Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2023-005645
UI-2023-005646

First-tier Tribunal Nos: EA/12649/2021
EA/12650/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 30 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

(1) SOBIA RAMZAN
(2) AISHA RAMZAN
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Mohammad, sponsor in person
For the Respondent: Mr P Lawson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 19 August 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This decision is the remaking of the appellants’ appeals following the decision of Upper Tribunal Judge Keith issued on 29 May 2025 (see annex attached) setting aside, for error of law, the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal of 12 April 2022 dismissing their appeals.

Background

2. The appellants are nationals of Pakistan (dates of birth 6 December 1994 and 15 May 1991 respectively) resident in Italy. They have become Italian nationals since the date of application. They are the daughters of Mr Ramzan Mohammad the sponsor, an Italian national who now has settled status in the UK. By applications in May 2021 the appellants applied (with the second appellant’s toddler son Ayan) for EUSS family permits as the dependent children over 21/grandchild of the sponsor. The appellants’ applications were refused in August 2021 on the basis they had not provided adequate evidence to show they were dependent on the sponsor; whilst they had provided evidence to show that they had access to the funds in the sponsor’s bank account, they had not provided any evidence of their own domestic circumstances in Italy. The appellants appealed and their appeals were dismissed in the First-Tier Tribunal as set out above; the appeal of the second appellant’s son was allowed as he did not have to show dependency on his grandfather.

The hearing

3. At the time of the hearing before Upper Tribunal Judge Keith the appellants’ bundle could not be located. Mr Lawson was able to find and send to me the original appellants’ bundle which included the sponsor’s witness statement. The appellants through the sponsor, with the help of the tribunal had put forward a bundle which contained some additional evidence (mostly along the same lines as the original, bills and bank statements from the sponsor’s Italian bank account) but also the appellants’ recent Italian passports and letters from the appellants. The letters from the appellants express their love for their father and desire for the family to be reunited rather than concentrating on the issue of financial dependency. There is some peripheral mention of relevant issues; the first appellant refers to “the economic challenges in Italy” and the second appellant explains that her son is still living with her in Italy, that her husband is in Pakistan unable to find stable work and she is unable to sponsor him due to her own circumstances.

4. The sponsor gave evidence through an Urdu interpreter and was cross-examined by Mr Lawson. I summarise what he said. He explained that he had lived in Italy since 1995 or 1996 and his family came from Pakistan to join him in 2010. At the time the two appellants had been aged about 16 and 19. They had been studying in Pakistan before they joined him in Italy. The other family members who joined the sponsor in Italy were his wife, his twin sons and a younger daughter. All seven of them lived in the rented property in which the appellants remained living. His sons used to work in Italy, but his daughters did not work. There was not much work in Italy and his sons were not getting continuous work, they had moved to the UK because it was difficult to find work in Italy. The sponsor had moved to the UK first in 2017, then his sons and then his wife came with the youngest daughter. All the family had applied to come to the UK, but the appellants did not get visas. The implication in his evidence was that this was the second time the appellants had applied for visas. The second appellant had married in Pakistan, but her husband did not have a job. He was only able to help his wife financially when she was with him and visiting Pakistan. The second appellant would visit Pakistan for 2 or 3 months at a time. The sponsor would return to visit the appellants in Italy for a few days every 2 – 3 months.

5. In 2021 the sponsor said he was sending 600 – 700 euros a month to the appellants, whatever he had. He sent the money via his Italian bank account to which the appellants had access. The appellants also used the account to pay the bills relating to the property which were in his name. His sons were also sometimes giving money to their sisters; they would give them money when they went to Italy to visit. He said the rent was around 400 euros a month, he could not remember the exact figure. There was also a very little needed for medical insurance, and the equivalent of council tax which was about 200 euros a year. Mr Lawson put to the sponsor that the appellants would only have about 280 euros a month left after rent and council tax so how could they afford their food and other expenses. He said that they used to cook at home and they were managing on that much.

6. Mr Lawson submitted that the point was a narrow one, were the appellants dependent or partially dependent on the funds, which it was accepted were sent by the sponsor. It was clear from the evidence that at the time of application it was not just the two appellants who were relying on those funds it would also have been their mother and younger sister who were still in Italy at the time of application. 280 euros a month was not very much money to keep four people. The appellants had lived in Italy for some time and were likely to speak Italian and, he submitted, likely to have had employment as they were living legally in Italy. There was an absence of evidence such as taxation documents to confirm what was said. There was no breakdown of overall income and expenditure. Mr Lawson said that for the avoidance of doubt any human rights claim by the appellants was a new matter and the respondent did not consent to it.

7. The sponsor reiterated that he was bearing all the appellants’ expenses.

8. I reserved my decision.

The law

9. Under Appendix EU (Family Permit) in force at the time of the application (FR6), an applicant meets the eligibility requirements if the entry clearance officer is satisfied that they are, at the date of application, a family member of a relevant EEA citizen.

10. The family member of a relevant EEA citizen includes the “child” of such a citizen where the family relationship existed before the specified date and continues to exist at the date of application. “Child” is defined to include a direct descendant aged 21 years or over of such a citizen as long as they are dependent on the relevant EEA citizen or on their spouse or civil partner. In the circumstances applying here, the dependency must be at the date of application. “Dependent” is defined as “(a) having regard to their financial and social conditions, or health, the applicant cannot meet their essential living needs (in whole or in part) without the financial or other material support of the relevant EEA citizen…. and (b) such support is being provided to the applicant by the relevant EEA citizen… and (c) there is no need to determine the reasons for that dependence or for the recourse to that support.”

11. The appellants therefore must show that as at May 2021 they were “dependent” within the definition set out above, on their father.

12. The burden of proof is on the appellants, and the standard is the balance of probabilities.

13. Although the appellants have raised what might be termed human rights claims in their letters, these are, under regulation 9 (6) of the Immigration Citizens Rights Appeals (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 a “new matter” because such aspects were not previously considered by the entry clearance officer in the context of the decision. Under regulation 9 (5) I am not permitted to consider a new matter without the Secretary of State’s consent, which Mr Lawson has not given. This means that the only issue I am considering in this appeal is whether the appellants were at least partly dependent on their father at the relevant time.

Findings and reasons

14. I am satisfied that the appellants remain living in what used to be the family home in Italy. It looks from the rent invoices (in the name of the sponsor) as if the home may be social housing. In any event, the rent is 360.10 euros a month. The appellants would therefore have available to them slightly more than Mr Lawson suggested, namely around 320 euros a month from the 700 euros or so sent to them by their father, once rent and council or property tax had been paid.

15. The documents show that the appellants do indeed, as the sponsor says, have authority to use his Italian bank account. There are two sources of payment into the sponsor’s bank account, the first from the sponsor himself, the amounts varying but being consistent with what the sponsor said in evidence. The second is a payment of 75 euros which seems to be monthly from “agenzia pat ass. e. prev. integr”. The wording suggests it is an official source. The sponsor denied that the appellants received state benefits as he was supporting them, but the payments into his bank account were not put to him. I observe that the payment could be consistent with the payment of the Italian equivalent of child benefit for the second appellant’s son (or indeed the appellants’ sister), as I am aware that all EU countries have some type of child benefit and the amount appears to be consistent with the amount of money typically paid for such a benefit (by comparison with the UK for example). In any event, the precise reason for the payment matters not. The amount, how often it is paid and the name of the payer, suggest it is an official benefit to which a member of the household is entitled rather than a work payment. The appellants are clearly able to draw on that amount, which suggests that the household had more like 395 euros available to them monthly.

16. Whilst 395 euros a month is a modest amount for a household which as Mr Lawson submitted appeared also to include the appellants’ mother and minor sister, it would appear possible if the household is very careful about the amount spent on food (the utility bills in the sponsor’s name which are exhibited vary between 55 euros to 123 euros, I assume this is a month).

17. I consider whether the picture the sponsor has painted is credible. I consider the budget although tight, is possible. There would be some supplements to the budget from monies given by the appellants’ brothers when they visited. It is realistic that the second appellant would not be working at the date of the application as she had a small child to look after. The first appellant however would be capable of work.

18. The question is whether what the sponsor told me was completely untrue so whether the appellants were being entirely supported through their own work and/or by the second appellant’s husband or whether the sponsor was at least partly supporting them.

19. The pattern of use of the sponsor’s Italian bank account is consistent with his supporting the appellants rather than sending the money as a “top-up”. It is not as if the sponsor’s money is paid in and then all transferred out in a lump, or paid in and just left, or just used for the rent, rather there are often multiple transactions a day, often of relatively small amounts, and to payees such as “Usman Foods” consistent with the appellants using a bank card on the sponsor’s bank account for shopping and daily small purchases– in other words, treating it exactly like their own household account.

20. The family history, which I find entirely credible, is consistent with the picture painted. The sponsor migrated first to Italy and then brought his family and rented a property for them all to live in as a family together. The sponsor and his sons left for the UK and a better lifestyle, intending to bring the rest of the family to join them. It is plausible against that background that the remaining daughters living in the property rented in the name of the sponsor are still seen as very much part of the family, the sponsor being still in effect the head of the household, the rent and utility bills being in his name, and he continuing to support his daughters and provide money for the rent and utilities as he used to do when he was living with them, and that the sponsor is not sending money just so that the appellants can live more comfortably but the money is really needed to pay the basic expenses of the household. I observe from the sponsor’s bank statements that his own income is relatively modest and he does not keep particularly large sums of money in his bank account. I can see from the dates on the power over his bank account which the sponsor gave to the appellants that it was given in 2018, so long before this application was made.

21. I am satisfied therefore bearing in mind the evidence as a whole and the credibility of the picture painted, with the appellants using the sponsor’s bank account and evidently using it for household expenses, that it is more likely than not that the appellants are indeed dependent on the sponsor. Even if what I have told has been exaggerated and on occasion some other monies come in to the household so that the first appellant is working occasionally, or the second appellant’s husband sends her some money from time to time, I am satisfied that the money from the sponsor is needed at least in part to pay the rent and essential bills.

22. The appellants therefore come within the definition of a family member of a relevant EEA citizen and qualify for family permits under Appendix EU. I allow the appeals of both appellants.

Notice of Decision

I allow the appeals of both appellants.

Fee award

I make no fee award. The documents on their own needed context and it is understandable why without such context, which I was given by the sponsor at the hearing, the applications were refused by the entry clearance officer.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 October 2025

ANNEX (Error of Law decision)

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2023-005645
UI-2023-005646

First-tier Tribunal Nos: EA/12649/2021
EA/12650/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

29 May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEITH

Between

MS SOBIA RAMZAN
MS AISHA RAMZAN
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mohammad, accompanying his father the Appellants’ sponsor
For the Respondent: Ms S Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 12 May 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. These written reasons reflect the full oral decision which I gave to the parties at the end of the hearing.

The Background

2. The appellants had appealed the judgment of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal, Judge Gribble, who in a decision promulgated on 12th April 2022, refused the appellants’ appeals against the respondent’s decisions to refuse their applications under the EU Settlement Scheme. The appellants had applied for family permits to join their father/grandfather, the sponsor, Mr Ramzan Mohammad. The applications had all been refused on 16th August 2021. The Judge had accepted that the test for dependence was a factual one set out in the case of Reyes (EEA Regs: dependency) [2013] UKUT 00314 (IAC). As the Judge correctly set out, the burden of proof was on the appellants to show that they met the requirements of the Rules or that the decision was in breach of the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement. Their rights of appeal were set out at Regulation 3 of the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 and the Judge was required to look at the position as at the date of the hearing.

3. I should add within context for the materiality of the alleged error that very regrettably the First-tier Tribunal bundle appears to have been lost and there had been a substantial delay before this matter coming before me. All I had instead was a copy of the original Judge’s decision, the grounds of appeal and the grant of permission together with the respondent’s bundle. What I did not have was the appellants’ bundle comprising 137 pages, including not only the sponsor’s bank statements but also a witness statement, as referred to at §11 of the Judge’s judgment.

4. Whilst not impugning the sponsor’s integrity, the Judge was critical of the sparsity of the evidence and late produced documents, written in Italian, which had not been translated but were said to include utility bills in his name. Of particular note, the Judge was unsatisfied as to the source of the financial remittances to the adult appellants and concluded:

“26. So, I cannot be satisfied that the money being sent is wholly from the EA citizen sponsor. I cannot be satisfied there is no money being sent to Aisha from her husband. I cannot be satisfied the first and second appellants have no other source of income in Italy or that they do not have savings because the Post Office account information was not disclosed”.

5. The Judge did go on to carry out an assessment of the wider evidence from §27 onwards, to which Ms Simbi refers me, including the absence of Post Office account evidence and witness statements or evidence from the sponsors. I should add that there was a minor son, named as a party, but there was no refusal of a family permit for him because he was a minor and therefore the same dependency requirements did not apply. The minor son has not appealed, because he was granted leave to enter.

The Appellants’ Grounds of Appeal and the Grant of Permission

6. The appellants at the time of the appeal to this Tribunal on 10th May 2022 were legally represented and argued that the Judge had erred in two respects. The first was a misdirection in law. The appellants relied on the case of Kuldip Singh v Minister for Justice and Equality – case C-218/14 for the proposition that an EEA citizen could establish that they would not be a burden on the social security system of a member state even if their means of support were, in part, derived from a third country national. The Judge had erred in imposing a requirement that the monies on which the appellants. relied needed to be wholly from the sponsor. Instead, the monies could in part be from a third country national and they could still meet the Rules. In the alternative, there was no requirement for the appellants to demonstrate that they were wholly dependent, provided that they needed material support for their essential needs. This was confirmed in Lim (EEA – dependency) [2013] UKUT 437 at §24.

7. Second, the appellants argued that the Judge had erred in failing to consider and reach findings on material evidence which show that the appellants lived in property rented by the sponsor in Italy, there was evidence of utility bills for the property in the sponsor’s name, that he was responsible for household costs including rental payments and utility bills, and that the appellants had access to his bank account.
All of that was relevant and went to the core issue of dependency, even if not ‘wholly or mainly’ but ‘in part,’ which was sufficient for satisfying dependency under the Rules.

8. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision of 23rd January 2023. As indicated, there appears regrettably to have been a delay in the appeal being progressed and referred for a hearing before me, for reasons which are unclear to me. In the meantime the appeal bundle of the evidence which was before the First-tier Tribunal Judge has been lost.

The Hearing before me and the respondent’s concession

9. Turning to the hearing before me, the first thing is to say is that the sponsor, who lacks proficiency in English was represented by his son, Mr Mohammad. I emphasise that there is no criticism of the lack of legal representation and Mr Mohammad answered my questions as best he could. He frankly accepted that the documents in the appellants’ own bundle were limited and they had wished to have adduced more evidence but that former solicitors had failed in forwarding these on to the Tribunal. Nevertheless, there was a witness statement and evidence by way of utility bills as referred to in the Judge’s decision.

10. For the respondent, Ms Simbi conceded that the Judge erred in law, specifically in imposing a
requirement at §26 that the source of financial support on which the appellants claimed to be dependent should be solely from the EEA sponsor. However, she disputed that this was material, in light of the lack of evidence from the appellants. She suggested that the Judge was bound to have reached the same decision in any event, because of the reasons at §27 onwards in the judgment.

Discussion and Conclusions

11. I am grateful to Ms Simbi for her pragmatism and assistance in explaining the respondent’s case in simple terms to the sponsor, which assisted their participation in the hearing. I accept that the Judge misapplied the law at §26, for the reason conceded by Ms Simbi. The next question is one of materiality and whether, on the evidence, the Judge was bound to reach the same conclusion. The practical difficulty is that neither I nor Ms Simbi have the entirety of the evidence that was before the Judge. In particular, I do not have the appellants’ bundle, including any record of utility bills, or the sponsor’s witness statement. The grounds reiterate the appellants’ case that they live in a house rented and paid for by the sponsor. Whilst I have some sympathy with Ms Simbi’s position that the Judge plainly considered the wider evidence, nevertheless I cannot be satisfied that his misapplication of the law was immaterial, because he was bound to reach the same decision, had he considered the correct question of whether the appellants required material support for their essential needs, as per Lim. On the one hand, it might be said that there was a gap in the evidence so substantial that there was nothing other than the sponsor’s oral evidence and limited documentation with which to form a view on dependency, even if only in part, for meeting basic needs. However, the practical difficulty with that contention is that here, it is plain that the Judge had some form of evidence about accommodation arrangements with rented property, utility bills and oral evidence. In the circumstances it is unclear what else extra would be required, by way of remittances for basic needs and how that was evaluated. That is an intensely fact-specific analysis.

12. In the circumstances I am satisfied that the misapplication of the law was material, such that the Judge’s decision is not safe and cannot stand.

Notice of Decision

13. The Judge erred in law such that his decision is not safe and cannot stand. I set it aside, without preserved findings. That being said, the parties accept that the appellants and sponsor are related as claimed.

Disposal of the Appeal

14. I canvassed with the parties how I should resolve this appeal. I considered paragraph 7.2(a) and (b) of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and the well-known Court of Appeal authority of AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512. The parties accepted that this was not a case where the effect of the error was to deprive either party of a fair hearing. I also bear in mind that the issue is a narrow one, namely dependency/household membership. Both parties invited me to retain re-making in the Upper Tribunal and accordingly I regard that as appropriate to do so. The matter will therefore be relisted with directions as follows.

Directions for Re-making

15. The hearing will be relisted for a further hearing, to last two hours, at Priory Courts in Birmingham, with an interpreter in Urdu.

16. The appellants have leave to provide a bundle with updated evidence and updated witness statements, to include all that evidence which Mr Mohammad was concerned had not been forwarded on by former solicitors. The sponsor is not legally represented so there is no requirement to use CE file. Instead, he is asked to provide a single bundle, if possible in electronic format, to this Tribunal and to the respondent. Documents send to the respondent should be sent to [~]@homeoffice.gov.uk. Documents should be emailed to this Tribunal at [~]@Justice.gov.uk using the Tribunal’s reference number (found at the top of these directions) as the subject line. Documents should be sent in good time before the hearing. Tribunal staff will then collate and circulate a final hearing bundle, for use, with a printed copy available at the hearing.

17. The sponsor’s correct postal address for correspondence is [142 ~]. His email address is [~]@gmail.com.

J Keith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15th May 2025