UI-2023-005123

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 18 Jul 2025
• Promulgation date: 3 Dec 2025
• Publication date: 18 Dec 2025
• Last updated on: 18 Dec 2025

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2023-005123

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51404/2023
LP/01130/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3 December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS

Between

MT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs Degirmanci, Counsel, instructed by Bostanci and Rahmans Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Interpreter: Kurdish Kurmanji

Heard at Field House on 18 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. This order is made on account of the fact that the appellant’s claim is for international protection.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The issue before the Upper Tribunal in this case is whether the appellant would be at risk of serious harm if returned to Turkey either because his own anti-government activities and pro-Kurdish views would come to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities or by reason of his association with his brother OT1 who has been charged with terrorist activities in Turkey and who has been recognised as a refugee in the UK.
2. For the reasons which follow, I conclude that he would be at risk of persecution and allow his appeal under the Refugee Convention.
Introduction
3. The Appellant appeals against the Respondent’s decision dated 16 February 2023 refusing his asylum and human rights claim.
4. In an error of law decision dated 15 March 2024 (annexed to this decision at Annex 1), a panel of the Upper Tribunal set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 6 November 2023, which dismissed the Appellant’s appeal because it found that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred by failing to take into account material evidence. This consisted of a photograph, used by the Turkish authorities to indict his brother on terrorism charges in which the appellant appeared. The Judge also found that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred because his conclusion that the appellant would not be at risk because of his association with his brother was contrary to the background evidence. Various findings made by the Tribunal were preserved.
5. The Appellant’s appeal now comes before me to be remade pursuant to s.12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
Background of the appeal
6. The appellant is a Turkish national of Kurdish ethnicity, born in Bingol in South East Turkey in 1980. He first came to the UK on 7 January 2000 and claimed asylum on 7 January 2000. His claim was refused and his appeal was dismissed on 25 June 2004. He became appeal rights exhausted on 13 July 2004. He was removed to Turkey on 24 October 2006.
7. The appellant then returned illegally to the UK on 18 January 2018. He claimed asylum on 1 February 2018, but withdrew his claim on the same date. He lodged further submissions on 11 May 2018 which were refused on 26 June 2018. He then lodged a further set of submissions on 16 February 2022. These submissions were accepted as a fresh claim because the material was new but the submissions were refused on 16 February 2023 on protection and human rights grounds. This is the decision which is the subject of this appeal.
8. The initial appeal before the First-tier Tribunal was heard relatively promptly on 6 November 2023. The error of law hearing took place on 15 March 2024. Unfortunately, there have been various adjournments of the re-making appeal primarily due to interpreting issues. The appellant is not well educated and having been brought up in the Kurdish area of Bingol, his first language is Kurdish Kermanji. It became apparent during a re-making hearing of his appeal, that he was not able to effectively communicate in Turkish because he does not know some Turkish words. It was very difficult to locate an interpreter that spoke Turkish Kurdish Kermanji as opposed to Kermanji spoken in other countries and the appeal was adjourned on two further occasions because an incorrect interpreter had been booked.
Documentary evidence
9. There was large amount of evidence including a 821 page bundle prepared for the error of law hearing, a supplementary bundle of 226 pages, an additional witness statement for the appellant and costs submissions. I was also provided with skeleton arguments from both parties. The respondent submitted a supplementary skeleton argument addressing the expert evidence. Ms Ahmed also provided a bundle of authorities. I have had regard to all the evidence before me when making my decision.
10. The additional evidence before me which was not adduced at the 2024 hearing comprised of:

a) Evidence of OT1’s membership of HDP and that he acted as a ballot box observer for the party in 2017 at the national referendum
b) Evidence of the appellant’s membership of HDP party
c) Public posts from the appellant’s Facebook made between 2014 and 2020
d) Medico legal report from Professor M R Graham
e) Expert report of Dr Saniye Karakas
Vulnerable witness
11. At the outset of the hearing, Ms Degirmanci made an application for the appellant to be treated as a vulnerable witness. She relied on the report by Professor Graham dated 24 April 2025. She also pointed to the evidence of the appellant’s brother OT1 who talks about the appellant’s mental health in his witness statement. Ms Ahmed opposed the application. Her submission was that the respondent has challenged the contents of Professor Graham’s report and that the appellant has not provided any GP records. There are no preserved findings about the appellant’s mental health but there is a preserved finding that his evidence was evasive.
12. In his latest statement the appellant says that he has poor memory; he could not afford for his memory to be tested by a specialist but did manage to obtain a report from Professor Graham which was cheaper. I will set out in more detail the weight I place on Professor Graham’s report below in respect of the appellant’s claim to have been detained and tortured in Turkey. Neverhtless, I have had regard to Professor Graham’s report when assessing whether he is a vulnerable witness.
13. The appellant saw Dr Graham with a family member who interpreted for him. He reported his symptoms as being low mood, feeling sad, having disrupted sleep and negative ideas. Professor Graham carried out various well known and accepted assessments including HADS and the Beck Depression Inventory. More importantly, he made his own clinical observations. He noted that the appellant appeared distressed and spoke in monotone. He commented that it was not possible to assess the appellant’s IQ but that the appellant’s knowledge of world politics and general knowledge was limited and that he seemed unable to understand questions. Dr Graham had to frequently repeat questions for the appellant to understand. In his opinion this is a symptom of reactive depression. The doctor also commented on the appellant missing his family and feeling depressed about being separated from them. This is consistent with paragraph 7 of OT1’s statement in which he states that his brother is vulnerable and his later oral evidence that his brother is distressed because he has been separated from his children for eight years. The appellant has also repeatedly claimed to have poor memory
14. Setting aside whether his low mood, anxiety and depression is caused by traumatic events in Turkey or by (or in combination with) his longstanding separation from his family and the limbo state in which he has been living for the last eight years, I find that Professor Graham’s report can be relied on in terms of diagnosing the appellant with anxiety and depression. Professor Graham has a range of medical qualifications. He is a Bachelor of Medicine and a fellow of the Royal Society of Medicine. He is trained in adult psychiatry and worked from 1990 to 1997 in primary psychiatric care. I find the appellant’s low mental state to be plausible in the context of his long separation from his family and the stress of these proceedings. In making this finding, I take into account Ms Ahmed’s submission that there are no GP records because the appellant has not reported his symptoms to the GP. In this respect I note Professor Graham’s observation that the appellant reported that in his culture there is a stigma attached to admitting mental health problems. His brother OT1 also later made the same point in his oral evidence stating that there was shame in his culture to be labelled as someone with mental health problems. I find this explanation for the appellant’s failure to attend the GP to be plausible. I do not attach significant weight to the absence of GP evidence for this reason.
15. Having considered the evidence in the round, I indicated that I was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence before me in the form of the medical report, the appellant’s and his brother’s evidence to persuade me that the appellant does have mental health problems including depression and anxiety. I also accept that he does have difficulty in comprehension and that his memory is poor. Having made these findings, I indicated to the parties that the appellant falls within the Joint Presidential Guidance Note no 2 of 2010 in respect of vulnerable witnesses.
16. I agreed with the reasonable adjustments proposed by Mrs Degirmanci, including giving the appellant time to process questions, the use of straightforward language and questions, breaks and the cross examination not to be over combative. I informed the appellant of these measures and reminded him that he was free to have a break at any time. I also took into account the appellant’s vulnerability when assessing his evidence.
17. I heard oral evidence from the appellant who gave his evidence in Kurdish Kermanji through a court appointed interpreter. He confirmed that he could understand the interpreter. He adopted his witness statements dated 10 February 2022, 17 June 2024 and 15 July 2025 and confirmed that the contents were correct. He was cross examined by Ms Ahmed. His evidence is recorded in the record of proceedings and I will refer to it when making my findings below. The appellant’s brother OT1 and OT2 also gave evidence and were cross examined by Ms Ahmed. Their evidence is also in the record of proceedings.
Submissions
18. Ms Ahmed relied on her skeleton argument and supplementary skeleton argument which addressed the expert reports. In summary, she submitted that the appellant is not credible, the previous findings should remain intact, the appellant has exaggerated his claim and his profile is not one that would put him at risk if returned to Turkey including his association with his brother. Ms Degirmanci also relied on her skeleton argument and made further submissions. The submissions are set out in the record of proceedings and I will deal with them below.
Issues in the appeal
19. The issues in this appeal are whether the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason in Turkey or whether he is entitled to humanitarian protection because he has or will come to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities because of his own activities or as a result of his those of his brother. The standard of proof is whether there is a real risk or a reasonable likelihood of the appellant being subject to serious harm. Mrs Degirmanci did not seek to rely on Article 8 ECHR as a separate ground of appeal.
Factual findings
20. There have been two previous hearings in respect of the appellant, the first heard by Judge Hart in 2004 (“the 2004 appeal”) in which various findings were made and the second by Judge Bulpitt in 2024 (“the 2024 appeal”) from which various findings have been preserved.
21. I agree with the appellant’s representative that in accordance with the principles of Devaseelan (second appeals–ECHR-Extra-Territorial-Effect)Sri Lanka [2002] UKAIT 00702 these findings form the starting point of my decision.
Preserved findings in 2004 decision

a) The appellant and his family members provided the PKK with food and clothing. This was not known to the authorities [81].
b) The appellant and his family were members of the now defunct HADEP party and campaigned at a low level for the party at the 1999 elections [72].
c) The appellant participated in the widespread protests that took place in Turkey following the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999. The appellant was detained at Duzgac Gendarme station following his participation [47].
d) The appellant and other family members were detained in November 1999 whilst at the appellant’s uncle's house. This occurred after a raid by the security forces on that property and the appellant’s family home. At the conclusion of this detention, the security personnel demanded that appellant and one of his brothers should become informers of the authorities. The state agents did so as a means of justifying their “unproductive” detention, and as a cautionary threat that the brothers must not become involved in the PKK and should report any approach by the militants to the authorities[89].
22. I am satisfied that the findings made in the 2004 decision have not been undermined by the findings in the 2024 decision.
Preserved findings from 2024 decision.

a) The appellant did not, around 22 October 2015 share posts on Facebook in which he criticised the authorities [18-22]
b) The appellant was not detained by the Turkish authorities in 2016 or in 2017 [2023-2024].
c) Any raids carried out on the family home in 2021 were not related to the appellant [25].
d) The appellant was not convicted in his absence. He has not been sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the Turkish authorities [28-33].
e) At the date of the 2024 decision, the appellant had attended no more that two Pro-Kurdish /anti government demonstrations in the UK[37].
Further agreed findings

a) The appellant’s brother is OT1. OT1 has been granted refugee status in the UK. It is accepted that OT1’s social media activities have made him a target of adverse attention from the Turkish authorities
b) OT1 has been indicted for making propaganda for the PKK and insulting the President contrary to the Anti terror law 7/2.2.
c) In the indictment OT1 is alleged to have shared a picture of an activity organised by the terrorist organisation the PKK and to have legitimised and praised the methods of that organisation. This is a photograph of him on a demonstration on 2 January 2020. The appellant is standing next to OT1 in this photograph
d) The appellant’s brother OT2 has also been granted refugee status in the UK.
Findings in dispute – I am asked to reconsider some of the 2024 findings on the basis of the new evidence
23. I am asked to depart from some of the factual findings in the 2024 decision. It is submitted that the appellant has produced further evidence that he posted material critical of the Turkish authorities on Facebook both when he was in Turkey and in the UK, further evidence in respect of his detentions in Turkey and the raids on his home and his activities in the UK. He has also provided additional evidence to demonstrate his membership of HDP and his political affiliation.
Further findings
24. When deciding whether I can depart from the previous findings in the 2024 decision , I have had regard to all of the evidence holistically as well as the submissions from both representatives.
25. Ms Ahmed’s primary submission is that the appellant is not a credible witness and nor are his witnesses. She relied on Ocampo v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1276. She submitted that there is no explanation for the two additional brothers HT and OT(2) previously failing to provide evidence Their new evidence cannot be relied on.
26. Ms Ahmed submitted that I should not depart from the findings of the 2024 decision. She relied on headnote (4) of Devaseelen. A judge will need a very good reason to depart from the earlier findings and the question of whether the evidence could have been adduced at that hearing is relevant to that issue. A good reason might be that the evidence is cogent and compelling.
27. Ms Degirmanci responded to Ms Ahmed’s submissions.
28. I first consider the appellant’s profile. My first observation is that the appellant is of Sunni Kurdish ethnic origin from Bingol in south east Turkey where historically there has been significant conflict between the Turkish government and PKK. I am satisfied that the appellant’s immediate and extended family were sympathetic to Kurdish separatism and politically involved. This was the finding in the 2004 decision in which it was accepted that the appellant’s home had been raided and that he and family members had been detained. This is also apparent from the fact that the appellant has various family members in the UK who have relatively recently been granted asylum as a result of their anti-Turkish government activities including the appellants’ brother OT1 who has terrorist charges against him and OT2 who was recognised as a refugee on 2 November 2023. His brother OT1’s evidence is that a nephew has also been targeted and ill-treated. It was accepted in the 2024 decision that the appellant’s home was raided by the Turkish authorities albeit not directly as a result of the appellant’s activities.
29. I assess the claim against this background and find that it is highly likely that the appellant shares his family’s support for the Kurdish cause and dislike of the Turkish government and that he relates culturally and politically as a Kurd from that area. I also accept that his home was raided by the police as recently as 2021. In this context I find it highly plausible that the appellant has attended various Kurdish cultural events in the UK because these are an expression not only of his cultural views but of his political outlook. Ms Ahmed characterised these events as social events but I am in agreement with the appellant’s representative that these events are political in nature. I accept the appellant’s evidence in the form of photographs that he attended political activities including the 2024 Newroz celebrations held in Finsbury Park on 17 March 2024 and a screening of a Kurish film held at the Kurdish People’s Democratic assembly Community Centre on 20 August 2023. He explains that in the photographs there are references to Kurdish colours and Kurdish flags and that the images on the stage are of prominent PKK figures including Abdullah Ocalan and Mazlum Dogan. I find that these are more than just social events, they have a political nature. I do not find that the appellant attended these events to bolster his claim for asylum I find that his attendance is as a result of his sympathy with the Kurdish cause. I state here that I do not find that his attendance at such events on their own would place him at risk but they are part of his background profile.
30. My second observation is that the appellant did not came across as being sophisticated or particularly intelligent. I find that he is educated to a low level, is not particularly intelligent and struggles to articulate himself.
31. Ms Ahmed sought to persuade me that the appellant’s communication difficulties are because he is lying and that he has exaggerated his lack of proficiency in Turkish to excuse his vague evidence.
32. On the point in respect of the appellant’s ability to speak Turkish, it was myself who adjourned a hearing with a Turkish interpreter because the appellant was very obviously struggling to communicate and this was confirmed by the Turkish interpreter who stated that he was using Kermanji words and could not speak Turkish fluently. I accept the appellant’s evidence that his first language is Kurdish Kermanji, that this is the language in which he communicates with his family and friends and community and that he also listens to TV and other media in this language. I find that the appellant does understand Turkish and can communicate to a certain level but that he is not fluent nor confident in Turkish. I take Ms Ahmed’s point that the appellant signed his statements and confirmed that they had been read back to him in Turkish, nevertheless I accept the appellant’s evidence that he has a longstanding relationship with his Turkish representative (his fresh claim was prepared by his representative in 2022) who speaks to him slowly and explains things simply to him and with whom he is relaxed and that she was able to communicate the contents of the statements with him for those reasons. I find that the appellant has not exaggerated his lack of communication skills in Turkish. In any event at the hearing before me the appellant confirmed that he was able to understand and communicate with the interpreter so any vagueness or confusion in his evidence before me was not as a result of poor interpretation.
33. The appellant was not a particularly impressive witness in that he frequently claimed to have a poor memory and plainly had trouble comprehending some of the questions put to him. The appellant was not able to remember very much about his last hearing and some of his evidence was confused. I accept in line with Professor Graham’s report that he struggles with memory because of reactive depression. I find that some of this confusion can be accounted for by his low level of education, the fact that he feels anxious, his poor memory and the fact that he gave evidence in Turkish in his previous hearing. I have also found the appellant to be a vulnerable witness because of his mental health problems. I do not find that his confused evidence was primarily because he was being evasive or deliberately misleading and I do not accept that this indicates that he lacks credibility. I also give weight to the fact that the appellant’s evidence was mainly internally consistent and consistent with the documentation.
HDP membership
34. In his fresh claim for asylum statement at paragraph 5 he stated that he was a member of the HDP party. The judge in the 2024 appeal did not make any finding on whether the appellant was a member of the HDP or not, rather the judge found that his claim for asylum was contrived, he had copied his brother’s claim and that he had not nor would not come to the attention of the Turkish authorities.
35. In a further statement dated 17 June 2024 , the appellant stated that he had obtained his HDP document. His older brother Ramazan Tekin attended the party building in Sancak Bingol to obtain it and his wife posted to him in the UK. A copy of the HDP membership form in Turkish (with an old photograph of the appellant attached) and English translation were enclosed with the supplementary bundle as well as the envelope from his wife in Turkey. The membership acceptance date is said to be 9 November 2012. In his 2025 supplementary statement the appellant explains that this is the HDP membership form which he completed to become a member. This took place at the HDP office. He also presented his Turkish ID card and photo and paid 170 Turkish lira to become a member. The form was retained at the office and he was not given a membership card. His brother obtained it from the office and passed it to his wife for posting. He did not realise previously that his claim to be an HDP member was disbelieved which is why he did not adduce this evidence before.
36. Ms Ahmed submitted that the evidence in respect of the HDP membership is unreliable in line with Tanveer Ahmed. Neither the appellant’s brother nor wife have provided statements to explain how they obtained the document. The evidence was not adduced at the 2024 hearing. In 2024 the judge found that the appellant’s claim was manufactured to be similar to his brother’s. The new HDP evidence should be treated with circumspection. In particular she submitted that the HDP evidence was inconsistent with the background evidence. According to the CPIN the HDP was founded in 2012.
37. I take into account that this evidence was not provided previously. I accept the appellant’s explanation that he did not realise that he needed to adduce it. As Ms Degirmenci pointed out the respondent’s refusal did not dispute that he was a member. The appellant has given a detailed explanation about the provenance of the document and has produced the envelope in which the document was sent from Turkey. Had he provided statements from his wife and brother no doubt they would have been characterised as self-serving. The appellant gave detailed evidence about the process he went through to apply for membership which is in line with the background evidence at 9.3.3. I reject Ms Ahmed’s submission that the document is inconsistent with the background evidence at 9.1.2 of the 2023 CPIN. The evidence is that the party was formed in 2012 which was consistent with the date of the appellant being admitted as a member. The CPIN did not say that it did not start issuing membership in 2012 it said it became politically activated on 27 October 2013. this is not inconsistent with the card being issued in 2012. Similarly the issue of the registration with the Court of Cessation is a red herring. This manifestly relates to parties and not to individual party members. The fact that the appellant became a member of the HDP when it was formed in 2012 is also consistent with the earlier findings in 2004 that he was a member of HADEP a forerunner of HDP. I find that this evidence is cogent and compelling and on the lower standard I find that the appellant became a member of HDP in 2012. It is not asserted that he was a high level member. It is however evidence of his commitment to the Kurdish cause. It is recognised in the CPIN that the Turkish authorities may conflate HDP with the PKK.
38. I am also satisfied that OT1 has now also provided evidence that he was also an HDP member and that he acted as a ballot box observer in 2017 at the national referendum.
Facebook posts
39. In his original witness statement in support of his fresh claim the appellant claimed that he had been convicted for terrorism offences as a result of his political posts on Facebook but the details were vague. He did not adduce any evidence of Facebook posts in his appeal.
40. The judge found at [18] that in his statement he did not give any further detail about the posts or why the posts led to him being detained and prosecuted . The judge characterised the witness statement as being vague and unpersuasive. In his oral evidence at the 2024 appeal he gave unclear and elusive evidence. He said he had posted a lot but could not remember because of his poor memory. The judge noted that the evidence was unsupported by documentary evidence. His explanation for the failure to produce the evidence was that his posts were lost when he suffered a water leakage on his phone. He did not access the account from another account because he had forgotten the password. He appeared confused when he was asked if a family member could access the account for him. The judge said he “demonstrated a fundamental lack of awareness of how Facebook works which his inconsistent with his claim”,
41. In his supplementary appeal statement dated 17 June 2024 the appellant says that he has three Facebook accounts and that he has been able to locate some of his posts from 19 January 2018 to 30 April 2019 which are pro HDP and in support of Selahattin Demirtas from an account that he set up in the UK. He lost the phone and could not access them and his brother OT1 who was a friend on the account accessed his old pages and made screen shots of the posts. The posts are include in the bundle with translations. He said that his brother also searched for his old Turkish Facebook account but he was only able to access screen shots of posts from 8 March 2014 until 17 August 2017. There are screenshots of posts in the bundle. He also includes posts from his latest Facebook page from 2020 in which his profile is in the name of MB. There is a later statement dated 15 July 2025. In this appellant explains that the posts from Turkey relate to a Mr Selahattin Demirtas who was the co-chair of the HDP and is currently in prison accused of terrorist activity. ( I note here that this is consistent with background information). In his post he mentions that people willingly join the PKK. He gives more detail about his other posts including his recent posts.
42. In his oral evidence before me, he was unable to remember the evidence that he had given at the previous 2024 hearing. He said he did not submit the Facebook posts earlier because he did not realise that it would be necessary. He said that he had used Facebook in Turkey and in the UK. He stated that his nephew “does” Facebook for him but later clarified that what he meant was that his nephew set up his Facebook account in the UK. He was asked about Facebook processes in detail and it became apparent that he does not have a detailed knowledge of how Facebook works including how to set up an account. He stated that he just accesses it from his phone and it comes up automatically. It was put to him that despite losing his phone he could have accessed Facebook from another device and recovered his posts. He then stated that he lost his password for the Turkish account. It was put to him that his evidence at the previous appeal was that his mobile phone was water damaged. He agreed. He is not very technological. He enters the account from his phone. It was put to him that the posts that he has produced belong to his brother OT1 and he has produced them to help his case.
43. He agreed that most of his political posts were shared privately with friends but insisted that the Turkish government sees the posts. His evidence was that many of the posts related to Mr Demirtas who was a President of the HDP.
44. The witness OT1 gave evidence that it was he that searched via his own Facebook account for posts that his brother had shared and that he has screenshot this evidence and provided it to his brother.
45. Ms Ahmed addressed me on the previous evidence in respect of the Facebook posts and the new Facebook evidence provided by the appellant and the oral evidence in the appeal. Her primary submission is that the evidence is not sufficiently cogent nor compelling to depart from the previous findings and should be treated with the greatest of circumspection. Firstly, the evidence of posts was not produced in the last appeal. the appellant’s explanation is that the posts were lost due to water leakage and because he had forgotten his password. This does not amount to a good reason why the posts were not adduced earlier.
46. She submitted that the appellant has not credibly shown that the posts are his. The appellant’s evidence that he could not access his Facebook from another device is not credible. His evidence was inconsistent. He said his nephew did Facebook for him and then that he set it up for him. She asked me to take judicial notice that it is possible to change a name and profile on Facebook. His evidence about Facebook in general reinforces the finding of the 2024 judge that the appellant shows a fundamental lack of awareness of how Facebook works. She pointed to the fact that the OT1 had not produced an updated statement explaining how he found the material.
47. Secondly, even if the Facebook posts are by the appellant they do not put him at risk. He can delete them. The evidence of these posts is not sufficient to overturn the previous finding that there was no arrest warrant.
48. In response, Ms Demirgenci emphasised that the appellant is not technologically minded. He has had three Facebook accounts. He was assisted to set up all three accounts and has only accessed the accounts on his phone. It is plausible that when he lost his phone he could not remember the password and was not able to access the accounts. The absence of this material was used as a reason to dismiss his appeal in 2024 and so after the appeal the appellant tried to find what he could with the assistance of his brother. She submitted that the appellant appears in some of the frames of the posts and has provided links to his accounts.
49. I find that the appellant is clearly not skilled at using technology but this does not necessarily mean that he did not have a Facebook account. I accept that after his previous appeal was dismissed he tried to find evidence of previous posts with the assistance of his brother. He was able to describe the material in the posts and who they related to. Many were related to Mr Selahattin Demirtas. I also note that the posts had a picture of the appellant in the smaller frame which suggest that they were not his brother’s posts. The evidence of the appellant and his brother was consistent in how this evidence was obtained. Although I do not have to accept OT1’s evidence as credible just because he has been granted refugee status, there were no discrepancies in the evidence and OT1’s evidence was not undermined in cross examination. OT1 was a prolific poster and obviously has more technical knowledge. Had the appellant wanted to fabricate his posts he could have asked OT1 produced a large quantity of material. Instead the posts are very few in number and as the appellant concedes, mostly shared only between his friends with very few views. He did not seek to exaggerate his Facebook activity. I did not find that there was an inconsistency between the appellant and OT1 and notwithstanding my judicial knowledge that Facebook can be manipulated and having regard to the authority of XX, I am satisfied to the lower standard that the appellant did post some limited material critical of the Turkish authorities and in support of the HDP both when he was in Turkey and since he has been in the UK. I am satisfied that there has been a reasonable explanation for why this evidence was not obtained previously and that the evidence is sufficient for me depart from the previous findings in this respect. I will assess this fact as a risk factor in the round.
Evidence of police raids
50. Ms Ahmed asked me to reject the evidence that the police asked about the whereabouts of the appellant in the 2021 police raids by the two witnesses OT2 and HT. In both statements the witnesses say they were present at the raids, neither said police visited more than once and neither mentioned the presence of the other. She emphasised that this evidence had not been produced before. The appellant’s evidence was that HT had attended the previous two hearings. He was not available for this third hearing because of work commitments outside London and I accept that this is a reasonable excuse for his non-attendance. This did mean however that he was not available for cross -examination and undermines his statement. I take into account however OT2’s evidence that there was more than one raid and it has been found that the home was raided. The expert refers to the evidence supporting there being raids on OT1’s home and that of other family members. I find that OT2 did not give evidence previously because his status had not been recognised. I find it plausible that the authorities may have asked about the appellant as well as OT1 because he was also abroad and he was in the photograph with OT1 which formed the basis of the charge against OT1 and links the two brothers. It has always been the appellant’s consistent evidence that the authorities were asking about him as well. OT2’s claim has also found to have been genuine. I find to the lower standard in the light of all of this that OT2’s evidence is sufficient for me to depart from the previous finding that the authorities did not ask about the appellant during the raid.
Evidence of detentions in 2017 and 2018
51. The additional evidence in respect of the appellant being detained by the Turkish authorities in 2017 and 2018 was predominantly in the form of Professor Graham’s report.
52. Firstly, I note that the appellant did not provide any further detailed evidence about these detentions and nor did his brothers since the last hearing and the evidence then was vague.
53. Ms Ahmed asked me to place little reliance on the medical evidence of Professor Graham. The expert is not a scarring expert ( KV/Sri Lanka) and has based his report on the account given to him by the appellant. I have accepted Professor Graham’s evidence in respect of his diagnosis that the appellant has anxiety and depression for the reasons I have given above. I agree with Ms Ahmed however that Professor Graham’s opinion in respect of the scars and PTSD is less persuasive. I note firstly that Professor Graham does not profess to be an expert in scarring which considerably undermines the value of his report. It is not clear to me how he has the expertise to evaluate the cause of a scar. The appellant has some scarring but it has also been accepted that he was detained many years ago. Further although he uses the word “consistent” there is no reference to the Istanbul protocol. There also appears to be no exploration of how else these scars may have been obtained This evidence on its own is not sufficiently compelling for me to depart from the previous finding that the appellant was not tortured and detained in 2017/2018. Nor was the mental health assessment on its own and the diagnosis of PTSD sufficiently compelling. I have accepted that the appellant has mental health problems but these as I have already said are also consistent with a long separation from his family and living without status in limbo.
Assessment of risk
54. I have had regard to IA and others (Risk-Guidelines -Separatist) Turkey CG [2003] UKAIT 00034, CPIN Turkey: PKK Version 6. July 2025, CPIN HDP October 2023 version 5, AB and Others (internet activity – state of evidence) Iran [2015] UKUT 00257 (IAC), BA (demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) and XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook)(CG)[2022] UKUT 00023, and the expert report which I address below.
The expert report by Saniye Karakas 14 June 2024
55. The appellant submitted an expert report in support of his claim by a Turkish lawyer/ academic with extensive experience in human rights cases in Turkey. The expert’s opinion is based on various and wide ranging background sources including a Human Rights Watch report dated 2016, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights reports, European Commission reports Turkey 2023, Amnesty International reports 2021, Dutch Ministry of Foreign affairs 2023, US Department of State reports 2023, and newspaper reports.
56. In summary her conclusions are :
i. The documents in respect of the appellant’s brother OT1 are authentic.
ii. The documentary evidence in respect of OT1 includes an investigation report includes evidence that a raid took place on OT1’s address and that officers spoke to RT. Police raids are a common tactic to suppress political dissent and silence critics of the government.
iii. The Turkish authorities extensively monitor and censor social media accounts and have tightened security measures around social media activities. Numerous individuals including ordinary people have been held and charged for insulting the President and making propaganda for terrorist organisations. The Turkish authorities have sophisticated surveillance and facial recognition technologies and monitor Turkish nationals abroad. Thousands of people have detained at airports by Turkish authorities for terrorism propaganda.
iv. Given the Turkish authorities documented practices of monitoring social media, utilising advance identification technologies and intercepting individuals at airports there is a significant likelihood that the appellant has already been identified as a result of the photograph posted by OT1 on 2 January 2020 (which led to his indictment for terror offences) and that he would be identified on arrival at Istanbul airport. It is also likely that his file would be called up as a result of his relationship to OT1.
v. It is likely that the appellant’s participation in the demonstration alongside his brother OT1 carrying an Ocalan flag would be interpreted by the Turkish authorities as constituting the commission of a terrorist offence. Even if his activities were limited the Turkish authorities may consider them to be significant. There is a substantial risk that the appellant would be subject to interrogation by anti-terror police on return. The appellant’s family connection to OT1 and OT1’s status as a fugitive with an outstanding warrant will also increase his risk of being transferred to anti-terror police. The Turkish authorities target family members especially in cases related to political activism and allegations of terrorism.
57. Ms Ahmed asks me to give this report little weight for the following reasons. It is not signed with a statement of Truth in accordance with the Practise Direction. This requirement is mandatory. Secondly it does not appear that the expert was provided with all the relevant documents including the 2004 determination; the expert does not engage with the preserved findings of the 2024 decision; the expert has not considered the appellants case in the round including the risk factors which the appellant has failed to show apply to him, the instructions to the expert relate to the evidence supplied in respect of the appellant’s brother OT1 and the credibility of his account, the instructions to the expert on OT1’s case are not appropriate or necessary because his case has already been allowed and the expert was considering the appellants case and the expert did not have all the relevance documents for OT1. She confirms that based on her expertise, the documents appeared to be authentic. Although she has been a human rights lawyer dealing with cases from Turkey for more than 20 years she has not shown that she has expertise in authenticating documents; she has given an opinion outside her expertise. The expert makes general points and refers to general background information not relevant to the appellant. The expert is arguably partisan towards the individual against the state because she has worked as a human rights lawyer representing individuals.
58. I take into account Ms Ahmed’s submissions. She submitted that the expert has not adopted the precise wording of the statement of truth. This is not correct. Paragraph one sets out the wording of 6.4 of the Practice Direction and later the expert states that the report has been provide with the sole purpose of assisting the court. She also confirms this in her addendum report. I do not agree that no weight can be placed on the report at all because of any slight difference in the wording about complying with a duty to the court. The declaration is the same in substance.
59. I agree that it was not necessary for the expert to authenticate the documentation in respect of OT1 because these have already been found to be genuine by a judge of the First-tier Tribunal and there is no new evidence for me to depart from the finding that he is subject to terrorist charges and been indicted for offences in connection with a photograph in which the appellant also appears. It is also uncontroversial that OT1’s home has been raided.
60. Ms Ahmed also submitted that the report was selective. She stated that at 5.2 of her report the expert replied on the report of a fact finding mission conducted by the Home Office between the 17 June and 21 June 2019. The section dealing with relatives of HDP members supporters is at 3.3 of the fact finding report. Ms Ahmed’s criticism is that the expert does not engage with the countervailing sources or opinions reported in the same section, for example that the Turkish ombudsman stated that the global principle is that the crime is of the person not the crime of his family members and family members will not be arrested. The two sources the expert relies on are the director of Turkish organisation in the UK and a human rights lawyer. The expert does not engage with the fact finding mission fully.
61. I take into account Ms Ahmed’s submission, however I note that the fact finding report was inconclusive as the report itself acknowledges. The opinions of individuals about risks to political opponents were primarily based on the profile and stance of the individuals concerned. Government officials and the ombudsman minimised risk whilst human rights activists and campaigners tended to point the other way. I do not find that one statement from the Turkish ombudsman to a UK fact finding mission stating that an individual will not be arrested as a result of to be particularly reliable. The 2025 CPIN refers to the individuals being reluctant to report incidents to the authorities for fear of retaliation. I do not find this omission to undermine the report.
62. My view is that the general comments of the expert on the nature of the scrutiny of individuals who criticise the Turkish government are based on a wide range of background materials and do not go any further than what is said in the Country Guidance case or the background material in Turkey in general in the respondent’s own CPIN. The expert has not considered the risk to the appellant on the basis for instance of his own Facebook posts, or wider political activity. The analysis goes no further than the risk to the appellant as a result of his association with his brother and his brother’s indictment. I find that Ms Ahmed’s objections that the assessment of risk was made without consideration of those factors that do not apply to him are not made out. The assessment was manifestly not been made on the basis that the appellant is a high level activist or prolific poster of social material and was explicitly made on the basis that he has a low level profile. I find that the expert does have the necessary long standing and wide ranging expertise to comment on the Turkish authorities attitude to dissent and I am not satisfied that she is partisan an I note her comments in the Addendum report in this respect. Her opinion is firmly in line with the County Guidance and objective evidence that the Turkish government is an authoritarian state with a history of suppressing dissent particularly against those who are perceived to support separatism and those who are critical of the government including individuals who do not have a high profile. I attach some weight to her report.
63. I will make my findings on risk however primarily on the basis of the Country Guidance authority of IA and the background material before me. I state here that I do not find that the fact finding mission undermines IA.
64. One of the difficulties acknowledged by both parties is that the Country Guidance case is very old dating from 2003. The situation in Turkey has of course moved on since then and the position of the respondent on the current country situation is set out in the CPIN July 2025 and fact finding report. I remind myself of the status of the CPIN which is that it is a summary of research and a statement of the Secretary of States’s policy. It is not said in the current CPIN that the Country Guidance is no longer relevant. At 3.1.6 of the 2025 CPIN it is said that whilst the Upper Tribunal’s findings are based on evidence that is now over 20 years old, the factors identified are relevant to assessing risk. The guidance is still valid and Ms Ahmed did not submit that it is not.
65. In general, it is clear from the report that large numbers of those who criticise the regime still come to the attention of the authorities, that many people are detained and prosecuted under wide ranging terrorist offences and that mistreatment does still occur in detention notwithstanding 3.1.20 that torture is not considered to be systematic and does not take place in every prison. Torture is more likely to take place for political prisoners and those of Kurdish ethnicity. The CPIN further notes that numerous sources reported that there is a lack of effective investigation into allegations of torture and ill treatment and that prosecutions are rare which gives the impression of impunity 3.1.21. It cannot be said that there has been a massive improvement in the human rights situation in Turkey. Since 2016 Turkey has been governed by a state of emergency regime and anti -terrorism laws are used to restrict rights and freedoms. The respondent also categorically did not submit that there was any lesser risk because of circumstance in respect of Abduallah Ocalan and the PKK changing shortly before the hearing. This is reaffirmed in the latest CPIN.
66. My assessment of risk then must be on an individual and holistic basis. The risk factors set out in IA and Ors are inexhaustive. The factors must not be treated as a sort of checklist. Assessment of the claim must be in the round. The risk faced will depend on the person’s profile and activities. This is the list of risk factors identified at [46].
a)The level if any of the appellant’s known or suspected involvement with a separatist organisation. Together with this must be assessed the basis upon which it is contended that the authorities knew of or might suspect such involvement.
b) Whether the appellant has ever been arrested or detained and if so in what circumstances. In this context it may be relevant to note how long ago such arrests or detentions took place, if it is the case that there appears to be no causal connection between them and the claimant’s departure from Turkey, but otherwise it may be a factor of no particular significance.
c) Whether the circumstances of the appellant’s past arrest(s) and detention(s) (if any) indicate that the authorities did in fact view him or her as a suspected separatist.
d) Whether the appellant was charged or placed on reporting conditions or now faces charges.
e) The degree of ill treatment to which the appellant was subjected in the past.
f) Whether the appellant has family connections with a separatist organisation such as KADEK or HADEP or DEHAP.
g) How long a period elapsed between the appellant’s last arrest and detention and his or her departure from Turkey. In this regard it may of course be relevant to consider the evidence if any concerning what the appellant was in fact doing between the time of the last arrest and detention and departure from Turkey. It is a factor that is only likely to be of any particular relevance if there is a reasonably lengthy period between the two events without any ongoing problems being experienced on the part of the appellant from the authorities.
h) Whether in the period after the appellant’s last arrest there is any evidence that he or she was kept under surveillance or monitored by the authorities.
i) Kurdish ethnicity.
j) Alevi faith.
k) Lack of a current up-to-date Turkish passport.
l) Whether there is any evidence that the authorities have been pursuing or otherwise expressing an interest in the appellant since he or she left Turkey.
m) Whether the appellant became an informer or was asked to become one.
n) Actual perceived political activities abroad in connection with a separatist organisation.
o) If the returnee is a military draft evader there will be some logical impact on his profile to those assessing him on his immediate return. Following Sepet of course this alone is not a basis for a refugee or human rights claim.
67. I first turn to the evidence that individuals may come to the attention of the authorities as a result of family connections. This was considered a risk factor in IA at [46](f) in which this is specifically accepted as a risk factor. The question is whether the appellant has family connections with a separatist organisation such as KADEK or HADEP or DEHAP. Ms Ahmed accepted that these parties were forerunners to the HDP and that the appellant’s brother was found in 2022 to be a supporter of HDP. However her main submission was that the appellant had been found in 2004 not to be at risk because of his own HPD membership and OT1’s affiliation with HDP did not put himself at risk so would not put the appellant at risk.
68. She did not make an overall submission that family members could not be at risk.
69. Firstly, I note that the appellant himself is a member of HDP and that his brother OT1 is a supporter. This along with the fact that the appellant has expressed some limited support on-line for the HDP is unlikely to have placed the appellant at risk on its own. However I agree with Ms Degirmanci that the situation here is somewhat different. The factual scenario is not on all fours with 46(f). The appellant asserts that he is at risk not just because of his brother’s and his own support of HDP but because his brother has been indicted for terrorist offences. Serious charges have been made against him including insulting the President and making propaganda for the PKK. These charges can and do attract lengthy sentences of imprisonment. The charges relate specifically to a photograph in which the appellant appears with his brother. I am satisfied that this on its own is a powerful risk factor for the appellant. I accept that the Turkish authorities have a large Cyber Department and sophisticated digital monitoring systems. The authorities have already been monitoring OT1’s Facebook page and I find that it is reasonably likely that the Turkish authorities possess the means and inclination to identify the appellant from the photograph and have already done so or would do so on his arrival at the airport. I find that he will be stopped at the airport and his file called up.
70. I find that it is reasonably likely that he too could be indicted on terrorism charges for the same photograph, notwithstanding that he does not have the same profile as his brother in terms of social media because this was the specific photograph referred to in his brother’s indictment (see the refence to protesting or online praise at 11.3.2 of the 2025 CPIN). I note that the Turkish penal code is wide ranging with a vague and broad definition of terrorism. There is a reasonably likelihood that his participation in the demonstration will be perceived by the Turkish authorities as support for the PKK and a terrorist activity.
71. I turn to the remainder of his profile in accordance with IA. The appellant is Kurdish. He comes from a part of Turkey where there has historically been separatist activity and from a family which has been actively involved in supporting the HDP. He has been detained in the past following protests against the arrest of Abdulah Ocalan in 1999 and again in a targeted raid at his uncle’s home, albeit long ago. He was not seriously mistreated on that occasion but was asked to become an informer. The appellant is an HDP member. He has posted limited material in support of an imprisoned HDP leader in 2017/2018. He attends pro -Kurdish community activities in the UK. He has been on two demonstrations in the UK. His home in Turkey has been raided. The authorities will be aware of the fact that his home has been raided and that he has attended a demonstration because of the investigation report and the photograph. He does not have a valid Turkish passport.
72. I am satisfied having regard to the country guidance and the background material that it is reasonably likely that as a result of this combined profile that the appellant will be perceived to be involved with separatist activities or to be a political opponent. I find that there a real risk he will transferred to the anti-terror unit and that as a result there is a real risk that he will be mistreated, detained and charged with terrorist offences.
73. I find on this basis that the appellant is at real risk of persecution on account of his perceived political opinion and treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
Conclusion
74. For the reasons above I find that removal of the Appellant would breach the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal is allowed on Refugee Convention grounds and Article 3 ECHR.


R Owens
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 December 2025

Annex 1



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2023-005123

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51404/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WELSH

Between

MT
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Sirihada of Bostanci and Rahman Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 February 2024


DECISION AND REASONS

Anonymity Order:

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, we make an anonymity order. Unless the Upper Tribunal or a Court directs otherwise, no report of these proceedings or any form of publication thereof shall directly or indirectly identify the Appellant or members of his family. This direction applies to, amongst others, all parties. Any failure to comply with this direction could give rise to contempt of court proceedings. We make this order because the Appellant seeks international protection and so is entitled to privacy.
Introduction
1. This is an appeal against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge L S Bulpitt (“the Judge”), promulgated on 6 November 2023. By that decision, the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State, dated 16 February 2023, to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The Appellant is a Turkish national of Kurdish ethnicity, born in 1980. In summary, the basis of his claim for international protection was that he faces a real risk of persecution on return to Turkey (i) because his pro-Kurdish and anti-government activities had, or would, come to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities and/or (ii) by reason of his brother’s pro-Kurdish and anti-government activities, which had come to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities and had resulted in his brother being recognised as a refugee by the United Kingdom.
3. At the conclusion of the hearing, we determined that the decision of the Judge involved an error on a point of law and gave brief reasons. We now provide our reasons in full.
Decision of the Judge
4. The Judge rejected the account of the Appellant to have suffered past persecution and that conclusion is not the subject of any challenge.
5. The Judge further found that the Appellant’s limited sur place activity had not, and was not reasonably likely to, come to the attention of the Turkish authorities [37]. He reached this conclusion because he found that the Appellant had only attended two pro-Kurdish/anti-government protests [35, 37] and the photographic evidence of this attendance showed that the Appellant “… is not a prominent position, is not carrying anything and is posing for pictures on each occasion” [35].
6. One aspect of the evidence relied upon by the Appellant to establish risk was the uncontentious fact that his brother had been recognised as a refugee on the basis of his political activities leading him to become the subject of the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities [27]. The evidence relevant to this issue was adduced on the day of the appeal hearing with the permission of the Judge and without objection by the Respondent’s representative [15]. In relation to this aspect of the Appellant’s appeal, the Judge concluded:
“There is nothing in the CPINs or other evidence in the objective bundle to suggest that a person is at risk of persecution as a result of the behaviour of a different family member and such an argument would not be consistent with the Appellant’s evidence about several family members still living in the same area in South East Turkey. Rather than the Appellant genuinely facing persecution because of his relationship with his brother I have concluded that the Appellant sought to use his brother’s successful asylum claim as a means to gain a right to live in the United Kingdom himself. I am simply not persuaded on the lower standard of proof that the Appellant has come to the adverse attention of the state authorities in Turkey.” [40]
Grounds of appeal and the error of law hearing
7. The grounds plead that the Judge:

(1) Failed to take into account material evidence, namely the fact that a photograph of the Appellant’s brother’s attendance at a pro-Kurdish/anti-government protest in the UK had come to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities and this photograph depicted the Appellant in the company of his brother (Ground 1).
(2) Failed to take into account material evidence, namely the CPIN (March 2020) that contains evidence capable of supporting the Appellant’s case that he was at risk as a result of his brother’s political activity (Ground 2).
(3) Failed to take into account material evidence and/or give adequate reasons for concluding that the Appellant’s family members choosing to remain in Turkey is inconsistent with there being any risk to the Appellant as a result of his brother’s activities.
8. The Respondent did not file a rule 24 response.
9. Permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Sheridan. The grounds upon which permission was granted were not restricted.
10. At the error of law hearing, we heard oral submissions from both advocates and we are grateful for their assistance. During the course of this decision, we address the points they made.
Discussion and conclusion
11. We find there is force in the submissions of the Appellant that (i) the Judge failed, in part, to take into account the evidence adduced on the day of the hearing and (ii) this evidence was capable of having a material effect on the outcome of the appeal. We therefore conclude, for the reasons set out below, that the decision of the Judge involved the making of a material error of law.
12. Grounds 1 and 3 both relate to evidence (i) of a photograph of the Appellant, in the company of his brother, at a political demonstration and (ii) evidence that this photograph had, in respect of the Appellant’s brother, come to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities.
13. Plainly, this evidence was capable of having a material effect on the assessment of risk:

(1) In relation to the Appellant’s own sur place activity, no matter how limited it was, this evidence was relevant to the question of whether that activity had come to the attention of the Turkish authorities and what view would be taken of it by the authorities.
(2) In relation to the Judge’s finding that the Appellant’s family remaining in Turkey was inconsistent with there being any risk arising from the brother’s activities, this evidence was capable of distinguishing the Appellant’s circumstances from those of other family members.
14. Mr Terrell submitted that, on the face of the decision, these arguments had not been the subject of detailed submissions before the First-tier Tribunal. There being a duty on the parties to clearly identify the issues to be determined, the Appellant cannot now complain that this evidence was not addressed by the Judge (relying upon Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163).
15. Whilst the principle outlined by Mr Terrell is undoubtedly correct, we cannot agree it applies in the circumstances of this case. Whilst we do not know the full extent of the oral submissions made at the hearing on behalf of the Appellant because they are not rehearsed by the Judge in his decision (we emphasise that we do not criticise the Judge for this), we are satisfied that these arguments formed part of the Appellant’s case, taking into account (i) the Appellant was represented by very experienced Counsel (ii) the new evidence adduced on the day dealt with precisely these issues and (iii) the Judge did make findings in relation to the relevance of the brother’s circumstances.
16. Ground 2 relates to the Judge’s finding that there was no objective evidence capable of demonstrating that a person can be a risk as a result of the behaviour of a family member [40] when in fact the CPIN (March 2020) contains evidence to support the contention that family members of political activists are, in certain circumstances, at risk by reason of the familial relationship.
17. Mr Terrell submitted that the contents of the CPIN are not clear-cut on the issue of risk. We agree with him: the CPIN deals, essentially, with the risk to people as a result of their family member being a member of HDP and the evidence before the Judge, as we understand it, did not include evidence that the Appellant’s brother is a member of HDP. However, the evidence in the supplementary bundle is capable of demonstrating that the Appellant’s brother is being investigated for supporting terrorist activity. It is, therefore, at least arguable that the Turkish authorities view the brother in precisely the same way as they view HDP members and that the corollary of this is that the authorities will view the appellant in the same way as if he were the brother of an HDP member.
18. For the reasons set out above, we conclude that all three grounds are made out, that these errors are material to the outcome of the appeal and we set aside those parts of the decision in relation to the risk posed to the Appellant by virtue of his brother’s activities. In particular, we set aside the overall finding at [37] that the Appellant had not been involved in any activity in the UK which would have brought him to the attention of the Turkish authorities.
19. The Appellant also sought to adduce further evidence by way of a rule 15(2A) application. This evidence relates to the Appellant’s brother’s involvement with DBP and HDP. The Appellant’s brother was only granted asylum shortly before the hearing of the First-tier Tribunal and we are satisfied that, in those circumstance, the appellant had very little time to obtain this evidence. We also take into account this evidence has a direct bearing on the risk to the Appellant and, this being an asylum appeal, the outcome is of the utmost importance to the Appellant. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that it is fair and in the interests of justice to admit this evidence for the re-making hearing. Mr Terrell did not object to this course of action.
Disposal
20. We conclude that the appropriate forum for remaking is the Upper Tribunal because only limited findings of fact need to be made in relation to a discrete issue. In reaching this decision, we apply paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and take into account the oral submissions of the advocates.
Preserved findings
21. The material errors we have identified do not affect the validity of the findings of the Judge in relation to (i) the extent of the Appellant’s sur place activity (both social media activity and attendance at protests/demonstrations (ii) the Appellant’s claim that the family home was raided by the authorities in 2016 and 2017 and (iii) the Appellant’s claim to have been convicted in absence and sentenced to a term of imprisonment by a court in Turkey. We therefore preserve the following findings that:

(1) the Appellant did not, in around 22 October 2015, share posts on Facebook in which he criticised the authorities and did not come to the adverse attention of the authorities because of these posts [18-22];
(2) the Appellant was not detained by the Turkish authorities in 2016 or in 2017 [23-24];
(3) any raids carried out the family home in 2021 were unrelated to the Appellant [25];
(4) the Appellant was not convicted in his absence and sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the Turkish authorities [28-33]; and
(5) the Appellant attended no more than two pro-Kurdish/anti-government demonstrations in the UK [37].
Notice of Decision
22. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision that the Appellant is not at risk of serious harm for a Convention reason or contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR is set aside with the findings at [21] above preserved.
23. The appeal is adjourned for re-making at the Upper Tribunal.
Directions
24. The following directions applying to the future conduct of this appeal:

(1) The resumed hearing will be listed at Field House, on the first available date after 5 May 2024, reserved to Upper Tribunal Judge Owens, with a time estimate of 4 hours.
(2) Within 14 days of the date this decision is sent, the Appellant shall notify the Upper Tribunal and the Respondent whether any witnesses are to be called, and if so, must identify the witness and confirm whether they need the assistance of an interpreter.
(3) No more than 14 days prior to the hearing the Appellant shall file and serve any up-to-date evidence upon which he wishes to rely together with the requisite Rule 15(2A) notices.
(4) The Appellant will, no later than 7 days prior to the hearing, file and serve an up-to-date skeleton argument.
(5) The Respondent will, no later than 2 working days prior to the hearing, file and serve an up-to-date skeleton argument addressing the further evidence and submissions.


C E Welsh

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 March 2024