/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 March 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ATHWAL

Between

MARIA NGOZI NWANAH
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr Islam, Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 4 March 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals, with permission granted by Judge Clarke, the decision of First-tier Tribunal Davison (“the Judge”), promulgated on 22 August 2023, dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of 22 August 2022.

Factual background
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Nigeria. Her immigration history is set out in the refusal letter. In summary, the Appellant married the Sponsor on 20 December 2013, in Nigeria. The Sponsor, who is a British citizen, returned to the United Kingdom (“UK”) shortly after the wedding. The couple lived apart until the Appellant entered the UK on 12 May 2018 as a visitor. Her visa was valid until 19 October 2018.

3. After exhausting other routes for leave to remain, on 16 July 2021 the Appellant applied for leave to remain on the basis of her private life and family life with the Sponsor. He has a Schizoaffective disorder, which includes schizophrenia. He was first diagnosed in 1992 and has received medical treatment since then. The Appellant submitted that upon entering the UK, the Sponsor became increasingly dependent upon her and it became apparent that the Appellant’s return to Nigeria would have a detrimental impact upon the Sponsor’s condition, so she applied to remain in the UK. She was unable to leave the UK temporarily because the Sponsor required her daily care. She acknowledged that the Immigration Rules did not permit her to change from a visit visa to a route leading to settlement. However, as her application centred on the Sponsor’s poor mental health she considered that a grant of leave to remain was warranted.

Refusal of the Appellant’s human rights claim
4. The Respondent considered the Appellant’s application under the 10-year partner route, in accordance with Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules. The Appellant did not meet the requirements of E-LTRP.2.2 because she was an overstayer, her visa expired on 19 October 2018.

5. The claim did not meet the requirements of paragraph EX.2. The Respondent accepted that the Appellant was in a genuine and subsisting relationship with the Sponsor but was not satisfied that there were insurmountable obstacles to their family life being continued in Nigeria.

6. The Respondent relied on the findings of Judge Parkes, who on 5 December 2019 refused the Appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse her application under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016, for a residence card as the primary carer of a British citizen.

7. It was not accepted that the Appellant met the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi). She had resided in Nigeria up to the age of 35-years. She had retained knowledge of the life, language, and culture and would not face significant obstacles to re-integrating.

The decision of First-tier Tribunal
8. The Judge established, with the assistance of the parties that there were four issues for consideration:
i. the previous determination and its effect on the present appeal;
ii. whether insurmountable obstacles existed for the couple returning to Nigeria;
iii. whether there were very significant obstacles for the appellant should she return to Nigeria; and/or
iv. The Appellant relied on the principles established in Chikwamba v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 40 (“the Chikwamba principle”). The issue was whether it was appropriate to expect the appellant to return to Nigeria and seek the correct entry clearance. The Appellant spoke English and would pass the English language threshold relatively easily. The financial rules given the Sponsor’s PIP award were met.

9. In accordance with Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 702, the starting point for the Judge’s assessment were the findings of Judge Parkes. The Judge set them out at [19];
“14. The sponsor coped without daily support from 2013 onwards maintaining a job and keeping on top of his condition with medication and professional support. The description of the appellant as his main carer is misleading as that implies that he requires a carer when the evidence taken overall shows that that is not the case. The evidence does not show that he would be unable to cope in the appellant’s absence.
15. I would accept that his personal circumstances may well have improved with the presence of the sponsor and that he is now more organised, taking better care of himself and has seen his personal motivation increase. The departure of the appellant may see a decline to the previous position but the evidence is that the sponsor managed from 2013 onwards and does not show that he could not continue living in the UK in her absence. Objectively the sponsor would not be compelled to leave the UK if the appellant were removed and accordingly the appellant cannot meet the EEA regulations.”
10. The Judge dismissed the appeal, and made the following findings;
i. There were no insurmountable obstacles to the couples reintegration into Nigerian society for these reasons [20]-[21];
a. The Appellant had retained social and cultural ties with Nigeria.

b. She was a graduate, held a good job in Nigeria, and was fit and healthy. She should be able to find employment.

c. The oral evidence established that the Sponsor had a yearly review in the UK for his mental health and took appropriate medication. No argument or evidence was advanced that the position would be different in Nigeria. The Sponsor, despite his mental health, had continuous employment since 2009. It was not argued that medication would not be available in Nigeria.

d. The Appellant could assist the Sponsor if they returned as a couple.

ii. There were no very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s reintegration because of her qualifications, employment history, health and cultural and social ties to Nigeria. The lack of a family home would not be a significant obstacle should the Appellant choose to return alone [22].

iii. In accordance with Alam & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 30, the Chikwamba principle required the Rules to be assessed and for the reasons given, the Judge was satisfied that they were not met [23]-[26].

iv. The situation had not changed since 2019 and there were no good reasons to depart from the findings of Judge Parkes. There was nothing exceptional that would require a grant of leave outside the Rules. The Judge found;

“25. I find having considered all of the evidence that little has changed since 2019. The appellant’s husband is still organised and taking better care of himself. He has to see his doctor less frequently (once a year rather than four times a year). Like Judge Parkes I accept that there may be a decline in the present position should the appellant return to make an Entry Clearance application but this decline would not be so severe. Her husband coped for many years without his wife and held down employment, he is arguably in a much better place now to be able to manage.”

v. The Judge considered the factors set out in 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”). He took into account the following factors;

a. She arrived on a visit visa with no expectation that she would be able to stay.
b. Her status was always precarious.
c. Although she spoke English, she did not hold the necessary certificate.
d. She was not a financial burden on the state.
e. Her English language and financial independence are neutral factors.
f. She had overstayed a visit visa, had made repeated applications to remain but had not left the UK when they were refused.
g. She did not presently satisfy the Rules.

Issues on appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The Appellant sought permission to appeal on three grounds but permission was only granted on Ground 1 which said as follows;

“The FTT Judge did not afford due consideration to the sponsor’s dependency on the Appellant on account of his schizoaffective disorder with ongoing recurrent psychosis, as written by the sponsor’s psychiatrist Dr Masil in his care plans at pages 66, 68 and 70 of the Appellant’s bundle (AB). At page 71 of the AB, it should be noted that Dr Masil refers to the sponsor’s non-compliance with his oral medication Depakote and a risk of relapsing as a result. This observation was made by Dr Masil prior to the Appellant’s entry to the UK and since her entry, there have been no reports of the sponsor failing to comply with his mental health care plans. It should be further noted that the sponsor’s ongoing recurrent psychosis was no longer a concern for Dr Masil in the care plan formulated by him at page 75 of the AB following the Appellant’s entry to the UK. Reference is also made to Page 77 of the AB in which the sponsor’s GP has stated in a letter dated 13th January 2023 that ‘his wife looks after him and monitors his medications’.”

12. Judge Clark granted permission on this basis:

“6. However, it is arguable that the Judge materially erred in his consideration of the medical evidence and in particular the issue of the Sponsor’s alleged dependency on the Appellant to ensure compliance with his medication and to avoid relapses. For example, the Grounds point to the letter from the Sponsor’s GP dated 13th June 2023 which states, “his wife looks after him and monitors his medications (sic)” and to the medical evidence from which it is arguable that the Sponsor’s compliance with his care plan has improved since the Appellant’s entry into the United Kingdom. It is arguable that the Judge materially erred in their assessment of the medical evidence, particularly in light of any relapses or decline in the Sponsor’s schizophrenia during any period of separation for the Appellant to make an entry clearance application. Permission to appeal is granted on this basis only.”

13. Permission to appeal on the following grounds was refused;
i. Ground 2; the Judge erred in his approach to the previous determination, in the context of Devaseelan principles and failed to consider the medical evidence independently. The determination was an extension of the previous determination by Judge Parkes without a clear assessment of the full and current circumstances of the Appellant and Sponsor.
ii. Ground 3; There were clearly insurmountable obstacles to the Appellant’s reintegration to Nigeria which were not weighted fairly by the Judge.

14. The Appellant did not make a renewed application for permission to appeal and therefore only has permission to appeal in relation to the first ground.

15. Mr Islam submitted that the Judge did not adequately consider the Sponsor’s schizoaffective disorder with the ongoing recurrent psychosis, which was detailed in the letters and care plans provided by Dr Masil, who is the Sponsor’s psychiatrist, and the Sponsor’s dependency upon the Appellant. Dr Masil’s evidence together with that of Dr Waheed and Dr Ali established that the Appellant ensured that the Sponsor took his oral medication, exercised and maintained a healthy diet. As a result of the Appellant’s full-time care, the Sponsor’s health had improved. Whilst the Sponsor may have managed his condition from 2013 to 2018, since 2018 he has been fully dependent upon the Sponsor. Disrupting their family life after such an extended period of time, would have an adverse impact upon the Sponsor’s mental health and would result in a relapse. The Sponsor’s medical records established that he had been sectioned on numerous occasions prior to 2013. It was argued that the Judge made a “blanket consideration” of all of the evidence instead of considering the specific documents against the extended period of time the Appellant had supported the Sponsor.

16. Mr Islam submitted that the Judge had touched upon the Sponsor’s mental health, but he had failed to provide an adequate justification for why the Sponsor’s health would not deteriorate. At [25] he did not adequately explain why he did not accept the additional medical evidence of Dr Ali.

17. Ms Arif submitted that the appeal amounted to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s findings. In summary she presented the following arguments:
i. The Judge, in accordance with Budhatkoki [2014] UKUT 00041 (IAC) which he referenced at [16], did not have to rehearse every detail or issue in a case. A failure to refer specifically to Dr Ali’s letters should not be construed as meaning they were not considered.
ii. The principles summarised in and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 were applicable.
iii. The Judge demonstrated an awareness of the Sponsor’s medical issues and mental health issues throughout the decision. This was evidenced at [3] when the Judge checked the Sponsor’s vulnerability and noted his medical issues. It was again apparent at [15] when he took into account the Appellant’s submission that a temporary separation between the Appellant and Sponsor could have an adverse effect on the Sponsor’s mental health.
iv. It was apparent that the Judge had considered the medical evidence. He started with the findings of Judge Parkes, which addressed the medical evidence relied on. At [20] he noted that the Sponsor has an annual mental health review and takes the appropriate medication. At [25] he clarified that he had considered all of the evidence and found that little had changed since 2019. It was clear that the Judge had taken into account the Sponsor’s mental health, the fact that there would be a decline in the Sponsor's health, but that it would not be severe, that the Sponsor had coped for many years without his wife and been able to hold employment, and that the Sponsor was arguably in a better place now to be able to manage.

Discussion

18. We have carefully considered the basis upon which Ground 1 was argued and the interrelationship with Ground 2 in respect of which permission was refused. It can be summarised in the following way. The Judge correctly treated Judge Parke’s decision as his starting point, but it is argued that when assessing the evidence holistically at the date of the hearing before him, he failed to adequately assess:
i. the medical evidence on the subject of the Sponsor’s mental health including the evidence previously before Judge Parkes and the new evidence before the Judge;
ii. any evidence about the Appellant’s role in ensuring compliance with his medication; the positive impact of the Appellant’s role; the impact upon the Sponsor’s health of the Appellant leaving the UK; and whether there would be a relapse and the extent of that relapse.
Assessment of the evidence
19. Mr Islam clarified that most of the medical evidence provided to the Judge had been before Judge Parkes. Judge Parkes had before him the report of 24 May 2019, prepared by Dr Waheed, and Dr Masil’s letters and care plans dated: 7 February 2017; 15 November 2017; 4 May 2018; 18 June 2018; and 8 May 2019. Mr Islam also clarified that Judge Parkes had before him two letters from Dr Ali dated 20 August 2019 and 16 October 2019. Mr Islam confirmed that the only new medical evidence before the Judge were two further letters from Dr Ali dated 24 November 2020 and 13 January 2023.

20. It is clear from Judge Parkes’ findings at [7 -15], that Judge Parkes considered the earlier evidence of Dr Ali, and all of the evidence provided by Dr Waheed and Dr Masil, and made findings on that evidence. The Judge used the findings of Judge Parkes on that evidence as his starting point, as is apparent at [19]. In our judgement, these factors are sufficient to demonstrate that the Judge properly considered all of the evidence that was before Judge Parkes. The Appellant does not have permission to argue that the Devaseelan principles were not correctly applied (Ground 2).

21. We move on to consider whether the Judge adequately considered the new evidence that was not before Judge Parkes. The only new medical evidence provided by the Appellant were the letters of Dr Ali dated 24 November 2020 and 13 January 2023. It is not in dispute that the Judge does not specifically refer to these letters.

22. We have reminded ourselves of the summary of principles set out in Volpi, to be adopted when it is an appeal on facts. An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it. Furthermore, reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.

23. We are not satisfied that failure to make specific mention of Dr Ali’s most recent letters is an error of law. In our judgement it is clear that the Judge did consider this evidence. These are our reasons:

i. At [3] the judge noted the Sponsor’s medical conditions when checking the vulnerability of the witnesses. It is reasonable to conclude that in order to establish whether any adjustments were required, the Judge considered the most recent medical evidence to clarify the Sponsor’s current mental and physical situation.
ii. At [13] the Judge notes the oral evidence provided by the Sponsor about his current care plan. The Judge records that the Sponsor is still under the care of Dr Masil, who he sees on a yearly basis. In our judgement, this again demonstrates that the Judge was aware of the Sponsor’s current medical situation.
iii. At [16] the Judge states that he considered the totality of the evidence and was mindful of the guidance provided in Budhatkoki and that it was not necessary to refer to every piece of evidence.
iv. For the reasons set out below, Dr Ali’s letters (taken at their highest) add little to the appellant’s case. In our judgement, there was little obvious reason to refer to them expressly.
Assessment of the Appellant’s role in ensuring compliance with his medication; the positive impact of the Appellant’s role; the impact upon the Sponsor’s health of the Appellant leaving the UK; and whether there would be a relapse and the extent of that relapse
24. The Appellant relied on the letters of Dr Masil, which contain care plans, dated 15 November 2017, 10 June 2018, 13 June 2018, and 8 May 2019. To summarise, they refer to the Sponsor’s non-compliance with his oral medication Depakote; the Sponsor’s adherence to his care plans since the Appellant’s arrival in the UK; and in May 2019, the Sponsor’s ongoing psychosis no longer being a cause of concern for Dr Masil.

25. Judge Parkes made findings on this evidence, and that was the Judge’s starting point. The issue before the Judge was whether the new evidence carried enough weight (either alone or when considered alongside the existing evidence) to allow the Judge to depart from those previous findings. He found at [25] that after considering all of the evidence, little had changed since 2019. We are satisfied that the Judge was entitled to reach this conclusion. We say this for the following reasons.

26. The only medical evidence provided after 2019 were the two letters from Dr Ali. The letter of 24 November 2020 records, “He suffers from severe mental illness and I understand his wife Mrs Maria Nwanah, please see her details below, is his main carer and he will relapse without her support.” The 13 January 2023 letter records, “He suffers from paranoid schizophrenia for a very long time with frequent relapses. He is under the care of mental health and is on psychotropic medication. He has Depakote and depot injection. He is also pre-diabetic. His wife looks after him and monitors his medications.” This, with the exception of a list of the Sponsor’s health problems and prescribed medication, is the entirety of Dr Ali’s evidence. Taken at its highest, this evidence adds little, if anything, to the medical evidence which informed Judge Parkes’ findings. It should be remembered that the medical evidence before Judge Parkes included reference to his wife being his main carer and the role she played in his life (see for example pages 98 and 76 of the hearing bundle).

27. Dr Ali’s letters failed to adequately address the Appellant’s role in ensuring compliance with the medication, and what would happen to the Sponsor if he failed to take it. Mr Islam confirmed that it remained the case that the mental health team monitored and administered the depot medication and that the Appellant only ensured that the Sponsor took his oral medication. Mr Ali did not explain in his letters what would happen if the Sponsor failed to take his oral medication. The evidence does not establish that there would be unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Sponsor in that situation.

28. We turn to the assessment of the Appellant’s positive impact upon the Sponsor and the impact upon the Sponsor’s health if she left. Whilst Judge Parkes’ findings represented the Judge’s starting point, it has to be acknowledged that when the Judge heard the appeal, several years had passed since Judge Parkes’ findings. During that time the Appellant had continued to support the Sponsor by ensuring a good diet and exercise regime and providing him with emotional support. However, it remained the case that it was for the Appellant to establish, on balance, that her removal from the UK would have unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Sponsor. The medical evidence pre-2019 was summarised by Judge Parkes;

“12. The tenor of the medical evidence since then [2013] is that the Sponsor has been sufficiently stable since 2013 that there have been no relapses or hospital admissions, he is compliant with his medication and no real concerns have been raised. Clearly he managed without the Appellant before her arrival in 2018 and there is no evidence of a decline around then from which intervention by her would have assisted. The Sponsor has worked for Morrisons throughout, it is not a job he obtained as a result of the Appellant's assistance.

13. The fact that the Sponsor is and was able to cope is supported by the PIP assessment in which his scores were almost all low, indicating a good ability to cope, the exception being in getting around. There is nothing to suggest a deterioration in his circumstances since the report was made and the Appellant cannot have had a bearing on the findings made.”

29. In our judgement, the Judge was entitled to find that the totality of the evidence does not carry sufficient weight to depart from those findings. The Appellant has failed to demonstrate that there was sufficient evidence before the judge to justify a different outcome. We note the PIP letter of 23 March 2022 records the Sponsor’s support needs, and they remain unchanged from 2019. The evidence of Dr Ali lacks specificity. It does not explain what the Sponsor’s current care needs are, how the Appellant meets those needs, or why he is satisfied that the Appellant is the main carer of the Sponsor. Furthermore, Dr Ali failed to address the likely impact upon the Sponsor if the Appellant left the UK. We are therefore satisfied that the Judge was entitled to reach the conclusion he made (at [25]) on the basis of the evidence before him.

30. We turn to consider whether the evidence established that the Sponsor was at risk of a relapse, if so, the extent of it, and whether the Judge failed to give adequate consideration to it. Judge Parkes at [12] of his decision, as set out above, found that the Appellant had not suffered a relapse or hospital admission since 2013. In the letter dated 13 January 2023, Dr Ali refers to the Sponsor suffering from “frequent relapses.” Dr Ali does not state whether he is referring to the historic relapses recorded in Dr Waheed’s report or more recent incidents that have occurred after 2019. If more recent incidents had occurred, then Dr Ali failed to provide the details of them and the accompanying medical records. Dr Ali fails to address the support provided by the Sponsor’s mental health team and why, in the event the Appellant left, they would be unable to prevent a relapse or reduce the severity of it. These crucial gaps in the medical evidence reveal that the Judge was entitled to reach the findings he did and the Appellant has failed to satisfy us otherwise.

31. It follows that the Appellant has failed to establish that the Judge’s decision is infected by an error on a point of law.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains no material error of law and accordingly stands.

H. Athwal

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 March 2025