UI-2023-005313

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 26 Feb 2026
• Promulgation date: 22 May 2026
• Publication date: 12 Jun 2026
• Last updated on: 12 Jun 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2023-005313
First-tier Tribunal No: DA/00232/2021
EA/04860/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

22nd May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL

Between

FJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Khubber and Ms Radford, instructed by Turpin & Miller
For the Respondent: Ms Masood, instructed by the Government Legal Department

Heard at Field House on 25 and 26 February 2026
Written submissions on 2 and 4 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and the women named as G and R below are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or G and R. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Anonymity

1. The appellant seeks an anonymity order. No such application was made when the matter was first before the Upper Tribunal. Nor was any application for anonymity made in the First-tier Tribunal.

2. Mr Khubber intimated at the hearing that he sought anonymity for the appellant. I invited counsel to make submissions on the point in writing, noting that there had been a number of recent occasions on which the Court of Appeal had set aside anonymity orders made by the Upper Tribunal in deportation appeals.

3. I am grateful to Mr Khubber for the written submissions which he made on 2 March, and for Mr Masood’s prompt response, by which she indicated that the respondent maintained a neutral stance on the application.

4. Mr Khubber submits that anonymity is justified on two bases. He submits, firstly, that the tribunal is required by sections 1 and 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 to make such an order. He submits, secondly, that the tribunal may make an anonymity order to protect the appellant from adverse impact on his mental health.

5. Albeit with some hesitation, I accept the first of Mr Khubber’s submissions for the following reasons. The appellant is in a relationship with a woman called R. He was previously in a relationship with a women called G. Both women have alleged to the police that the appellant has committed serious sexual offences against them, although no charges have ever been brought. By section 1 of the 1992 Act, those women are entitled to life-long anonymity, and the tribunal is also required to ensure that they cannot be identified by “jigsaw identification”. It is insufficient for me simply to anonymise their names; I must also ensure that their identities cannot be ascertained by members of the public from the content of this decision.

6. I am satisfied that the identity of R is likely to become known if the appellant is named in these proceedings. From what I have seen and heard in these proceedings, I am satisfied that the appellant is well known in his local area and that he and R are known as a couple within their social circle of homeless persons and drug users. Were the appellant’s identity to be made public, there is every risk that her identity would be revealed by jigsaw identification and it would then be known, as a result of what follows in this decision, that she has alleged that serious sexual offences have been committed against her.

7. In relation to G, the risk of jigsaw identification is lower but it is still real. The appellant and G were in a relationship for a number of years and it is likely that information contained in this decision would enable their shared acquaintances to identify her, and to learn therefore that she has also alleged that the appellant has committed serious sexual offences against her.

8. For that reason, whilst I consider the appellant to be wholly undeserving of anonymity on his own account, I consider that it is necessary to make an anonymity order to protect the identities of the women who have made allegations against him.

Introduction

9. The appellant is an Italian national who was born in 1971. He appeals against two decisions made by the respondent. By the first, dated 23 July 2021, the Secretary of State decided to deport the appellant in accordance with regulation 27 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (“the EEA Regulations”). By the second, dated 21 September 2021, she decided to refuse the appellant’s application under the European Union Settlement Scheme (“the EUSS”) on the basis that he was subject to a deportation order.

10. The appellant states that he was born in Morocco but that he grew up in Trapani, Italy, before moving to Rome in his late teens. The appellant received a number of convictions in Italy. I take the following summary, and the clarificatory footnote from Ms Masood’s skeleton argument:

(1) 6 December 1990 – convicted of robbery and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Sentenced to 1 year imprisonment and fined.

(2) 17 December 1992 – convicted of murder. Sentenced to 12 years imprisonment.

(3) 17 December 1992 – convicted of theft. Sentenced to imprisonment for 1 month and fined.

(4) 24 September 1996 – convicted of blackmail. Sentenced to 1 year imprisonment and fined.

(5) 23 October 1998 – convicted for destroying/damaging property. Sentenced to 6 months imprisonment.

(6) 24 November 2005 – convicted of common assault, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and destroying/damaging property. Sentenced to 6 months imprisonment.

(7) 5 November 2013 – convicted of robbery, carrying a firearm and ammunition in a public place, and possessing a firearm without a certificate. Sentenced to 3 years and 4 months imprisonment, and fined.1

11. The appellant claims to have arrived in the United Kingdom on 17 June 2015 but that is a matter in issue before me, as is the length of time that he has been continuously resident in this country.

12. The appellant first came to the attention of the British authorities in December 2017, when he received a caution for theft. A movement check undertaken by the respondent is said to show that he most recently entered the United Kingdom on 17 October 2019.

13. The appellant came to the attention of the Home Office on 1 April 2020, following his arrest for theft offences by Kent Police. He was convicted of those offences on 2 December 2020. He received a community order until 2 December 2021 and was ordered to pay compensation, costs and a victim surcharge. On 23 May 2024, the appellant was convicted of possession of a class A drug (crack cocaine), for which he received a 12 month conditional discharge and was ordered to pay a victim surcharge.

14. The appellant was listed as wanted or missing for immigration purposes on 22 June 2021. On 29 June 2021, he made an application for residency under the EUSS. The following day, he was stopped by the police in a routine traffic stop and was detained under immigration powers as a result of the marker.

15. The appellant sought asylum in detention. That claim was refused and certified as clearly unfounded on 23 July 2021. The decision to deport the appellant under the EEA Regulations was communicated in the same letter. A deportation order was signed on 28 July 2021. Those documents were provided to the appellant on 5 August 2021 and he appealed to the First-tier Tribunal against the decision to deport him.

16. The respondent sought to remove the appellant despite the pending appeal but she subsequently realised that the application under the EUS was still pending. As I have already recorded, that application was refused on 21 September 2021, and the appellant lodged a further appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against that decision.

The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

17. The appellant’s appeal was heard by the First-tier Tribunal on 20 January 2023. The appellant was represented by Ms Radford of counsel, who appeared with Mr Khubber before me. The respondent was represented by a Presenting Officer. The judge heard evidence from the appellant and a woman who claimed to be his partner. He then heard submissions from both representatives before reserving his decision.

18. In his reserved decision, the judge found that the appellant is very clearly drug dependent and a long term and active user of illicit drugs including cannabis, heroin and crack cocaine as well as prescription drugs including Xanax and diazepam. There were fundamental differences between the account of events given by the appellant and his claimed partner in relation to his drug use. He considered there to be difficulties with the appellant’s account of events in Italy and the UK and he approached the appellant’s evidence with a degree of caution. The judge did not accept that he was in fear of return to Italy. The judge expressed concern about the amounts of money which were passing through the appellant’s bank account, with deposits totalling just under £3000 in November 2022 alone. The judge did not accept that this was from a small, cash in hand job, as the appellant had suggested. The judge also noted that the appellant’s account appeared to show that he was in different parts of the country at the same time, which was potentially evidence that the account was used by multiple people.

19. The judge did not accept that the appellant and his claimed partner were in a genuine and subsisting relationship. The judge considered the evidence which was said to show that the appellant had been exercising Treaty rights in the UK. The judge did not accept that the appellant had worked in the UK in 2015 but he did accept that the appellant was in full time employment in the tax years 2016-2017 and 2017-2018, however. He did not accept that the evidence supported the assertion that the appellant had been working between April 2018 and April 2020. The judge did not accept, therefore, that the appellant had acquired permanent residence under the EEA Regulations.

20. The judge found that the appellant’s removal from the United Kingdom was justified on grounds of public policy or public security. In reaching that conclusion, the judge took account of the appellant’s long-term and continuing drug use; his extremely serious criminal record in Italy and his offending in the UK; his “unsafe and unacceptable lifestyle in the UK”; and his clear and consistent dishonesty at the hearing.

21. Taking all of those matters into account, the judge concluded that the personal conduct of the appellant represented a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interests of the UK. Having considered the wider circumstances of the case, the judge concluded that the appellant’s deportation would be proportionate under the EEA Regulations and under Article 8 ECHR. He did not accept that the appellant’s removal would be in breach of Article 3 ECHR for any of the reasons given. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the second decision because there was an extant and lawful deportation order.

The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

22. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, which was in due course granted on renewal by Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede. The appellant’s appeal was heard by me and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Ó Ceallaigh KC in May 2025, when Mr Khubber represented the appellant and Mr Wain, a Senior Presenting Officer, represented the respondent.

23. In our reserved decision, we found that the judge in the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law in several respects and that no part of its analysis could be preserved. We ordered that the decision on the appeal would be remade in the Upper Tribunal. The appeal was initially listed to be heard on 17 September 2025 but that hearing was adjourned on the respondent’s application, it having been discovered that the appellant had recently been arrested for criminal offences in the UK. Case management directions were helpfully agreed by the parties and the matter was re-listed before me, for one and a half days on 25 and 26 February 2026.

The Resumed Hearing

24. In preparation for the hearing, the appellant’s solicitors had filed and served an agreed composite bundle of 1040 pages. A small bundle of additional material (thirteen pages) was also admitted into evidence without objection from Ms Masood. I was informed that I was due to hear from one witness for the respondent (PC Tim Weston of Canterbury CID). I was also informed that I would hear evidence from the appellant and from Jon Limebury, the appellant’s Housing Led Support Worker. In the event, Ms Masood confirmed that she would not have any questions for Mr Limebury and that she was content for me to take his witness statement as read.

25. I indicated at the outset that I had read the evidence concerning the appellant’s mental health and that I proposed to treat him as a vulnerable witness. Ms Masood was content that I should do so. There was a short delay in hearing the evidence whilst a hard copy of the bundle was printed and made available for the witnesses. I am grateful to Ms Masood for providing that bundle from her chambers.

26. I heard evidence from PC Weston and the appellant but not from Mr Limebury. I do not intend to rehearse their evidence but I will refer to it insofar as it is necessary to do so to explain my findings of fact.

Submissions for the Respondent

27. For the respondent, Ms Masood submitted as follows. She accepted that the list of issues set out in Mr Khubber’s skeleton argument were those that fell for determination. She did not accept that the appellant had acquired permanent residence in the United Kingdom. There was a decision from the Department of Work and Pensions (“DWP”) to that effect but it was not binding on the tribunal and the evidence before the tribunal was different in any event. Some of the claimed employment was established but there were significant gaps in the evidence.

28. The evidence of employment in 2015-2016 was unsatisfactory and the appellant had given contradictory evidence about his employment at a pub in Oxfordshire at that time. The evidence of activity between April 2018 and April 2019 was unsatisfactory and the bank statements for that period were missing. For the first half of 2020 the appellant stated that he was street homeless and that his addiction was to the fore. He was not in employment and he was not a jobseeker during that period. Later in 2020, the appellant stated that he had resumed living with a partner but that was at odds with the evidence of Mr Limebury and there was no mention of it in the decision of the social security tribunal.

29. In sum, the appellant was not exercising Treaty rights and he was not demonstrably continuously resident up to the date of the decision to deport him in July 2021. The appellant had also failed to give an account of his travel history, despite accepting that he had returned to Italy quite regularly. (Mr Khubber interjected and noted that the appellant had sought disclosure of the respondent’s records in this respect but that nothing had been forthcoming except the record of the appellant having entered on 17 October 2019.)

30. Ms Masood submitted that the appellant was not an honest witness and that he had sought to downplay his culpability for his offending in various respects. His account of the murder conflicted with the fact that he had been convicted of theft on the same date. He could not explain that in oral evidence. It was to be noted that he had already acquired a conviction for a violent offence (robbery) before then. The appellant had also sought to minimise his involvement in that offence, stating that he was merely a get-away driver for his friends, but the conviction for possession of a firearm and ammunition in a public place told a different story. His evidence in that respect was “all over the place”.

31. The appellant had been implicated in various other offences in the United Kingdom. There was some suggestion on the part of the appellant that non-conviction conduct could not be taken into account but that was wrong as a matter of law, since regulation 27 included personal conduct. Wahl v Iceland [2014] 1 CMLR 29 was instructive in that regard. What was said by Nicol J at [67] of R (B) v SSHD [2018] EWHC 2651 (Admin) was also relied upon in this connection. The respondent had provided a position statement regarding the conduct relied upon in this regard. She did not rely on the second item therein described but she did rely on the most recent incident in 2026.

32. Taken as a whole, it was clear that the appellant had a propensity for violence and theft and sexual violence towards females including his current partner and other drug users. A similar allegation had been made by his former partner, G, in 2023. That allegation was withdrawn, as were many others, because the complainant was unwilling to pursue it and the police decided not to do so without her support. The detail provided to the police was stark and G was particularly vulnerable by reference to a past abusive relationship. R’s allegation that the appellant had raped her in 2025 was supported by the otherwise unexplained injuries which were seen by support workers. The appellant asked why his partner would stay with him if he acted in this way but it was commonplace for victims of domestic violence to remain with their partners. The appellant seemed to suggest that it had all been manufactured by the support workers but that was far-fetched. Even if that specific incident was not established, the tribunal could find that the appellant had raped and assaulted his partner on previous occasions.

33. It was more likely than not, Ms Masood submitted, that the appellant had been dealing drugs at a local level for some time. That was supported by the “tick list” which had been found in his room, and the appellant’s explanation that it was a list of money that he owed was not the explanation he had given to police at the time. The appellant had a refrain that he had made mistakes and that his behaviour had been affected by his addiction. He had a tendency to deny and downplay. The respondent’s evidence amply established the appellant’s propensity to violence, sexual violence, theft and other such conduct.

34. All of the conduct, taken together, showed serious grounds of public policy or public security for expelling the appellant from the United Kingdom. The appellant’s conduct plainly affected the fundamental interests of the country. The appellant had accepted that there was a heated argument with his partner in 2025. He had suggested that a significant factor in that argument was their drug use. Even if he was abstaining from drug use at present, there was every likelihood that he would relapse.

35. Ms Masood submitted that the appellant’s conduct in Italy engaged the principle in R v Bouchereau (Case 30/77) [1978] 1 QB 732. It did not matter, in the respondent’s submission, that the relevant offending had taken place in Italy rather than in the expelling state.

36. The respondent maintained that it would be proportionate to remove the appellant from the United Kingdom. Some of the conduct relied upon was very recent. The relevant factors were addressed at [52] of Ms Masood’s skeleton argument. The appellant had been in the UK for ten years on his own case. Most of his life had been spent elsewhere. He had not integrated into UK society in any meaningful way, having been a regular user of Class A drugs for some time. His mental health was quite poor but there was no recent expert evidence on the subject. He was not rehabilitated, even if he had not received any convictions since 2024. Article 8 ECHR added nothing. The appellant’s relationship with R was abusive and she had not attended to support him. There was nothing from the appellant’s friends. The appeal fell to be dismissed accordingly.

Submissions for the Appellant

37. Mr Khubber submitted that the evidence disclosed nothing which undermined the arguments made in the appellant’s skeleton argument. He would address me in three sections: general themes, oral evidence and, finally, legal submissions on the evidence.

38. In relation to the general themes, Mr Khubber noted that the case concerned events spanning a very long period of more than 36 years. Questions of memory and recollection were necessarily to the fore. That was all the more so when it was recalled that the appellant is vulnerable witness and a longstanding drug user.

39. There could be no doubt that the appellant’s original offending in Italy was very serious. The offending in the UK was of a starkly different nature. The EU context was important – the focus was on the present threat and the Bouchereau exception. The focus should be on the conduct in the host state, since the law required there to be a threat to the fundamental interests of that state. Notably, submitted Mr Khubber, there was no domestic or EU authority on non-conviction conduct in this context. There was, he submitted, a real question about the propriety of importing principles from non-EU decisions such as Bah (EO (Turkey) – liability to deport) [2012] UKUT 00196 (IAC) and Farquharson (removal – proof of conduct) [2013] UKUT 146(IAC). The law required there to be sufficiently cogent evidence to discharge the Secretary of State’s burden. Something more was required than what she relied upon.

40. Mr Khubber submitted that the facts in this case were wholly distinguishable from those in Bouchereau or Marchon, as they were from Wahl v Iceland or R (B) v SSHD. This was an unusual case, in which the respondent could not rely on convictions for serious offences in the UK but in which the appellant was entitled to serious grounds protection against expulsion. That entailed procedural and substantive protections. There were evident difficulties procedurally, in that what had been disclosed by the Secretary of State represented only one side of the picture, and no victims had given evidence.

41. The tribunal had heard evidence from the appellant and from PC Weston. No criticism was made of the officer, but he had no direct involvement with the appellant. He was not aware of the respondent’s refusal to provide material on grounds of proportionality. He had redacted the material extensively but had not considered whether the exceptions in the Data Protection Act applied.

42. There were some inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence but this was not a “quasi civil trial”; the real issue was whether the respondent had provided the evidence to justify expulsion on serious grounds. The non-conviction conduct had not resulted in a charge or a trial. It was to be recalled that the appellant’s relationships were centred around drug use. It was inevitable that there would be elements of toxicity in such relationships. The circumstances could not be further from those in Farquharson, in which there was ample material, including DNA evidence, which established the conduct on the civil standard.

43. The legal framework was set out at page eight of the appellant’s skeleton argument. I was asked to note in particular what was said about schedule 1 to the 2016 Regulations. As Underhill LJ had remarked at [91] of George v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1192; [2025] 1 WLR 1025, that schedule contained considerations which were formulated at a high level of generality, which could not supplant or qualify the criteria themselves. Submissions were made at [3] of the skeleton argument concerning what was said by Singh LJ about the current status and effect of Bouchereau in SSHD v Robinson [2018] EWCA Civ 85; [2018] 4 WLR 81. It was in any event to be noted that the appellant’s sentence for murder was at the lowest level.

44. The appellant had acquired the right to reside permanently in the UK. He had to show that he had been a qualified person between 2015 and 2020. His case was as had been stated to the DWP. That decision was not binding on the tribunal but the respondent misstated the standard in submitting that there was no “compelling” evidence to support the conclusion reached; the standard was the ordinary civil standard and there was in truth nothing which unseated the conclusion.

45. The temporal period under the EUSS was different, as set out at 4.2.1 of the skeleton argument. The appellant said that he had not been absent from the UK for any significant period and there was no proper reason to conclude otherwise. The respondent had relied on a gap between April 2018 and April 2019 but that was addressed by the HMRC Employment Schedule.

46. The appellant did not pose the requisite threat to the fundamental interests of the United Kingdom. It was notable that there had been deficiencies in the evidence in relation to the allegations made by the appellant’s partners. Even when G had decided that she did wish to pursue a prosecution, the prosecution had still been discontinued. Whilst it was accepted that the Bouchereau exception existed in principle, it was clear that it should only be applied in the most exceptional cases, of which this was not one. The appellant had not served a term of imprisonment in the UK and the non-conviction matters had not even resulted in a charge. I was referred to the schedule at the end of the bundle, which contained a summary of the appellant’s responses to the conduct allegations made by the respondent.

47. The appellant had been in the United Kingdom for eleven years and that was highly relevant to any assessment of proportionality. The appellant was undergoing a process of rehabilitation which would be brought to a premature end if he was deported because there was nothing in place in Italy. Looking at the totality of the evidence, the requisite level of threat was not made out, even if the respondent was correct to assert that only a basic level of protection against deportation was appropriate.

48. Ms Masood sought permission to make a single, short point at the end of Mr Khubber’s submissions. He was content for her to do so. She asked me to consider the evidence of the appellant’s activities between 2018 and 2019 carefully. There was insufficient, she submitted, to “plug the gap” despite Mr Khubber’s submissions. Mr Khubber submitted, in reply, that the chronology was clear and that the appellant was either self-sufficient or a worker during that period.

49. I reserved my decision at the end of the submissions. I record here that the written submissions I subsequently received from Mr Khubber were directed only to the anonymity order which was sought.

The Issues

50. I am grateful to the appellant’s counsel for their distillation of the issues at paragraph 1.5 of their skeleton argument. As I have already recorded, Ms Masood accepted that those were the issues in the case. I agree with counsel, not only that those are the issues but also that it makes sense to resolve the issues in the order suggested. The issues set out in the skeleton argument are as follows:

(i) Whether A can rely on the “serious grounds” threshold to be established by the SSHD on the basis of either
(a) having established “Permanent Residence” (“PR”) under the EEA Regs 2016 during the material time or
(b) having established continuous residence for “Continuous Qualifying Period” (“CQP”) under the EUSS at the material time.

(ii) If A can rely on serious grounds (under either legal regime) whether the SSHD has discharged the burden on her to show serious grounds have been established to justify deportation.

(iii) If A cannot rely on serious grounds but “basic grounds” whether the SSHD has discharged the burden on her to show basic grounds have been established to justify deportation.

(iv) Under either serious grounds or basic grounds whether deportation under EU law would be proportionate and therefore lawful.

(v) Under Article 8 ECHR whether deportation would proportionate and therefore lawful.

(vi) Whether the decision under the EUSS was lawful in light of the above issues.

Analysis

51. Before examining any of the issues, I make clear that I have taken account of the appellant’s multi-faceted vulnerability in evaluating his evidence. The medical evidence in the bundle is fairly substantial, and includes the appellant’s medical records from detention; a 2021 psychiatric assessment from Professor Katona; a 2022 letter from the appellant’s GP; and a further report from Dr Rachel Swain (a Specialist Registrar in Forensic Psychiatry) which was written in December 2022.

52. As Judge Seelhoff noted in the FtT, there is evidence to show that the appellant has suffered from significant mental health problems. Amongst other concerns, psychosis and schizophrenia are both mentioned in the medical evidence. He currently takes three mental health medications: Olanzapine, Mirtazapine and Promethazine. He is in receipt of Personal Independence Payment at the enhanced rate to meet his daily living needs and at the enhanced rate to meet his mobility needs. There is reference in the medical reports to the appellant having suffered a serious head injury when he was younger: [60]-[61] of Dr Rachel Swain’s report, for example. I note that the appellant says in his statement that he attempted suicide as a child and that he was in a psychiatric facility in Italy for four years.

53. The appellant has also attempted suicide in the UK. He is also a long-term user of various drugs including heroin and crack cocaine. He lives in supported housing and is supported by Mr Limebury, who is a Housing Led Support Worker. Whilst he was said to be abstaining from illegal drug use at the hearing before me, I take account of the fact that he was in receipt of methadone by way of a prescription. Whilst the appellant was entirely lucid before me, therefore, he was still dependent upon opiates. He is assisted by the Forward Trust in attempting to overcome his addictions. I have taken careful account of the appellant’s current and past vulnerability in assessing his evidence.

The First Issue – Serious Grounds protection under the 2016 Regulations or the EUSS

54. EU law contains three levels of protection against expulsion for EU citizens such as the appellant. Those levels are identified in the Citizenship Directive and the 2016 Regulations: basic grounds, serious grounds and imperative grounds. At [44] of B v Land Baden-Württemberg and SSHD v Vomero [2019] QB 126, the Court of Justice explained that this system of protections was based on the degree of integration into the host member state, “so that the greater the degree of integration … the greater the guarantees of against expulsion they enjoy”.

55. The appellant contends that he is entitled to serious grounds protection. To be entitled to such protection, the appellant must establish that he acquired a right of permanent residence: regulation 27(3) refers. He must have acquired that right before the date of the decision to deport him. To acquire the right of permanent residence, a person must have resided legally for a continuous period of five years in the UK. To have resided legally, the person must have been exercising their Treaty rights.

56. It is not accepted by the Secretary of State that the appellant was in the UK for a continuous period of five years before 23 July 2021, or that he was a qualified person for such a period.

57. In considering the competing submissions on those points, I have taken account of the DWP’s decision of 8 March 2023. The appellant had been the subject of an adverse decision when he applied for Universal Credit. It had been concluded that he did not have a right to reside in the UK and was not entitled to Universal Credit. The appellant lodged an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (Social Security and Child Support Chamber) against that decision. His appeal was supported by “an in-depth timeline and evidence” which had been prepared by his then representatives, Osbornes Solicitors. The DWP revised its decision in light of that evidence. In its revised decision of 8 March 2023, the department accepted that the appellant had gained a permanent right to reside in the UK because he had been a qualified person for a five-year period. For present purposes the material part of the decision is as follows:

20/06/15 – January 2016 – worker
January 2016 to April 2016 – jobseeker
April 2016 to 12/05/2017 – worker
May 2017 to August 2017 – jobseeker
August 2017 to 29/04/2018 – worker
30/04/2018 to May 2019 – worker
May 2019 to December 2019 – self-sufficient for this period
December 2019 to July 2020 – jobseeker/self-sufficient
July 2020 to October 2020 – worker

You have provided comprehensive evidence of your previous employment and also bank statements to show the periods you were self-sufficient for. You were supported by your long term partner at the time and the evidence provided verifies this. You have shown that at the time you had sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the UK.

I am satisfied that based on the statement /timelines and supporting evidence you have satisfied the conditions to gain a permanent right to reside.

58. It is common ground that this decision is not binding on the Upper Tribunal but that I should take it into account. I accept that it is relevant to my assessment that a government department has accepted that the appellant has acquired permanent residence, and I do take that fact into account. As Ms Masood submitted, however, it is nevertheless necessary to take account the evidence which is before me in reaching my own decision on the question.

59. There is very limited evidence to show that the appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in June 2015 as he claims. As an Italian national, there is obviously nothing in a passport to show that he entered at this point. The appellant claims in his statement of 16 December 2022 that he had been contacted by a friend called PT shortly after he had been released from prison in Italy. The man said that there was an opening for a chef at a pub in Oxford and that he might be suitable. He said that he had accepted this offer of employment and had flown to Heathrow on or about 17 June 2015, whereupon he started working at the pub in question.

60. There is a short statement from PT within the bundle. It was taken over the telephone by the appellant’s current solicitor. That statement confirms the appellant’s version of events. PT states that he contacted the appellant via Facebook and told him about the pub. He says that he collected the appellant from the airport and that he was working at the pub the following day. He says that the appellant worked there for four months before leaving.

61. In the FtT, Judge Seelhoff expressed concern about PT’s statement. It was unsigned and unsupported by PT’s identity document. He had not given his address and he had not attended to have his evidence tested. Nor was there any evidence to show the connection between PT and the pub in question.

62. Those concerns remain; the appellant’s solicitors have not been successful in their attempts to contact PT again and PT did not attend to give evidence before me. I also accept the points made at [35] of the respondent’s skeleton argument about this claimed period of employment. There is nothing from the pub and there are no payslips or bank statements which reflect the employment. The earliest bank statement in the bundle is from Lloyds Bank and begins with a balance of £0.00 on 18 April 2016.

63. The appellant’s oral evidence about this period was unsatisfactory. He and PT maintained in their written evidence that his employment at the pub in Oxford was for a few months, whereas he said in his oral evidence that he had worked in the pub for a year. Ms Masood showed the appellant the statement which he had made in support of his appeal against the DWP’s decision, in which he said that he had stopped working at the pub in October 2015. The appellant then suggested, firstly, that he had perhaps worked at the pub for less than a year (possibly ten months, he said) before changing his evidence to suggest that it had been around eight months.

64. Even making proper allowance for the passage of time and the appellant’s vulnerability, I considered his evidence about this claimed employment to be unreliable. There is a vast difference between a period of employment which lasts for four months and one which lasts for eight months or a year and I do not consider that I can attach any weight to the evidence of the appellant or PT on this period.

65. The appellant claimed that he began a relationship with the owner of the pub and that he moved in with her in October 2015. He said that he then found work at a restaurant in Oxford and that he worked there for two months or so. As with the work at the pub, there are no bank statements or payslips which contain any reference to that employment. Nor is there anything from the restaurant.

66. What I do have is a statement from a Detention Outreach Officer at the Jesuit Refugee Service, William Neal. The statement is dated 21 January 2022. Mr Neal states that he supported the appellant from July 2021. Mr Neal states that he had a telephone conversation on 13 December 2021 with the manager of the restaurant in question, and that he had confirmed that the appellant had worked there for two months in 2015. They had had another conversation on 13 January 2022, during which the manager had refused to provide either a signed statement or any evidence of the appellant’s employment.

67. As Ms Masood submitted, however, the appellant’s oral evidence about his employment at the pub has an impact on his evidence about employment at the restaurant. If he worked at the pub for eight months, he cannot have worked at the restaurant for two months; the former period would subsume the latter. As Ms Masood put it in her closing submissions, there is a ‘domino effect’ on the chronology.

68. It is for that reason that it becomes all the more important to look to the supporting evidence to see whether it provides any real support for the appellant’s asserted employment at the restaurant. I regret to say, however, that I am unable to attach any weight to Mr Neal’s statement. Although I observed at [41] of my first decision in this case that there was no reason why Mr Neal would have lied or been mistaken, there are obvious evidential difficulties with his short statement. He does not give any indication of how he confirmed that the person he spoke to was the manager of the restaurant. He does not give the person’s name. He does not give the telephone number he called to speak to the person. With respect to Mr Neal, his short statement is essentially worthless as evidence to confirm that the appellant worked at a restaurant in Oxford in 2015.

69. In the circumstances, I do not consider there to be satisfactory evidence of the appellant’s residence in the UK in 2015 or of him exercising Treaty rights in the UK in that calendar year. He was accepted by the DWP to have been a worker between June 2015 and January 2016 but, having subjected the evidence to more detailed scrutiny with the assistance of counsel, I do not consider it to discharge the burden of establishing that contention on the balance of probabilities.

70. Nor do I consider there to be adequate evidence to show that the appellant was present in the United Kingdom, whether as a jobseeker or at all, between January 2016 and April 2016. As Ms Masood submitted, the appellant’s oral evidence about the length of his claimed employment at the pub in Oxford casts doubt on what he has previously claimed about this period. He stated in his submissions before the FtT(SSCS) that he was living with his then partner and looking for work but there is a dearth of evidence in support of either suggestion. He was not registered as a jobseeker. There is no evidence from his partner of the time. Nor is there other evidence from a third party to state that the appellant was in the UK at that time.

71. The helpful schedule at p410 of the consolidated bundle gives details of the evidence which is said to support the various periods of residence and employment in the UK. Reliance is placed in that schedule on the statement which appears on the first page of the respondent’s bundle before the FtT(IAC):

Mr Fasulo’s exact date of arrival in the UK and the length of time that he has been resident is currently unknown although residency is confirmed on PEGA with bank statements and addresses covering over the period of 2016 - end of 2019.

72. That statement stands alone (although it was repeated verbatim in a bail summary which was placed before the FtT in October 2021). There is nothing from the respondent’s PEGA system before me. The evidence which I have does not include any documentary confirmation of the appellant’s addresses or banking in the UK before April 2016. The statement on the respondent’s bundle is imprecise and unhelpful as regards the start of the period. Whilst it states that residence has been confirmed to the “end of 2019”, it gives no such detail in relation to the start of the accepted period. I find myself unable to attach any weight to that statement, given its imprecision and the absence of any other evidence concerning the appellant’s residence and exercise of Treaty rights for the first four months of 2016.

73. From April 2016, however, there is clear evidence of the appellant being in the UK and exercising Treaty rights here for a time. The HMRC Employment Schedule shows that the appellant worked for Lord Neidpath’s Estate and the Riverside Shop and Café Ltd in the tax year 2016-2017, earning £4697.43 and £10,807.51 respectively. There is a Lloyd’s bank statement which begins on 18 April 2016 and gives an Oxfordshire address for the appellant. Payments were made on 3 and 31 May and 1 June 2016 which are clearly marked “Riverside Shop & C Waterfront Wages”. Although there are no bank statements for the latter half of 2016, the Lloyd’s Bank statements recommence in January 2017 and show amounts being credited from Lord Neidpath’s Estate. There is clear evidence to show that the appellant was in the UK and economically active in the tax year 2016-2017. The respondent did not contend otherwise.

74. Nor did Ms Masood seek to dispute that the appellant had been in the UK and economically active for the tax year 2017-2018. The appellant’s medical records give an address in Oxfordshire for the appellant in July 2017. The HMRC schedule records that the appellant worked for MP Resourcing and Lord Neidpath’s Estate during this year, earning £10,408,80 and £2,121.21 respectively. There are also payslips from MP Resourcing which cover the period.

75. Ms Masood did dispute that the appellant was in the UK and economically active for much of the tax year 2018-2019, however. The schedule prepared for this appeal cites the appellant’s earnings of £1514.03 in support of his residence in the UK for that year but, as Ms Masood noted, that is hardly a sum which suggests that the appellant undertook very much work at all in that year. There are no bank statements for that period, and there is a gap in the Lloyd’s statements from 26 January 2018 to 11 July 2019. Ms Masood asked the appellant why this should be so. He stated that he did not wish to give inaccurate answers, and that his Lloyd’s account had ultimately been closed. As Ms Masood put to him, however, the Lloyd’s bank statements recommence after July 2019, and what she wanted to know was why there was a gap of more than a year. The appellant was unable to give an adequate response to that question, stating merely that he would need to check his other account (with Monzo) to ascertain where he was and whether he was working. Re-examined by Mr Khubber, he said that his lawyers had obtained these statements, although there was still no explanation for the gap.

76. The appellant has made submissions on this period before me and before the FtT(SSCS). The submissions made in the appeal against the DWP’s decision stated that he had continued living with his then partner (HH, the woman he had met whilst supposedly working at the pub in Oxford) and that he was working as a handyman for her within her Bed and Breakfast business. But there is no evidence from HH about that. No such activity was recorded the HMRC records and, as I have already noted, there are no bank statements covering this period. Whilst I note that there are some payments from HH into the appellant’s account in the period immediately before this gap, the amounts are small and sporadic and coincide with the appellant having a very low balance; the clear implication is that she was gifting him small amounts of money to keep his balance above zero, rather than paying him sums for work done. The evidence does not show that the appellant was exercising Treaty rights (whether as a worker or a self-sufficient person) throughout the tax year 2018-2019.

77. Nor am I prepared to accept that the appellant was within the UK continuously during that tax year. I recall that regulation 3(2)(a) of the 2016 Regulations provides that continuity of residence is not affected by periods of absence from the United Kingdom which do not exceed six months in total in any year. I must therefore consider whether it is more likely than not that the appellant was outside the UK for more than six months in the tax year 2018-2019. The small sum he earned during that year is of little assistance in answering that question. Of greater assistance is the almost complete absence of evidence to show that he was in the United Kingdom, which stands in fairly stark contrast to the evidence of residence I have for other periods. As far as I can tell, the only documentary evidence which gives any indication that the appellant was in the UK in this period is the unparticularised reference in his medical records to “Drug addiction therapy” on 5 September 2018. The appellant was unable to give any real answer to Ms Masood’s questions about the gap in the bank statements.

78. In many cases, of course, it is merely fanciful to suggest that a person who has been in the UK for some time would up sticks and spend such an extended period abroad. In this case, however, I do not consider it at all fanciful to suggest that the appellant might have done so. He had, on my findings, been in the UK for rather less than two years. The appellant’s travel history after the gap also sheds light on his tendency to spend extended periods out of the UK. Foreign transaction fees were applied to various transactions from 19 August to 18 October. The abbreviated details of the transactions show that the appellant was in Spain throughout that time, as was noted at [16] and [53] of the submissions made to the FtT(SSCS) and paragraph 4.2.2 of the appellant’s skeleton argument before me. Taking account of the significant gap in the evidence, the absence of any adequate explanation for that gap, and the appellant’s travel history later in 2019, I conclude that it is more likely than not that he was out of the United Kingdom for more than six months in the tax year 2018-2019, and that his continuity of residence was broken at this time.

79. It follows that the appellant cannot establish five years continuous lawful residence before the date of the decision to deport him in July 2021. It also follows that he cannot establish a Continuous Qualifying Period under the EUSS. He is not entitled to anything other than basic protection under either regime, therefore, and issue (ii) does not arise.

The Third Issue - If A cannot rely on serious grounds but “basic grounds” whether the SSHD has discharged the burden on her to show basic grounds have been established to justify deportation.

80. As the appellant’s counsel correctly recorded in formulating this issue in the manner above, the burden is on the respondent to establish that there are “basic grounds” to justify deportation SSHD v Straszewski [2015] EWCA Civ 1245; [2016] 2 CMLR 3, at [12]. That convenient shorthand means that it is for the respondent to show that the appellant poses a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interests of the United Kingdom, taking into account that the past conduct of the individual and that the threat need not be imminent: regulation 27(5)(c) refers.

81. As observed at paragraph 4.4.1 of the appellant’s skeleton argument, even when considering expulsion on basic grounds, the threshold is set reasonably high because there must be a good reason to justify exporting the problem from one European country to another: VP (Italy) v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 806, at [7], per Carnwath LJ. As Moore-Bick LJ put it at [13] of SSHD v Straszewski, such exceptions to the right to freedom of movement must be construed restrictively because that right is a fundamental aspect of the Union.

82. I heard evidence from the appellant and from PC Weston, although I propose to say very little about PC Weston’s evidence, for essentially the reasons given by Mr Khubber in oral submissions. PC Weston has no knowledge of the appellant beyond considering the PNC. He has never arrested or charged the appellant and he has never come across him in the course of his usual police work. Whilst I am grateful to him for attending the tribunal, and it was necessary for him to do so, his evidence really took matters no further.

The Appellant’s Credibility

83. The appellant’s oral evidence was illuminating. He was cross-examined by Ms Masood for much of the first day and some of the second day and I was able to form a clear view of him as a witness. Even making allowance for the vulnerabilities I have mentioned above, the view that I formed very clearly is that the appellant was a deceitful witness. I reached that conclusion for the following reasons.

84. Firstly, in relation to his conviction for murder, he gave an account which was inconsistent with the record of convictions.

85. When the appellant was asked by Ms Masood to give an account of the events which culminated in his receiving a conviction for murder in 1992, he stated that he had struck a member of the Italian mafia with a metal object because the man had attempted to throw him off a balcony during a heated dispute over some land. He said that he had gone to the police shortly thereafter to confess what had happened. That is essentially the same account he gave to the First-tier Tribunal: [7]-[10] of his original statement and [3] of Judge Seelhoff’s decision refer.

86. The appellant was asked a number of questions about the murder by Ms Masood. He began by stating that he recalled the date of the incident very clearly, and he gave it as 2 February 1991. Ms Masood pointed out that the PNC suggested that the offence had taken place in October that year but the appellant was adamant that it had occurred in February. I take no point against the appellant in that regard; I merely observe that he claimed to have a very precise recollection of the date.

87. Ms Masood asked the appellant whether he had advanced a case of self-defence, given that he was the younger man and had only struck his assailant because he feared being thrown from the balcony. The appellant stated that he could not remember the events at the trial because it had happened 35 years ago. Again, I take no point against the appellant in that regard; it is quite plausible that he would not have understood all that was happening in court, or that he has forgotten the niceties of his defence as a result of the passage of time.

88. The difficulty for the appellant comes about, however, as a result of the fact that he was convicted on the same occasion for an offence of theft. When the appellant was asked about that, he said that he had been prosecuted for stealing a necklace from the neck of the man he had killed. Ms Masood suggested to the appellant that this sat rather uneasily with his suggestion that he had struck the man in self defence and then run away. The appellant merely said that theft had not been the motive. When pressed, the appellant repeated the account he had previously given, and he was unable to give any explanation as to how he had come to take the necklace from the deceased. As Ms Masood put to the appellant, and as she submitted to me, the theft tends to suggest that the appellant’s claim of self-defence is not true.

89. Mr Khubber submitted that the appellant’s claim to self-defence was probably true, however, and he pointed to the fact that the appellant had received a comparatively light sentence (12 years’ imprisonment) for the offence. I decline to make any such finding. There is no evidence before me concerning the Italian sentencing regime in 1992, and I simply cannot say whether a 12 year sentence for that offence is likely to indicate that the version of events in the appellant’s statement was accepted by the court. What I can say with certainty is that the appellant made no reference to the theft in his statement, and that he was unable to reconcile what he said in that statement with the fact that he stole a necklace from the deceased. This difficulty arose within the first few questions of cross-examination and suggested to me that the appellant was a dishonest witness. That impression was confirmed by what followed.

90. Secondly, when asked by Ms Masood about his conviction for robbery in 2013, the appellant gave an account of events which was inconsistent with the record of convictions.

91. According to the PNC, this followed an offence on 21 September 2012. The appellant said that he was in a “horrible situation” because his father had cancer and the appellant had no money and no job. He said that he had agreed to act as a “get-away driver” for two friends who stole cigarettes from a shop. They had been wearing balaclavas, the appellant said, but he stayed in the car, around the corner and ready to drive off once they had completed the robbery. He said that his accomplices had a toy gun from which they had removed the “red part”, which I took to mean the part (probably in the barrel) which would have showed that it was a toy rather than a real firearm. The appellant said that he was not armed. The account that he gave orally in this respect was essentially the same as that which he gave at [15] of his original statement.

92. Ms Masood put to the appellant that the latter suggestion sat rather uneasily with the fact that he was also convicted of the offences of carrying a firearm and ammunition in a public place and possessing a firearm without a certificate on the same date. The appellant suggested that the police had come to his house and had found ammunition in a metal box which belonged to his father but that is no explanation for the conviction for carrying a firearm in a public place. The appellant maintained in answer to this question that the police had not found a gun and that he would contact his Italian lawyer for more information. Ms Masood suggested to him that he was seeking to downplay the seriousness of these offences, and his involvement in them. The appellant said that he was trying to help. I accept Ms Masood’s submission that the appellant was evidently trying to portray this offence in the best possible light and that his account cannot be reconciled with the convictions recorded in the PNC.

93. Thirdly, when the appellant was asked about an allegation of rape which was made against him by his current partner in June 2025, he gave an account which was inconsistent with his witness statement. The schedule of police disclosure records that the appellant’s partner reported to a support worker that she had been raped by the appellant on 18 June 2025. The report was in the following terms (which I have reproduced verbatim):

The victim has disclosed that on Wednesday 18th June 2025. The victim has received a phone call from male called […] (unknown surname) who lives with the victim at their supported accommodation. The victim has answered this phone call and the suspect has become insanely jealous of the victim saying words to the effect of “[…] WANTS TO HAVE SEX WITH YOU.” “YOU ARE A CUNT IF YOU TALK TO HIM.” “FROM NOW ON YOUR NOT ALLOWED HOME. YOU ARE GOING TO STAY HERE.” “I AM GOING TO TEACH YOU A LESSON. YOU DON’T KNOWN WHAT IS COMING TO YOU.” The victim explained to the suspect that he should trust her but this seemed to enrage the suspect more and the suspect became very jealous. The victim and suspect were having a verbal argument about this incident all through the day into the night.

This all ended up getting physical with the suspect punching the victim in the face and head multiple times causing ABH level injuries. The victim has a slight cut to her nose, bruising to the left side of her forehead and red marks to her arm which will be uploaded onto this report, The suspect has then spat in the victims multiple times in a way to degrade her after she fell to the floor after the assault and then chucked a drink all over her.

The suspect has then picked up the victim from the floor and slapped her round the head again. The suspect has then grabbed the victim round the throat restricting her breathing and said words to the effect of “IF THE POLICE COME I WILL KILL YOU.” Then the suspect started to tie up the victim with black cloth and put a sleeping eye mask on the victim and started to sexual assault the victim by forcibly grabbing at her vagina. The victim said that she just shut down because she had been raped previously and the rest of the assault became a bit of a “HAZE”. The suspect has forcibly put his penis in the victim mouth multiple times then the suspect vaginally and anally raped the victim multiple times over the course of a few hours into the early hours of the morning on to the 19th June 2025.

The victim said that she was scared throughout the incident for her life. The victim said that the suspect did it all so forcibly. The whole incident took place in [the appellant’s] bedroom and front room which was […].

It was at this point the victim stopped engaging and said that she wanted to go to sleep. Happy to attend SARC and have samples taken but did not want to give them at that time.

94. The disclosure records that the victim said that “none of this incident was consensual”. The victim went on to allege that the appellant had also stolen £500 from her.

95. An officer attended the scene on 21 June 2025 and a Domestic Violence Protection Notice (“DVPN”) was authorised by a Superintendent and issued to the appellant the following day. A Sexual Offences Liaison Officer was subsequently involved but the victim stated that she was not willing to support a prosecution. The appellant was arrested and responded “no comment” to all questions. The victim told the police that she did not want the appellant to be in custody and that she wanted him to be released. The appellant was released on bail but a Domestic Violence Prevention Order was granted by the court. The case was ultimately closed on the authority of a Detective Inspector on 11 August 2025. The DI was concerned that the victim remained “in harms way” and “at risk of domestic abuse” but he noted that the victim did not intend to support a prosecution and that she wished to resume a relationship with the appellant. He did not consider it to be in her interests of the interests of justice to compel her attendance.

96. This material was disclosed to the appellant in advance of the hearing so that he and his advisers were able to consider it. The appellant made a supplementary statement in which he responded to this and other allegations made in the disclosure. In respect of this incident, the appellant stated:

Regarding the incident alleged to have taken place on the 18-19 June 2025, I remember that I was detained and released on bail. There was an investigation, but no charges were ever pressed. Otherwise, I do not have a clear memory of that time, for the reasons set out above.

97. The “reasons set out above” were his mental health problems, his drug use and the “complete mental collapse” he experienced following his time in immigration detention.

98. Ms Masood asked the appellant about the incident in June 2025. He denied that he had raped his partner on this occasion, or at all, and he gave a detailed account of his version of events. He stated that there had been an argument about his partner being given the synthetic drug “Spice” by another man. The appellant said that this had worried him because Spice users “completely lose control”. He said that he and his partner had been using a lot of cocaine and crack cocaine at the time and that they had not been eating or sleeping. He said that they had been spending all of their money on drugs and that this had caused an argument because he was “not happy about the situation”. The appellant had told her that he wanted to have a break from taking too many drugs and this had caused his partner to grab two knives and say that she was going to hurt herself. He had “blocked” her from doing so, which explained the mark on her nose which was noted in the police report.

99. Ms Masood noted that none of that exculpatory detail was in the appellant’s statement. He said that his solicitors had “not asked him about the detail” and they had merely asked him if he remembered the incidents described. I considered the appellant to be lying to me when he said that. His solicitors have prepared this appeal with the utmost professionalism. They were obviously well aware of what was said in the authorities about the need for proper disclosure, and they would obviously have been equally well aware of the need to ensure that the appellant had a proper opportunity to respond to such serious allegations. I consider it more likely than not that the appellant told his solicitors that he could not remember anything about this recent incident, only to reconsider the wisdom of that stance when he was cross-examined by Ms Masood.

100. Fourthly, the appellant gave evidence in relation to his possession of “tick lists” which he did not provide during police interview. Ms Masood asked the appellant a series of questions about his assertion that he is a drug user but not a drug dealer. She referred the appellant to a report made by a drug user in Canterbury at the end of August 2022. The individual had been seen smoking heroin and crack cocaine in a public place and she told the police that they had been sold to her by the appellant. The appellant was arrested on suspicion of supplying Class A drugs. The drug user stated to the police that the appellant

as a nasty man which is why she was angry at the park yesterday. She said that he had previously assaulted her and stolen from her. She stated that she met him around two months ago in the subway under Farleigh Road, Canterbury to buy some drugs off him. As she approached him in the subway with the cash in her hand, he grabbed her tightly by her chin, ripped the cash out of her hand and then walked of [sic] without giving her drugs. She had a sore chin as a result but had no other injuries. He never returned with any drugs. […] said that he does this a lot with female drug users.

101. The appellant was arrested on suspicion of supplying drugs on 30 August 2022. On arrest, he had two mobile phones and £307 in cash. He had a wrap of drugs in his sock. There was also a distinctive notepad which appeared to contain a “tick list”. The appellant’s home address was searched. Two more phones were discovered. There were also some digital scales and three further wraps. The police also found ripped up paper which matched the distinctive notepad, upon which there were notes which mentioned “money, parcels and amounts of W (white) and D (Dark)”. The appellant was interviewed by the police shortly after arrest. He said that he was a drug user but not a dealer. Asked about the tick lists, the appellant is recorded as having said the following:

[FJ] was asked about the paper that officers found in the bin whilst searching his room. It was described to [FJ] as a “tick list”, he said that he doesn’t know what one is. It was described to him as a list of money owed and written down. The images of the paper was shown to him, exhibit KS/01A. [FJ] said that he had not written on the paper; he does not know who’s writing it was. The other notes were shown to him. [FJ] was explained why it looked like a tick list and could not offer an explanation for the notes. He was asked why it was there if he hadn’t written them and answered “no comment”. When asked if it wasn’t him, who was it, [FJ] suggested it could be his girlfriend but denied that she was involved in drug supply.

102. The police took the view that the appellant was “clearly [a] low level street dealer” but decided not to prosecute because he had what they considered to be a viable defence of duress. That was because he and his partner had been threatened by a gang who had “cuckooed” his flat. The police had subsequently arrested those responsible and had recovered “a large amount of drugs and weapons”.

103. Ms Masood asked the appellant about these events. He said that he had been arrested with a wrap of ketamine in his shoe and that the cash and the other phone were in his girlfriend’s backpack. Asked about the list, the appellant stated initially that he knew nothing about it, and that he really didn’t remember. He said that it was not helpful that Ms Masood could not give him the address at which the documents were recovered. He maintained that he was not a dealer, but Ms Masood pressed him, asking why he would have the lists if he was not a dealer. The appellant stated at that point that it was “the other way around”, and that these lists were lists of debts for him and his girlfriend to pay because they were buying heroin on credit and they needed to know who they had to repay. That was not the account that he gave to the police, or in his previous evidence. If that innocuous explanation was available all along, I cannot see why it would not have been provided to the police or, for that matter, to Ms Masood when she first asked about the lists.

104. As I stated at the start of this analysis, I have taken careful account of all of the medical evidence which is before me. As the most recent expert assessment of the appellant’s mental health, I have taken particular account of the report written by Dr Swain in 2022. I have found it helpful, despite the limitations which she quite properly noted at the start of that report, which included that she was not able to see the appellant in person; that she did not have an Italian interpreter, and that she did not have access to his full medical records. She was nevertheless able to undertake a detailed assessment and to write a lengthy and comprehensive report which details the appellant’s history and his presentation at the point of assessment. Dr Swain noted, amongst other things, that the appellant had suffered a brain injury when he was a boy; that he had made attempts on his life at various stages and in various ways; and that he was a long-term user of a variety of drugs including heroin and crack cocaine. At [129]-[141] of her report, Dr Swain concluded that the appellant was suffering from recurrent depressive disorder with psychotic symptoms. She also noted significant distortions in his personality development and queried whether the childhood brain injury which he had reported was relevant to his current presentation. She noted the role of substance abuse in his mental health conditions. She expressed concern about his risk of completed suicide in the event of deportation.

105. Whilst I have taken those observations into account, I considered the appellant to be a deceitful witness. He gave evidence in a clear and forthright manner. What was notable about his evidence was his tendency to omit or add detail which he thought was likely to assist his case. His account of the murder omitted reference to the theft of the necklace, which he could not satisfactorily explain. His account of the robbery omitted his conviction for possession of a firearm in a public place. He said in his statement that he could not remember what had happened in June 2025 when his partner made an allegation of rape, only to recall at the hearing that he was defending himself when she attacked him with two knives. And he maintained to the police that he knew nothing about the tick lists which were found at his home address, only to tell me (when pressed by Ms Masood) that he was keeping a tally of the debts he owed to his suppliers. I considered these to be calculated omissions or additions, designed to assist the appellant’s case against deportation, and I did not accept that they were attributable to the mental health conditions detailed in the medical evidence.

106. Having taken that view of the appellant’s credibility, I return to the question posed by the sub-heading above: what risk, if any, does the appellant present to the fundamental interests of society? I have already detailed his convictions in Italy and the UK. Ms Masood also relied on various incidents of “non-conviction conduct” which were helpfully particularised in a schedule which was filed in compliance with directions I made in September 2025. One additional incident was identified in the core bundle which was subsequently prepared.

Non-Conviction Conduct – The Law

107. The law in this area has been considered by Presidential panels of the Upper Tribunal in Bah (EO (Turkey) – liability to deport) [2012] UKUT 196 (IAC) and Farquharson (removal – proof of conduct) [2013] UKUT 146(IAC) and by the Administrative Court (Hickinbottom J, as he then was) in R (V) v AIT & SSHD [2009] EWHC 1902 (Admin).

108. In the latter decision, Hickinbottom J rejected a submission that it was unlawful for the tribunal to consider evidence that V had murdered a person in London despite his acquittal of that offence in the Crown Court. Hickinbottom J stated that the Secretary of State could still seek to persuade the tribunal on the civil standard that V had committed the murder, and he stated that he was unimpressed by the submission that the professional judges of the tribunal would be unduly influenced by the nature of the evidence.

109. In Farquharson, a panel of the Upper Tribunal chaired by Blake J held that the principles established in Bah applied to removal as they did to deportation. Bah was a decision of a three-judge panel of the Upper Tribunal, comprising Blake J and Upper Tribunal Judges Southern and Gill. The first paragraph of the judicial headnote to that decision states as follows:

In a deportation appeal not falling within section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007, the sequence of decision making set out in EO (deportation appeals: scope and process) Turkey [2007] UKAIT 62 still applies but the first step is expanded as follows:
 
i)     Consider whether the person is liable to be deported on the grounds set out by the Secretary of State. This will normally involve the judge examining:-
 
a.     Whether the material facts alleged by the Secretary of State are accepted and if not whether they  are made out to the civil standard flexibly applied;
b.     Whether on the facts established viewed as a whole the conduct character or associations reach such a level of seriousness as to justify a decision to deport;
c.     In considering b) the judge will take account of any lawful policy of the Secretary of State relevant to the exercise of the discretion to deport and whether the discretion has been exercised in accordance with that policy;

110. Mr Khubber rather tentatively expressed some doubt as to whether these principles should apply in the context of deportation under European law as they do under the domestic deportation or removal framework. I see no principled reason for adopting a different approach. It is necessary in either context to consider the appellant’s past conduct, and there is no reason to exclude conduct which has not resulted in a conviction, providing that it is established to the civil standard. Conduct which results in a conviction and conduct which does not both fall within the scope of an appellant’s “personal conduct”.

111. Ms Masood cited Wahl v Iceland [2014] 1 CMLR 29 in support of that approach. That was a case in which a member of the Hell’s Angels motorcycle gang had been excluded from Iceland because of a police danger assessment which had concluded that his personal conduct in connection with that membership was likely to constitute a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interests of the country. In its advisory opinion, the court held that

• Under art.7 EEA, an EEA/EFTA State has the choice of form and method when implementing an act corresponding to Directive 2004/38 into its legal order. Depending on the legal context, the implementation of a directive does not necessarily require legislative action, as long as it is implemented with *839 unquestionable binding force and the specificity, precision and clarity necessary to satisfy the requirements of legal certainty.

• It is sufficient for an EEA State to base a decision under art.27 of the Directive not to grant an individual who is a national of another EEA State leave to enter its territory on grounds of public policy and/or public security only upon a danger assessment, which assesses the role of the individual in the accession of a new charter to an organisation of which the individual is a member and which concludes that the organisation is associated with organised crime and that where such an organisation has managed to establish itself, organised crime has increased. It is further required that the assessment is based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned. Moreover, this personal conduct must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society, and the restriction on the right to entry must be proportionate. In the light of the relevant matters of fact and law, it is for the national court to determine whether those requirements are met.

• An EEA State cannot be obliged to declare an organisation and membership therein unlawful before it can deny a member of that organisation who is a national of another EEA State leave to enter its territory pursuant to art.27 of the Directive if recourse to such a declaration is not thought appropriate in the circumstances. However, the EEA State must have clearly defined its standpoint as regards the activities of that organisation and, considering the activities to be a threat to public policy and/or public security, it must have taken administrative measures to counteract those activities.

• In order to invoke a public policy and/or public security threat under art.27(1) of the Directive it does not suffice that an EEA State has defined as punishable, conduct that consists of conniving with another person in the commission of an act, the commission of which is part of the activities of a criminal organisation.

• The national administrative authorities must ensure that there is sufficient evidence to conclude under art.27(2) of the Directive that the individual concerned was likely to engage in personal conduct that represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. It is for the national court to determine, in compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, whether this is the case.

112. In deportation proceedings under EU law, as the Court of Appeal explained in Straszewski, the task of the tribunal is one of forward-looking risk assessment, focused on the personal conduct of the individual: regulation 27(5)(b) refers. The factual foundation for that assessment is usually based on criminal convictions and on an assessment of the post-conviction conduct of the appellant, so as to decide whether it is more likely than not that there is a risk of future offending. In a case such as the present, however, the evidence on which the respondent relies as the starting point for that assessment is conviction-based and non-conviction based. The former is not subject to question, whereas it is for the respondent to establish the reliability of the latter. As I have said, I see no reason in principle why that should be impermissible in this context. I accept that Wahl v Iceland provides some support for the respondent’s approach. I also consider it to be supported by regulation 27(5)(f), which provides that

(f) the decision may be taken on preventative grounds, even in the absence of previous criminal convictions, provided the grounds are specific to the person.

113. Mr Khubber cited the decision of the CJEU in K v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie and HF v Belgische Staat (C-331/16 and C-366/16); [2018] 3 CMLR 26 at paragraph 3.13 of his skeleton argument. That was a case in which the authorities of the excluding states (The Netherlands and Belgium) sought to expel individuals who had been excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention on account of their participation in war crimes. K and HF relied on their rights to remain in the expelling state under the Citizenship Directive. The Grand Chamber ruled that it did not automatically follow from the exclusion under the Refugee Convention that a person represented a genuine present and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interests of society, and that:

The finding that there is such a threat must be based on an assessment, by the competent authorities of the host Member State, of the personal conduct of the individual concerned, taking into consideration the findings of fact in the decision to exclude that individual from refugee status and the factors on which that decision is based, particularly the nature and gravity of the crimes or acts that he is alleged to have committed, the degree of his individual involvement in them, whether there are any grounds for excluding criminal liability, and whether or not he has been convicted. That overall assessment must also take account of the time that has elapsed since the date when the crimes or acts were allegedly committed and the subsequent conduct of that individual, particularly in relation to whether that conduct reveals the persistence in him of a disposition hostile to the fundamental values enshrined in Articles 2 and 3 TEU, capable of disturbing the peace of mind and physical security of the population. The mere fact that the past conduct of that individual took place in a specific historical and social context in his country of origin, which is not liable to recur in the host Member State, does not preclude such a finding.

114. As Mr Khubber recognised in his skeleton argument, therefore, the Grand Chamber accepted that non-conviction evidence of conduct could form the basis of a decision to restrict free movement rights. In principle, therefore, there can be no proper objection to the consideration of material such as that relied upon by the Secretary of State in this case, and the reception of that material is just as unobjectionable in an EU context as it is under the regimes considered in Bah and Farquharson.

115. In the following paragraph of his skeleton argument, however, Mr Khubber takes a point which was foreshadowed in correspondence between the parties, which is that the respondent has not made full disclosure of all material obtained by the police in connection with the non-conviction conduct relied upon. In reliance on the EU law principle of effective judicial protection, he submits that the appellant must have adequate disclosure “to defend his rights in the best possible conditions” and “to examine all the documents or observations submitted to the court for the purpose of influencing its decision, and to comment on them.” Mr Khubber took those observations from the decision of the Grand Chamber in ZZ v SSHD (C-300/11); [2013] 3 CMLR 46.

116. ZZ was a national security case, concerning the procedures adopted in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, in which judicial decisions might be “founded on facts and documents which the parties themselves, or one of them, have not had an opportunity to examine and on which they have therefore been able to state their views.”: [56]. This is obviously not such a case; I have not been asked to consider any material which was not made available to the applicant, and he has had an opportunity to consider all of the material on which this decision is based.

117. Mr Khubber’s fundamental point, however, is that which was made in the third paragraph of the Upper Tribunal’s decision in Farquharson: that “the relevant documents should be produced, rather than a bare witness statement referring to them”. Mr Khubber is correct, it seems, to submit that the respondent has not produced every single document held by the police in respect of the non-conviction conduct. That was seemingly accepted in correspondence between the parties before the hearing. Having reviewed the disclosure, the appellant’s solicitors sought “further disclosure of any interview records/statement made by the Appellant in interviews for the alleged incidents.” and “any medical assessment of the Appellant while he was in custody on the occasions referred to”. Dr Hopkin of the GLD responded to that request in the following terms:

After communications with the police concerning interview records and statements available for disclosure following the request from the Appellant’s solicitors, we have been advised that such a request would require extensive resources given the nature of having to redact individuals outside of Mr Fasulo from the audio recordings as well as transcribing all interviews between 2022 – 2025. The Secretary of State submits that this would be disproportionate and, in any case, based on the existing MG11 evidence, reports and statements submitted in October 2025 as part of the respondent’s supplementary bundle running to 371 pages, she has already complied with the guidance given in the authority Farquharson [2013] UKUT 146 at paragraphs 23 – 28 by when providing intelligence material relied upon. The Secretary of State does not therefore intend to submit any further material from the police.

118. I accept what was said in that letter. The appellant was not disadvantaged by the scope of the evidence provided by the Secretary of State, which provided more than a gist of the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence gathered (and not gathered) in respect of each of the incidents upon which the Secretary of State relied. The disclosure was adequate, in other words, to enable the appellant to mount a rebuttal.

Non-Conviction Conduct - Conclusions

119. In respect of some of the incidents relied upon by the respondent, there is so little detail in the papers that it would not be appropriate to attach any weight to those matters. Into that category fall the second, third and fourth incidents on the respondent’s schedule.

120. The second incident concerns a complaint that the appellant threatened to stab someone in the vagina during an argument, but very little is said about the incident and it is not even clear who made the complaint. Ms Masood made it clear that this allegation was no longer relied upon.

121. The third incident concerns a complaint that the appellant threatened to stab someone if she did not pay for the drugs he had supplied to her. Again, however, even the identity of the complainant is not clear from the police material.

122. The fourth complaint seemingly concerns the appellant’s current partner. It was that he was controlling her, making her pay for drugs and forcing her into prostitution. But very little investigative work was put into that complaint and the evidence is scant.

123. The tenth incident also falls into this category. It was reported in September 2022 that the appellant had sexually assaulted a female whilst sharing a tent with her but the identity of that complainant is unclear, and it seems that she was dismissive of the incident when subsequently approached by police, describing the appellant as having been “touchy feely” only.

124. There are four remaining allegations of sexual assault and/or rape in the papers. Firstly, in the summer of 2023, the appellant was alleged to have raped G near a supermarket as a punishment for chiding him about his drug use. Secondly, in the summer of 2024, the appellant was alleged to have licked his current partner’s vagina whilst she was asleep, after which he had written the words “Been licked out” on her body. Thirdly, is the event which I have already detailed above, in June 2025, in which the appellant is said to have bound and raped his current partner orally, anally and vaginally when he was enraged by her contact with another man. Fourthly, the appellant is alleged to have raped his current partner in a wooded area in January this year.

125. The appellant denied the first of those claims, stating that G had made it up a week after they had split up. He said that she was seeking revenge. He said that he had no recollection of it because it did not happen. She had made it up, he said, because she had lost her flat and ended up homeless as a result of their relationship. He said that it was completely invented. I note that G wished to pursue a prosecution but it was not pursued because of a lack of evidence, whether forensic or otherwise.

126. The appellant denied the second of the allegations. He said that it had been reported not by his partner but by a social worker, and that she had made a further statement in which she had stated that it was untrue. He said that he was “not a weird person” and that no such claim had come from R. Ms Masood pressed the appellant. She showed him the police report, which stated that the complaint had been made by his partner but he maintained that it had been manufactured by the support workers at the property R lived in because they did not like him. Ms Masood put to him at the start of the second day of the hearing that R had reported that their relationship was “toxic” but he said that this was to do with their joint drug use, whereas their relationship itself was “full of love”.

127. I have already recounted the substance of the third allegation and the appellant’s response to it, which I considered to be unsatisfactory for the reasons above.

128. The final incident is quite recent. The appellant’s current partner returned to her supported accommodation at 1030am on 24 January 2026. She was described by a support worker as being “mentally drained and had a swollen face with bruises”. She was asked if she was okay, whereupon she said that she was “mentally down”. The support worker took R to get her medication from the pharmacy, whereupon she began to cry and stated that the appellant had “strangled her, forcefully raped her mercilessly, beat her and put her in the wooded areas”. She said that she was unwilling to engage with the police because “This has happened before and nothing happened.” She told the officers that the appellant was controlling and manipulative but that she would not give an evidential account because she was “terrified of potential repercussions” from the appellant. Ultimately, when spoken to by a Sexual Offences Liaison Officer (“SOLO”), R refused to provide intimate samples or to support any prosecution. She stated that she had not been raped. The SOLO observed no injuries on R, and it was concluded that there were “no viable lines of enquiry and no other evidence available that could support a charging decision”.

129. When Ms Masood asked the appellant about these police reports, he stated that he had a clear recollection of the evening. He said that he and R had had a “small fight”, which was drug-related, but that they had then decided to go to a romantic wooded area “where you can see animals and stars”. He said that he had seen a shooting star and was thinking about his mother. R had got out of the car after half an hour so and they had had “a romantic evening in the woods”. Ms Masood asked the appellant why R had gone on to say what she had said when she returned to her supported accommodation. The appellant said that R had not reported these events, and that it had been manufactured by a support worker from City Care as a result of their animus towards him.

130. I do not consider it at all likely that support workers would manufacture serious allegations such as these. The appellant sought to suggest that they had a grudge against him because of his behaviour in R’s supported housing but I do not accept that any such annoyance would cause a professional support worker to fabricate allegations of rape in the way that the appellant suggested. It is much more likely that R did report these allegations to the support workers, only to retract them subsequently.

131. Not one of these incidents resulted in a formal police charge. There was certainly no decision to prosecute taken by the Crown Prosecution Service, and none of the allegations resulted in any proceedings before a court. As detailed in the papers, and above, that is because the complainants were ultimately unwilling to support a prosecution and/or because of the overarching evidential weaknesses.

132. Having considered all of the evidence before me, I consider it more likely than not that the appellant raped G and that he has also raped R. In reaching that conclusion, I am acutely conscious of the fact that the evidence in this case is not as strong as the evidence which the tribunal considered in Farquharson. Nor, as Mr Khubber quite properly noted, do I have any records of police interviews as such; the evidence is limited to the police summaries of those interactions.

133. What struck me as I read the police evidence, however, is the similarity between the allegations made by these two women. That was a point made by Ms Masood in her skeleton argument as well. The appellant is said to have raped G as punishment for her chiding him over his drug use. He is said to have raped R as punishment for her association with a man of whom the appellant did not approve. There is no suggestion that these two women know each other, and it is inherently unlikely that they would both claim that the appellant had raped them as a punishment.

134. I was also struck by the difficulties with the appellant’s evidence. As I have recorded above, he sought to blame his immigration advisors for the suggestion in his statement that he could remember nothing of the incident in June 2025 and he sought to suggest that the support workers had manufactured the incident at the start of this year. I did not consider either explanation to be true for the reasons I have given. I consider that it is highly likely that the appellant is violent and coercive in his relationships. I was particularly concerned by the evidence I read about R. She lives in supported housing. She is a heavy drug user. She seemingly suffers from mental health problems as well. She is described in the papers as being “extremely vulnerable”. A community practitioner opined in 2024 that R does not even have capacity.

135. The Detective Seargent who reviewed the evidence concerning the incident in June 2025 remarked in August last year that “I think we are going to have to accept the remaining risk of further harm” to G. I consider that assessment to have been sound, and I think it more likely than not that the appellant poses a risk of violence and sexual violence to R and to any other women with whom he becomes involved sexually. He had convictions for serious violence when he arrived in the UK but his violent and coercive behaviour now takes place within his relationships with vulnerable women.

136. I also consider it more likely than not that the appellant has been engaged in what the police have described as low-level street dealing of Class A drugs. He has been identified to the police as a street dealer. He has been found by the police to have amounts of cash which are inconsistent with his legitimate income. When asked to explain those sums in cross-examination he said that he had no bank account at the relevant time but the bank statements before me suggest otherwise. He has managed to sustain addictions to heroin and crack cocaine for years. There is unexplained activity in his bank statements; in December 2022 alone, some £2730 passed through the appellant’s Monzo account. His explanation for the “tick lists” found by the police has not previously been given, and was in my judgment a fabrication designed to address a problem raised in Ms Masood’s excellent cross-examination. If, as he now accepts, those lists were in his own hand, it is more likely than not that the lists were of money owed to him than of money owed by him. I consider that the evidence before me is more than sufficient to show that the appellant has been involved in supplying drugs of class A to the other users with whom he associates.

137. It is said that the appellant’s life has now stabilised because he has stopped taking street drugs and is following a regime of opiate substance replacement with the support of the Forward Trust. I note their email to the appellant’s solicitor of 10 September 2025, in which they confirm that the appellant had attended 115 out of 126 appointments and was no longer rough sleeping.

138. I also note what is said by Mr Limebury, and there was no challenge to his evidence. He is the appellant’s Housing Led Support Worker and he is evidently very supportive of the appellant. It was Mr Limebury who took charge of the situation when it emerged at the end of the first day of the hearing that the appellant would need to attend a pharmacy to get his methadone prescription. Mr Limebury explained in his statement that the appellant had voluntarily engaged with the substance misuse service and other relevant services but that he has assisted the appellant to manage his utility bills and benefits. He says that the appellant had gained independence and has been granted Personal Independence Payment and Universal Credit. He adds that addiction is a mental health disorder and that “the road to recovery is not a straight line and we expect people to relapse”.

139. Although Mr Limebury states at [11] of that statement that he is aware that the appellant has been arrested on a number of occasions during the time that he has been known to their service, it is not at all clear that the appellant has been frank with Mr Limebury about the extent to which his addiction has relapsed. Mr Limbeury’s statement was signed in February 2026 yet it makes no reference to the events of June 2025, as recounted above. On the appellant’s case, he and his partner were spending all of their money on cocaine and crack cocaine at that time, such that it led to a confrontation. The appellant’s account of events was not of a bump in the road or a minor relapse but of a period in which he and his partner were not eating or sleeping and were entirely focused on the consumption of drugs. I do not accept that the appellant’s life has stabilised to the extent he has suggested, and I think it likely that he has presented his circumstances in an artificial light to his support workers. His claims to be on the path to recovery from those addictions is not borne out when set against his evidence of recent and significant divergence from that path.

140. In sum, I consider that it is more likely than not that the appellant has dealt in drugs of class A and I consider that there is a continuing risk of him doing so because he remains a user of those substances and is likely to fund his use by selling to others, as he has in the past.

141. I conclude that the appellant presents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious risk to the fundamental interests of the United Kingdom for the two reasons set out above. As the police have concluded, despite the absence of a successful prosecution, the appellant presents a risk of violence and sexual violence to his current partner. And he presents a risk to wider society in the form of supplying class A drugs. I do not propose to lengthen this judgment with reference to authorities defining the fundamental interests of society since the risks which the appellant currently poses so obvious fall within that definition.

142. I therefore answer the third question posed in Mr Khubber’s skeleton argument by concluding that the respondent has discharged the burden upon her to show basic grounds have been established to justify the appellant’s deportation.

143. It will be noted that I have reached that conclusion without reference to schedule 1 of the 2016 Regulations, and have not needed to consider what was said by Mr Khubber about the need to approach that schedule with caution. Nor has it been necessary to consider whether the appellant is a persistent offender or whether the Bouchereau exception applies, as Ms Masood contended orally and in writing.

144. I add this. I have concluded in answer to the first of Mr Khubber’s questions that the appellant is not entitled to “serious grounds” protection against deportation. Had I accepted his submissions in that regard, however, I would have concluded that there were serious grounds to justify the appellant’s deportation. The risks I have detailed in this section of my decision amply provide serious grounds for the expulsion of an EEA national. In reaching that conclusion, I make clear that I am conscious of the entirety of the guidance given by Moore-Bick LJ in SSHD v Strazsweski.

The Fourth Issue - whether deportation under EU law would be proportionate and therefore lawful.

145. In order to decide whether the appellant’s expulsion would be a proportionate measure under EU law, it is necessary to consider the factors set out at regulation 27(6), which mirror those set out Article 28(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC: “age, state of health, family and economic situation of P, P’s length of residence in the United Kingdom, P’s social and cultural integration into the United Kingdom and the extent of P’s links with P’s country of origin.”

146. I have been assisted in that analysis by the parties’ skeleton arguments but particularly by paragraph 4.7.1-4.7.2 of Mr Khubber’s.

147. The appellant is currently aged 54. He is in poor mental and physical health for the reasons I have considered at some length already.

148. I have not accepted that the appellant has been in the UK for the 11 years suggested by Mr Khubber. I have found that he entered in 2016 and then spent an extended period out of the country in 2018 and 2019. He is recorded as having re-entered the UK on 17 October 2019 and I accept that he has been resident since then. As Mr Khubber submitted, he has spent no time in prison in the UK but the fact remains that he has spent most of his life in Italy.

149. The appellant has no family in the UK. The relationships which he has in this country, including particularly his relationship with R, are manipulative and built around drug use. His father passed away in Italy some years ago. According to his original statement, only his sister remains in Italy but they do not get on very well.

150. The appellant’s economic situation is as previously set out. He has worked to some extent in the UK but he is currently dependent on PIP and Universal Credit. As to the appellant’s level of integration, I accept the following submission made by Mr Khubber as to the law:

Contrary to the Respondent’s skeleton argument, §52(b), A’s integration and private life ties need to be weighed against any threat he poses to public policy. The conduct justifying his expulsion cannot also be used to remove weight from his integration based on temporal proximity. If that is the effect of Schedule 1 of the 2016 EEA Regulations, it should not be applied. A different, legitimate question is whether, as a matter of fact, any criminal offending reflects a lack of integration or has undermined it (compare, by analogy , CI (Nigeria) [2019] EWCA Civ 2027, at [77]-[78]).

151. On any rational view, the appellant’s degree of integration to the United Kingdom is minimal. He has undertaken some work and he has formed some relationships in the past but much of his time here has been as a drug addict. On my findings, he has also engaged in drug dealing and serious sexual violence against his partners, all of which points away from a finding that he has achieved any real integration to the United Kingdom. Mr Khubber relies on the stability which the appellant is said to have achieved with the support of various dedicated professionals including Mr Limebury but, as I have explained, the extent of that stability is not as claimed.

152. I accept Mr Khubber’s submission that the appellant’s subjective fear of the mafia, as described in the psychiatric reports, is relevant to the assessment of proportionality, and militates against his deportation. I also accept that the appellant’s deportation to Italy is likely to bring about some deterioration in his mental health, for the reasons given at paragraph 4.7.1(iii) and (iv) of Mr Khubber’s skeleton argument. Dr Swain and Professor Katona expressed concern about the appellant’s mental health deteriorating in the event that he was removed from the excellent package of support he received in the UK.

153. The support which the appellant receives from Mr Limebury and others would obviously be discontinued and he would need to access whatever support might be available for him in Italy. There is a lack of evidence to suggest that there would be inadequate services to support the appellant there, however, and I do not accept that the Italian authorities would permit the appellant to deteriorate to the extent that he was at risk of further suicide attempts. The proposal is to deport him to a signatory state of the ECHR and there is no reason to think that Italy fails to provide its citizens with an adequate standard of healthcare to address mental health problems including addiction. Whilst there is obviously a risk associated with a discontinuity in care, the evidence does not establish that it is as significant as suggested by the appellant’s counsel because there is an absence of evidence as to what is available in Italy.

154. Mr Khubber also suggested that the appellant’s rehabilitation would be compromised in the event of his deportation. He relied on MC (Portugal) [2015] UKUT 520 (IAC); [2016] Imm AR 114, in which the Upper Tribunal drew on authorities of the CJEU and the domestic courts to give guidance on the significance of rehabilitation in cases such as this. The Upper Tribunal explained that references to the prospects of rehabilitation concerned the reasonable prospects of a person ceasing to commit crime, and that gauging such prospects required an assessment of the relative prospects of rehabilitation in the expelling state as compared with those in the state of origin.

155. Given the findings I have already made about the appellant’s drug use, the likelihood of him supplying drugs to others, and the risk he presents to his partner, I very much doubt that it can properly be said that the appellant is in the process of “rehabilitating” in any real sense. On the contrary, his conduct towards his partner in January this year shows that he continues to present a serious risk to her. There is, on my findings, no reasonable prospect of the appellant ceasing to commit crime in the United Kingdom or in Italy. As I have found above, however, there is no evidence before me to show that the facilities for supporting the appellant in Italy would be in any way inferior to those which he is able to access in the UK.

156. I note also the final paragraph of the judicial headnote of the guidance in MC (Portugal), which provides that:

In the absence of integration and a right of permanent residence, the future prospects of integration cannot be a weighty factor (Dumliauskas [44] and [54]). Even when such prospects have significant weight they are not a trump card, as what the Directive and the 2006 EEA Regulations require is a wide-ranging holistic assessment. Both recognise that the more serious the risk of reoffending, and the offences that a person may commit, the greater the right to interfere with the right of residence (Dumliauskas at [46] and [54]).

157. The final sentence of that paragraph emphasises that the task of a decision maker in this context is to weigh the risk of the reoffending against the interests of the individual. In this case, the outcome of such a balance must be clear. Whilst the appellant’s removal will be unsettling for him, and will bring to an end the package of support he receives from the British authorities, the risk he poses to the fundamental interests of the United Kingdom is such that his deportation is a proportionate measure.

158. Again, had I reached the conclusion that the appellant enjoyed serious grounds protection against deportation, I would still have concluded that his deportation is a proportionate measure, such is the risk he poses to vulnerable parts of the community of the United Kingdom.

159. The appellant’s appeal against the decision to deport him from the United Kingdom under the 2016 Regulations must therefore be dismissed. Mr Khubber made no separate submissions in relation to the decision under the EUSS or Article 8 ECHR and the appeal falls to be dismissed in those respects also. For the reasons I have given above, any interference with the appellant’s private life in the United Kingdom is amply justified by the countervailing public interest in his deportation.

Notice of Decision

The First-tier Tribunal’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law and that decision has been set aside. I remake the decision on the appellant’s appeals by dismissing the appeals.


Mark Blundell

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 May 2026