Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2023-005472
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/60575/2022
IA/00533/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8th December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

Between

RAT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Winter
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Edinburgh on 6 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a female citizen of Eritrea born on 20 November 2006. She made an application to join her half-brother (the sponsor) in the United Kingdom. She appealed to the First-tier Tribunal after her application for entry clearance to the United Kingdom was refused by the Entry Clearance Officer dated 10 November 2022. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed her appeal. She now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
2. There is a single ground of appeal:
The FTT erred in undertaking the proportionality assessment for the following reasons:
(i) The FTT failed to consider whether it was reasonable for entry clearance to be refused. The FTT did not recognise that the proportionality assessment also encompasses reasonableness. The error is material as had the FTT recognised that there is a real possibility of a different decision being reached (GM (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1630 at paragraph 53 per Green LJ);
(ii) Although the FTT notes the age of the appellant there is no reference to assessing the best interests of the appellant as a child. In substance the FTT has erred by failing to assess whether it is in the best interests of the appellant to remain in Uganda rather than being reunited with her family in the UK;
(iii) The informed reader is left in real and substantial doubt as to why the FTT states at paragraph 28 that the appellant is not financially independent when the Home Office accepted the finances of the sponsor at paragraph 20 being sufficient. That is material as the remaining reasons are the appellant’s lack of English and not meeting part of the Immigration Rule. There is a real possibility that a different conclusion could be reached. The appellant is prejudiced where her appeal has been refused.
3. Mr Winter, who appeared for the appellant before the Upper Tribunal, submitted that, had the judge considered whether it was reasonable to maintain the separation of a 17 year old girl from her family in the United Kingdom (see GM (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1630) then there is a real possibility that the Tribunal would have come to a different conclusion. Mr Winter acknowledged that the judge had considered ‘all relevant factors’ but his failure then to consider reasonableness vitiated his decision.
4. The Entry Clearance Officer had refused the application under paragraph 319X(ii):
(ii) the relative has limited leave in the United Kingdom as a refugee or beneficiary of humanitarian protection and there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make exclusion of the child undesirable and suitable arrangements have been made for the child’s care;
5. The Entry Clearance Officer’s refusal letter states:
I note that you state that you have been living with your half-brother’s wife in Uganda for the last 3 years. With regards to serious and compelling family or other considerations, these are limited to circumstances where a child cannot be adequately cared for by parents or relatives in the country in which they are living. Given that you reside with your half-brother’s wife, and you have provided nothing to suggest that she is not able to continue adequately caring for you, I am not satisfied that special consideration should be given to you joining your half-brother in the UK. I am not satisfied that there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make your exclusion from the UK undesirable. Your application is therefore refused under paragraph 319X(ii) of the Immigration Rules.
6. In GM, the Court of Appeal held at [53]:
In this case the Judge did not say that she was considering the "reasonableness" of the husband leaving and instead focused upon whether he had the ability / capability to move to Sri Lanka: see FTT paragraph [46]. The UT judge when rejecting the appeal commented that although the Judge did not make a finding that it was "reasonable" for the husband to return to Sri Lanka that this is what she intended to so find: UT paragraph [13]. However, this is not clear on our reading of the FTT ruling, which is about ability not reasonableness or fair balance. There will of course be some nexus between the two concepts, but they are not the same: a person might be able to return to a foreign country, yet it might still be unreasonable or disproportionate to compel return. The point is made for the Appellant that if her husband and children were to follow her then they would lose their leave to remain and with it the chance (which of course did materialise) of settled status in the UK. There is no analysis of whether in such circumstances this was proportionate or reasonable for the husband or for the children.
The Court of Appeal decided GM on its particular facts (a person returning from the United Kingdom to a foreign country and effectively giving up a right to remain in the United Kingdom). Those facts are materially different from those of the instant appeal. Having said that, I acknowledge that the judge in the instant appeal was required to have regard to reasonableness in achieving a fair balance between the public interest and the appellant’s own interests. The Court of Appeal held that it was necessary for a Tribunal to reasonableness of a proposed course of action as opposed to a consideration of whether such a course was possible. In my opinion, the judge in the instant appeal has taken a broad view of the evidence; his analysis is not ‘mechanistic’ in the manner deprecated by the Court of Appeal in GM. The judge has considered the appeal holistically and has reached findings open to him on the evidence. I am not satisfied that the Upper Tribunal should interfere with the judge’s decision.
7. In my opinion, the judge has carried out an adequate analysis of the relevant evidence. At [22], the judge found that the appellant had failed to discharge the burden of proof upon her to ‘gainsay’ the passage of the refusal letter which I have quoted above. The judge found that the appellant had failed to adduce ‘cogent evidence.’ Those findings were available to the judge.
8. As regards the grounds of appeal at (ii), contrary to what is asserted in the grounds, the judge did consider section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 at [20]:
In terms of section 55, addressed in the decision notice, the appellant was safe in Uganda on the arrangements made by HA and his wife. [my emphasis]
The reference is brief but it clearly indicates that the judge was aware that he had to consider the appellant’s best interests. On the facts, it is difficult to know what else the judge could have said; the appellant is living apparently comfortably with adults in Eritrea who care for her whilst the judge found had found that she had failed to adduce evidence that her best interests required that she move to the United Kingdom to live instead with her half-brother.
9. The grounds at (iii) submit the judge has made a finding which is inconsistent with the Entry Clearance Officer’s decision. I disagree. At [20], the judge observed that ‘In terms of recourse to public funds Mr Warren [the Presenting Officer] accepted that [the sponsor’s] resources as a taxi driver and a student in receipt of a student bursary were sufficient.’ At [28], the judge noted that ‘the appellant is not financially independent’. Both statements are accurate; the appellant is not financially independent in the sense that she does not have any income of her own whilst she would not be a burden on public funds because she would be maintained by the sponsor. I am not satisfied that ‘an informed reader’ would be ‘left in real and substantial doubt’ by reading the judge’s decision.
10. For the reasons I have given, I find that the appeal should be dismissed.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

C. N. Lane

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 2 November 2025