UI-2024-000275

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 4 Mar 2025
• Promulgation date: 16 Jun 2025
• Publication date: 1 Jul 2025
• Last updated on: 1 Jul 2025

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-000275

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/60654/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

16th June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ATHWAL

Between

SUCHA SINGH
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mohzam, Abbots Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 4 March 2025


DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is a remaking, under section 12(2)(b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of the First-tier Tribunal decision of 4 November 2023 to allow the Appellant’s human rights appeal under s 82(1)(b) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“2002 Act”). On 25 June 2024 Upper Tribunal Judge Smith and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Shepherd set aside that decision because it contained an error of law. Their error of law decision is attached in the annex below.

Background
2. The factual background and the basis upon which the Respondent refused the Appellant’s human rights claim is set out at [6-11] of the error of law decision, annexed below1. The appeal arose in the context of the appellant as a ‘foreign criminal’ who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 14 months for the offence of causing death by careless driving committed on 9 July 2021. He therefore fell within the automatic deportation framework. His challenge to the respondent’s decision to deport him was founded on the basis of his private and family life in the United Kingdom (“UK”).
Legal framework
3. As established in HA & RA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1176, Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (NIAA) 2002 provides a complete code for assessing the Appellant’s Article 8 claim. S.117B is always applicable. Whether s.117C applies depends on whether the appellant meets the definition of a foreign criminal in s.117D(2).
4. S.117C sets out the considerations in cases involving foreign criminals as follows:
“(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where—
C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.”
5. Significant weight must be given to the public interest in the deportation of the offender. S.117C(1) of the 2002 Act states that “the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest”. This societal interest is however intended by Parliament to be a flexible one, reflecting the criminality of the offender, because s.117C(2) of the 2002 Act states that; “the more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal”; Hesham Ali v SSHD [2016] UKSC 60, Akinyemi v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2098.
6. In in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 the Supreme Court gave authoritative guidance on the approach to the question posed by section 117C(5) 2002 Act.
7. To marshal that evidence, assess its weight, and then balance it against the assessed weight of the public interest in deportation the Supreme Court recommended in Hesham Ali [2016] UKSC 60 that the Tribunal should use a ‘balance sheet’ method, setting out within the decision each of the factors telling for, and against, deportation.
Very Compelling Circumstances
8. There is a significantly enhanced public interest in the Appellant’s deportation. NA (Pakistan) [2016] EWCA Civ 662 established the principles to be followed, which were reiterated in HA (Iraq) at [31], as being applicable to the case of a medium offender. These are summarised as follows;
• In order for such an offender to demonstrate that either their own circumstances or those of the individuals with whom they are in a relationship, outweigh the relevant public interests, they must show very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exception 1 and 2 (HA (Iraq) [32]).

• There may be cases in which such an offender can say that features of his case of a kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2 have such great force for Article 8 purposes that they do constitute such very compelling circumstances, whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to Article 8 but not falling within the factors described in Exceptions 1 and 2. The decision maker must look at all the matters relied upon collectively, in order to determine whether they are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation, (HA(Iraq) [33]).

• “…The cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be rare. The commonplace incidents of family life, such as ageing parents in poor health or the natural love between parents and children, will not be sufficient.”(NA (Pakistan), [33].

Error of law and preserved findings
9. Judge Smith and Judge Shepherd found that on the basis of the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s (“the Judge”) reasoning, it was not possible to conclude that there were “very compelling circumstances over and above” the exceptions to deportation. The Judge did not adequately address the extent to which it would be unduly harsh on the Appellant’s wife, Mrs Kaur, and their adult children, to remain in the UK without the Appellant. The error of law decision preserved the findings of fact reached by the Judge insofar as they were not infected by the error of law.
10. In the original decision, the Judge recorded her findings within the framework of the Immigration Rules and the 2002 Act. For ease of reference and because that is how we have to approached the appeal, we have organised the preserved findings within the s.117C framework (the substance of each is the same). We also record those matters agreed by the parties during the hearing so that the uncontroversial matters are all recorded in one place. The preserved findings and agreed matters are as follow:
i. S.117C(4) Exception 1;
a. S117(C)(4)(a); The Appellant arrived in the UK illegally in 1995 and was removed in 1998. On 8 June 2008 he returned to the UK, with his children, as a visitor. He did not seek to regularise his immigration status until 2018. Mr Mohzam confirmed that the Appellant resided in the UK unlawfully until 5 August 2021, which is when he was granted limited leave to remain. Mr Mohzam was unable to clarify the basis upon which that leave was granted. The Appellant is unable to meet the requirements of Exception 1 because he has not been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life.
b. S117(C)(4)(b)- The Judge at [51] was satisfied that the Appellant had been in the UK for a substantial period of time and had integrated into his local community.
c. S117(C)(4)(c)- The Judge at [57-59] accepted Mrs Kaur’s evidence that the Appellant was 56 years old with poor mental health, which arose from the impact upon him of the offence he committed, and his time in prison. He was unfit to work. They had no family or friends to support them, and nor did they have savings to fall back on if they returned to India. The children did not have a sufficient income to support themselves in the UK as well as their parents in India. At [62-63] the Judge found that the Appellant suffered from Major Depressive Disorder. At [67] the Judge found there would be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s return to India.
ii. Section 117C(5) Exception 2;
a. The Appellant did not meet Exception 2 because Mrs Kaur did not meet the definition of a qualifying partner, as set out in s.117D(1). Mr Mohzam confirmed that Mrs Kaur was not granted indefinite leave to remain in line with her children. It was agreed that at the date of this hearing Mrs Kaur was not settled in the UK and it remained the case that she did not meet the requirements of Exception 2.
b. The Respondent, as confirmed by the Judge, accepted that the Appellant and Mrs Kaur were in a genuine and subsisting relationship.
c. The Judge at [57-59] found that there would be very significant difficulties for Mrs Kaur if she had to return to India. The error of law decision at [30] records that the Judge’s use of the term “significant difficulties” was shorthand for the “unduly harsh” test insofar as the impact of going to India with the Appellant would be concerned. Judge Shepherd and Judge Smith found that in isolation, paraphrasing the statutory test using different language would be an issue of form rather than substance, and did not find it a material error of law. The Judge found that Mrs Kaur had lived in the UK for 22 years. They did not have a family home in India, it belonged to the Appellant’s parents and when he came to the UK, he sold it. They had no relatives or siblings in India and no one to accommodate them. The Appellant would be unable to work, they had no savings, and their children would be unable to financially support them from the UK.
d. The children were adults when the matter was heard and could not bring the Appellant within Exception 2 on the basis of his relationship with them.
iii. Other factors taken into consideration:
a. The Judge considered the “best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled” and “the solidity, cultural, and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.” The Judge acknowledged that the children, who at the time of the hearing were 24 years old, were adults. Although she has referred to their best interests, we do not treat this as meaning that the children’s interests attract a primary consideration, in the way that they would if the children were under the age of 18 years. The Judge found that the relationship between the children and the parents goes beyond the normal emotional ties and engages Article 8. The Judge found at [60-61] that the children had been in the UK for most of their lives. They were educated here and were now in work. They did not have the means to support themselves if their parents left the UK. They are fully integrated into life in the UK and have no friends or connections in India. The parties agreed that insofar as the children’s ability to support themselves in the UK was concerned, we would have to consider the current situation as of the date of this hearing. In regard to their immigration status, whilst they remain Indian nationals, they were granted indefinite leave to remain on 12 November 2024.
b. The Judge at [48-50] was satisfied that the Appellant was fully rehabilitated due to the nature of the incident he was convicted of, its effect upon him, the impact of serving a custodial sentence, and the fact that he had not previously been convicted of other offences.
c. At [52] the Judge considered the Appellant’s conduct since the offences were committed and she was satisfied that it was an isolated incident in the life of an otherwise law-abiding citizen, a fact that was also acknowledged by the sentencing judge.
d. The Judge at [54] accepted that the Appellant and his wife married on 19 October 1988, in India. (Mrs Kaur in evidence clarified that it was in fact 19 September 1988). Mrs Kaur came to the UK in April 2001 as a visitor and overstayed. The Appellant and their children joined her in July 2008. They accepted that they sold their family home in India as they had no intention of returning there. The offence took place in the course of a very long marriage and Mrs Kaur did not enter the marriage with knowledge of it [55].
Hearing before us and evidence
11. It was agreed before us that the principle issues were:
a. In the event that the Appellant returns to India alone, whether it would be unduly harsh for Mrs Kaur and her adult children to remain in the UK;
b. Whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2, so as to bring the Appellant within section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act thereby rendering the Respondent’s decision disproportionate.
12. The Appellant provided two supplementary bundles in addition to the consolidated bundle (“CB”), a 111-page bundle (“SB1”), a 12-page bundle (“SB2”). The parties confirmed that we had before us all of the documents relied upon.
13. Mr Mohzam made an application to treat the Appellant and Mrs Kaur as vulnerable witnesses. He accepted that the psychiatric reports prepared for both witnesses did not address the adjustments required, but submitted that they should be asked simple questions in evidence and be provided with breaks when required. In accordance with the Joint Presidential Guidance Note, No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance and the latest edition of the Equal Treatment Bench Book, we agreed that both the Appellant and Mrs Kaur should be treated as vulnerable witnesses and ensured that the adjustments were in place throughout the hearing.
14. The Appellant, Mrs Kaur, and their daughter, Ms Simranjit Kaur, gave evidence. Their son, Mr Jagjit Singh, did not attend. The witnesses adopted their statements in evidence-in-chief and were not questioned further. They were all cross-examined and re-examined. We took into account the entirety of the evidence whether or not referred to specifically below.
15. The parties each made oral submissions. Whilst we have referred in our decision to the main points made on each party’s behalf; we took the parties’ submissions into account in their entirety.
Discussion and analysis
16. As Mrs Kaur and the children are not qualifying relatives, Mr Mohzam accepted that the Appellant cannot meet the requirements of Exception 1 or Exception 2. We have nevertheless considered the elements of these exceptions because, as established in HA & RA (Iraq) they are factors that we must take into account when considering s.117C(6).
17. We do so in relation to what is sometimes called the ‘stay scenario’ (whereby the family remain in the UK without the appellant) as the preserved findings are that it is unduly harsh on Mrs Kaur and would cause significant difficulties to the adult children to leave the UK with the Appellant (see 10(iii)(a)).
18. Furthermore, we have taken into consideration the following evidence, which was not before the original judge: the additional expert reports, prepared by Dr Kashmiri, on the Appellant and Mrs Kaur; the material from their GPs; and the oral evidence of the witnesses. We have made findings on the evidence within the relevant parts of s.117C structure below.
19. During the cross-examination of Mrs Kaur, Mr Mohzam objected to her being questioned about whether the children would now be able to support the Appellant and Mrs Kaur if they returned to India. He submitted that the finding on this matter was preserved and we could not go behind it. We allowed the question to be put by Ms Arif. Whilst the preserved findings are our starting point, we have been provided with additional evidence that was not before the original judge, and in accordance with s85(4) of the 2002 Act, we may consider any matter which is relevant to the substance of the decision. The situation for the Appellant and his family has changed since November 2023 and we must take into consideration all of the evidence as of the date of hearing, as a whole.
Whether it would be unduly harsh for Mrs Kaur to remain in the UK without the Appellant
20. We have carefully considered the evidence as a whole and on balance we are not satisfied that it would be unduly harsh for Mrs Kaur to remain in the UK without the Appellant. These are our reasons.
21. Before us was an unchallenged psychiatric report about Mrs Kaur prepared by Dr Kashmiri, dated 6 September 2024. Based on this report, Mr Mohzam submitted that there would be a deterioration in Mrs Kaur’s mental health if she was separated from the Appellant. He directed us particularly to [12.4] which set out Mrs Kaur’s symptoms, and the expert’s summary and opinion at [13.4-13.8].We have considered the report in its entirety.
22. At [13.7] and [13. 8] Dr Kashmiri sets out Mrs Kaur’s diagnosis and her symptoms. This was not disputed by Ms Arif, and we accept the diagnosis, that Mrs Kaur suffers from Major Depressive Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder.
23. Notwithstanding the sections to which Mr Mohzam directed us, in our judgement the key part of the expert report is at [14(iii)] where Dr Kashmiri addresses whether Mrs Kaur’s mental health condition will deteriorate if the Appellant was to return to India alone. This is the expert’s opinion;
“Mrs. Kuldip Kaur is at risk of declining mental health if her husband is returned to India as she shares a close emotional bond as well as an inter-dependent relationship with him in terms of emotional and family support. She will constantly be worried about his well being. The distance is likely to be a barrier to their ability to provide support for each other which in turn will have a negative effect on both their mental health and quality of life. The effects of separation as a result of the deportation extend beyond impacts on socio-economic status and private life. Forced removal from a country is a traumatic experience for both the individual (deportee) and his family. Use alternative means of communication such as WhatsApp or Skype, cannot replace the intimacy and feelings of safety that are brought about by being able to stay in close proximity with a partner. This could bring about strain in relationships between spouses, causing a further negative effect on their mental health.”
24. The report was not challenged by Ms Arif. Nevertheless, whilst there are parts of the report which address the issue of what would happen to Mrs Kaur if she remained in the UK without the Appellant, in our judgement it offers limited assistance for the following reasons;
i. We accept that there is a risk of a decline in Mrs Kaur’s mental health but the expert has not explained the extent of that decline and what impact it would have on Mrs Kaur in real terms (see for example [13.4]). The issue before us is whether the decline in Mrs Kaur’s health would be unduly harsh. Without specific details on how that decline would present itself and the impact on her life, we are unable to assess its severity.
ii. At [12.5] the report records that Mrs Kaur, “seemed to have reasonable insight into her condition as she understood she was experiencing mental health symptoms and was willing to accept help and treatment if offered.” The expert does not explain why Mrs Kaur would not be able to rely on help and treatment from medical professionals to stop or reduce a decline in her mental or physical health in the event that she is separated from the Appellant.
iii. Ms Simranjit Kaur gave evidence that she and her brother provided emotional support to Mrs Kaur whilst the Appellant was in prison, and since his release. We were not directed to any part of the expert report that addressed what would occur if Mrs Kaur remained in the UK with her children, and to what degree the presence of her children would be a protective factor.
iv. At [13.5] of the report the expert sets out her discussion with Mrs Kaur about why she does not want her husband to be deported. The expert’s opinion at the end of this paragraph is that the Appellant’s deportation would have a significant negative psychological impact on the family as a whole. The expert does not specifically address the impact of being separated from the Appellant and the specific consequences for Mrs Kaur.
25. We heard oral evidence from the Appellant and Mrs Kaur about Mrs Kaur’s current situation. They both said Mrs Kaur has returned to work at a farm where she packs vegetables. The appellant confirmed that Mrs Kaur was able to support herself. Mrs Kaur stated that she is currently taking sleeping medication because she has difficulties sleeping. Prior to that, she took paracetamol.
26. In our judgement, the evidence demonstrates that there has been some improvement in Mrs Kaur’s health since the report and her witness statement were prepared, in that she is now able to work.
27. The evidence of Mrs Kaur and Ms Simranjit Kaur was that the children supported Mrs Kaur when the Appellant was imprisoned, and since his release. We are satisfied that this emotional support would continue if Mrs Kaur remained in the UK without the Appellant.
28. We turn to consider whether the Appellant’s deportation would have an adverse financial impact upon Mrs Kaur. Mrs Kaur and Ms Simranjit Kaur confirmed in oral evidence that the Appellant is not in employment. They explained that the household expenses were shared primarily between Ms Simranjit Kaur and Mr Jagjit Singh, and that Mrs Kaur contributed. It is clear from this evidence that the Appellant does not contribute financially and that his absence would not reduce the family’s income.
29. We are however mindful of the fact that the Appellant’s family may want to support him in India, which could have an impact on their financial situation. We have considered the oral evidence of Mrs Kaur and Ms Simranjit Kaur and summarise their financial situation as follows:
i. Income: Mrs Kaur £700-£800 per month, net; Ms Simranjit Kaur £400 per week, net, approximately £1600 per month; Mr Jagjit Singh approximately £450 per week, £1800 per month. Total family income amounts to approximately £4100 to £4200 per month.
ii. Outgoings (monthly): £800 rent; £200 utility bills; do not pay council tax separately; £800 on food; £50 medication, £400 car insurance. Total expense per month is approximately £2250.
iii. Surplus family income is approximately £1850-£1950 per month.
30. Mr Mohzam submitted that the family were currently living hand to mouth. We have taken into account that the family are currently paying for the Appellant’s legal costs in this matter, but we were not told how much that was and when it would be paid in full. We reject Mr Mohzam’s argument and we find on the evidence before us that Mrs Kaur and her children have a surplus income which could be used to financially support the Appellant in India. The burden of proof is on the Appellant to establish that this amount would be insufficient to pay for his essential needs in India, we have not been referred to any evidence that supports this claim.
31. Finally, despite the preserved finding that it would be unduly harsh upon Mrs Kaur to relocate permanently to India, it was not submitted that there would be such obstacles to her visiting the Appellant there. In fact, her oral evidence was that she would actually relocate with the Appellant were he to be deported.
32. We have considered the following factors cumulatively: the lack of detail in the expert report about the extent of the deterioration in Mrs Kaur’s mental health if she remained in the UK; the fact that the Appellant’s health has improved since she made her statement, and from when the expert report was prepared; the fact that her children would provide her with support if she remained in the UK; the family’s current income and the fact that the Appellant does not contribute to the family’s financial situation and the fact that the Appellant and Mrs Kaur can continue their relationship via visits. We are not satisfied that the evidence establishes that Mrs Kaur’s mental health will deteriorate if she remains in the UK without the Appellant or, if it does, that the deterioration would have unduly harsh consequences upon Mrs Kaur.
Whether it would be unduly harsh for the adult children to remain in the UK without the Appellant or both parents
33. Mrs Kaur has been granted limited leave to remain and notwithstanding the findings of the Judge, it is her choice whether she wishes to remain in the UK or return to India with the Appellant and we have noted what she said about that at [31] above. Her concern about this option was the impact upon the children because the separation would be difficult for the family.
34. In light of this evidence we consider not only the consequences for the children if the Appellant returned to India, but also the consequences for them if both parents returned.
35. We find that it would not be unduly harsh for the children, who are now 25 years old, to remain in the UK without the Appellant or without both of their parents. These are our reasons.
36. We start with the family’s financial situation. The Judge accepted that “the children work but do not earn much and certainly could not afford to keep themselves in the UK and support her and her husband in India” [58]. The family’s financial situation has moved on since this finding was made (see [29] above).
37. We have taken our calculations at [29] and removed Mrs Kaur’s financial contribution. In that situation the children would have a surplus income of approximately £1,150. However, that amount is likely to be higher because less money would be spent on utility bills, food and medication. We have not been referred to evidence which establishes that this amount would be insufficient to support either the Appellant if he returned alone, or both the Appellant and Mrs Kaur if they returned together.
38. We turn to consider the family’s emotional dependency on each other. It was clear from the evidence of Ms Simranjit Kaur that she and her brother are no longer dependent upon the Appellant and Mrs Kaur. The roles have reversed and it is the parents who are now dependent upon their children.
39. Mrs Kaur came to the UK, alone, in 2001 and overstayed. She lived apart from the Appellant and her children until 2008, which is when they joined her in the UK. The children were 3 years old when Mrs Kaur left them in India and 9 years old when they were reunited with her. They spent a considerable part of their formative years living apart from Mrs Kaur. We have no doubt that since their arrival in the UK the Appellant, Mrs Kaur and the children have formed a strong family bond. We have referred to the earlier separation because Mrs Kaur has chosen in the past to have a long distance relationship with her children and her husband. We have not been referred to evidence that it had a detrimental impact on the family then. The children are now adults and are not dependent upon either parent. Mrs Kaur at [9] of her statement records that the children are seeking to get married, which would result in them establishing their own family units. The children are now better placed to manage a separation from their parents. In these circumstances we are not satisfied that any separation from either the Appellant or from both parents would be unduly harsh.
Whether there are compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2
40. In our consideration of this section we remind ourselves that neither Mrs Kaur nor the children are qualifying relatives for the purposes of Exception 2 of section 117C of the 2002 Act. Whilst findings have been made adopting the terminology of Exception 2 (unduly harsh), we have regard to the fact that Parliament did not intend that relatives who are not qualifying relatives are to be protected to the same degree as those that are.
41. We also remind ourselves of the high threshold set by the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test as confirmed at [8] above.
42. Before we proceed further, it is incumbent upon us to make findings on the Appellant’s mental health in light of the updated medical evidence. Mr Mohzam relied on the evidence of Dr Kashmiri as to the consequences for the Appellant if he was separated from his family and had to live in India without them.
43. Neither psychiatric report was challenged and Ms Arif made no submissions about them. We have evaluated the reports with that very much in mind. However, in our judgement there are nevertheless reasons why, even taking the expert evidence at its highest, it offers limited assistance to us in identifying the precise medical consequences for the Appellant if he were to return to India alone and therefore, whether or not his mental health conditions are capable of amounting to a very compelling circumstance. We set out our reasoning below.
44. The Judge had before her the original psychiatric report prepared by Dr Kashmiri on 24 October 2023 (“the first report”). By the time of the hearing before us, Dr Kashmiri had prepared an updating report dated 6 September 2024 (“the second report”). In both reports she diagnosed the Appellant as suffering from a Major Depressive Disorder. However, in the second report she noted his reported worsening symptoms and a lack of improvement to his condition despite treatment. The reports were not challenged and we do not have any reason to reject the expert evidence as to the fact of the Appellant’s diagnosis as the judge did previously.
45. In both reports, Dr Kashmiri listed the Appellant’s symptoms as at the date of the respective reports and opined that in the event he is deported to India his symptoms would deteriorate, particularly in the absence of his family (see [14.2] of the first report and [12.4[ of the second report).
46. In particular at [14.2] of the first report Dr Kashmiri said of the loss of family support:
“Without this, there is risk of further deterioration of his mental health with detrimental effect on his well-being.
Given Mr Sucha Singh’s mental health difficulties, further stress concerning his immigration issue has likely led to further exacerbation of his mental well-being. His mental health would benefit from the security and safety he feels living in the UK.”
47. The report states at [14.3] that:
“considering Mr Sucha Singh’s presenting difficulties and severity of his symptoms, anything that will require a suitable level of cognitive, emotional and behavioural energy and effort (such as a traumatizing move to India) would not be possible at least until he has had further opportunity to undergo suitable psychological treatment to help alleviate some of his symptoms, increase his energy levels and improve his ability to make logical decisions. He will not be able to cope with the challenges awaiting him in India in his current mental state.”
48. At [12.4] of the second report Dr Kashmiri says:
“With appropriate treatment and alleviating the stressor of his immigration issue, his prognosis with long term treatment can be good. Without appropriate treatment his prognosis is poor. His response to treatment is limited due to his current immigration matter and being away from his social support networks would only worsen his ability to cope. His mental condition is likely to worsen and his ability to access mental health services in India may be compromised. It should be noted that ‘availability’ and ‘ability to access’ are not the same thing. Given Mr Singh’s unstable mental state which has not been successfully treated at present, he is unlikely to engage or access mental health care, irrespective of whether it was potentially available to him, because of his psychological state of mind.”
49. Dr Kashmiri attributes the decline in the Appellant’s mental health and the lack of improvement to the ongoing immigration matter. We note however, that in her first report Dr Kashmiri recommended that the Appellant should be treated with an antidepressant, psychological/psychotherapeutic approaches, and that he should be referred to the local mental health team for further assessment and management of his mental health needs. However, despite the first report being sent to the appellant’s GP (see GP records at SB1 p27), the treatment plan does not appear to have been actioned. Dr Kashmiri does not address this in her addendum report. She also recommends that he ‘continue’ to take amitriptyline although GP notes (SB1 p24) record that the Appellant was taking Mirtazapine and had not taken Amitriptyline since July 2023 (SB1, p28) which in our judgement causes some confusion about whether or not the Dr Kashmiri considered the appellant to be on the recommended treatment. We note that by the time of the hearing before us, the Appellant stated that he is currently taking medication to help him sleep but he was not aware what medication he was on. This adds to the confused picture about the appellant’s treatment, whether or not he has had the recommended treatment and what, if any, impact any departure from the recommended treatment may have had on his symptoms and recovery.
50. In terms of the Appellant’s current symptoms Dr Kashmiri noted that the Appellant experiences tension headaches which were treated with non-prescribed medication. On examination there was no evidence of psychomotor disturbance; he responded appropriately to questions; he appeared anxious; there was no formal thought disorder; he had fleeting suicidal ideations but did not express active plans to end his life (his family are a protective factor); he had a reasonable insight into his condition as he understood he was experiencing mental health symptoms and was willing to accept help and treatment if required [10]. At [11.6] she described the Appellant’s symptoms as low mood with feelings of anhedonia, he was in a constant state of worry and as a result had difficulty concentrating on daily activities, his sleep was disturbed, he self-isolated, and that he had a low appetite.
51. At [12] where Dr Kashmiri spoke more about the Appellant’s current symptoms, she did not particularise which of the Appellant’s symptoms would be exacerbated if he returned alone. Neither did she say what impact that would have in real terms, upon the Appellant’s daily life. In our judgement, the report falls short of setting out a detailed and reasoned explanation of how the Appellant’s mental health would evolve if he returned to India alone. Although she noted that there may be available treatment in India, she opined the Appellant may not be able to access it because of his psychological state of mind [12.4]. She did not explain how this reconciled with her findings at [10.5] that he seemed to have a reasonable insight into his condition as he understood he was experiencing mental health symptoms and was willing to accept help and treatment offered.
52. The unchallenged expert evidence is that the appellant’s mental health is likely to deteriorate without family support. However in our judgement, the factors identified above reveal a significant gap in the medical evidence about the degree of deterioration in the Appellant’s mental health, and the impact it would have in real terms on his daily life and his ability to cope in India. We are not satisfied that the expert evidence on its own is sufficient to conclude that the impact upon the appellant’s mental health following deportation to India amounts to a very compelling circumstance.
53. In conducting our proportionality assessment, we have adopted the balance sheet approach as recommended in Hesham Ali.
54. We have taken into consideration the factors relied on by the Appellant. We attach weight to the following factors:
i. The preserved findings of the previous Judge that the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK;
ii. The close relationship between the Appellant, his wife, and their children and the support that they provide each other through what is undoubtedly a difficult time for them all.
iii. The preserved findings on the Appellant’s previous good character: that this was an isolated offence; as a result of his rehabilitation and because of his previous good character, he presents a low risk of reoffending; the degree of remorse recorded by the sentencing judge; and that judge’s view, that the Appellant would not repeat this behaviour in the future. The Appellant has not reoffended since the date of his offence, albeit we accept he would have been on probation supervision licence until recently. We do not accept Mr Mohzam’s argument that the weight we must attach to this this factor outweighs the public interest. As established in Zulfiqar v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 492 at [38-44], there are two further facets of the public interest that must be considered: the being the need to deter foreign nationals from committing serious crimes; and the public concern. Whilst we take into account the Appellant’s rehabilitation, we must also consider the two other facets. This is addressed in more detail below.
iv. Our starting point is the preserved findings that there would be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s re-integration into India. However, we must evaluate the situation at the day of the hearing and 16 months have elapsed since those findings were made. The evidence of the witnesses established that the situation has since changed, and for the following reasons we attach less weight to this factor now:
a. The Appellant’s family’s income has increased and on the most modest interpretation, there is in excess of £1000 left per month after expenses. The Appellant has not established that this amount would be insufficient to pay for his essential needs in India. Whilst the Appellant would be separated from his family, we are not satisfied that the Appellant’s family would be unable to pay for suitable care, or visit him on a regular basis.
b. We accept that he suffers from depression, and if deported to India, he would not have accommodation or family support there. However, whilst the evidence establishes a deterioration in his mental health upon return, it does not establish the extent his mental health would deteriorate if he returned to India alone, and the impact that would have on his daily life.
v. The preserved finding that it would be unduly harsh for Mrs Kaur to relocate to India and contrary to the children’s interests to do so.
vi. It would be harsh but not unduly harsh for Mrs Kaur to live in the UK with her children if the Appellant was deported.
55. The following factors strengthen the public interest in deporting the Appellant;
i. In accordance with s.117C(2) we have considered the seriousness of the crime and the corresponding public interest in deportation. We find that within the parameters of this type of offending, the circumstances of this offence make it serious. This increases the public interest in his deportation. We rely on the following findings of the sentencing judge;
a. The offence was aggravated by the fact that the Appellant chose to drive for a significant period of time without complying with the conditions of his provisional licence. He was not supervised, and did not display ‘L’ plates.
b. The driving involved a high degree of carelessness. This was not simply momentary inattention.
c. The case fell into the upper end of the medium category of seriousness. The driving came into the range of careless or inconsiderate driving that falls not far short of dangerous driving and there was an overlap between that category and the upper end of the middle range.
d. The Appellant only changed his plea to guilty when the defence expert report supported the prosecution position. As a result the appropriate credit for a guilty plea was reduced to 15%.
e. The Appellant’s age at the time of his first offence, and that he was a family man were mitigating factors.
ii. We now return to the other facets of public interest. We are satisfied that the circumstances of this particular offence are so serious that a deportation is required to alleviate public concern when such offences are committed. For the same reasons there is a need to deter foreign nationals from committing such serious offences. Mr Mohzam submitted that we needed to consider that this was an offence of careless driving and that the Appellant did not mean to cause harm. We reject this argument. The sentencing remarks establish that the Appellant chose to drive on a provisional licence for a significant period of time, and that he chose not to take the appropriate safety measures. It was entirely foreseeable that this could ultimately result in an accident that had the potential of endangering the public.
iii. The Appellant entered the UK in 2008 as a visitor and upon his visa expiring did not seek to regularise his immigration status until 2018. He was only granted limited leave to remain on 5 August 2021. We take into account the preserved finding that the Appellant and Mrs Kaur sold their family home in India as they had no intention of returning there. We attach significant weight to the fact that they entered as visitors but had the intent to remain and did not seek to regularise their immigration status for approximately 10 years in the Appellant’s case, and 17 years in Mrs Kaur’s case.
iv. Mr Mohzam submitted that the Appellant had been sentenced to a custodial sentence of 14 months imprisonment, but was being treated as a more serious prisoner who had been sentenced to more than 4 years imprisonment. He relied on [24] to [26] of NA (Pakistan) and argued that the lacuna for medium offenders outweighed the public interest. We do not accept this submission, [26-27] of NA (Pakistan) clearly states that if s.117C(6) barred medium offenders from asserting any Article 8 claim other than that provided by (4) and (5), that would plainly be incompatible with Article 8 rights. The “fall back protection” contained in s. 117C(6) avails both serious and medium offenders who fall outside Exceptions 1 and 2.
56. We have balanced those factors for and against the Appellant’s removal. We are satisfied that the deportation of the Appellant will have a harsh effect on the Appellant, Mrs Kaur and their children. However, that is not the test that we must apply. In order to allow this appeal, we must be satisfied the Appellant has established that there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exception 1 and 2. The Appellant does not meet the requirements of either Exception and even when we consider all of the factors cumulatively, he has not established that there are very compelling circumstances. Consequently, we are satisfied that the Appellant’s removal would be proportionate.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.


H. Athwal

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


25 March 2025

Annex 1

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-000275

Extempore decision
First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/60654/2022
LH/03902/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STEPHEN SMITH
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHEPHERD

Between

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Appellant
and

Sucha Singh
(ANONYMITY ORDER revoked)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Mozam, Counsel, instructed by Abbott Solicitors

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 10 June 2024


DECISION AND REASONS
1. By a decision dated 4 November 2023 First-tier Tribunal Judge Suffield-Thompson (“the judge”) allowed an appeal brought by the appellant against a decision of the Secretary of State dated 1 December 2022 to refuse a human rights claim made in response to him being notified of a decision to deport him.
2. The judge heard the appeal under Section 84(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”).
3. The Secretary of State now appeals against the decision of the judge with the partial permission to appeal of First-tier Tribunal Judge R. A. Pickering.
4. Although this is an appeal of the Secretary of State, for ease of reference we refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.
Anonymity
5. We queried with the parties whether it was necessary to maintain the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal. Neither party suggested that it was. We agree. As presently advised, we do not consider that it is necessary to derogate from the principle of open justice. We revoke the order.
Factual background
6. The appellant is a citizen of India. He has a lengthy immigration history which is set out in detail in the refusal letter. In summary, the appellant arrived illegally in the United Kingdom in 1995. He was later granted leave to remain.
7. In 2022 he pleaded guilty to causing death by careless driving and offences relating to driving without a licence and without insurance. The offences arose from an incident in 2021 when the appellant pulled out of a minor road onto a major road without sufficient care and attention for other road users, in particular a motorcyclist with whom he collided very shortly afterwards. The victim was killed instantly and left behind him a terminally ill wife with two young children. As the sentencing judge noted, the effect of the appellant’s crime was to deprive two young children of not only their father but also a father who was to be their primary carer upon the expected and tragic imminent death of his wife, their mother. For those offences the appellant was sentenced to a total of one year and two months’ imprisonment. The judge gave a discount of 15% to reflect the appellant’s late plea of guilty. Until shortly before the trial the appellant had maintained that he was not at fault and had sought to attribute responsibility for the accident to the deceased. By his guilty plea he recognised that that position was not sustainable. The Secretary of State informed the appellant that as a result of his conviction she was minded to deport him.
8. The appellant made representations seeking to dissuade the Secretary of State from deporting him. Those representations were treated as a human rights claim; the refusal of the human rights claim generated the right of appeal which the appellant exercised before the judge.
Refusal of the appellant’s human rights claim
9. The Secretary of State’s decision to refuse the appellant’s human rights claim was taken on the basis of the Immigration Rules applicable to the deportation of foreign criminals. The Secretary of State considered that, pursuant to rule 399B, the appellant was unable to satisfy the exception based on the relationship with his wife. That was because that relationship had been formed while the appellant was in the UK, albeit not when he was present lawfully. The Secretary of State did not consider whether the other criteria in rule 399B were met. The points not expressly addressed by the Secretary of State included whether it would be unduly harsh for the appellant’s wife either to live in India with him having relocated to that country upon his deportation, or for her to remain in the United Kingdom in his absence.
10. The Secretary of State considered the private life limb of the exceptions to deportation contained in rule 399A. There are three limbs the appellant had, in principle, to meet in order to satisfy that exception. In the view of the Secretary of State, the appellant failed at the first hurdle; he had not been lawfully resident for half of his life in the United Kingdom. Although he had leave to remain at the time of the offence, that had not been granted until relatively recently, in 2019. For the majority of the appellant’s time in the United Kingdom, he had been residing as an overstayer and without lawful status. The Secretary of State did not go on to address the remaining criteria in rule 399A, such as whether the appellant was socially and culturally integrated to the United Kingdom, and whether there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in India.
11. The decision addressed whether there would be very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions to deportation. The focus of that part of the analysis lay primarily in the impact of the appellant’s deportation on his daughters, Jagjit and Simranjit, both of whom were born in 1999 and are now aged 24. The Secretary of State concluded that the impact upon either daughter or the appellant’s wife would not be unduly harsh. They had been able to cope while the appellant had been in prison and would be able to do so again. The decision set against the considerations relied upon by the appellant the impact that his offending would have had on the lives of those his conduct had ruined.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
12. In her thirteen page decision, which was drafted only the day after the hearing (we pay tribute to the pace with which that promulgation took place), the judge set out the issues and the law and summarised the overall proportionality assessment which she considered was inherent to her analysis of the appellant’s case. Her discussion of the law may be found in two sections of the decision. First, at paras 17 to 22, the judge outlined in broad terms some of the relevant considerations applicable to the deportation of foreign criminals. Then, at paras 29 to 37, the judge summarised the factors that are inherent to the concept of “serious harm” and other relevant considerations under Part 5A of the 2002 Act.
13. In relation to the exceptions to deportation, it had been conceded at para. 7 of the appellant’s appeal skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant was unable to meet the exceptions to deportation under section 117C to the 2002 Act. In relation to exception 1, he had not been lawfully resident for more than half of his life. In relation to exception 2, his wife was not a “qualifying partner” (she holds only limited leave to remain), and his adult daughters were incapable of being qualifying children, since they were over the age of 18. The focus of the appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal, and the focus of the judge’s decision, was therefore whether the appellant was able to point to “very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions to deportation” (section 117C(6)).
14. At para. 45, the judge set out what she considered to be the relevant factors concerning that issue. They appear to be taken from para. 51 of the Supreme Court’s decision in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22. They included the following:
a. the nature and circumstances of the offence committed by the appellant;
b. the length of the appellant’s stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled;
c. the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant’s conduct during that period;
d. the nationalities of the various persons concerned;
e. the appellant’s family life situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple’s family life;
f. whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship;
g. whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age;
h. the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled;
i. the best interests and wellbeing of the children; and
j. the solidity of cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of the destination.
15. The judge proceeded to address those considerations in turn. At para. 57 she concluded that the appellant’s wife would be likely to encounter what she termed “significant difficulties” if she were to accompany the appellant to India. Those difficulties were based on the judge’s analysis of the oral evidence concerning the absence of any family or other ties in India. It was the appellant’s case that the family hold no property in India; the appellant was said to have exceeded the age at which he would be able to secure work, and there were plainly fears that the family would return to India to a situation of a destitution.
16. It was against that background that the judge reached her findings concerning the appellant’s wife.
17. At paras to 60 to 63 the judge considered the impact of the appellant’s deportation on his daughters, Jagjit and Simranjit. The judge noted that although the children are now young adults, nevertheless they would have no friends or relatives in India, and no home to live in. They have a fully integrated life in the United Kingdom.
18. The judge addressed the appellant’s mental health conditions and evidence concerning his experience of a major depressive disorder. At paras 64 and 65 she addressed section 117B of the 2002 Act, concerning factors relating to the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration controls. The judge went on to note that the appellant had worked in the United Kingdom, and had not been a financial burden on the state. He had regularised his status since entering the United Kingdom.
19. The judge concluded her operative analysis at paras 67 and 68. She said:
“67. Looking at all of the findings I have made above I do find that they combine to mean that there are very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s return to India. When using these circumstances for the family overall I find that looking at the test approved by Sedley LJ ‘what must be shown is more than mere hardship or a mere difficulty or mere obstacle. There is a seriousness test which requires the obstacles or difficulties to go beyond matters of choice or inconvenience.’ I do find that there is more than mere hardship in this appeal.
68. I do not and cannot underestimate the significance of immigration control or the protection of the economic stability of the UK but in this appeal, I do find that, having conducted a thorough proportionality assessment, that the balance in this appeal falls on the side of the Appellant and his family. I find that in this appeal the public interest is outweighed by the Article 8 rights of the Appellant and his family.”
The judge allowed the appeal.
Issues on appeal to the Upper Tribunal
20. The Secretary of State sought permission to appeal on two grounds.
21. By the first, the Secretary of State contended that the judge failed properly to address whether there were “very compelling circumstances” over and above the exceptions to deportation.
22. Pursuant to ground 2, the Secretary of State sought to challenge a number of the findings of fact the judge reached when concluding that there had been very compelling circumstances over and above.
23. Judge Pickering granted permission to appeal in relation to the first ground and expressly refused permission to appeal in relation to the second ground. There has been no renewed application for permission to appeal in relation to ground 2. It follows that the Secretary of State only enjoys permission to appeal in relation to ground 1.
24. Expanding on the grounds of appeal, Mrs Arif submitted that the judge failed properly to assess whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above by applying the incorrect test. She further submitted that the appellant was incapable of meeting the exceptions to deportation and that the judge therefore failed to address the import of the appellant’s failure to meet the tests and when concluding that there were very compelling circumstances over and above those exceptions to deportation.
25. Mr Mozam relied on a helpful rule 24 notice and detailed submissions explaining how the judge reached a finding that was entirely consistent with the relevant authorities concerning the deportation of foreign criminals. He submitted that the judge addressed the inherent flexibility that may be found in the public interest, and decided the case entirely consistently with Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60. The judge had had the benefit of considering the sentencing remarks and assessing the various criteria which one finds in para. 51 of Hesham Ali.
Discussion
26. While we pay tribute to the clarity of Mr Mozam’s submissions we respectfully consider that there was a significant omission from the judge’s proportionality analysis, which renders her conclusion on there being “very compelling circumstances over and above” the exceptions to deportation unsafe.
27. The judge’s analysis was concerned predominantly, if not entirely, with the appellant’s prospective integration in India and the prospective impact of an enforced move to India on his wife and his daughters. Although the Secretary of State’s decision had addressed the ability of the appellant’s wife and daughters to remain on their own in the United Kingdom and cope in his absence as they had done while he was in prison, the decision of the judge did not address that significant facet of the Secretary of State’s case.
28. Therefore, in our judgment, on the basis of the judge’s reasoning, it was not possible to conclude that there were, in fact, “very compelling circumstances over and above” the exceptions to deportation. That is because the requirement for public interest to be over and above the exceptions to deportation meant, in the circumstances of this case given the way it had been argued before the First-tier Tribunal, that it was necessary to address the extent to which it would be unduly harsh on the appellant’s wife for him, and daughters, for them to remain in the United Kingdom without him.
29. While the judge addressed what the impact of returning to India would be on the appellant’s wife if she were to accompany the appellant, we respectfully consider that she failed to address the scenario whereby the appellant’s wife would stay without him. That in our judgment is a significant error and infects the judge’s overall conclusions that there were very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions. Of course, it may be that this expert judge did address precisely that matter. We should be slow to infer that a judge of the First-tier Tribunal made an error of law, sitting as an expert judge of a specialist tribunal. However, if the judge did address that matter in her analysis, her reasons concerning it are not set out, and are therefore insufficient. We respectfully consider that the judge either failed to address this matter at all, or, having considered it, did not give sufficient reasons in relation to it.
30. We also note that there appeared to be a degree of confusion in other aspects of the judge’s analysis. The judge analysed the impact of the appellant’s deportation on his wife in relation to the “go with” scenario by reference to what she described as “significant difficulties”. The test the judge had to apply was not whether there would be “significant difficulties” but, as part of the “very compelling circumstances over and above” test, and, by reference to the matters raised in the Secretary of State’s decision, whether it would be “unduly harsh” for the appellant’s wife to remain in the United Kingdom without him, just as it would be for her to go to India with him. Whilst we infer that the judge’s use of the term “significant difficulties” was shorthand for the “unduly harsh” test insofar as the impact of going to India with the appellant would be concerned, we are unable to infer that that is what she meant concerning the prospect of the appellant’s wife remaining in the United Kingdom without the appellant. In isolation, paraphrasing the statutory test using different language would be an issue of form rather than substance (especially bearing in mind the fact that the judge was sitting as an expert judge of a specialist tribunal), and would be unlikely to merit a conclusion that there was a material error of law. However, in light of the fact the judge in our respectful judgment failed expressly to address the impact of the appellant’s wife remaining in the United Kingdom without the appellant, this aspect of the judge’s analysis is thrown into sharp relief.
31. Similarly, in relation to the impact of the appellant’s deportation on his two adult daughters, the judge addressed the impact of them following him to India (“go with”) but failed to address the impact of them remaining in the United Kingdom in his absence (“stay without”). The appellant’s daughters are grown adults and while, as the Secretary of State accepted in the refusal letter, there is a family relationship between the appellant and his daughters (they still live in the family home), there is nothing in the judge’s analysis that suggests that adequate consideration was given to the prospect of the children remaining the United Kingdom without him. That was a further relevant consideration that the judge failed to take into account for the purposes of determining the presence of very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions.
32. For these reasons, we allow the Secretary of State’s appeal. We will preserve the findings of fact reached by the judge insofar as they are not infected by the error of law, but we will retain this matter in the Upper Tribunal for it to be re-made acting pursuant to section 12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. The nature of the fact-finding required for the decision to be remade is not such that the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. The focus of the hearing will be the impact on the appellant’s wife and daughters of remaining in the United Kingdom without him, in the event that he returns to India alone. The preserved findings of fact will represent the starting point for the analysis of the Upper Tribunal at the resumed hearing, but it will be necessary to address the contemporary position at the resumed hearing. We do not preserve the judge’s proportionality analysis, in particular that at paras 67 and 68.
33. We give directions below for the remaking of this appeal.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside, subject to the findings of fact reached by the judge being preserved.
1. The decision will be remade in the Upper Tribunal with a time estimate of three hours on a date to be notified.
2. An Indian Punjabi interpreter will be required.
3. If the appellant wishes to rely on any additional evidence, he must file and serve the evidence on which he wishes to rely, along with an application to rely on it under rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to rely on it within 28 days of being sent this decision.
4. The appellant must file and serve a skeleton argument within 28 days of being sent this decision.
5. The Secretary of State must file and serve a skeleton argument within 42 days of being sent this decision.


Stephen H Smith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Transcript approved 17 June 2024