Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2023-005651
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03026/2019

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18th of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY CHAMBER PRESIDENT PLIMMER

Between

MK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Kalyan, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil and Family Justice Centre on 6 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Sierra Leone. She was born in Port Loko in 1963 and is 62 years old. In this decision the Upper Tribunal (‘UT’) remakes the decision following an earlier UT decision dated 26 March 2026, which set aside a First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) decision dated 5 January 2023, dismissing the appellant’s appeal on asylum and human rights grounds.
2. I have continued the anonymity order made by the FTT, as the requirements under the Refugee Convention in this particular case outweigh the demands of open justice. No party sought to argue otherwise.
Background
3. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom (‘UK’) with her husband, also a citizen of Sierra Leone, as a visitor, as far back as 1 July 2006. She overstayed her leave and has remained in the UK ever since. She claims that her husband abandoned her shortly after this and she began living with a man named Francis in the UK. Francis was the appellant’s sponsor for the purposes of her visitors’ visa.
4. After the expiry of her visit visa in December 2006, the appellant did not make an application to regularise her immigration status until August 2011, when she made an application to remain based upon her relationship with Francis, pursuant to Article 8, ECHR.
2014 FTT decision
5. In a decision dated 29 July 2014, the FTT dismissed the appellant’s appeal on Article 8 grounds (‘the 2014 FTT decision’). The evidence before the 2014 FTT included an outline of the development of the appellant’s relationship with Francis, after her relationship with her husband broke down. When Francis had a stroke in 2006, the appellant began caring for him and the relationship between them developed.
6. It is also important to highlight that which was not before the 2014 FTT. The appellant maintained a fear of her husband in Sierra Leone but confirmed she did not wish to raise asylum. Having heard evidence from the appellant and Francis, the 2014 FTT made the following findings.
(i) The FTT did not go behind the respondent’s concession that the appellant and sponsor were in a relationship but had concerns about the quality of that relationship. The FTT concluded that the appellant and sponsor were not as close as they claimed or had colluded to suppress material information but in any event their credibility was damaged.
(ii) Having outlined inconsistencies in the evidence, the FTT did not accept the appellant’s account of the breakdown of her marriage and considered the claim that she was abandoned by and feared her husband to be incredible. By way of example, the appellant said she was not the subject of death threats from her husband, yet Francis made the opposite claim.
(iii) The FTT did not accept the appellant’s claim of ignorance for the delay in attempting to regularise her immigration status, noting that she was able to exercise her own initiative to enter the UK without legal representation. The FTT noted that any relationship was formed in the full knowledge that the appellant was in the UK unlawfully, having overstayed for a lengthy period.
(iv) The FTT did not accept that the appellant provided an honest or reliable account of her circumstances and concluded that she had social and family ties to Sierra Leone which she failed to disclose.
(v) The FTT expressly addressed her employment situation in Sierra Leone, concluding that she failed to demonstrate that she could not access the income she was owed from the police service, which was said to be diverted to her husband, having worked as a police officer for many years and having been in communication with relevant contacts.
(vi) In all the circumstances, the FTT did not accept that the appellant had provided an honest or reliable account of her circumstances and concluded that it would not be unjustifiably harsh to expect her to return to Sierra Leone, such that the appeal on Article 8 grounds fell to be dismissed.
7. Further submissions to remain in the UK based upon Article 8 dated 17 July 2015 and 8 April 2016, and accompanying judicial review applications, were unsuccessful. The appellant was detained on 16 September 2016. From the papers available, it is unclear when she was released.
Asylum claim
8. On 10 March 2017 the appellant claimed asylum. She was interviewed on 4 September 2017. She stated that she underwent female genital mutilation (‘FGM’) at the age of 18. This was very painful and traumatic, and made all the worse because her friend bled to death in front of her. After this, the appellant claims that her aunt, the head of the Bondo society in Port Loko, selected her as her successor for the role of Sowei in the Port Loko area. A Sowei acts as a leader in the Bondo society, including in facilitating FGM, a practice the appellant is understandably entirely against.
9. The appellant claims that when she came to the UK in 2006 with her husband, she was recuperating from the deaths of three of her children, who died in mysterious circumstances in 2004. She claims that her husband told her family that she was exposing the Bondo society in the UK and she started to receive death threats. When interviewed for her asylum claim, the appellant said that she started receiving threats when her husband turned against her in 2006.
10. In a decision dated 9 March 2019, the respondent accepted that the appellant was a national of Sierra Leone who had been subjected to FGM, but rejected the remainder of her account and refused her asylum and human rights claims. The appellant appealed against this decision, but regrettably this has not yet been finally determined. In a decision dated 5 January 2023, the FTT dismissed the appellant’s appeal. This has been set aside by the UT, save for the adverse findings made against the appellant’s son. The appellant and her son claimed not to be in contact until 2019, but the FTT was satisfied that he used the appellant’s address in 2014. The 2023 FTT concluded that contrary to their claims, the appellant and his son were in contact in 2014 and this impacted their credibility.
11. It is unnecessary to rehearse the history of other overturned FTT decisions concerning this appellant appeal against the 19 March 2019 decision. Both parties accept that only the 2014 decision and the limited 2023 FTT findings are relevant. The appellant continues to fear serious harm from her aunt and Bondo society members if returned to Sierra Leone. She also claims that her circumstances, including her medical conditions are such that her removal would breach Articles 3 and 8. I now turn to that medical evidence.
Medical reports
12. The appellant’s solicitors have relied upon extensive medical evidence. I summarise the medical reports relied upon at this stage. In a psychiatric report dated 12 July 2019 prepared by Dr Battersby, the appellant is described as receiving counselling for PTSD symptoms, but as functioning too well to meet the threshold for a full diagnosis. It was noted that she was suffering from a depressive disorder after the death of her children but this had resolved. Dr Battersby assessed the appellant’s mental health problems as mild in nature but that the presence of PTSD symptoms indicates that a traumatic incident may have occurred. Dr Battersby also cautioned that the cogency of the appellant’s evidence would be reduced by her PTSD symptoms, however this was mild and should not have a serious impact on her ability to give evidence, albeit caution should be exercised to avoid re-traumatisation (which was likely to be short-lasting and mild in nature).
13. Dr Battersby’s 19 January 2022 report repeats her opinion that the appellant was suffering from PTSD symptoms but functions too well to meet the threshold for full diagnosis, albeit that her mental state had declined for reasons including isolation during the pandemic. Dr Battersby was sufficiently concerned about the appellant’s presentation and ability to self-care that she contacted her GP. The appellant had developed a severe depressive order since she was last assessed. Dr Battersby’s third report is dated 15 April 2022. This addresses, amongst other things, the appellant’s possible risk of suicide as it existed at the time.
14. Dr Slinn’s report dated 18 March 2026 likewise records that the appellant can give oral evidence but should be treated as a vulnerable witness. Dr Slinn records mild to moderate depressive disorder, continuing post-traumatic symptoms, impaired cognition, and a recommendation that the appellant be treated as a vulnerable witness. The report records the appellant’s poor physical health, loneliness, difficult living arrangements, impaired recall and poor memory, and her spontaneous focus on practical and health fears. I also note Dr Slinn’s observation that there were times during the interview when she was clearly struggling to recall dates.
Country expert evidence
15. The appellant has relied upon two country expert reports prepared by Ms Conteh dated 15 August 2019 and 5 February 2022. The respondent did not dispute that Ms Conteh should be accepted as a country expert. I have read both reports in full. I note that Ms Conteh has highlighted the extensive prevalence of FGM and the power of the Bondi society in Sierra Leone. Ms Conteh emphasises that the appellant does not have a generalised fear. Rather she specifically fears the Bondo society’s adverse reaction to her declining to join the more elite and limited group of Soweis, who have links to political power.
16. Ms Conteh has described the role of the Sowei in considerable detail. Ms Conteh also detailed the significant economic challenges faced by Sierra Leone following the Ebola outbreak and the Covid pandemic, as well as other destabilising factors such as corruption, unemployment, food insecurity, access to justice, reduced life expectancy and widespread poverty.
Hearing
17. At the beginning of the hearing I observed that the skeleton argument submitted on behalf of the appellant was less than helpful – it made scant reference to the 751-page bundle and provided not a single page reference to that bundle. The appellant’s skeleton argument does not contain a chronology in a case with a very lengthy history and made no reference to the 2014 FTT decision, notwithstanding the UT’s direction in its decision dated 30 January 2026, that both parties should use their best endeavours to obtain the decision. Ms Kalyan explained that she had been instructed late and had therefore been unable to provide an amended skeleton argument. The respondent had only filed and served the 2014 FTT decision shortly before the hearing and I provided Ms Kalyan additional time to consider it.
18. I also pointed out that the PDF bundle did not comply with the standard directions: it is not hyperlinked, not searchable and very difficult to navigate to the more important documents. Nevertheless, the parties agreed that the hearing could fairly proceed. There has already been a lengthy delay since the respondent refused the appellant’s asylum claim in 2019 and both parties wished to avoid further delay. However, these are avoidable matters that have made preparation for the hearing and the drafting of this decision more difficult.
Vulnerable appellant
19. I have approached the hearing and the appellant’s evidence with the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance (‘the Vulnerability Guidance Note’) fully in mind. I accept the mental health evidence in the bundle is directly relevant to the assessment of memory, chronology and disclosure. I therefore give the appellant the benefit of the doubt where I have concerns regarding memory, consistency, failure to disclose and delay. As the appellant is a vulnerable witness, it is particularly important I take into account the country background evidence addressing the plausibility of her account and all objective indicators of risk.
Issues in dispute
20. Regrettably the skeleton argument submitted on behalf of the appellant by her solicitors does not adequately crystallise the appellant’s case by reference to the applicable legal framework. It was therefore necessary to spend some time understanding the manner in which the appellant’s case was being put, in accordance with the legal framework and evidence relied upon. The parties agreed the following issues must be determined by the UT:
(1) Asylum: Is the appellant’s account of being threatened by her aunt credible, applying the lower standard of proof? The starting point for the credibility of the evidence was agreed to be the 2014 FTT findings and the limited preserved findings at [78-85] in the 2023 FTT decision in accordance with Devaseelan (Second Appeals, ECHR, Extra-Territorial Effect) [2002] UKAIT 702; [2003] Imm AR 1, as recently considered in KD v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 349. The parties agreed that the fact that the appellant was the victim of FGM was not in dispute but the remainder of her claim was disputed.
(2) If credible, upon return is there a reasonable degree of likelihood of serious harm for reasons relating to the aunt’s past threats, which could not be obviated by sufficient state protection and internal relocation?
(3) If yes, does the appellant fear persecution for a Convention Reason?
(4) Article 3 health claim: Are the appellant’s health conditions such that she is a seriously ill person?
(5) If yes, has the appellant provided substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that appropriate treatment would either be absent or inaccessible to her; and this absence or lack of access to appropriate treatment would expose her to a serious, rapid, and irreversible decline in her state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in life expectancy?
(6) Article 8: Would the appellant face very significant obstacles to reintegration to Sierra Leone?
(7) Would it be a disproportionate breach of Article 8 to remove the appellant in the light of her very lengthy residence in the UK and particular circumstances?
21. Ms Kalyan confirmed that no reliance was placed on family life for the purposes of Article 8. Ms Kalyan was right to do so. The appellant’s previous partner Francis died in 2025. The appellant’s adult son does not reside with the appellant and there are no additional elements of dependency beyond generalised emotional support and minor financial support in order to support a finding of family life for the purposes of Article 8(1) – see IA v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516.
Witnesses
22. The appellant attended by remote link from her accommodation in Plymouth. I explored with the parties possible adjustments to ensure she was able to provide her best evidence. Ms Kalyan assured me that all options had been considered and the appellant was content to proceed giving her evidence remotely, albeit we paused the hearing to ensure arrangements were made for a welfare officer to be available for support should that be necessary. I agreed to make the adjustments sought by Ms Kalyan, having accepted the appellant to be a vulnerable witness. These included: breaks; ensuring straightforward questions were put in a sensitive manner, and; keeping the process under regular review.
23. The appellant confirmed that her solicitors had recently taken her through her witness statements. These are dated 31 August 2017, 15 August 2019, 4 February 2022 and 29 May 2026. I shall refer to these as the 2017, 2019, 2022 statements. Ms Kalyan did not ask any further questions. Mr Wain asked questions in an admirably clear and straightforward manner and cross-examination was completed in under 35 minutes. There was no re-examination.
24. The appellant’s son confirmed his witness statement dated 18 May 2026 and was cross-examined briefly by Mr Wain. The son did not seek to challenge the adverse factual findings in the 2023 FTT decision. I therefore approach his evidence with a considerable degree of caution.
Submissions
25. Mr Wain invited me to find the appellant’s disputed account as not credible but, in any event, there was a sufficiency of protection and she could internally relocate safely and reasonably. He submitted that the medical evidence came nowhere near to meeting the relevant threshold and the appeal should be dismissed on asylum and human rights grounds.
26. Ms Kalyan reminded me that the appellant is a vulnerable witness and the lower standard of proof applies. She invited me to find the core of her account as credible and consistent with the country expert evidence, and submitted that the appeal should be allowed.

Assessment
Asylum
27. I begin my assessment of the appellant’s disputed account i.e. all but her being a victim of FGM) by reminding myself that she is a vulnerable witness. Collectively, Dr Battersby and Dr Slinn have observed PTSD symptoms from 2019 to 2026. The evidence the appellant has provided over a lengthy period of time must be considered in that context and in accordance with the applicable lower standard of proof as this is a pre-Nationality, Asylum and Borders Act 2022 case. Particular regard must therefore be given to the objective indicators of risk in accordance with the Vulnerability Guidance Note. With that in mind, I have carefully scrutinised the country background and expert evidence when assessing the appellant’s credibility and the plausibility of her account. I accept that the appellant’s account is broadly consistent with the country background outlined in Ms Conteh’s reports.
28. Much of Ms Conteh’s reports focus upon outlining the prevalence of FGM and the powerful role played by Soweis in Sierra Leone. There was less detail available on the methodology of choosing the Sowei. This is understandable as there are no written codes and no uniform practices with a central control. Ms Conteh nevertheless considered it to be very plausible that the succession in the appellant’s family is based on the understanding that she has been “chosen by the spirits”. The Sowei are traditionally chosen by passing the role through mothers and grandmothers. It is said to be something that is often highly encouraged due to the prestige it brings to the family, as well as the economic benefits through income generation. I note that Ms Conteh refers to factors in Sierra Leone's society that support forcing Soweis through initiation. On the other hand, there is evidence that Soweis can be appointed from outside of the family and there is a rising trend to encourage younger woman to become Soweis because of the increasing fear there will be insufficient women with the skills in the future. Ms Conteh concluded that “the possibility that excessive pressure is placed on [the appellant] from her family to accept the position is highly plausible” and that this is all the more so because the aunt is based in the north where prevalence rates are highest and there is strong support for the practice.
29. Ms Conteh made it clear that Bondi society members may not always follow through with threats of killing in relation to those who disrespect the Sowei, but nevertheless those who are raised in the culture take the threats seriously which instils fear. Ms Conteh concluded that it would be very difficult to verify the extent to which threats are carried out or not. Ms Conteh however went on to suggest that a likely reaction from the Bondo society would be that of meting out physical violence. Ms Conteh relied upon reported coercive practices to try to initiate Soweis. Ms Conteh concluded that it is plausible the appellant received death threats but it would be difficult to assess the potential that these would be realised.
30. Ms Conteh has therefore set the scene for a finding that the appellant’s account is generally plausible but much will depend upon the credibility of this appellant’s claim, including the intent shown by those who are said to want to force the appellant to become a Sowei.
31. As set out above, the parties agreed that the 2014 FTT findings are the appropriate starting point. Devaseelan makes it clear that facts happening since the 2014 FTT decision and facts happening prior to that decision but having no relevance to the issues before it, can always be taken into account; facts personal to the appellant that were not brought to the attention of the 2014 FTT, although they were relevant to the issues before it, should be treated with the greatest circumspection; the force of this reasoning is greatly reduced if there is some very good reason why the appellant's failure to adduce relevant evidence before the 2014 FTT should not be held against her.
32. The 2014 FTT simply did not accept that it was provided with an honest account from the appellant. This extended beyond the closeness of her relationship with Francis. The FTT did not accept the circumstances of the appellant’s separation from her husband or her claimed circumstances in Sierra Leone. In addition, the appellant clearly had every opportunity to refer to the deaths of her children and her fears regarding her aunt before the 2014 FTT, but did not do so. These were clearly relevant to the issues before the 2014 FTT: whether the removal of the appellant to Sierra Leone, and away from her accepted relationship with Francis would be proportionate in all the circumstances. That demanded an assessment of the appellant’s claimed circumstances in Sierra Leone. The 2014 FTT found that the appellant had not provided an honest or reliable account of her circumstances in Sierra Leone and explicitly rejected her claim that she faced threats from her husband and did not have social and family ties.
33. The appellant’s failure to mention claimed significant life events before the 2014 FTT needs to be viewed in the context of the medical evidence that has since become available. The medical evidence, including the psychiatric reports outlining the appellant’s post-traumatic symptoms over an extended period, lends support to her claim that she suffered a significant trauma in the past. The respondent has accepted that the appellant suffered FGM at the age of 18. This has been verified on examination. The appellant has described her deep sadness and the intrusive memories associated with this event. I accept the surrounding circumstances: this was very painful, the process included rituals which had a traumatic impact upon the appellant, and was made all the worse by the circumstances of her friend’s death - see in particular the appellant’s detailed description of those events in her 2019 statement. The description of those events are consistent with the prevalence of FGM practices in the appellant’s home area of Port Loko, even at the age of 18. I also accept the appellant’s entirely understandable hostility to getting involved in any way with perpetrating FGM on others.
34. I therefore accept that the appellant was traumatised by what happened when she was 18 and wished to put this behind her. For the purposes of the 2014 FTT proceedings, there was no need to disclose what happened to her when she was 18. I also note the appellant’s evidence when cross-examined, that she found it very difficult to talk about the loss of her three of her children because it made her very emotional, and did not raise this before the 2014 FTT. This is an understandable explanation, consistent with wishing to avoid intrusive memories. I also note the son’s reference to the deaths of his siblings in his letter. In all the circumstances, I am prepared to accept the three of the appellant’s children prior to her arrival in the UK.
35. These events can be contrasted with the appellant’s claim that she was threatened in relation to becoming a Sowei from around 2006 onwards and has remained at risk on return for reasons relating to this ever since. I have deliberately said ‘around 2006’ because in her 2019 statement the appellant said that she knew her aunt wanted her to become her Sowei successor while she was in Sierra Leone and for that reason, she stopped going to Port Loko. As set out above, these issues were clearly relevant to appellant’s removal and the 2014 FTT assessment of her likely circumstances upon return. The threat from the aunt was similar to the alleged threats from the husband and to a certain extent inter-linked. It is noteworthy that the appellant continued to make submissions in 2015 and 2016 as to why she should not be removed from the UK and did not disclose the threats from the aunt until 2017 – some eleven years after it is said they first arose.
36. I have carefully considered the appellant’s explanation for not relying on these facts in the light of Ms Conteh’s reports and the medical evidence concerning her vulnerability. Mr Wain asked the appellant why she did not mention her claim that in 2006 she did not wish to be removed because she was receiving threats from her family and had been told by her aunt that she would have to go back to become a Sowei, failing which she would be killed, as outlined in her 2017 statement. The appellant said that she did mention this. When the question was repeated she said that she only answered the questions asked. I have made allowances for the appellant’s mental health and possible confusion, but these answers do not provide a credible explanation for the failure to disclose. The threats from the aunt played no role in the appellant’s claim to remain in the UK until 2017. The appellant was legally represented before the 2014 FTT. She was prepared and able to talk about threats from her husband and the difficult circumstances relating to their separation. Her 2017 and 2019 statements describe being “devastated” by this.
37. I have considered the appellant’s statements in order to discern any other explanations for not disclosing her Sowei fears until 2017. The 2017 statement refers to a sister recently sending a message not to return following a family meeting at [9] but the appellant had already explained at [7] that “she did not know anything about asylum” and said this:
“All the time I was in the UK I was receiving threats from my family but I have been scared of talking about it. I have been told by my aunt that I have to go back and become a leader in the society and if I refused, they would kill me. I wanted to take my own life many times but Francis is the one who helped me.”
38. The appellant went on to explain at [8] of the 2017 statement that when she was in detention in 2017 a roommate told her she could claim asylum, which she did in March 2017. The above references within the 2017 statement are replicated within the 2019 statement. The 2019 statement adds at [16] that when the appellant believed she was in actually danger she decided to talk about her past.
39. Ms Kalyan submitted that there were good reasons for the appellant’s non-disclosure before the 2014 FTT: the appellant did not believe she could claim asylum at the time and in any event, there was a fundamental difference between the issues before the 2014 FTT and the instant appeal. I do not accept those submissions. Having made allowances for the appellant’s vulnerability including her post-traumatic symptoms, I do not accept her explanation for not claiming asylum prior to 2017 or not referring to the Sowei threats during the 2014 FTT proceedings.
40. I do not accept her claim that at that time she only talked about her relationship with her legal representatives and not her fears, if removed. As explained above, the Article 8 assessment inevitably required an assessment of the appellant’s circumstances in Sierra Leone if returned. Whilst the 2014 FTT was not considering whether there was a prospective risk of persecution on return, it was obliged to address whether there were obstacles for the appellant in Sierra Leone and made explicit findings on the appellant’s claimed circumstances there. The appellant’s claim that the legal representatives would not have asked about her fears, and that she only felt motivated to take advice from her detention roommate in 2017 is implausible. The suggestion in the 2019 statement that the appellant only talked about her past when she was actually in danger is difficult to reconcile with her claim that she was scared to go back to Sierra Leone because of the Sowei threats since 2006.
41. In my judgment, the appellant has not advanced good reasons for not raising the threats from the aunt before the 2014 FTT, and in the circumstances, I approach this claim with circumspection. It nevertheless remains important to carefully consider this claim. Having done so, I do not accept the claim to be reasonably likely.
42. First, when the evidence concerning the threats from the aunt is considered holistically, the core features of the appellant’s claim are vague. In response to the respondent’s concern in the refusal letter that the appellant did not provide any examples of her aunt threatening her, the appellant provided a vague response in the 2019 statement at [13]. The appellant merely says that her aunt did threaten her and she had to change her phone number. No attempt is made to provide: a date (even an approximate year bearing in mind memory issues); details of the appellant’s location (Sierra Leone or UK); the last contact the aunt had with the appellant. The 2019 statement refers to contact with her sisters in March and April 2019, not the aunt. The evidence emanating from the sisters is vague and inconsistent. By way of example, the letter from the sister Rugiatu implores the appellant to accept the role of Sowei otherwise bad things would happen to family members. Rugiatu alleges that the family have already been forced to pay fines to the Bondo society elders. By contrast, the transcript of a conversation with another sister at the beginning of 2022, appears to make no reference to any threat, but is rather a plea not to return home. The 2022 statement mostly addresses the appellant’s health concerns, but also includes the appellant’s claim to have been in contact with two sisters in the last year over WhatsApp. This merely repeats the claim that the aunt has put her down as a successor and she should stay away otherwise her life would be in danger. There is no reference to a specific threat from the aunt or the Bondo society.
43. Second, there is an immediate family member in the UK who should be in a position to provide supporting evidence as to the family’s understanding of threats made by the aunt. The son provided an undated letter in the bundle (p 122) which outlined how he came to be separated from his mother. This includes losing contact with his mother after she visited the UK in 2006, following the deaths of his siblings. Yet, he makes not even passing reference to threats from the aunt in his letter. The son’s failure to make any reference to his mother’s fears of the Bondo society has continued. His most recent statement does not address this aspect of the appellant’s case. Even if he has no direct knowledge, from the relatively safety of the UK, he has made no attempt to contact his mother’s sisters to provide him with any updated evidence.
44. Third, the appellant appears to maintain a generalised expectation that she is expected to become a Sowei in the absence of any recent evidence over the last few years that this continues. It may well be that the appellant at one stage held a subjective belief that she would have to accept the Sowei role or otherwise she could expect serious supernatural consequences to befall her. Such a belief is consistent with the supernatural aspects of the Bondo society, as described by Ms Conteh, but it is not well founded.
45. The appellant’s current concerns about being removed to Sierra Leonne focus intently upon her general living conditions there and not the Sowei fears she has previously expressed. The appellant’s health concerns dominate the 2026 statement. Dr Slinn noted that the appellant’s clinical presentation at assessment in 2026 was one of mild to moderate depression in the context of loneliness, poor physical health and difficult living arrangements. She spontaneously reported her practical fears regarding return to Sierra Leone and only mentioned coercion, threats and FGM when prompted. Dr Slinn said this at [7.5.2]:
“Overall, it is my view that her presentation now is really quite different from four years ago when the psychiatric report noted she seemed very focused on the worry about FGM, etc. This was not spontaneously disclosed at all, and she did not become especially distressed when we spoke about it. The evidence that her physical health has deteriorated significantly may well play a part here as she was focused on her physical difficulties. In 2022 she was felt to be severely depressed which was not the case when I interviewed her.”
46. The appellant will be viewed as very elderly indeed in Sierra Leone. Average life expectancy in Sierra Leone is 51, according to Ms Conteh. The appellant has mobility concerns and is in poor health. I note Ms Conteh’s evidence that Bondo society membership is for a person’s lifetime and the decision that the appellant should take on the Sowei role is not timebound. However, Ms Conteh also refers to younger women taking on the role and the economic benefits to be gained in a society where wealth generation is very limited. It is difficult to see how the appellant could be expected to physically perform the Sowei role and responsibilities given her mobility and frailty concerns and the fact that she has no skills or experience in performing the role. Ms Conteh made it clear that Soweis are required to be skilled and the role is often passed on through the generations.
47. Even assuming, contrary to my factual finding above, the aunt threatened the appellant in the distant past, there is no cogent evidence of any ongoing interest. Ms Conteh’s last report dates back to 2022 and I therefore do not have her up to date assessment of the plausibility of the threats being carried out in the absence of any cogent credible evidence of continuing adverse interest and the appellant’s poor health. Ms Kalyan accepted there were no threats recently. I invited her to specify the date of the last contact or threat. This appears to go back to 2022 when the appellant’s sisters warned her to stay away. There is no reference to any recent contact in the 2026 statement. The absence of any contact or threat is significant. Even assuming there was past interest, there has been no evidence of any adverse interest for many years. I note Ms Conteh’s evidence but given the appellant’s age and frailty, there is no reasonable likelihood of that interest being renewed.
48. In any event, even if there remains adverse interest, it is not reasonably likely it will be acted upon. Ms Conteh has made it clear that this sort of risk evaluation turns on the specific facts. In the instant case, there would be no practical way to force the appellant to physically carry out the Sowei role. Moreover, the appellant accepted in response to Mr Wain’s question that she did not know how her return to Freetown would be known to the aunt. I have considered Ms Conteh’s evidence regarding internal relocation but the appellant could safely and reasonably reside in Freetown, well away from the aunt’s home area. The reasonableness analysis covers similar matters addressed in the Article 3 and Article 8 analysis, and for the reasons I provide below, relocation to Freetown, away from the Port Loko area would be reasonable.
49. It follows that I do not need to address Ms Kalyan’s very brief submissions on the Convention Reason of membership of a particular social group.
Article 3
50. The relevant legal framework concerning health claims relying upon Article 3 of the ECHR has been recently summarised in OSB v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 647. It summarises the well-known guidance in AM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 17; [2021] AC 633, that an applicant must establish that:
(1) They are seriously ill,
(2) They have provided substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that, if returned to the receiving country,
a) Appropriate treatment would either be absent (i.e., unavailable to anyone) or inaccessible to them in particular; and
b) This absence or lack of access to appropriate treatment would expose them, either,
i) To a serious, rapid, and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering, or
ii) To a significant (i.e., substantial) reduction in life expectancy.
51. AM’s case returned to the UT in AM (Article 3, health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC), which emphasised that the requirement of “intense suffering” means that it is insufficient for the applicant to merely establish that their condition will worsen upon removal or that there would be serious and detrimental effects.
52. It is regrettable that the skeleton argument prepared for the purposes of the re-making hearing before the UT vaguely summarised the medical evidence available and made no reference to the relevant Article 3 test to be applied. The solicitors submitted a bundle containing “subject access request medical records” from pages 405-751, yet the skeleton argument includes not a single page reference to this medical material, although three entries are highlighted. Ms Kalyan’s closing submissions did not include any attempt to explain how the appellant could be said to be “a seriously ill person” by reference to the medical evidence available. Ms Kalyan made no reference to the appellant being at risk of suicide upon return to Sierra Leone. She was correct to do so as the updated evidence does not support this, and I say no more about it.
Is the appellant seriously ill?
53. As made clear in the UT decision of AM (Zimbabwe), the applicant must discharge the burden of establishing that she is a seriously ill person; this is a relatively straightforward issue and will generally require clear and cogent medical evidence from treating physicians in the UK. The appellant relies on her longstanding mental health problems, diabetes, kidney-related illness and overall presentation. I note that it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that her case is not put on a narrow assertion about insulin alone, but on the broader picture of serious physical illness, ongoing treatment needs, impaired self-management and vulnerability. Her 2026 witness statement says that since the 2023 FTT decision, her physical and mental health have worsened, she has become more forgetful, her mobility has deteriorated and she struggles with daily functioning. She has described her health problems as serious but Ms Kalyan did not take me to any medical evidence describing the appellant as suffering from a serious illness. The appellant’s diabetes is under control and treatable. The medical material includes a hospital discharge summary showing admission from 2 September 2025 to 16 October 2025 for a dislodged drain for a perinephric collection, with a known large left staghorn calculus, ongoing follow-up and a requirement for a fridge to store medication. I also note a consultant letter dated 21 January 2026 recording obesity, diabetes on insulin, poor mobility, osteoarthritis and deconditioning in the context of surgical assessment; and later GP/SAR entries in February to April 2026 showing continuing diabetic review, including transition to Mounjaro and monitoring of blood sugar control.
54. The son’s 2026 witness statement summarises the appellant’s claimed support needs. He says that he is now in regular telephone contact with his mother, visits when able, and has observed significant deterioration in her physical and mental health. He says she has difficulty walking, tires easily, struggles to attend appointments, forgets medication, cannot manage her medical conditions independently and receives only limited support from him because he cannot provide full-time care. I do not accept the son’s assessment of the nature and extent of the appellant’s health difficulties. His credibility is undermined by his failure to be open regarding his contact with the appellant in the period 2014-2019, for the reasons outlined at [79-85] of the 2023 FTT decision. In any event, he is not medically qualified and appears to be able to only rarely visit his mother.
55. Having considered the broad range of medical evidence, the appellant is able to manage on a day to day basis, albeit she is worried, very lonely and tires easily. The medical evidence confirms that the appellant’s mobility is poor. I note the appellant has repeatedly said that she believes she is unable to leave accommodation because of poor mobility. I asked Ms Kalyan if there was any medical evidence to support this belief. Ms Kalyan acknowledged that there is merely reference to “poor mobility” in the medical evidence. I accept the appellant suffers from poor mobility but in the absence of clear medical evidence, I am not prepared to accept the assessment of her mobility as made by the appellant or her son.
56. I note Dr Slinn’s observation at [7.6.1] that although she is not a physical doctor, she considers the appellant’s physical frailty to be such that after 20 years in the UK it would be exceptionally difficult for her there, unless there is clear support in terms of accommodation, medication, surgery etc. I entirely accept the appellant is in poor health but she is able to function adequately on a day to day basis. Apart from the appellant and the son’s description of the impact of her health concerns, there is no cogent medical evidence to suggest that the appellant requires additional support with day to day functioning. In addition, in my judgment the appellant can be expected to have some financial support from her son in the UK and her daughter in Australia, which will assist her to have basic accommodation and support with medication. Dr Slinn has not factored this in.
57. The son accepted that he provides the appellant with small amounts such as £20 here and there, but says that he would not be able to provide meaningful financial support. I do not accept his evidence. The son works full-time as a security officer. He may well have other responsibilities but he has not outlined what these are and why he would not be able to find a modest monthly amount to send to his mother. He claims he would not be able to fund the regular access to insulin but he has not explained this by reference to the costs in Sierra Leone or his income / expenditure in the UK.
58. The appellant’s children may only be able to support her modestly, relative to the UK and Australian respective costs of living, but even modest amounts are likely to be enough to provide basic accommodation, maintenance and support to treat her medical conditions. Ms Conteh made it clear that it is extremely common to see several families surviving from the income of one person. Ms Conteh addressed the costs of diabetes medication in Sierra Leone but has not considered whether alternative medication available would be cheaper or whether the appellant could obtain support from her children to pay for the medication.
59. Dr Slinn’s recent report records the appellant’s mild to moderate depressive disorder, impaired cognition and continuing post-traumatic symptoms. Dr Slinn described the appellant as overall presenting in March 2026 as mildly depressed with low mood, decreased motivation, poor appetite, sometimes a sense of worthlessness, but she was still able to enjoy some things and was not experiencing intense suicidal thinking. She was also not experiencing some of the voices that she had previously and her reported hallucinations at night were quieter now and not related to psychosis. Whilst the appellant had some symptoms which are post-traumatic in nature, they do not cross the threshold for PTSD. I note Dr Slinn’s conclusion at [7.6.1] that the appellant’s deportation could precipitate severe depression again. She based this upon her severe bereavements in the past and the fact that she would be moving away from her son and granddaughter. The appellant’s removal would undoubtedly be difficult for her but she has had severe depression in the past and has been able to improve. In addition, much of the contact between the appellant and her son / granddaughter takes place over WhatsApp ,which could continue from Sierra Leone.
60. I have no doubt that the appellant cannot be described as seriously mentally ill. As Dr Slinn put it at [7.6.4] her main complaints are of loneliness, distance from her son and inability to consider visiting Australia to see her daughter and so the social aspects of her treatment are more important than any further medication or therapy.
61. I have considered all the evidence in the round and have concluded that whilst the appellant and her son maintain that she is seriously ill, this is unsupported by the medical evidence available. The appellant clearly has concerning health conditions and suffers from loneliness and isolation but she is able to manage, albeit with difficulty.
62. When the appellant’s physical ailments and mental illness are viewed either individually or cumulatively, she cannot be described as a seriously ill person for the purposes of Article 3.
Treatment in Sierra Leone
63. Even assuming the appellant to be seriously ill, she has not provided substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that, if returned to Sierra Leone, appropriate treatment would be absent or inaccessible to her. The appellant has not adduced any medical evidence that the medical treatment she requires will be unavailable or inaccessible to her in Sierra Leone. I note the very challenging conditions faced by the Sierra Leone population as described by Ms Conteh. I do not underestimate the additional challenges likely to be faced by the appellant as a result of her general health concerns, her diabetes, difficulties with mobility and depression. However, as explained above, the appellant will be able to rely on small amounts of support from her son working full time in the UK, her daughter in Australia and her sisters in Sierra Leone. She has not provided substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that, treatment for her diabetes and other health conditions would be inaccessible with financial support from her children
64. The appellant has come nowhere close to demonstrating that the absence or lack of access to appropriate treatment would expose her to either a serious, rapid, and irreversible decline in her state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant (i.e., substantial) reduction in life expectancy. I asked Ms Kalyan where in the bundle there was evidence relevant to this. She was only able to take me to a GP letter from 1 November 2021, which appears to state that without the treatment she has received for diabetes she would have become unwell resulting in significantly reduced life expectancy. Although I was not taken to this by Ms Kalyan, I note that in Dr Battersby’s report dated 15 April 2022, she commented that without good diabetic control a substantial decrease in life expectancy from complications associated with this could be anticipated. This is of course evidence of some vintage which does not engage with the availability of medication or any alternative medication / treatment in Sierra Leone. Whilst Ms Conteh’s 2022 report addresses the issue of medication in Sierra Leone, this is not current and does not grapple with alternative sources of income to pay for medication and support. Dr Slinn also observed that although she is not ‘a physical doctor’ the appellant would find it “exceptionally difficult” to adjust to Sierra Leone given her physical frailty and having spent 20 years in the UK. Dr Slinn has not factored in the financial and emotional support that would be available to the appellant.
Article 8
65. As set out above, Ms Kalyan confirmed that she did not rely upon family life for the purposes of Article 8. The appellant’s Article 8 case is predicated upon her lengthy residence in the UK together with the significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Sierra Leone. The parties agreed that the appellant accrues 20 years residence on 1 July 2026. That is very soon but the relevant rule remains 276ADE(1)(vi), as she has only lived in the UK continuously for less than 20 years.
66. I must conduct a broad evaluative judgment as to whether the appellant will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in Sierra Leone society is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships. For the reasons I have already outlined, the appellant does not have a well founded fear of serious harm in Sierra Leone and will be able to access basic accommodation and medical support with the help of family members. She was born in Sierra Leone and lived there for over 40 years. She has a clear understanding of the language and dialect, cultural norms and society, having brought up her children and worked there as a police officer for many years. I have considered Ms Conteh’s report and note the challenging living conditions for many in Sierra Leone. I have found that the appellant will have the emotional and financial support from her children. Her private and family life in the UK is very scant and she suffers from loneliness and isolation and the health conditions I outline above. The appellant has sisters in Sierra Leone who have offered a degree of support in the past and are likely to be supportive again. Whilst her health and possible isolation may be difficult to cope with, the appellant has demonstrated a degree of robustness in coping with rather difficult circumstances in the UK over a lengthy period. Her circumstances in Sierra Leone, with the financial support available, are likely to be sufficient to enable her to re-build a life in Freetown, in the sense envisaged for the purposes of 276ADE(1)(vi) and the relevant authorities (as summarised in Ackom v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 537, at [21-23]).
67. Although the appellant has nearly completed 20 years continuous residence in the UK, the fact remains that she has not. She cannot meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules. I have considered the applicable public interest considerations at s.117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The appellant overstayed her visitor visa and there is a strong public interest in her removal. She speaks English but has never been financial independent in the UK. Little weight must be given to her private life, which is in any event slight, because it was established when she was in the UK unlawfully, albeit I note that since 2017 she has remained pending the determination of her asylum claim. At best in this latter period her immigration status was precarious, and little weight should also be given to a private life established at a time when the person’s immigration status is precarious. The appellant has some family life in the UK but not family life protected by Article 8(1). Her circumstances in Sierra Leone are likely to be difficult but her circumstances in the UK are also difficult. The public interest in this case significantly outweighs any interference with the appellant’s private life including her very lengthy residence.
Decision
68. The appellant’s removal will not breach the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection or her human rights. I dismiss her appeal on all grounds.

DCP Plimmer
Deputy Chamber President Plimmer

17 June 2026