UI-2024-000143
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-000143
First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/53458/2022
LH/00688/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
5th November 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
Between
VANCE RICHARD WELLS
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: No appearance
For the Respondent: J. Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 30 September 2026
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. Mr Wells was born in New Zealand in August 1946. Mr Wells’s wife is a British citizen, born in 1944. As set out in more detail below, the Upper Tribunal’s files contain a brief note of a telephone call received from his wife on 1 September 2026, in which she said that he was “no longer with us”. I conclude that it is likely that she meant to inform the tribunal that he had died. I express my sympathy, if I have understood the brief note of the message correctly, and I apologise if receiving this determination at this time causes any distress. However, for the reasons set out below, I have concluded it is necessary to decide this appeal in spite of that phone call, because in the month between then and the hearing before me, the tribunal received nothing in writing to confirm this.
2. Mr and Mrs Wells met in Zimbabwe in 1998, and they married in the UK in 2003. They initially lived together in Australia, but they relocated to the UK in 2009. By the time his appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal on 3 December 2023, Mr Wells was 77 years old, had been married to a British citizen for twenty years and had been living in the UK for 14 years. He had, however, only held leave to remain for three years, between 20 October 2010 and 19 October 2013.
3. On 9 December 2020, Mr Wells applied for a second period of leave to remain on the basis of his relationship with his wife. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (“the Secretary of State”) refused that application in a decision dated 23 May 2022. Mr Wells appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”), and he asked for the appeal to be decided on the papers, without an oral hearing. The Secretary of State did not object. In a decision dated 3 December 2023, the FtT allowed Mr Wells’ appeal.
4. The Secretary of State appeals against that decision. Although the Secretary of State has become the appellant in these proceedings and Mr Wells has become to the respondent, for continuity of reference, I will refer to the parties as they were during the proceedings before the FtT. All further references to “the appellant” are to Mr Wells and to “the respondent” are to the Secretary of State.
The FtT’s decision
5. The first section of the challenged decision sets out the background to the appeal, at [2]-[12]. The FtT noted that the appellant asserted a right to remain in the UK on the basis of his marriage and gave basic details about that marriage. It then set out his immigration history at some length. It noted that the appellant had arrived in the UK in July 2009, without entry clearance. He had said in his statement that he had sought indefinite leave to remain on arrival and had been subsequently granted it by the High Court, but the FtT found that this was a misunderstanding and the litigation the appellant was referring to was actually an appeal the FtT. The FtT had allowed his appeal in a decision promulgated on 26 August 2010. The appellant had then been granted three years’ discretionary leave.
6. The FtT also recorded that in the letter granting the appellant discretionary leave in 2010, he was “advised […] that he should make a further application for leave before the period of leave expired. He did not do so, preferring to write letters of application. He was advised on a number of occasions to make the appropriate application and pay the appropriate fee.”
7. The FtT further recorded that the appellant had left the UK at some point before July 2015. When he sought re-entry on 19 July 2015, he was granted one month’s discretionary leave in order to lodge an application for leave to remain. He had not done so.
8. The FtT recorded that the appellant submitted that “weighty consideration” should be given to the High Court decision granting him indefinite leave to remain (namely, the FtT decision allowing his human rights appeal). He said that ever since that decision, the respondent had been “difficult”.
9. The respondent’s position was that the appellant did not meet the immigration status requirements of the rules because he had not held leave to remain since 2013 and he had not demonstrated that there were insurmountable obstacles to continuing family life with his wife outside the UK. Nor had he demonstrated that he would face very significant obstacles to his reintegration in New Zealand. The respondent contended that the appellant’s COPD, peripheral vascular disease in his left leg and “past medical history” did not “meet the threshold for an article 3 claim, as established in AM (Zimbabwe) [2020] UKSC 17, and there fore [sic] does not amount to exceptional circumstances.”
10. The FtT listed the “Issues in Dispute” at [14]-[15]:
“14. The parties agree that I must resolve the following factual disputes about the appellant’s ability to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules.
Does the appellant satisfy the immigration status eligibility requirement?
Are there insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the UK?
Are there very significant obstacles to integration on return?
“15. The parties agree that I must resolve the following factual disputes about other circumstances put forward as relevant to the proportionality balancing exercise.
Is the decision to refuse leave proportionate?”
11. At [16], the FtT confirmed that it had read the documentary evidence “very carefully” and repeated that the issues in the appeal were whether the appellant met the requirements of the Rules and, if not, whether the decision to refuse leave was disproportionate.
12. At [17], the FtT directed itself that under the principles set out in Devaseelan, the 2010 determination must be its starting point. The findings of that determination were summarised: the appellant had a family life with his wife and this was “one of the rare situations where the principles in Chikwamba [2008] UKHL 40 should apply”. The only reason that the application had failed was the appellant’s lack of entry clearance. He was 66 years old and it would be disproportionate to require him to return to New Zealand simply to apply for entry clearance.
13. The FtT then considered the appellant’s immigration history since that decision. It noted that the appellant had made requests for his leave to be extended but had been unable or unwilling to comply with the requirements of the immigration rules or to follow the respondent’s advice as to the correct procedure. It concluded that the reason for the appellant’s poor immigration history was his lack of funds, rather than a “complete disregard for the immigration rules.”
14. The FtT then noted that the appellant was 74 years old and had “some medical difficulties”. He would lose continuity of care if he were to return to New Zealand to apply for entry clearance. The FtT then noted the length of the appellant’s marriage and of his residence in the UK. It considered the changes in circumstances since the last determination. They were that the appellant was older and had “additional health conditions”, but also that he had not held leave since 2013. It concluded that it would be disproportionate to require the appellant to return to New Zealand to seek entry clearance and allowed the appeal “in line with the findings” of the 2010 appeal.
The grounds of appeal
15. The respondent raises two grounds of appeal. I set them out in full for reasons that will become clear below.
“Ground one: Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on a material matter / Making a material misdirection of law.
“9. The Respondent respectfully submits the FTTJ has failed to provide adequate reasons for finding the appellant’s health conditions are of sufficient severity to outweigh the significant public interest in upholding the Immigration Rules.
10. The Respondent submits the medical evidence submitted in support of the application fails to meet the high threshold for the appeal to succeed under Article 8 grounds. The letter by Dr Craig Needs at RB p47 notes:
“I would not expect Mr Well's COPD (Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease) to be severe enough to preclude air-travel based on his current treatment regime for this condition.”
Dr Needs reaches no conclusive finding in respect of the appellant’s additional condition of peripheral vascular disease (PVD).
11. The Respondent continues to rely on the RFRL and Respondent Review which found there is adequate medical treatment available for the appellant in New Zealand. The Respondent maintains the appellant’s medical conditions are not severe enough to engage the high threshold of Article 3 (which the FTTJ has failed to make any findings on) and submits the FTTJ has failed to provide adequate reasons for finding otherwise.
Ground two: Failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on a material matter.
12. Despite setting out the key issues to resolve at [14], the Respondent submits the FTTJ has failed to make any findings on whether the appellant can meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules, specifically whether he can meet the immigration status eligibility requirement of Appendix FM, and whether EX.1. is satisfied.
13. The Respondent therefore submits the FTTJ has failed to take into account or resolve conflicts of fact on material matters. “
The appeal before the Upper Tribunal
16. The FtT granted the respondent permission to appeal. On 12 February 2024, the Upper Tribunal notified the parties that the appeal would be heard on 5 March 2024. On 1 March and again on 4 March 2024, the appellant emailed the tribunal to request that the appeal be adjourned because he had a hospital appointment on that date. It appears from the correspondence I have seen that the tribunal either could not open or could not read the documents he had attached as proof of that appointment. The hearing was adjourned by the Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge before whom it had been listed, and directions were issued in which it was noted that the appellant did not appear to be fully apprised of the nature of the hearing and he was urged to seek legal advice. These directions were not promulgated until 27 August 2026.
17. On 1 September 2026, the parties were sent notice that the hearing had been listed for 30 September 2026. The tribunal’s records show that on the same day, the appellant’s wife called the tribunal “to say appellant no longer with us”. She was advised to email Field House to confirm this. She did not do so. On 29 September 2026, attempts were made to contact the appellant or his wife by email, but his phone was permanently engaged and the email went unanswered.
18. At the outset of the hearing before me, I informed Mr Nappey that I considered that the likely meaning of the brief note on the tribunal’s files was that the appellant was deceased. He agreed that if this were the case, the appeal would have automatically come to an end, in accordance with FZ (human rights appeal, death, effect) [2022] UKUT 00071. However, I did not consider that I could treat the appeal as having ended on the basis of this brief note alone. My view was that the appeal would need to be treated as continuing, but that there was a clear possibility that the appellant’s widow would not respond to the tribunal’s request to confirm this in writing. It was therefore in the interests of the overriding objective to bring the appeal to end by determining it, rather than to adjourn it indefinitely. I considered that it was fair to proceed in the appellant’s absence, as it was clear from the phone call of 1 September 2026 that notice of the hearing had been received. Moreover, the issues before me at this stage were purely legal ones.
19. I then heard submissions from Mr Nappey, for which I am grateful and to which I refer in the discussion below.
Legal Framework
20. It is not my role to decide whether the appellant’s removal from the UK would be a disproportionate interference with his family life with his wife. It is my role to decide whether the FtT erred in law when it found that it would be. In exercising that role, I must bear in mind the principles reiterated in numerous cases, most recently in ECO v BB & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 97 at [56]:
(i) The FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently;
(ii) Where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account;
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out;
(iv) The issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference;
(v) Judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they have failed to do so;
(vi) Reasons will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract: Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2](6); and
(vii) An appellate court should avoid “island-hopping”: Fage v Chobani [2014] EWCA Civ 5.
21. I also consider the guidance set out in Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC) to be relevant, in particular:
“[3] Each point of law, where there is more than one, must be clearly and succinctly identified as a numbered ground of appeal with sufficient detail so that the Tribunal and the parties are able to identify the essential issue raised by that ground. […]
[4] The Upper Tribunal is likely to take robust decisions and not permit grounds to be advanced if they have not been properly identified and pleaded, or where permission has not been granted to raise them.”
22. It may be open to the Upper Tribunal to consider an appeal point that was not raised by a party, but only where the point is “Robinson obvious”. As recently reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370 at [69], Robinson obvious points cannot be taken in favour of the Secretary of State.
Discussion
23. Mr Nappey began with ground two, so I do the same.
24. Ground two is not made out. Although it is correct that the FtT did not explicitly make findings on the three issues listed at [14], its implicit findings on them are clear throughout the decision. The fact that the appellant did not meet the immigration status requirement of the rules is obvious from his immigration history, to which the FtT returned at multiple points throughout the decision. The FtT also set out the basis of the appellant’s submissions, from which it was clear that he did not rely either on insurmountable obstacles to continuing family life in New Zealand or very significant obstacles to reintegration. Moreover, the sole focus of the FtT’s consideration was the proportionality of the decision, and throughout that consideration it is clear that the FtT is aware that the appellant was unable to meet the requirements of any rule that would allow him to make an application from within the UK. As he would have been able to do so if the answer to any of three questions set out at [14] were yes, it is implicit that the answer to all three questions was clearly no.
25. I do not consider it an error of law for the FtT not to set this out explicitly. In the first place, I take into account the guidance above that FtT judges must be presumed to know and be seeking to apply the law, and that they are not required to set out every step in their reasoning explicitly. Secondly, it is clear from the FtT’s description of the parties’ submissions that the respondent had clearly found that the answer to all three questions was no and that the appellant had never submitted otherwise, either explicitly or implicitly. It cannot be an error of law for the FtT not to make express findings about issues that are not genuinely in dispute. There was no conflict of fact for the FtT to resolve here.
26. At the hearing before me, I drew Mr Nappey’s attention to the fact that there were two distinct errors identified in the heading to ground one: failure to give reasons and misdirection in law. I asked him if he could identify what the misdirection in law was. He submitted that the ground was, essentially, a failure to give reasons.
27. Ground one, as advanced in the grounds of appeal, is not made out. It is based on a misunderstanding of the FtT’s decision as based on the seriousness of the appellant’s health concerns. This misunderstanding was reflected in Mr Nappey’s initial submissions on this ground, in which he took me to the limitations of the medical evidence that was before the FtT. It is obvious that the FtT did not find that the appellant was entitled to leave under article 3 in accordance with AM (Zimbabwe). Nothing in the decision refers to article 3. There can be no question, therefore, of the FtT having failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the article 3 threshold was reached. It plainly made no such finding.
28. Although this is perhaps slightly less obvious, I consider that the respondent has also misunderstood the decision when submitting that the FtT failed to give adequate reasons for “finding the appellant’s health conditions are of sufficient severity to outweigh the significant public interest in upholding the Immigration Rules.” In the first place, the FtT did not find that the appellant’s health conditions were “severe”. It made modest findings, which were that the appellant had a number of health issues, more than he had had in 2010, and that returning to New Zealand to apply for entry clearance would interrupt his continuity of care. If the FtT had found that his appeal fell to be allowed for that reason alone, the respondent would have good reason to complain – although the reason would perhaps have been better expressed as a misdirection in law as to the relevant standard or as irrationality, rather than a failure to give reasons.
29. When the decision is read as a whole, however, it is clear that this is not what the FtT decided. The FtT took the 2010 appeal as its starting point, as it was required to do by Devaseelan and which the respondent does not say was wrong. It then assessed all of the evidence before it, noting the length of the appellant’s overstay since 2013 and reaching a conclusion as to the reason for it. It took into account the appellant’s age, his health conditions, the likely interruption to the care he was receiving in the event that he returned to New Zealand to apply for entry clearance, the length of his marriage and the length of his residence in the UK. The respondent does not challenge any of the factual findings made here. Taking all of these facts into account, and taking the pervious determination as its starting point in accordance with Devaseelan, it allowed the appeal. I consider that the reasons it reached the conclusion that it did are entirely clear: the factors that weighed in the appellant’s favour (which include but are by no means limited to his ill health) outweighed the facts that he could not meet the rules and had overstayed since 2013.
30. At the hearing, I put my preliminary view to Mr Nappey in similar terms to what I have written immediately above. He then made an alternative submission, which was that the FtT had failed to follow Alam v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 30. This meant that the “Chikwamba principle” was far narrower than in 2010, and that the FtT had been required to put considerably more weight on the appellant’s failure to meet the rules. It had not done so.
31. This, taken out of context, might be a fair criticism of the FtT’s decision. It was not, however, the basis of ground one. The basis of ground one was that the medical evidence did not suggest that the appellant was severely ill or that medical care would be unavailable in New Zealand, such that the judge’s finding that his medical needs outweighed his failure to meet the immigration rules was either irrational, based on a misdirection in law about what was required to succeed in article 8 and article 3 health claims, or insufficiently explained.
32. As noted above, the parties are required to identify their grounds of appeal when they apply for permission to appeal. They will rarely be allowed to raise new grounds in the course of an error of law hearing in response to indications from the tribunal that it is unpersuaded by the grounds as pleaded. The Robinson obvious principle cannot operate in favour of the Secretary of State.
33. For these reasons, the errors of law that the respondent has been granted permission to raise are not made out.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 3 December 2023 is upheld. The Secretary of State’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
E. Ruddick
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
6 October 2026