Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-000467

First-tier Tribunal No:
EA/50734/2020
IA/02086/2020

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

Dominika Havrilova
(NO ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: No appearance by or on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Mr A Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Edinburgh Tribunal Hearing Centre on 12 August 2025
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Slovakia. She clams to have entered the UK in March 2010 when she was 12 years old. The earliest record held by the respondent of the appellant’s presence in the UK is from March 2016. Over a period of three years she was convicted of 13 offences, culminating in a conviction in October 2020 (albeit it appears that was for an offence in April 2018). The longest period of imprisonment she had received was one of 9 months in 2019. On 16 November 2020 the respondent made a decision to deport the appellant under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (‘the EEA Regulations’). The appellant’s appeal against that decision was allowed by First-tier Tribunal Judge McTaggart (“the FtT judge”) for reasons set out in a decision dated 5 August 2023.
2. The respondent was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal by Upper Tribunal Judge Pickup on 23 February 2024. The decision of the FtT judge was set aside by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Wilding for reasons set out in a decision issued on 13 March 2025. In summary, he found that the FtT judge failed to consider various factors relevant to the fundamental interests of society. The FtT judge did not consider whether the appellant’s numerous convictions over a three year period affected one of those interests. The Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge noted the FtT judge did not have any up to date evidence from the appellant at all. Two reports were relied on, an independent social worker report from 21 August 2021, and a criminal justice social work report dated October 2020. The appellant’s witness statement was dated 11 April 2022, some 15 months before the hearing. The appellant did not attend the hearing to give oral evidence. There was also a statement from the appellant’s partner, again dated 11 April 2022, however again, she did not attend to give evidence.
3. The decision of the FtT judge was set aside and the Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge directed that the decision in the appeal will be remade in the Upper Tribunal. He directed that the finding by the FtT judge that the appellant had not established a permanent right to reside in the UK is preserved. He also made the following direction for the filing of further evidence:
“Parties are to file and serve any updated evidence they wish to, by no later than 14 days before the resumed hearing. Ms Simbi had said at the hearing that she understood that the appellant had reoffended. If that is the case the respondent must file and serve up to date evidence of the appellant’s criminal record, and any associated documentation as to the further offending since the decision of November 2020.”
4. This decision must therefore be read alongside the error of law decision of the Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge. It was against that background that the appeal was listed for further hearing before me on 21 May 2025. The appellant did not attend that hearing but was represented by counsel, Mr Bilal Shabbir, attended by his instructing solicitor. At the outset of the hearing, I was told by Mr Shabbir that the appellant would not be joining the hearing (permission having been granted for there to be a hybrid hearing with the appellant joining remotely) and that the appellant would not be giving evidence. Mr Shabbir also confirmed that the appellant had not filed and served any updated evidence as permitted by the directions previously made. The appellant relied in principle on the ‘error of law’ bundle.
5. At that hearing, I referred the parties to the direction made at paragraph [25(d)] of the decision of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Wilding and in particular, the information provided by the Presenting Officer that “the appellant had reoffended”. The respondent did not have an up-to-date PNC record identifying the appellant’s convictions. The Presenting Officer was unable to offer any explanation for the respondent's failure to provide evidence that is relevant. I asked Mr Shabbir if he and Mr Bradley (both having attended the hearing) were aware of the appellant’s convictions. Mr Shabbir submitted the onus is on the respondent to provide the information regarding the appellant's convictions as relied upon by the respondent and he would neither deny nor confirm the appellant has any further convictions until the appellant’s representatives have had sight of the evidence relied upon by the respondent. I was concerned that a decision had been taken that the appellant would not attend the hearing and had not provided any further evidence addressing a matter that the appellant and her representatives must plainly be aware of. Following a short adjournment, I was informed by the Presenting officer that the appellant received a sentence of imprisonment on 9 September 2024 for 8 counts of shoplifting.
6. I was surprised that the respondent failed to provide the evidence regarding the appellant’s convictions as directed. I was equally concerned that despite being aware of what was recorded in paragraph [25(d)] of the decision of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Wilding, the appellant had not filed any further evidence, had decided that she will not attend the hearing listed before me, and that Mr Shabbir was neither prepared to confirm nor deny that the appellant has the further convictions outlined by the Presenting Officer. Although I had no doubt that Mr Shabbir would not have sought to mislead me during the course of the hearing of the appeal, the position was wholly unsatisfactory and it was not in the interests of justice for me to hear the appeal and reach a decision based upon incomplete information as far as the appellant’s offending is concerned. I set out my reasons for adjourning the hearing in the ‘Order and Directions’ sealed on 21 May 2025 in which I said:
“11. I have no doubt that as competent representatives experienced in this field, the appellant’s representatives will have taken instructions upon the appellant’s convictions knowing what has been recorded before. Whilst I am sure Mr Shabbir will have been careful not to mislead the Tribunal, I am not prepared to proceed with the hearing of the appeal without some clarity regarding the appellant’s offending. It is not in the interests of justice for the Tribunal to reach a decision upon an inaccurate or incomplete factual matrix. 1
12. As all the evidence currently before the Tribunal is somewhat dated, the appropriate course therefore is to adjourn the hearing to give the respondent an opportunity to file and serve the up-to-date evidence regarding the appellant’s convictions. Failure to do so will mean that the Tribunal is likely to proceed on the next occasion without that evidence. In fairness to the appellant, the appellant should have an opportunity to file and serve further evidence regarding her convictions, and in particular, any further convictions since the respondent’s decision.”
7. I adjourned the hearing on 15th May 2025 to a date to be fixed before me and directed that the hearing will be a face-to-face hearing with the parties to attend in person. I made directions for the respondent to file and serve a PNC print and/or any further evidence relied upon by the respondent regarding the appellant’s offending, including convictions since the respondent’s decision dated 16 November 2020. I also directed that the appellant shall file and serve any further evidence she intends to rely upon, including evidence regarding any further convictions since the respondent’s decision dated 16 November 2020, by 4pm on 12 June 2025.
The Hearing of the Appeal Before Me on 12 August 2025
8. On 19 May 2025, the respondent filed an up-to-date PNC record with the Upper Tribunal. I shall return to that record which sets out a number of convictions since the respondent’s decision dated 16 November 2020. On 22 May 2025, the appellant’s representatives confirmed that the appellant will require a Slovakian interpreter at the hearing of the appeal.
9. On 2 June 2025 the Tribunal received correspondence from AJ Bradley & Co Solicitors that they have now withdrawn from acting for the appellant.
10. The Notice of the hearing listed before me on 12 August 2025 was sent to the appellant by post on 9 July 2025, and again on 29 July 2025 to an address that the appellant’s representatives confirmed to be the appellant’s address. The hearing before me was called on at 11:30 am and there was no appearance by or on behalf of the appellant. Furthermore, despite the directions made for the filing of further evidence by the appellant by the Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge in the ‘error of law’ decision and again by me at the hearing on 15 May 2025, the appellant has failed, without explanation, to file and serve any further evidence. I have had regard to Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. I am satisfied that the appellant has had notice of the hearing before me and that it is in the interests of justice and in accordance with the over-riding objective to proceed with the hearing of the appeal in the appellant’s absence. There is simply no prospect that an adjournment would result in any progress being made.
11. On behalf of the respondent, Mr Mullen referred to the PNC record provided to the Upper Tribunal that sets out a number of further convictions since the respondent’s decision dated 16 November 2020. Between June 2022 and January 2025, the appellant has been convicted of shoplifting on 30th June 2022, 29 August 2023, 11 January 2024, 9 September 2024 and 28 January 2025, and, of theft on 11 January 2024, and 22 April 2024. She has also been convicted of failing to comply with conditions of bail on 9 March 2023, and common assault on 22 April 2024. Mr Mullen submits the appellant has simply continued offending and in the absence of any further evidence from the appellant her appeal should be dismissed.
Decision
12. It is useful to begin with the EEA Regulations 2016 that applied. There is a preserved finding that the has not established a permanent right to reside in the UK. Regulation 23(6)(b) provides that an EEA national who has entered the United Kingdom may be removed if the respondent has decided that the person’s removal is justified on grounds of public policy. Regulation 27 as far as it is material to this appeal provides:
“27.—(1) In this regulation, a “relevant decision” means an EEA decision taken on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health.
(2) A relevant decision may not be taken to serve economic ends.
…
(5) The public policy and public security requirements of the United Kingdom include restricting rights otherwise conferred by these Regulations in order to protect the fundamental interests of society, and where a relevant decision is taken on grounds of public policy or public security it must also be taken in accordance with the following principles—
(a) the decision must comply with the principle of proportionality;
(b) the decision must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the person concerned;
(c) the personal conduct of the person must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society, taking into account past conduct of the person and that the threat does not need to be imminent;
(d) matters isolated from the particulars of the case or which relate to considerations of general prevention do not justify the decision;
(e) a person’s previous criminal convictions do not in themselves justify the decision;
(f) the decision may be taken on preventative grounds, even in the absence of a previous criminal conviction, provided the grounds are specific to the person.
(6) Before taking a relevant decision on the grounds of public policy and public security in relation to a person (“P”) who is resident in the United Kingdom, the decision maker must take account of considerations such as the age, state of health, family and economic situation of P, P’s length of residence in the United Kingdom, P’s social and cultural integration into the United Kingdom and the extent of P’s links with P’s country of origin.
…
(8) A court or tribunal considering whether the requirements of this regulation are met must (in particular) have regard to the considerations contained in Schedule 1 (considerations of public policy, public security and the fundamental interests of society etc.).”
13. It is also convenient to set out Schedule 1 of the 2016 Regulations as far as it is relevant to this appeal.
“The fundamental interests of society
7. For the purposes of these Regulations, the fundamental interests of society in the United Kingdom include—
…
(b) maintaining public order;
(c) preventing social harm;
…
(g)
(j) protecting the public
…”
14. To justify interfering with the appellant’s rights to free movement and residence in the UK, the respondent must establish the appellant’s removal is justified on grounds of public policy and public security. As set out in Regulation 27(5)(c), the appellant cannot be removed unless her personal conduct represents "a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society, taking into account her past conduct and that the threat does not need to be imminent”. Paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 confirms that the EU Treaties do not impose a uniform scale of public policy or public security values and member States enjoy considerable discretion, acting within the parameters set by the EU Treaties to define their own standards of public policy and public security, for purposes tailored to their individual contexts, from time to time. The application of paragraph 1 to the United Kingdom is informed by what follows at paragraphs 2 to 6 of Schedule 1.
15. The respondent refers to Regulation 27(5) and having regard to the appellant’s convictions as at the date of the respondent’s decision, said that theft by housebreaking is a serious offence that often has long-term consequences for the victim, who may be emotionally traumatised. The respondent noted the first verifiable record of the appellant being in the UK is from March 2016 when she was made subject to a Compulsory Supervision Order due to her lack of engagement with education, lack of parental care and allegations of her involvement in offending behaviour in the community.
16. In reaching my decision I have had regard to the appellant’s evidence as set out in her witness statement dated 11 February 2022, the statement of her partner of the same date and the Report of Ruth Stark dated 25 August 2021 in particular. The appellant describes a difficult childhood and claims that after leaving home at the age of 16/17 she met “the wrong kind of people” and stared using dugs. Her addiction was hard to control and she stole to fund her use of drugs. The respondent refers to her offending and states that she had not committed any offences since 2019. She refers to a relationship she had formed following her release from prison in December 2020 and apologises for her offending. She agrees with what is said in the ‘Criminal Justice Social Work’ report that he is a vulnerable young woman and that her life has been far from stable. She refers to the support she had subsequently received from the Glasgow Addiction Services, which she considers to be better suited to her needs. She clams in her statement that she is addressing her substance misuse and she claims she does not believe she will continue any pattern of offending in the future. She claims she has been able to reflect and had realised that a lot of her offending was as a result of heroin use. She wishes to address that and live a normal life. She claims the time she spent in prison was not a nice experience and she would not wish to risk behaviour of the kind that would put her at risk of being returned to Slovakia.
17. Ruth Stark has prepared an Independent Social Work Report that is dated 25 August 2021. She refers to the appellant’s background and the offending. She concludes there are significant factors in the history of the offending that stem from her childhood, pressure from family to enter into criminal activity alongside other family members, her self-medication to deal with emotional and psychological trauma through drug addiction and her rootlessness and homelessness during this period. She states the appellant now has a permanent home with her partner and has caring responsibilities with her partner’s extended family. She states the appellant has ended her reliance on drugs for self-medication. That Ms Stark claims, has reduced the likelihood of re-offending significantly as can be seen from the lack of outstanding charges for criminal behaviour.
18. The weight that I can attach to the evidence relied upon by the appellant, her partner and Ms Stark is limited for three reasons in particular. First, the appellant and her partner have not attended the hearing before me and there has been no opportunity for their evidence to be tested. Second, the evidence is now somewhat dated. Third, and connected to the second reason, the appellant’s claim that she has sought to address her substance abuse and not engaged in any further offending is entirely undermined by the evidence before me in the PNC record provided to the Upper Tribunal that sets out a number of further convictions since the respondent’s decision dated 16 November 2020. The appellant has failed to engage with that evidence at all despite having been provided with several opportunities to file and serve up-to-date evidence.
19. I accept that the appellant’s convictions indicate an established pattern of repeated acquisitive offending and I find that the appellant continued to offend without being deterred by her previous convictions or sentences indicating she has a lack of regard for the law, a lack of remorse for her offending behaviour, and a lack of understanding of the negative impact her offending behaviour has on others. I accept, that the ‘Criminal Justice Social Work‘ report noted the appellant had failed to engage with any support services and therefore is considered to pose a high risk of reoffending and a significant risk of harm to the public, notwithstanding the nature of her offending. I accept as the respondent submits that the evidence indicates that the appellant has a propensity to re-offend.
20. My decision must be based on the appellant’s conduct alone. I have had regard to the numerous offences the appellant has been convicted of between December 2017 and January 2025 for which she has received a range of sentences, none of which appear to have had any significant impact on her so that she would refrain from continuing her offending. In view of the appellant’s continued offending behaviour, even after the respondent’s decision, I accept that the appellant’s conduct represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society. The fundamental interests are specified in Schedule 1 and, in regard her, include preventing social harm, excluding an EA National with a conviction, combatting the effects of persistent offending, and protecting the public.
21. In assessing the appellant’s conduct, the appellant has been convicted or numerous offences and her convictions on 9 September 2024 for theft by shoplifting were sufficiently serious, when taken with her previous convictions to justify a further sentence of immediate imprisonment and this crossed the custody threshold. The appellant has not sought to address her offending since the respondent’s decision dated 16 November 2020 or to provide any evidence regarding her offending between June 2022 and January 2025.
22. Schedule 1 tells me that, where an appellant has received a custodial sentence or is a persistent offender, the longer the sentence or the more numerous are the convictions, the greater the likelihood that the appellant will meet the test contained in Regulation 27(5)(c). Here the appellant has, a number of convictions and she is a persistent offender.
23. In reaching my decision, I have had regard to considerations such as the appellant’s age, state of health, family and economic situation and her length of residence in the United Kingdom. I have also considered the appellant’s social and cultural integration into the United Kingdom and the extent of her links with Slovakia. The respondent noted the time the appellant is likely to have spent in Slovakia previously and the strong cultural, societal and linguistic ties to her country of origin. The respondent referred to the appellant’s claim that her parents have returned to Slovakia, and although the appellant claims to have lost contact with her family the respondent said the appellant would be able to reconnect with her parents and siblings on return. The respondent rejected the appellant’s claim that she is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with a partner in the UK. The respondent referred to the lack of evidence regarding employment and said that the appellant’s drug use and consequential criminality, indicates a lack of social and cultural integration. The respondent referred to the background material regarding the availability of treatment for drug dependency and the opportunities the appellant has had towards rehabilitation. The respondent concluded that interference with rehabilitation would be proportionate and justified when balanced against the continuing risk the appellant poses to the public. There is no up-to-date evidence provided by the appellant that addresses these matters, particularly given the appellant’s on-going offending and convictions since the respondent’s decision..
24. Standing back, I accept that the appellant is a persistent offender who has committed numerous criminal offences in the United Kingdom. I find she presents a sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of United Kingdom society, and that her deportation is justified on grounds of public policy in accordance with regulation 23(6)(b). I have considered her personal circumstances and find that on the evidence before me, the respondent’s decision complies with the principle of proportionality. The decision to deport the appellant is proportionate and in accordance with the principles of regulations 27(5) and (6).
25. It follows that I dismiss the appellant’s appeal.
Notice of Decision
26. The appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision of the respondent on 16 November 2020 to deport the appellant under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 is dismissed.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
4 November 2025