The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-000470
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50077/2022
IA/02808/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2nd March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

M M
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K. Wood, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Mr M. Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at (IAC) on 3 November 2025 and 28 January 2026


DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity order:
1. The FtTJ made an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
2. This is the remaking of the decision in the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. In accordance with section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, it follows the decision made by Upper Tribunal , issued on 25 February 2025 by which it was concluded that the FtTJ materially erred in law when dismissing the appellant’s appeal and that its decision should be set aside.
3. The error of law decision is set out in the annex to this remaking decision.
The issues:
4. The adverse finding of facts which concern the appellant’s account of events in Iraq are preserved findings for the remaking hearing .Thus, when the appellant left Iraq in 2018 he was not of any interest to the PMF nor was he detained and ill-treated and has not shown that he will be at risk on return arising out of any claimed events in Iraq.
5. The appellant also relied upon his political activities in the United Kingdom. It is common ground that the appellant was not politically active when in Iraq ( see asylum interview Q 36 and FtTJ’s finding at 12 paragraph thus he had no political profile when he left Iraq.
6. His claim was based on his political activities in the United Kingdom evidenced by his attendance at demonstrations and his social media postings. As set out in the error of law decision it was conceded on behalf of the Secretary of State that the decision of the FtTJ involved the making of an error of law on his assessment of the sur place ( political activities) carried out in the UK. The position of the respondent was that there were no questions raised before the FtTJ on the basis of the lack of genuineness or motivation on the appellant’s part dealing with why he posted material on Facebook at the time of the decision letter. The Presenting Officer for the respondent referred to the decision letter at paragraph 43 (p406 CeF) and as set out in the written grounds it was accepted that he had given a plausible and credible account of his motivation for attending demonstrations and the issue of whether his political activities were genuine were not in issue. At the hearing the respondent confirmed that she does not seek to withdraw paragraphs 42-44 of the decision letter. That has remained the position although the skeleton argument filed on behalf of the respondent does seek to refine that issue further.
7. The issue of documentation was considered in the light of the findings made not only in relation to the events in Iraq but also based on the assessment of his credibility in relation to the sur place claim. Both parties agreed at the error of law hearing that it was not possible to separate those issues of credibility and that in the circumstances it is necessary to make findings on the documentation issue also.
8. At that hearing a further issue was identified relating to his home area and upon which there appeared to be some confusion before the FtT. The parties were also to address that issue at the remaking hearing.
9. Mr Wood on behalf of the appellant had identified that the issues which would form the remaking of the decision related to the sur place activity and the issue of documentation. In view of the limited factual findings that were necessary, he had submitted that it was a matter of considering the background evidence and therefore was suitable to be retained in the Upper Tribunal.
10. Following that decision the appeal was listed for a hearing. There were several case management issues that arose and whilst it had not been anticipated that there would be any expert reports submitted on the issues raised, subsequently Dr Fatah was asked to provide a report on the issue of the appellant’s home area and also risk relating to this appellant’s political views if returned to his home area. Further, the appellant then sought to advance a further claim based on his claimed sexual orientation as being bi-sexual. This had not formed part of his earlier factual account, and the respondent was therefore entitled to consider whether this was being raised as a “ new matter” in the sense of the legal jurisprudence, and whether the respondent consented to this being raised and for the appellant to be interviewed. Having assessed this issue, the respondent gave her consent for this issue to be determined on the 18 September at the remaking hearing and did not consider that it was necessary for any further interview to take place on this issue. Mr Wood submitted his skeleton argument on this issue dated 23 October 2025 however it was conceded on behalf of the respondent that this issue should also be determined at the remaking hearing.
11. The respondent filed and served her skeleton argument including the maps as relied upon. There followed a report entitled “ Response to the Respondent” written by Dr Fatah dated 31 October 2025. There had been no permission for any further evidence to be filed, and it was not available to Mr Diwnycz until the night before the hearing on 3 November 2025. In the circumstances, it was agreed that Dr Fatah would not give evidence on 3 November but at a later date to be arranged.
12. Thus, the issues identified for the hearing are as follows:
(1)Who governs the home area of the appellant and who is in control of the area?
(2)Would there be real risk of persecution for the appellant on return to Iraq due to his political opinion?
(3)Is the appellant bi-sexual? If so, how would he conduct himself on return to Iraq and why and the consequences as to risk on return.
(4) Would there be a real risk of a breach of Article 3 due to any claimed lack of Iraqi documentation?
The evidence:
13. At the outset of the hearings steps were taken to ensure that the evidence was available to both advocates and the Tribunal. There had been a large bundle of documents provided by the appellant consisting of the appellant’s composite bundle (847 pages) which consisted of the material which had been before the Upper Tribunal and First-Tier Tribunal and also included the respondent’s bundle. It did not include the documentary material filed and served on behalf of the respondent in the form of maps ( see entry 87 on Ce file of 51 pages), or the email sent with the respondent’s response to the country information as to the locality of Gwer ) nor the report of Dr Fatah dated 31 October 2025. They were additional documents to the consolidated bundle.
14. Mr Wood had prepared a skeleton argument for the hearing dated 3 November 2025 referred to as a “revised skeleton argument”. Mr Diwnycz relied upon his skeleton argument and a series of maps which he had also provided along with the response to the country information concerning the locality of Gwer and the relevant CPIN’s for Iraq.
15. The appellant gave his evidence with the assistance of an interpreter. There were no problems identified with the interpretation and both the interpreter, and the appellant confirmed that they were able to understand each other.
16. The appellant confirmed the previous witness statements that had been filed for the previous proceedings dated 27 January 2021 (p346-7), 14 March 2022 (p. 345), 10 April 2025 (p33-35) and 14 July 2025 (p36-39) as his evidence in chief. There were no additional questions asked in chief. Mr Diwnycz questioned the appellant about aspects of his claim, including his including his activities in the UK, his sexual orientation, issues about documentation and family. Dr Fatah has provided a report and also an addendum report. He gave oral evidence at the hearing remotely. It is not necessary to set out the evidence as it is in the record of proceedings, and its salient aspects will be reviewed in the analysis of the evidence.
17. At the conclusion of the evidence each party had the opportunity to provide their closing summary. I am grateful for the helpful submissions proved by both advocates. Each party relied upon the written submissions that they had provided, and they were supplemented by their oral submissions. It is not necessary to set out those submissions in any detail as they are a matter of record, and I confirm that I have had regard to those submissions in reaching an analysis on the issues in this appeal.
Discussion:
18. The appellant has appealed under s82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the decision of the respondent to refuse his claim for asylum and humanitarian protection. The appellant claims to be a refugee whose removal from the UK would breach the United Kingdom's obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention.
19. The appellant bears the burden of proving that he falls within the definition of "refugee". In essence, the appellant has to establish that there are substantial grounds for believing, more simply expressed as a 'real risk', that he is outside of his country of nationality, because of a well-founded fear of persecution for a refugee convention reason and he is unable or unwilling, because of such fear, to avail himself of the protection of that country.
20. The degree of likelihood of persecution needed to establish an entitlement to asylum is decided on a basis lower than the civil standard of the balance of probabilities. This was expressed as a "reasonable chance", "a serious possibility" or "substantial grounds for thinking" in the various authorities. That basis of probability not only applies to the history of the matter and to the situation at the date of decision, but also to the question of persecution in the future if the Appellant were to be returned.
21. The Immigration Rules provide at paragraph 339L as follows:
'It is the duty of the person to substantiate the asylum claim or establish that they are a person eligible for humanitarian protection or substantiate their human rights claim. Where aspects of the person's statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects will not need confirmation when all of the following conditions are met:
(i) the person has made a genuine effort to substantiate their asylum claim or establish that they are a person eligible for humanitarian protection or substantiate their human rights claim.
(ii) all material factors at the person's disposal have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant material has been given.
(iii) the person's statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the person's case.
(iv) the person has made an asylum claim or sought to establish that they are a person eligible for humanitarian protection or made human rights claim at the earliest possible time, unless the person can demonstrate good reason for not having done so; and
(v) the general credibility of the person has been established.'
22. The starting point in the factual assessment are the preserved findings for the decision of the FtTJ. They are as follows: The appellant is a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 19 March 2019 and claimed asylum three days later. In summary, he asserted that he had been detained by the PMF on 4 October 2018 as they believed that he was a spy for the peshmerga, having drifted into their river territory in a dinghy in which he and his friend had been fishing. He was released several days later on condition that he would spy on the peshmerga and report back to the PMF. He did not want to comply and so he fled the country at the end of October 2018 in order to avoid further arrest by the PMF. He said that he had attended some demonstrations in the UK and had posted on social media.
23. In a decision promulgated on 17 November 2023, the FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk from the PMF on the basis he had claimed. The FtTJ found at paragraph 9 that “the Appellant invited me to find that, having drifted into PMF waters in a dinghy with his friend on a fishing expedition, he was firstly detained and ill-treated before being required to act as a spy for the organisation against the peshmerga. I am afraid that I do not find that credible for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Appellant would have had no obvious attributes to render him an attractive proposition to the PMF. He had no obvious power, influence or specialist knowledge which would have suited him to the role of spying against the peshmerga. He also confirmed, in cross examination, that after he had been detained and ill-treated by the PMF, he had a negative view of the organisation. Consequently, he would not have been disposed to assist them in any way. Most significantly, he admitted in cross examination that the PMF would have their own people, who had shown loyalty to the organisation, and who were working, figuratively speaking, underground on its behalf. I have no doubt that they would have been experienced and suitably trained, in contrast to the Appellant who, as I have already highlighted, had no obvious attributes to render him attractive as a prospect. He was cross examined at some length about his account that, on 13 October 2018, the PMF had asked him to travel to the IKR to collect a bag for them. I do not find it credible that, having had contact with the Appellant for so little time, they would have trusted him to take on a task of this nature, especially as it would have had members who had already demonstrated their commitment to the cause”.
24. The FtTJ concluded that “having considered the evidence before me in the round, I do not find the Appellant’s account to be reasonably likely to be true. I therefore reject his claim to be at risk from the PMF on return”.
25. Those finding of facts which concern the appellant’s account of events in Iraq are preserved. Thus, when the appellant left Iraq in 2018 he was not of any interest to the Hashd al-Shaabi (PMF) nor was he detained and ill treated and has not shown that he will be at risk on return arising out of any claimed events in Iraq.
26. The appellant also relied upon his political activities in the United Kingdom. It is common ground that the appellant was not politically active when in Iraq ( see asylum interview Q 36 and FtTJ’s finding at 12 paragraph thus he had no political profile when he left Iraq.
27. His claim was based on his political activities in the United Kingdom evidenced by his attendance at demonstrations and his social media postings. It was accepted in the decision letter of 14 December 2021 that he had given a plausible account of his motivation for attending demonstrations at that time. At the previous hearing the respondent confirmed that she did not seek to withdraw paragraphs 42-44 of the decision letter. That has remained the position and subject to what was raised in the skeleton argument provided by Mr Diwnycz. Mr Diwnycz submission is that the appellant’s involvement can be viewed as “ small calibre” and such a “low level” that he is not likely to be of interest or have come to the attention of the authorities. Mr Diwnycz places reliance upon his conduct prior to entering the UK and that he had not undertaken any political activity, and it is not accepted that he will continue any such activity in Iraq.
28. I make the relevant factual findings considering the evidence as a whole and whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the material aspects of the appellant’s claim are demonstrated. The burden of proof remains on the appellant.
Sexual orientation:
29. I have considered the evidence with care. As set out the FtTJ rejected the appellant’s factual account relating to the events in Iraq and expressly found that he was of no interest to Hashd-al Shaabi or anyone in Iraq prior to him leaving. Those factual findings are preserved findings. Whilst he has not been found to be a credible witness by FtTJ Fisher, in assessing his evidence I have taken into account that a witness may have lied about one matter, but it does not follow that they have lied about other matters. A witness may lie for many reasons; shame, panic, distress, confusion etc (applying R v Lucas [1981] QB 720).
30. In this context I required to assess his claim that he is bisexual. The skeleton argument filed on behalf of the appellant sets out the background to this claim and that reliance is placed on his most recent witness statement of 14 July 2025 that the appellant is bisexual, that he has a letter of support from a service for those who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or transgender. The factual basis of his claim is that a man named X threatened to “out” him on social media and subsequently received a call from his brother in Iraq via WhatsApp in which he said, “you changed to be a gay so if you come back to Kurdistan I will kill you”.
31. The appellant was questioned about his claimed sexuality during the hearing, and both parties made their submissions evidence following that evidence. Mr Diwnycz behalf of the respondent submitted that there were a number of credibility issues raised from his evidence, including the delay and the circumstances in which the claim was now made. This included the failure to make any reference to his sexuality during a previous hearing before a Judge in September 2023, and that his evidence was not credible in his attempt to explain the delay. He submitted there was no witness evidence or any supporting evidence from those who have had relationships with him or any evidence in respect of threats that was made both in the UK and from Iraq.
32. Mr Wood accepted that there were no witnesses but sought to rely upon the letter from the organisation (p48-49) and that he had told them of his sexuality. He submitted that it was difficult to produce evidence from any partners and therefore applying the lower standard of proof the appellant had demonstrated that he was bisexual.
33. There is no dispute that the appellant did not raise his claimed sexuality to either the respondent when raising any part of his protection claim to any former solicitors and did not raise it before the First-tier Tribunal in September 2023 when giving evidence concerning his circumstances and that the first reference that was made was in the witness statement filed for the remaking hearing dated 14 July 2025.
34. When assessing the evidence, I take into account paragraph 26 of the appellant’s skeleton argument and the asylum policy instruction: Sexual Orientation in Asylum Claims which states that the reasons for the late disclosure must be considered; “each claim must be considered on its individual merits and all factors considered in the round. Any late disclosure must be fully investigated and the overall credibility of the claim considered “in the round…”
35. When assessing the issue of delay in the context of the credibility of his claim I have considered that “in the round” and on its own individual merits. When considering that issue, I take into account the factual claim that is now made. The appellant has stated that he was involved in a relationship with a man in Iraq which was long-standing given that he stated it occurred from 2006 – 2014 and it was a sexual relationship that was hidden from his family. There has been no reference made to this part of his account or any subsequent information until July 2025. The appellant has been represented by more than one solicitor and legal representation has been provided by those specialising in asylum /protection law. When looking at the chronology and history, the appellant had been asked in his final questionnaire to provide all reasons ( underlined in the document) for his asylum claim (p727). No reference was made to his sexuality. Nor in the PIQ dated 27/8/20 20 setting out the reasons for his protection claim. Whilst he raised the claim of being at risk in his home area from the PMF, that was not the only claim made and he also raised his family’s involvement with the Baath party as an issue (p789). In 2021 he was interviewed by the respondent. It is recorded at the beginning of the interview of the importance of not withholding any information and that was explained. It included a conversation between the interviewer and the appellant that there may be some parts which are difficult to talk about but that it was all confidential. He was expressly asked a number of questions about his circumstances in Iraq,: Q 56 he was expressly asked “why is your life in danger?” Question 63 followed up with if there were any other reasons why your claiming asylum cannot return to Iraq? Problems with daesh and question 64 a further follow-up question was, “it is the only reason you cannot return to Iraq? The reply given is “ yes” (p764).
36. Following this it is clear from the documents disclosed that his solicitors did go through with him his problems in Iraq and the factual account given because on the 12 February 2021 he filed a witness statement and that having gone through the information with the solicitors he set out that he wished to clarify the interview (p733). There is no reference in any part of that clarification to either seeking to add to his factual claim any other circumstances in Iraq. It is of relevance that at the time this witness statement had been filed it is the appellant’s account given now that he had a relationship in 2020 and having been involved in meet up /dating apps in 2020-2021 ( see paragraph 7;p36).
37. The appellant’s claim was refused on 14 December 2021, and the appellant was thus aware that the position adopted by the Home Office was that he would not be risk on return to Iraq. In 2022 he filed a 16-page witness statement in response, again there is no reference at all to his factual background in Iraq or that in the United Kingdom, relating to sexuality and that this would put him at risk on return. When asked about his relationship with the man in Iraq (during cross examination) he was asked if he had had any other relationships in Iraq? The appellant stated that he had not because “you could not trust anyone in Iraq”. The inference drawn from that evidence and from his account is that there were inherent risks to someone who was involved in a relationship with men. When asked why he trusted the man in Iraq the appellant’s oral evidence was that it was because “he was a neighbour” and was “involved with the family”. That does not answer the question when viewed in the context of the country material relevant to Iraq. Nonetheless the evidence demonstrates that the appellant was aware of the risks to him arising from any relationship with someone from the opposite sex before he entered the UK not only based on the cultural circumstances in Iraq but also based on his own experiences.
38. The appellant had a hearing before the First-tier Tribunal in September 2023. According to factual claim made now that hearing was at a time when he had been in three or four relationships between 2020 – 2022. It was not only the fact that he had been involved in relationships but I find what was significant is that he claimed that he had been threatened not only in the UK but that at the time of the hearing he had been threatened by his brother in Iraq and told that he would be risk of serious harm (he would be killed ) the threat having been made on 23 January 2023.
39. I have therefore considered the issue of delay not only by the length of time that has elapsed, but the specific circumstances as set out above. I also considered his explanation for his failure to refer to his claimed sexuality from 2019 onwards but also why he had not referred to it in his evidence in September 2023. His explanation was that he had not previously mentioned his sexuality in any protection claim, “because I was not previously asked about my sexuality” and that the reasons for leaving Iraq, “was because of my fear of Hashd al-Shaabi and the militia are not related to my sexuality” (para 4). Having heard the evidence and considered it “in the round” I do not accept that explanation is either plausible credible or that it provides any reasonable explanation as to why had not referred to his claimed sexual orientation previously. It is not simply a matter of delay, but I am satisfied that there were number of opportunities for the appellant to refer to this issue, which he must have always realised is important to his claim, in particular taking into account the context of his factual claim that having previously being in a long-standing relationship from 2006 – 2014 and one which he kept secret due to the risks involved. Further, at the time of interview and his claim he had already been on meet up/dating apps to meet members of the opposite sex and therefore it could not be said that he was not aware that the risk had ceased.
40. More relevant is the lack of any reference during the hearing or prior to it in September 2023. At this stage according to his evidence, he had been experiencing threats of death from his brother and also it was claimed that he had been threatened to be “ outed” in the UK. His explanation for this is that he had previously discussed the problems with this man but did not inform his solicitors that this was his sexuality as he was embarrassed. I do not accept that explanation is either credible or plausible in the context of the factual claim made. If the appellant had discussed problems of being “outed” and had made reference to the man who was doing so, it is reasonably likely that such a factual complaint would have been viewed by the solicitor as relevant to his own sexuality. In other words, it could not be considered in isolation, and it is reasonably likely that if he did raise this it would be seen in the context of his own sexuality and further explored.
41. Further it does not explain why if he had been receiving threats of a serious nature from his brother in Iraq, that he did not think it was relevant to his protection claim. In this respect his evidence is wholly unreliable, and I conclude he has not told the truth about threats from his brother. One of the issues raised at the hearing in September 2023 related to his documentation and whether he could access it from his family. Therefore, contact with his family was central to that issue. The appellant gave evidence in the witness statement and before the FtTJ that he had had no contact with his family including his brother since 35 days before his interview in 2021. This was recorded in the Home Office minute (p24) of the questions asked at the hearing and where he expressly was asked about being in contact with his family. It records that he stated at present he had not got any contact with his family. He had also claimed he had even had to seek help from the Red Cross. In his oral evidence he was asked about that recording and he agreed that he had said this. When asked why he had done so when he had stated in January 2023 he had had contact with his brother who had made threats to him, the explanation he gave was, “I was in shock- how did my brother find out about the tik-Tok?” When asked why he had not told the court that he had received contact from his brother he explained that it wanted to discuss this but that his barrister and the Home Office were discussing issues about his address and he did not have the opportunity to discuss this. He further clarified that he was confused and this is why he did not mention it. I reject that explanation. The evidence before the FTT is entirely clear and without any confusion. He had been expressly asked about contact with his brother, but he denied having been in contact with any members of his family since 2021. It is not plausible or credible that if he had received threats from his family that he would not have referred to it at that time.
42. His evidence is further undermined by the lack of explanation as to how his brother obtained the information or the Tik Tok post. In cross-examination the appellant was unable to provide any explanation as to how his brother (who he claims he had lost contact with), had obtained the information or how he obtained the appellant’s contact details. When asked if there was any evidence for his claim that his brother had received it, his evidence was that he was in shock and “do you expect me to gather information?”. He could give no explanation as to why, if the post was available in November 2022, it took his brother until January 2023 to threaten him. He could provide no explanation or provide any evidence as to how his brother had obtained the post. When asked about the conversation with his brother and whether his brother had asked him about what was in the post, the appellant’s evidence was that his brother did not asking any questions and “no words were given”. I reject that evidence as implausible. It is not plausible or credible that his brother, whom he claims has had no contact with him since 2021, would threaten him without asking him about the information he had been sent and to hear what the appellant had to say.
43. I have considered whether there is any reliable independent supporting evidence as to his sexuality. Mr Wood relies upon the letter from X (page 48-9). It is from a specialist support service for those who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or transgender and refers to him contacting their office in January 2023 for support. It references that he claimed an acquaintance has threatened to “out” him on Facebook. It refers to the appellant later having made the journey to their office to discuss it and reference was made to his contact with the police. The next contact with them was in November 2023 and until May 2024 by telephone. There is no record of any groups that he attended. It states that he then lost contact with them until a later date which is not given. The date of the letter is April 2025.
44. When assessing the weight attached to that letter I take into account that the letter is from a support service for those who identify as lesbian, gay bisexual and/or transgender and that the appellant told them he was bisexual in January 2023. The letter provides no independent support for his claimed sexuality and repeats what the appellant has told them. They have not met with or had any contact with any partners of the appellant and in light of the nature of their organisation they are a supportive organisation and not one which whose role is to question the individuals claim. Further the contents of the letter are not consistent with the claim. The appellant claimed that he received four threatening messages from the man which is not described in the letter. Nor is there any reference to having contact with his brother and the threats were made from him.
45. As Mr Diwnycz submits, there is no supportive evidence of anyone who knows the appellant or has been in a relationship with him. Whilst Mr Wood submits it difficult to obtain evidence, that does not explain why he is not sought to do so in support of the claim. His evidence concerning the relationships was vague as to dates and times. I also find the Tik-Tock evidence to be unreliable and lacking in credibility. Those pictures pages 40 – 42 show the appellant in the gym. None of the posts refer to the appellant by name or by reference to any relationships despite the apparent claim made during cross-examination that he had told the man who had made the post that it was his boyfriend when coming across him. The contents as translated (see p42) give no detail of any relationship or make any sense in the context in which it is claimed. Nor are the photos explained.
46. Drawing those matters together, there are a number of credibility issues which go to the core of the claim made and I accept the submission made by Mr Diwnycz that they are such to demonstrate that he has not given a credible, plausible or consistent account of either his claimed sexuality, being involved with a man in Iraq or having been threatened from Iraq. He therefore has not demonstrated to the lower standard that he will be a real risk of harm on return due to any claimed sexual orientation.
Documentation:
47. Dealing with the issue of documentation, it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that he has maintained a consistent account that his Iraqi identity documents were left behind when he left the country and he is no longer in contact with his family in Iraq ( see skeleton argument paragraph 31). It is therefore submitted that the appellant is without identity documents and in the absence of contact with his family he will not be able to replace them for his return to the country. The other submissions made relate to the process whereby an individual may be able to obtain a replacement INID ( a document which replaces the former CSID’s)) and that his evidence is that he is not in contact with his family and therefore they could not provide him with any assistance and would be excluded from the process identified by the respondent as set out at paragraph 32. The argument is that without any documentation he would not be able to travel internally to his home area or register for work or stay in a different area and thus would fall into destitution without access to any documentation and this would breach his rights under Article 3.
48. I have considered the issue of documentation by considering the evidence “in the round”. Having done so I am satisfied that the appellant has not given reliable or credible evidence relating to this issue. Firstly, in his interview with the respondent he gave an account as to what documents he had in Iraq. He claimed that he had a CSID in Iraq (Q42) and also that he had an INID at home in Iraq (Q49). When asked about being able to obtain documentation from his family, the account given by him in September 2023 was that he was not in contact with his family therefore he could not access his documents. As set out earlier, this is entirely inconsistent with the account now given of the family members having sufficient information about him so that his brother was able to contact him in January 2023.
49. The whereabouts of his documents was explored in oral evidence and also in re-examination. In that part of his evidence ( re-examination), he was asked about his documents and that he had said his documents were left in Iraq. He was asked if that was correct? The appellant stated, “ yes I have stated this in interview it was dropped in the water”. When asked what document was dropped into the sea”, the appellant responded, “my Iraqi ID and my passport”. The appellant was then asked, “ one document you have is a CSID, was this the document dropped into the sea? The appellant stated “yes”.
50. His evidence is not consistent with what the appellant had said in interview when he was asked about his CSID.
Question 42. Do you have a CSID document?
Answer: Do you mean in Iraq or here?
IO: Either?
Answer: I had in Iraq; it was left at home. I went to take it and I used the passport.
Q43: Do you have any copies of your CSID?
Answer: “No. I don't I had everything with me, but I dropped my bag including my mobile into the sea”
Q44 44. Ok so you had your CSID with you but dropped it, is that right?
Answer “ No I took a picture of all of the documents, and they were in my passport but as I said I dropped everything including mobile into the sea.”
Later at Q48 he was asked: Did you have any other nationality documents apart from a CSID? He replied “ INID”. Q 50: Is this also in Iraq? Answer: Yes at home in Iraq.
51. I am satisfied from the evidence that the appellant did not drop his CSID card into the sea as he claimed in oral evidence but that that his CSID card is in Iraq with his family. That was what he had said previously in his witness statement at paragraph 80. He also has an INID in Iraq. I am further satisfied that they are available to him and they are documents which is family members would be able to provide to him. I reject his claim that he is not in touch with his family as a fictitious one given his claim that his family had not contacted him since 2021 when in fact he now claimed that his brother had been able to contact him in January 2023. I am therefore satisfied to the lower standard that there is a reasonable likelihood that those documents can be sent to him from his family members in Iraq with whom he is able to contact.
52. Having made that finding it is unnecessary to consider any further arguments raised as to being able to re- document is raised by both advocates, as there is no need to re-document given that he has his original documents available. That is consistent with the evidence of Dr Fatah that the appellant would be able to use a CSID even if it had expired to return to Iraq. In this appellant’s case he also has an INID which is a document that replaces the CSID.
Location of home area:
53. Dealing with the issue of the appellant’s home area the appellant stated that he was born in a village X, Gwer, Makhmour ( see PIQ p737). In his asylum interview he claimed have been displaced from the area prior to Daesh coming (Q 151) having gone to live in Khabet for three months before moving to Sfyia. Dr Fatah in his oral evidence confirmed that those other areas identified were in the IKR.
54. The position on behalf of the appellant is at the appellant’s home area and former residence belongs to Makhmour, Mosul and that it sits within the area that is disputed between the KRG and the Iraqi government ( see paragraph 9 skeleton argument).
55. The position on behalf of the respondent set out the skeleton argument dated 23 April 2025 is that Gwer and Makhmour belong to Erbil Governorate not Nineveh Governorate ( reference is made to an information request Iraq: location of Gwer dated 17 August 2022 which addresses the location and the administrative boundaries since 2019. It concludes from the sources cited between 2016 – 2022 Gwer has been reported as being in Erbil and there is no evidence the change in administrative boundaries. Again, whilst the respondent’s position refers to a CSA/INID office in Gwer itself is shown by the geographical physical location, it is not necessary to consider that further is an issue for the reasons given above.
56. Dr Fatah address this issue in his report between paragraphs 35 -36. Whilst there appeared to be a dispute in the written evidence about the location there was an agreement between the respondent and Dr Fatah when he gave his oral evidence (during cross examination). He was asked about the appellant’s home village, and it was suggested by Mr Diwnycz that it was not in Makhmour governorate, and this was agreed. He stated that Makhmour was part of Mosul and divided by the KRG and the Iraqi government. Gwer and Dibaga ( both shown in the yellow area on the maps) were in the control of the KRG. Dr Fatah was taken to the live maps which he agreed were a “neutral source” ( see page 5 PDF) showing the yellow area as KRG controlled in the pink area to be the government-controlled area. Gwer was located in the yellow area including Dibaga. Dr Fatah agreed that Gwer and Dibaga were in the Erbil governorate and not Nineveh, stating that Makhmour as a whole is a disputed territory but that he did not dispute that Gwer was part of Makhmour and that this part was within the KRG. He explained the history of the area essentially that the KRG and the Iraqi government came to the area because of ISIS activity around the disputed territories and it was the most efficient use of resources for both to be in control. He stated that some districts of Makhmour were controlled by the KRG and the security and offices of the CSID were controlled from Baghdad. He stated that he did not dispute that the formal way they are controlled is by Erbil. Dr Fatah gave evidence about where the CSID offices were located. He identified that there is a checkpoint when you leave Erbil where security is important but stated that it did not mean that someone would be stopped at the checkpoint if they had Iraqi ID even if it was one that was old or out of date, it could still be used. He referred to a further checkpoint just beyond Dibaga that this was not secure as the one at Erbil. He explained that any restrictions were overcome by having Iraqi ID.
57. In summary Dr Fatah confirmed that he accepted that Gwer and Dibaga are under the administrative control of Erbil governorate despite being in the disputed area of the Makhmour district. As can be seen from the above exchange and evidence, in the end the location was agreed. There was no re-examination on this issue.
58. Whilst both advocates sought to rely on the evidence of location by reference to the local Civil Status Affairs office and where that is situated, in light of the factual finding made above, it is not necessary to consider any issue of re-documentation as I am satisfied that it is reasonably likely that the appellant has his documentation available to him in Iraq which he can access from his family members.
Sur place activity:
59. Turning to the remaining issue of the sur place political activity, Mr Wood submits that the appellant would be at risk on return for two reasons; he has attended demonstrations in the UK and has posted material on face book and as a result he is likely to have been monitored by the Iraqi authorities and by those in control of the KRG. He submits that the background evidence indicates that activists abroad experience transnational repression. Secondly, if he were to replicate his political activity on return to Iraq, as shown in the UK, whether the IKR or the Iraqi Government controlled Iraq he would be at risk on return.
60. In his oral submissions Mr Wood argued that the appellant is likely to have become of interest to the authorities due to his criticism of them mounted from the UK and the scrutiny of social media.
61. In his oral submissions he placed reliance on the report of Dr Fatah and his oral evidence and that if it was correct, the appellant had identified political parties and had named the two parties and therefore would be at risk. He directed attention to page 589 as a post which demonstrated he would be at risk on return as he had denigrated the two leading families.
62. He further submitted that if the appellant were to replicate his political activity in return he will be at risk of persecution and that if he were to cease his political activity and it would be under threat of persecution he would still be entitled to succeed applying HJ(Iran). He submitted that irrespective of whether his activity was known he would still be at risk on return.
63. Mr Wood submitted if the appellant’s evidence is accepted and that he would replicate this behaviour and return it would lead to real risk of mistreatment. It was submitted that if he returned to his home area even if not in Erbil and he continued to criticise the regime he would be at real risk even if he lived in a remote part of the KRG from those authorities.
64. Mr Diwnycz submits that the political activity of the appellant is of a low level and limited and that it has not been demonstrated that he has come to the attention of the authorities in Iraq. There is no evidence that he has any profile at all or one that has been discovered by anyone in Iraq. The mere possession of a face book account is insufficient.
65. Mr Diwnycz relied upon the skeleton argument submitted. At page 4 of that argument refers to the acceptance by the respondent as set out in the original decision letter (paragraphs 42 – 43) that he attended demonstrations and posted on social media and that he provided a plausible account of his motivation. However, he submits whilst that is not withdrawn despite their appearance and the acceptance is that he has undertaken some politically orchestrated activity in the UK those paragraphs fall well short of accepting that he has or will come to the attention of the authorities in the KRG or Federal Iraq. He relies upon his involvement being such as “ small calibre” and such a “low level” that he is not likely to be of interest or have come to the attention of the authorities. Mr Diwnycz places reliance upon his conduct prior to entering the UK and that he had not undertaken any political activity, and it was not accepted that he will continue any such activity in Iraq.
66. In his oral submissions he sought to distinguish the report of Dr Fatah ( set out at paragraph 51) and that the appellant did not fall with any of those categories. He submitted that in light of the type of demonstrations he had attended they would not put him at risk and that this was “generic” activity. He submitted that whilst the appellant might have a subjective fear, his profile as such to be of no interest to the authorities on return.
67. Further he submitted that whilst he claimed he would continue to demonstrate/post material on Facebook the appellant has no political affiliation, he is not a follower of any particular faction, and this puts him in a generic category. Mr Diwnycz referred to the level and quality of the dissent expressed and that it was such to make him of no interest to the Iraqi authorities or those in the KRG. He submitted that the appellant had not sought to identify any particular individual, which was one of the categories Dr Fatah had identified, and did not name any particular individual or made any serious allegations against anyone therefore had not demonstrated that he would fall with any risk category or be of any interest to the authorities on return.
68. Dealing with the country evidence, the appellant relies upon the report of Dr Fatah and the oral evidence he has given. Dr Fatah refers to the two parties in control of the KRG – the KDP and the PUK and their historical governance locally known as “Penca be Penca” which meant that everything in the KRG was divided between those two parties which included employing public employees to members of Parliament. The KRG ( or as otherwise described as the IKR) is not governed as a unitary autonomous region . The government is essentially split into two with Erbil and Dohuk being administered by the KDP and Sulaymaniyah being administered by the PUK and whilst they share the apparatus of the state, the two regions are governed independently by each party. In that system high-ranking government and administrative positions are often granted based on political loyalty rather than qualifications. He identifies the entrenchment of the elites turning government institutions and tools are personal and partisan enrichment rather than of public service. In particular the allocation of civil service jobs and public contracts. They are described as deeply unpopular with wide swathes of the population viewing them as corrupt, incompetent and oppressive ( paragraph 37).
69. His report refers to political influence remaining a dominant factor affecting press freedom in the Kurdistan region and expressly refers to Kurdish media outlets and the risks to journalists who often face political pressure to publish misleading or fabricated content ( see paragraph 38). His report summarises that journalists and media outlets often face censorship pressure and covering sensitive issues such as corruption, human rights abuses or criticisms of political elites and that public officials and other powerful figures are known to influence online journalism. The KDP and the PUK also owned dozens of media outlets through which they promote their political narratives ( paragraph 40). Under the section entitled “repression” at paragraph 41, the report refers to the position of online journalists and activists being routinely detained and arrested in Iraq and the Kurdistan region although long prison sentences for online content are rare. Reference is made to a reported increase in the number of arrests and violence against journalists in Kurdistan since June 2024 amid the run-up to the parliamentary elections. The violations included eight arrests of journalists, 22 media coverage bans, 6 attacks and insults against media workers and 2 threats issued against media professionals, for confiscations of media equipment in two cases in which journalists were beaten. Paragraph 42 refers to the arrest of four journalists from a digital outlet, and journalists being the victims of verbal and physical abuse during protests in February 2025. Other examples are given concerning journalists and civil society activists; one being the owner of media ( paragraph 44).
70. In relation to the issue of sur place activities Dr Fatah refers to activists abroad being in a better position than activists inside Iraq when it comes to criticising the authorities but if criticism is perceived as being particularly damaging to a particular ruling party the risk may be greater or pressure exerted. He gives an example of the IKR exerting influence or a change in activist’s behaviour by pressurising their family inside the Kurdistan region or if they are in receipt of benefits from the ruling parties their benefits stop to alter their behaviour. He refers to those at risk as those who were previously sought by the authorities or had an active arrest warrant issued before they fled Iraq ( paragraph 51).
71. Dr Fatah set out that he could not state certain whether they would be aware of the appellant or the extent to which they would have been monitoring him if at all. He then makes reference to that assessment of risk being undertaken on an individualised basis, which was his oral evidence given at the hearing. In respect of profiles that may be of interest to the Iraqi Kurdish officials, he states it would be an individual who tries to undermine the ruling powers for the status quo, for example an individual’s act as a whistleblower on corruption in Iraq by naming individuals and providing evidence that they are involved in corruption ( see paragraph 52). He also refers to journalists and individuals that are critical of the ruling parties. In this respect he notes that media institutions in the KR GR generally firmly affiliated with the ruling parties.
72. His conclusion at paragraph 65 is that since 2020 there has been a marked escalation in the arrest and imprisonment of journalists, activists and protesters. If the appellant were to attend demonstrations in Iraq against the authorities or post on Facebook being critical of the government he may face a risk detention, imprisonment and/or harassment. Reference is also made that if the appellant is wanted by the authorities it is plausible they would question him and inspect his social media usage upon return and whether he is affiliated with any political party or organisation. He also stated that in terms of distinguishing between low level and high-profile political activists, in some cases having a low profile may expose somebody critical of the Kurdish authorities to a greater level of risk than if they had a high profile. A person with low profile would not have the same safety is a high-profile person such as an established media or political figure ( see paragraph 66).
73. In cross examination, Dr Fatah was referred to his report and that he had identified profiles of those of interest. He stated that it was a complicated issue. He was asked about paragraph 66 and the reference to being affiliated with any particular party and that the appellant had given evidence that he did not claim to be affiliated with any political party. Dr Fatah explained that being a member of the Goran movement or the PUK or affiliated with the PUK, or others in Erbil, the appellant may be questioned it would depend upon what he has done if undermining the KDP and its leadership that will be of interest. More serious is talking about the corruption and naming particular individuals of influence and saying their acts are immoral. If simply saying the Kurdish government is corrupt, Dr Fatah stated that, “this will be fine because everyone says this”. He identified that there were other actors they would be interested in for example if they were from the PKK ( the Kurdish armed group) or any links to Turkey they would be of interest because they have power critical of sheer groups can be of interest and those who undermine the Iranian national interest. Dr Fatah’s evidence in cross examination was that every appellant should be treated on its own merits. He referred to the recent evidence in relation to Syria and the changes that were occurring there which may in the future change the position for another country guidance.
74. In re-examination, Dr Fatah was asked about his evidence where he said that someone who generally criticises the parties in the KRG may not experience difficulties. He was asked whether his answer be the same if they ventilated the same at demonstrations in Erbil or Sulaymaniyah? Dr Fatah stated that the history of Kurdistan was different there have been heavily handled protesters killed in protests and for the Goran movement. He said that it is difficult, but you can protest but it is more difficult. He referred to seeing protestors as not against the KRG authorities but against the American and the new Syrian government.
75. In re-examination Dr Fatah was asked about the appellant attending demonstrations and condemning the militia ( only by reference to paragraph 5 of his witness statement; p.33). Dr Fatah stated that protests are in Sulaymaniyah and against the rule of the security forces of the political groups. He stated that there is not a central authority in Kurdistan there is a shell and so against that background there have been serious protests for a better way of living. Dr Fatah was then asked if complaints are made about the wages not being paid then that would not be a problem for a protester but of being overly critical of the KDP or the PUK in a public demonstration would someone experience difficulties? Dr Fatah stated that the Goran movement tried to publicly protest and people were armed and children were killed as were protesters and that was not tolerated. However, if protests were about wanting a better way of living, those type of protests are tolerated by the authorities.
76. I set out the other country evidence relied upon. The respondent relies upon the updated CPIN- Iraq: opposition to the government in the Kurdistan region of Iraq (KRI) (July 2023), 1 August 2023 and in particular section 3 under the heading “ Risk”.
77. At paragraph 3.1.1 It stated “CPIT was unable to find any evidence that substantiates a generalised real risk of mistreatment or risk relating to the support, membership or any activity on behalf of an individual political party in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in the sources consulted. If there was such a risk, it is reasonable to consider it would be reported on and there would be information available. Based on the available evidence, it is concluded that any risk regarding political activity in the KRI is centred around protesting against the KRG more generally, rather than as a result of being a supporter, member or carrying out activities on behalf of a specific political party”.
78. At paragraph 3.1.2: “The evidence is not such that a person will be at real risk of serious harm or persecution simply by being an opponent of or having played a low-level part in protests against the KRG. Despite evidence that opponents of the KRG have been arrested, detained, assaulted and even killed by the Kurdistan authorities, there is no evidence to suggest that such mistreatment is systematic. The instances of mistreatment are small in relation to the vast numbers who attended the protests. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that the KRG have the capability, nor the inclination, to target individuals who were involved in the protests at a low level. As such, in general, a person will not be at risk of serious harm or persecution on the basis of political activity within the KRI. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise. Decision makers must consider each case on its merits.
79. At paragraph 3.1.3 it stated: “However, available evidence does indicate that the following groups of people may be at higher risk of arrest, detention, assault, excessive use of force and extrajudicial killing by the KRG authorities:
• Individuals with higher profiles: Those who have a prominent public presence, who are actively involved in or have previous history of organising or participating in protests and demonstrations.
• Journalists: Those who are seen to be criticising government officials or engage in critical reporting on controversial political or other sensitive issues, for example protests and demonstrations, corruption, abuse of authority etc.
80. Mr Wood relied upon the UNHCR who have has issued a document entitled International Protection Considerations with Regards to People Fleeing Iraq dated 30 January 2024. The UNHCR conclude: UNHCR considers that…individuals opposing or perceived to be opposing the KRG authorities, the dominant ruling parties or others with political influence in the KR-I are likely in need of international refugee protection… ( see bundle p138 for the report).
81. In that report the following is stated:
“Individuals who criticize or are perceived to criticize the KRG authorities, the dominant ruling parties, or others with political influence in the KR-I, or who allege government abuse or corruption in the KR-I, are reported to be targeted by the authorities, influential government and party officials and party-affiliated security forces. Those falling under this profile are reported to include in particular journalists and other media professionals, members of rival or opposition political parties, civil society activists, religious figures and protestors, the profiles of whom may overlap. Forms of targeting include intimidation, harassment, physical assault, arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention, as well as politically motivated criminal prosecution (e.g., on charges of espionage and undermining national security). The authorities have also targeted for harassment, arrest and prosecution individuals who have posted criticism of the local or regional authorities on social media. Such repressive measures have reportedly created an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. Attacks on persons of this profile are rarely investigated and are largely committed with impunity.”
Analysis of the sur place activities:
82. I therefore turn to my analysis of the points raised and of the evidence relevant to the issues. In assessing the evidence as to risk arising from sur place activities that this can only be assessed by reference to an individualised risk assessment. So much is clear from the country information in the respondent’s CPIN, the UNHCR document summarised above and also the evidence of Dr Fatah.
83. Mr Wood relied upon the UNHCR who have has issued a document entitled International Protection Considerations with Regards to People Fleeing Iraq dated 30 January 2024 ( see submission set out earlier).
84. In this context ,Mr Wood refers to the decision of HF (Iraq) v Secretary of State v Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1276 at [44] the evidential significance of the UNHCR’s reports was noted thus: "…Frequently the court is faced, as in this case, with a raft of reports from various international, state and non-governmental organisations, and although the guidance enunciated in a UNHCR report will typically command very considerable respect, for the reasons given by the Tribunal in paragraph 277, it will do so because of its intrinsic quality rather than the status of its author…
85. I have therefore considered that submission. What has been described as the “unique” and “unrivalled” expertise of the UNCHR in the field of asylum and refugee law has been acknowledged in a number of cases and notably IA (Iran) v SSHD [2014] UKSC 6 at paragraph 44 as follows:
"Although little may be known about the actual process of decision-making by UNHCR in granting refugee status in an individual case, the accumulated and unrivalled expertise of this organisation, its experience in working with governments throughout the world, the development, promotion and enforcement of procedures of high standard and consistent decision-making in the field of refugee status determinations must invest its decisions with considerable authority.
86. Lord Kerr concluded that: 74…”The UNHCR material should form part of the overall examination of the particular circumstances of each of the appellant's cases, no more and no less.”
87. Whilst the legal analysis and recommendations of the UNHCR will typically command very considerable weight, the UNHCR is only one source of material. I do not think that Mr Wood would disagree with that as his submission also relied upon the evidence of Dr Fatah to which I will return.
88. Having considered the UNHCR report I am satisfied that its contents provide a generalised description of those who criticise or are perceived to criticise the KRG authorities. But the report goes on to set out in greater detail those who fall under this profile. It is stated that, “Those falling under this profile are reported to include in particular journalists and other media professionals, members of rival or opposition political parties, civil society activists, religious figures and protestors, the profiles of whom may overlap.”
89. The UNHCR goes on to state : “UNHCR considers that, depending on the particular circumstances of the case, individuals opposing or perceived to be opposing the KRG authorities, the dominant ruling parties or others with political influence in the KR-I are likely in need of international refugee protection on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution at the hands of the State for reasons of their political opinion or imputed political opinion, and/or other relevant Convention grounds “.
90. In my view the report is not authority or evidence that all individuals will face a real risk or reasonable likelihood to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. It requires an individual assessment taking into account the individuals particular circumstances. This is also consistent with the material set out in the CPIN in that it requires an individualised assessment and also as agreed by Dr Fatah in his oral evidence.
91. The appellant relies upon the report of Dr Fatah and the oral evidence he has given. It is for a tribunal to consider what weight should properly be placed upon evidence, and the approach to expert evidence is no different. Whether a proposed expert is entitled to be regarded as an expert remains a question for this tribunal, applying the principles reiterated in Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP (Scotland) [2016] UKSC 6, [2016] 1 WLR 597, at [43]-[44],
92. I also remind myself of the Supreme Court in Griffiths v Tui UK Ltd [2023] UKSC 48; [2023] 3 WLR 1204 where Lord Hodge, with whom the other Supreme Court Justices agreed, made clear that,“37.  Because an expert's task is to assist the judge in matters outside the judge's expertise, and it is the judge's role to decide the case, the quality of an expert's reasoning is of prime importance. This court gave guidance on the role of the expert in Kennedy v Cordia [2016] 1 WLR 597 , in which, in the judgment of Lord Reed and Lord Hodge JJSC with whom the other Justices agreed, it was stated:
“48.  An expert must explain the basis of his or her evidence when it is not personal observation or sensation; mere assertion or ‘bare ipse dixit’ carries little weight, as the Lord President (Cooper) famously stated in Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh 1953 SC 34, 40 .“
93. In MH (review; slip rule; church witnesses) [2022] UKUT 125 (IAC), the former President and Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell at paragraphs 38 to 48 considered the duty placed on experts and that ultimately the weight to be afforded to any such evidence is a matter for the judge.
94. Mr Diwnycz does not seek to argue that Dr Fatah is not qualified to be an expert in matters as raised and relevant to Iraq but raises issues as to the assessment in respect of this appellant. I accept that Dr Fatah is an expert qualified to give evidence about the circumstances in Iraq and his evidence has been considered in country guidance cases before the Upper Tribunal and his body of research and writing in his field is self-evident. I therefore place weight on his reports which provides general country information concerning Iraq and in particular the KRG. That general country information is consistent with the respondent’s CPIN. However, the material which relates to risk arising from sur place activities does differ and in particular as it relates to this particular appellant.
95. In his report and addendum, Dr Fatah also made it clear that he could not state whether the Kurdish authorities would be aware of the appellant for any of his sur place activities and extent to which they would be monitoring him if at all ( see paragraph 52 and paragraph 33 of addendum report). In this context his evidence is that an assessment must be made of the number of protests/oppositional events an individual attends, the people that they are socialised with and are seen with, number of followers online when assessing the likelihood of whether an individual is monitored and would be of interest to the Kurdish authorities. That approach does not differ from that set out by the Upper Tribunal in BA ( demonstrators in Britain- risk on return) Iran CG) and as approved in XX (PJAK). It is right to observe that Dr Fatah did not make reference to any of the demonstrations the appellant claimed to have attended or any posts that he had made in the report or assessed any of that material. He provides a list of profiles that may be of interest to the authorities in Iraq. Whilst the risk to journalists and those in media institutions is documented within the report ( see section entitled “repression” and the examples given, also in paragraphs 40, 52, and 53, there are few examples given of the profiles of interest that he refers to or any sourced documents.
96. Dealing with the issue of whether the Kurdish authorities are aware of this appellant’s political activities, Mr Wood relies upon the decision of MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688.
97. He relies upon paragraphs 37 -38 of that decision:
“It can be seen from the cases considered above that the FTT (and the Upper Tribunal if remaking an FTT decision) must not impose an unrealistic evidential burden upon asylum applicants who rely upon sur place activities. It is inherently unlikely that an applicant for asylum will be able to adduce direct evidence of covert surveillance and monitoring by a foreign state. Accordingly, tribunals are not merely entitled, but required, to use their common sense.
38.As Singh LJ pointed out during the course of argument, however, there are limits to this. As Elisabeth Laing LJ observed in the passage I have quoted from WAS (Pakistan), a tribunal can, and should, take judicial notice of the ease with which persons attending a demonstration can be photographed and filmed and the resulting photographs and films transmitted abroad. Similarly, a tribunal can, and should, take judicial notice of the fact that publicly accessible websites and social media postings can readily be monitored by electronic means. Beyond the fact that it is generally understood that targeted monitoring is technically easier, but more resource-intensive, than bulk monitoring, however, the technical capabilities of methods of monitoring is a matter that requires expert evidence, not least because (i) states differ in their capabilities and (ii) such capabilities change over time.”
98. Mr Wood has cited the decision in MH(Bangladesh) which I have taken into account in this assessment. The Court of Appeal found that the FtT had not placed an unrealistic evidential burden on the appellant in that appeal in determining that it failed to establish that his political activities in the UK against the regime were at such a level that he would be at risk of harm if returned to Bangladesh. Arnold LJ reviewed the authorities in the decision as set out in paragraphs 37 and 38 relied upon by Mr Wood ( see above). However , paragraph 39 states:
“ Furthermore, as Patten LJ made clear in EM (Zimbabwe), the question of the capacity of the foreign state to carry out surveillance and monitoring cannot realistically be divorced from the questions of whether the person in question is already of interest to the regime and, if not, whether the activities relied on are likely to make the person of interest in the regime. To take a simple example, if there is a large demonstration outside the Bangladesh High Commission in London, and there is a considerable difference between a person who stands at the front waving a placard bearing the slogan hostile to the government and a person who stands at the back with no placard: it is inherently more likely that the former will thereby get themselves noticed by government agents, photographed and targeted for further surveillance and monitoring than the latter..”
99. I have therefore considered the evidence on this issue. As the decision in XX (PJAK) states by reference to BA ( demonstrators in Britain- risk on return) Iran CG) when assessing risk from attending demonstrations it is necessary to consider the evidence such as leadership role and/or degree of involvement in the protests, nature of activities, political and/or sectarian background of the individual, gender, visibility, being known to the authorities (e.g. previous arrest), etc. It is thus recognised that the sole fact of participating in protests/demonstrations are sufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.
100. Whilst the decision of the Upper Tribunal in XX (PKAK) concerns the country of Iran, I have taken into account the sections which are of general application. Paragraphs 5 – 9 deal with the guidance on Facebook more generally and also between paragraphs 73 – 81 in more detail. As relevant to this particular appeal the UT found at paragraph 5 that there was no evidence that the Facebook website itself has been “hacked” either by the Iranian or any other government. There is no evidence before the Tribunal to demonstrate that the authorities in the IKR or the Iraqi authorities are able to access Facebook or that they have monitored this appellant’s Facebook activity.
101. I turn to the appellant’s political activities in the UK. As set out earlier the appellant was not politically active in Iraq before he came to the UK. On the findings of fact made by the FtTJ he was of no interest to anyone before he left Iraq nor did he have any profile, adverse or otherwise.
102. There is no dispute that the appellant arrived in the UK on 19 March 2019. He was interviewed on 29 January 2021 and gave an account of his political activities since his arrival which consisted of attending 2 demonstrations. He could not provide specific details about who organised the protests and claimed that he had found out about them via others on Facebook -one on 25 August in (Northern city) (Q37 ;p 760) and one in (Northern city) (Q39). The appellant’s evidence was that he found out about the protests from someone else’s Facebook (p.790), and he did not know who was organising them. His role was taking pictures and videos. As to the people attending the demonstrations in (Northern city) he said there were many people, but the majority were Arabs and in (Northern city) there were many people but mainly they were of Kurdish ethnicity. He said he had posted on Facebook.
103. By the time of his hearing before the FtTJ in September 2023, there was evidence of Facebook posts from July – September 2023 which were uploaded and also from 2022. His evidence before the FtTJ was that he had attended demonstrations in (Northern city) and another Northern city. His oral evidence given as recorded at page 25 and that it was about the Iraqi people being abused including Arabs, Kurds and the PMF.
104. The appellant’s witness statement lists the demonstrations, and I have been able to cross-reference them by some of the material posted on Facebook. They can be summarised as follows. One on 25/8/2020 Northern city, 11 March 2022 (Northern city), 22 June 2023 (Northern city; see p589 and p590 for the pictures). 12 May 2023 (Northern city: p58). There is reference to a demonstration held in 2019, but this must be a repost from someone else as it is not suggested that he was at any demonstrations in 2019 ( see p56). He attended a demonstration on 11 July 2023 (Northern city; p648 - which is a demonstration against the UK authorities concerning a person who they wished to remove), and a demonstration on 8 April 2025 outside the Iraqi Consulate in a Northern city (p52). It is said that this was to condemn the Kurdish government for their treatment of journalists and freedom of speech in the Kurdish region. Thus, in summary since his arrival in 2019, he attended one in Northern city in 2020, none are identified for 2021 and the next is May 2022 (Northern city), in 2023 there were demonstrations in May, June and July. None appear to be identified for 2024, and one is identified in April 2025. There is no evidence provided as to what demonstrations the appellant attended thereafter.
105. There are Facebook posts for 2022-July 2023 and screen shots from 2023 to date. The appellant claims that he believes that his activities in the UK have already been brought to the attention of those living in Iraq.
106. Having viewed the posts, they contain what might be viewed political in nature. By way of example, they refer to the arrest of a man in Chanchal (p577), there are references to a Kurdish English man who was deported from the UK (p581), there are generalised posts about the KDP (p587) and generalised references to the Barzini family (p589), Kurds in Kirkuk (p672) and P681 refers to “the unity of the justice system are the symbols of the two parties PUK and KDP are the authority of the regime”… “Mafia character, lack of freedom and crippled justice system ..” .
107. Whilst Dr Fatah referred to there being team dedicated to monitoring social media and there are two kinds of investigations one is about criticism against both parties and the two ruling families and one is dedicated to tackling extremism and the security aspects of Kurdistan region; Dr Fatah could not state whether the appellant was being monitored. He again referred to the number of protests/oppositional events the people seen with as relevant to that assessment ((see addendum paragraphs 33-35).
108. Having considered the evidence of the demonstrations I make the following finding of fact. The demonstrations that he has attended are limited both in their number and in their prominence. None were outside the Iraqi embassy in London and one (8/4/25) was outside the consulate in (Northern place). The others in ( Northern place) were, as the pictures demonstrate, local demonstrations which were not outside any embassy or any notable institution affiliated or otherwise connected to Iraq or the IKR. There is no evidence as to who organised those demonstrations or whether they were on behalf of any specific political party and it is not suggested that the appellant was involved either as an organiser of any of the demonstrations or that he played any particular role in them.
109. One of the demonstrations (11/7/23) was not against the Iraqi authorities/IKR authorities but was a demonstration against the UK government in support of someone the authorities wished to deport. The photographs provided show a limited demonstration and one which the appellant referred to as a “peaceful demonstration” (see p659). As stated the photographs show the appellant of having no specific role in the demonstrations and is not readily identifiable for example he is not wearing a fluorescent jacket or otherwise particularly notable.
110. There is no evidence either that any of the demonstrations he attended generated any exposure in the media or were otherwise publicised. I find that the appellant is not prominent in those demonstrations and is nothing more than a participant in a crowd of others and who is peripheral and has no role or prominence. It is not claimed that he is standing alongside anyone of authority. Further, the appellant stated in his evidence that he has no political affiliation to any party.
111. Mr Wood places reliance upon the US Department of State, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 22 April 2024 and expressly p235AB. That reads as follows; “f. Transnational Repression: Several activists from the 2019 Tishreen movement who lived in exile in foreign countries reported receiving regular threats to their own and their families' safety, including warnings they would be harmed if they returned to Iraq. Some of the activists moved abroad due to criminal lawsuits they believed were aimed at preventing them from exercising their right of free expression and in retaliation for leading anti-government protests.
112. The material relied upon by Mr Wood in the form of the US State Department report is limited in its contents. It refers to activists from the 2019 Tishreen Movement and that they have moved abroad due to criminal lawsuits. Thus, those identified in those passages were already of interest to the Iraqi authorities. Before the appellant left Iraq, he was not known to the authorities nor was of any interest to them either because he held any political, views and also in light of the adverse findings of fact made by FtTJ Fisher and which are preserved findings.
113. When considering the evidence of Dr Fatah as relied upon by Mr Wood (paragraph 51), the reference to exerting influence to change an activist’s behaviour by pressurising the family in Kurdistan does not apply in respect of this appellant. There is no evidence that anyone associated with the appellant whether it be family or friends have been contacted by the authorities or anyone else or that any influence has been exerted upon them as a result of anything posted by this appellant or having demonstrated in the UK. Dr Fatah highlighted that possible profile of those at risk were those previously sought by the authorities or had an active arrest warrant issued before they fled Iraq. Neither of those factors apply to this appellant.
114. I therefore conclude that it is not demonstrated by the evidence that there is a reasonable likelihood that the appellant is known to the authorities either in the IKR or in the government-controlled area of Iraq or any militia in his area for having either attended demonstrations or as a result of the material posted on Facebook. This is further reinforced by the appellant’s evidence. He was asked in cross-examination if anyone ever contacted him via Facebook to say anything negative about his posts (including demonstrations) and he said they had not. He further confirmed that no one had ever threatened him and also that no one had ever disagreed with any of those posts. If his social media was being monitored and was seen to fall within the two categories identified by Dr Fatah, I am satisfied that there would have been evidence of some response to his posts or activity. There has been none and I find that he has not been of any interest to anyone as a result of his posts or attending the demonstrations.
115. As to whether the appellant’s conduct on return would be of interest I have taken into account the evidence of Dr Fatah subject to what I have set out above and that for some of the profiles he has identified there is no source material quoted, or examples given. One profile of interest identified who may be of interest to the authorities (whether it is the Iraqi or Kurdish officials) is where it is said that they would prioritise anyone who was an individual who had acted as a whistleblower on corruption in Iraq by naming individuals and providing evidence that they had been involved in corruption ( see p 52 and addendum at paragraph 36). His oral evidence was that those who protest about general levels of corruption are tolerated. If saying that the Kurdish government is corrupt, Dr Fatah stated that, “this will be fine because everyone says this”. He stated that those who report on issues such as corruption is allowed but that any journalist reporting on the corruption of individuals affiliated with the ruling parties would face a serious risk of harm. He identifies those at paragraph 53. He further refers to investigative journalism as done in the West would not be tolerated by the Kurdish authorities and that anyone who undermined the ideology of the state or ruling parties would be of interest. As set out earlier the references in the report to those of interest being journalists, media outlets and activists, is broadly consistent with the material set out in the CPIN ( see section 14.1 and the references to the protests in the context of civil servants and teachers, and also journalists para 14.2).
116. As observed earlier, Dr Fatah did not refer to any of the material provided by the appellant in his reports. Furthermore, he was not directed to consider them in examination in chief, and in re-examination Dr Fatah was asked about one post at p589. This was a demonstration in support of “our brothers and sisters in Kurdistan region and in support of the demonstrations against the lack of water, electricity and salaries”, reference made to embarrass the two parties… that there is no law in Iraq..”
117. Having considered that post it is a generalised post referring to those in Iraq demonstrating against lack of water, electricity and salaries. Those relate to general issues of corruption which Dr Fatah considered would not be of any interest. The appellant’s references to the two political parties and their leaders simply by referring to them as the “Barzani’s and the Talabani” does not seek to identify any particular person within those ruling families or by any reference to any particular activity carried out by any such person. Whilst it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the posts would be of interest to the KRG authorities because the appellant has said negative comments about them, Dr Fatah gave an example in his report at paragraph 54 of the type of criticism which might be of interest. It referred to the case of SA found in Mosul who had written a satirical piece about an imaginary daughter of Barzini and his hopes of becoming his son-in-law. Thus, it is said that criticising or mocking the family aspect of prominent figures provoked strong reactions as it was considered insulting the family honour. A further example is given of a woman activist however in that case a gender issue had been identified as women were particularly vulnerable to having their social character defamed and damaged. The appellant’s posts do not fall into that category.
118. Whilst Dr Fatah thought that using the word “ mafia” would be viewed as serious, the appellant’s posts using that word are not specific to any individual, but it is used in a generalised form of insult. In fact, that word is used in country information/reports referring to Iran and the militia’s. There are no examples of the use of that word in Dr Fatah’s report or how anyone who has used that word is considered or treated. The two respective families in the KRG are independent of each other and have been in charge for a considerable amount of time. I do not find that there is a reasonable likelihood that on the evidence provided that a generalised insult of that type would lead to adverse interest.
119. Other people of interest would be those in the Iraqi -controlled areas who openly undermine Shia Islam or deeming it not be a true version. Anyone who tried to undermine the ruling plans within the international arena would be of interest, such as providing evidence of corruption of human rights abuses to Western governments. The appellant’s posts or activity does not fall within either of those. Nor does the appellant have any links to Turkey and the PKK.
120. Having undertaken an analysis of the evidence, and for the reasons set out above it is not demonstrated that the appellant’s posts or his attendance at the demonstrations have come to the attention of or are of any interest to either the two independent authorities in the KRG or the Iraqi authorities. As set out above, none of the photographs posted by the appellant indicate that he is standing alongside anyone who has been identified as someone with a high profile or one of authority. The photographs show him alongside other demonstrators and is simply a member of the crowd. None of the demonstrations been shown to attract any or any significant publicity and the appellant had stated it was not part of any particular group to any political party.
121. Having viewed the posts they are of a type properly described as generic or generalised statements and whilst I would accept that some may be viewed as critical of the two governing parties in the KRG and a few about Iraqi -controlled government I have undertaken an analysis of them in the context of those identified as being of interest as set out above. He is not someone who falls within the category of a journalist, nor do I find he is properly considered to be an activist or someone who would be perceived as such. Even if those views are genuine, the posts themselves are of variable content. Some of the posts are no more than references to events in Iraq, such as protesters inside the Iraqi Parliament eating lunch (p515) references to protests in 2022 and marching towards the green zone in Baghdad, reposting information in a report from the British authorities. Taking into account his likely conduct on return, when describing his attendance at demonstrations in the UK, the appellant had stated that he was not part of any particular group of individuals in fact he stated in his oral evidence, “I go on my own”. That is a factor which is relevant to any conduct continuing in Iraq as the appellant does not align himself to any political party or cause. Nor did he when he was resident in Iraq or have or express any views either online or in person. The appellant’s evidence that he would continue should be viewed in the light of his previous conduct and how he has behaved but also his general lack of credibility and reliability as identified in the earlier decision of FtTJ Fisher and my assessment of his evidence. It would be entirely artificial to take the paragraphs relied on in the decision letter as the answer to the issue when that was taken on the evidence as it stood and without that being the subject of analysis. When assessing any future conduct/behaviour, many of the demonstrations are in Sulaymaniyah and the appellant has not said he has ever been there to protest or otherwise travel there. Dr Fatah refers to responses to criticism varies by region and that criticism in Erbil ( the relevant Governorate) may differ in its impact and response. The submissions on behalf of the appellant do not seek to make any distinction between areas and the case is advanced on the basis of risk in the whole of the KRG and Iraq. That is not supported by the country evidence. Furthermore, I take into account that he is not taken part in any political activity when in Iraq and I do not find that he is likely to organise any demonstrations or otherwise be involved as an organiser or will have any prominent role as he has not sought to do so when in the United Kingdom. His social media is limited, and the contents of the posts do not demonstrate that they are the type beyond a general criticism of the KRG authorities and occasionally the Iraqi authorities which is not reasonably likely to be of adverse interest even if he does continue to post or attend any demonstrations.. He has not identified any “ friends” on Face book either in Iraq or in the UK who are aligned to any political party or cause or someone of prominence such as a journalist which would lead to any interest in him.
122. When asked about his posts, in particular when asked about the demonstration that had taken part in against the UK authorities removing someone to Iraq, the appellant was not able to provide any further detail as to what had happened to the man despite having attended the demonstration of that specific purpose. A further example was when he was asked about a demonstration in 2023 about the killing of Kawa Garmyani who was a journalist. He was asked about this, and he said that the man had been “martyred” however when asked what had happened to him and when, the appellant replied, “I don’t know I can’t remember”. This was a demonstration he said he attended for the specific purpose, but his actual knowledge is not commensurate with that claimed support and is superficial.
123. Drawing those matters together, and when assessing the issue of risk, I place weight and reliance upon paragraph 3.1.2 of the CPIN: “The evidence is not such that a person will be at real risk of serious harm or persecution simply by being an opponent of or having played a low-level part in protests against the KRG. Despite evidence that opponents of the KRG have been arrested, detained, assaulted and even killed by the Kurdistan authorities, there is no evidence to suggest that such mistreatment is systematic. The instances of mistreatment are small in relation to the vast numbers who attended the protests. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that the KRG have the capability, nor the inclination, to target individuals who were involved in the protests at a low level. As such, in general, a person will not be at risk of serious harm or persecution on the basis of political activity within the KRI. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise” .I therefore conclude for the reasons set out above that the appellant has not demonstrated that he has a well-founded fear of persecution on return on account of any political opinion or that which would be perceived by either the KRG authorities or the Iraqi authorities in his home area.
124. The skeleton argument does not refer to any specific risk on return applying Article 15 ( c) or that he would be at risk of harm from Hashd-al shaabi as a result of his sur place activity. The appellant’s original factual claim was rejected by the FtTJ who found that he had not been detained by Hashd-al Shaabi nor known to the PMF as a spy for the Peshmerga nor that he had been reporting to them. His factual account was disbelieved by FtTJ Fisher. Those findings of fact were preserved findings. Dr Fatah did not address risk on the basis of the findings of fact made by the FtTJ. He considered that he would face the same level as risk as the general population. Whilst the appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity and Sunni Muslim, it has not been demonstrated applying the lower standard that he would be at risk on return for those characteristics of race and religion.
125. It further is not demonstrated that Hashd-al Shaabi has any adverse interest in him arising from his earlier residence in Iraq in his home area or any sur place activity in the UK. As set out in the oral evidence, his received no threats or any interest arising out of his posts from others either in the UK or outside UK. When considering the factual aspects of his claim and posts, Hashd-al Shaabi is an umbrella organisation consisting of many different militia’s. They were originally formed in 2014 to combat ISIL following the takeover of Mosul and are heterogeneous in nature and whilst most are Shia Arabs, there are other minority groups represented such as Yazidi, Christian, Shabak and Turkmen. They are reported to engage in illegal activities, harassment and exploitation, kidnapping ( see report para 55 – 58). Whilst there has been reference in earlier posts in 2020 and 2022 p 492 and 350, referring in general terms to Hashd-al Shaabi, the appellant does not identify any specific militia group, or any individuals or even the geographical area and simply refers to them under the umbrella term of “Hash Al Shabi”. He has not demonstrated previously when living in Iraq that he has sought to undertake any criticism of them and that is relevant to an assessment of his conduct on return. His posts have been directed towards general events in the KRG and some in relation to Iraq rather than Hashd al-Shaabi. In terms of return to his home area, the appellant has access to his relevant documents which will enable him to travel from Erbil to his home area enabling him to travel through the checkpoint ( see oral evidence of Dr Fatah). He has not come to adverse attention of them previously. Drawing together those circumstances I am not satisfied to the lower standard that the appellant is of or will be of any adverse interest to the militia on return to Iraq.
126. For those reasons, the appeal is dismissed on all grounds ( Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and Article 3 of the ECHR).

Notice of Decision:
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law; the decision was set aside by the decision of the Upper Tribunal. It is re-made as follows: the appeal is dismissed on all grounds.



Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
18 February 2026