Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-000498

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/07964/2019

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

16th June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

DRDS
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Mr K Forrest, instructed by Rea Law
For the Respondent: Ms E Blackburn, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Edinburgh Tribunals Centre on 29 January 2025
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Brazil. His appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 29 July 2019 to refuse his claim for international protection was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) Judge McGrade (“the Judge”) for reasons set out in a decision promulgated on 10 November 2023.
2. The appellant claims the judge accepted the core of the appellant’s account but erred in concluding that it would not be unduly harsh to expect the appellant to internally relocate elsewhere in Brazil. The appellant claims; (i) the decision is irrational, (ii) the judge failed adequately or at all, to consider the evidence before the Tribunal, and (iii) the judge fails to give adequate reasons for the decision.
3. Permission to appeal was granted by FtT Judge Seelhoff on 9 February 2024. He said:
“The consideration of internal relocation is brief [25], It is correct that the judge has not identified a specific destination of return, and appears to have found that all barriers to relocation can be overcome due to the support of two friends. It is arguable that the judge has failed to give adequate reasons for this finding.”
The Background
4. The background to the appellant’s claim is summarised at paragraph [4] of the decision of the FtT. The judge noted, at [9], that the appellant had originally entered the UK on 20 February 2018 as a visitor. He was encountered by immigration enforcement officers working in a brothel on 6 January 2019. He requested voluntary return to Brazil and was removed on 28 January 2019. However, he returned to the UK in late February 2019 and was again encountered on 18 April 2019 working in a brothel. He claimed asylum on 22 April 2019. The judge rejected the appellant's claim that he was not previously aware that he could claim asylum. Nevertheless, the judge accepted, at [18], that the appellant had held a post at the municipality of Morrinhos in Brazil. The judge went on to say:
“18. …I accept that he worked as a volunteer for the Morrinhos Child and Adolescent Council (CCAM), which had responsibility for working with the judiciary and other state bodies, including in the field of child protection. In the course of his duties with CCAM, the Appellant sought to expose the abuse and exploitation of children. I accept that he received threats as a result of his activities, which included being threatened by telephone and having shots fired at his home. He reported these threats to the police. These reports appear at p37-48 of the second inventory of productions. I am also prepared to accept to tire lower standard of proof that the Appellant was targeted again, following his return to Brazil in early 2019 and threatened and physically ill treated. However, I consider this incident took place at his home.
5. At paragraph [19], the judge said:
“I have to consider the extent to which the Appellant remains at risk as a result of his past activities and whether there is a sufficiency of protection or whether the Appellant can relocate hr order to avoid those difficulties.”
6. At paragraph [20], the said that it was accepted the appellant was targeted in early 2019 after the appellant had been away from Brazil for almost a year. The judge said:
“20. …I accept there is therefore a real risk of the Appellant being subject to a real risk of serious harm from non-state actors, should he return to his hometown.”
7. The judge went on to refer to the evidence of witnesses relied upon by the appellant and the background material, and as far as ‘sufficiency of state protection’ is concerned, the judge said:
“While I accept that there is a system in place in Brazil to provide protection to those who report allegations of sexual abuse against children, I am not satisfied that they are capable of providing the Appellant with adequate protection.”
8. The judge then went on to address the question of ‘internal relocation’. He said:
“24. …There is also no evidence before me that his activities in exposing the sexual abuse and exploitation of children extended beyond Morrinhos. I also do not accept that he was targeted outside Morrinhos.
25. I consider the fact that the Appellant's activities and his ill-treatment were localised mean that he may be able to internally relocate. I also consider the passage of time means that those who were interested in him before are less likely to wish to pursue him now. Brazil is a very large country with a number of cities to which I consider the Appellant could relocate. I consider internal relocation will remove the risk of serious harm. In addition, the Appellant is clearly an intelligent individual who has had support from [AD] and [WM] in the course of this appeal and I can think of no reason why they will not continue to provide him with support, should he return to Brazil. I am therefore not satisfied it is unduly harsh to expect the Appellant to relocate elsewhere in Brazil.”
The Hearing of the Appeal Before Me
9. Mr Forrest adopted the skeleton argument filed on behalf of the appellant. He submits the issue in the appeal before me is the judge’s assessment of the question of ‘internal relocation’. The judge concluded that it would not be unduly harsh for the appellant to internally relocate. The judge accepted the core of the appellant’s account is credible and that there are substantial grounds for believing the appellant will face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned to Brazil. Mr Forrest submits the judge clearly found at paragraph [23] that he was not satisfied the authorities “are capable of providing the appellant with adequate protection”. It is therefore irrational to then say the appellant can internally relocate and seek protection elsewhere. Put another way Mr Forrest submits, the judge has decided that it would not be unreasonable (or unduly harsh) for the appellant to live in an area where he would not receive adequate protection.
10. Mr Forrest submits that if the judge had intended to say that there was inadequate protection in his home area, but there would be sufficient protection elsewhere in Brazil, that is what the judge would have clearly said. That is not however what was said and the judge does not identify where the appellant could safely relocate. The judge’s consideration is brief. Paragraph 339O(i)(b) and (ii)(a) of the immigration rules required the judge to consider whether there is a part of Brazil in which the appellant would not face a real risk of serious harm and he can reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country. In carrying out that assessment the judge was required to have regard to the personal circumstances of the appellant. Mr Forrest submits the judge failed to consider the wealth of background material that was relied upon by the appellant, albeit he accepts there was nothing specific to the question of internal relocation in that material. There was however a wealth of evidence about those who report sexual abuse against children. Mr Forrest refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in SC (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] 1 WLR 3190 in which the Supreme Court said that when determining whether it would be reasonable to expect a potential deportee to relocate internally within the country to which they were being deported, the decision-maker had to conduct a holistic assessment. Mr Forrest submits the judge failed to carry out the holistic assessment required.
11. In reply Ms Blackburn submits the central finding made by the judge regarding the risk upon return is that the appellant is only at risk in his home area. That much is clear from the what the judge said at the end of paragraph [20]. At paragraphs [24] and [25], the judge went on to address the question of internal relocation. The risk was localised and it was open to the judge to conclude the appellant will not require protection elsewhere in Brazil. The Judge was not required to explicitly sate where the appellant could relocate to. The respondent had identified in her decision that it would not be unreasonable to expect the appellant to return to Sao Paulo, Sao Luis, Salvador or some other location in Brazil. It was for the appellant to establish he cannot internally relocate and the judge was not satisfied the appellant has established his case. Ms Blackburn acknowledges the reasons given by the judge are brief but she submits, the reasons adequately explain the decision reached.
Decision
12. In considering the appellant’s claim that the decision of the FtT is vitiated by material insofar as the question of internal relocation is concerned, I have had in mind the need to exercise judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the FtT. It is now well established that the Upper Tribunal is not entitled to find an error of law simply because it does not agree with the decision, or because the Tribunal thinks the decision could be more clearly expressed or another judge can produce a better one. Baroness Hale put it in this way in AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678), at [30]:
"Appellate courts should not rush to find such misdirection simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently."
13. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] 4 W.L.R. 48, in dismissing an appeal against findings of fact, the Court of Appeal emphasised that it was not for an appeal court to come to an independent conclusion as a result of its own consideration of the evidence; the question is whether the trial judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
14. Reading the decision as a whole, I accept, as Ms Blackburn submits, that the judge found the risk the appellant is exposed to is localised. The judge said, at [20], that he accepts the appellant faces a “real risk of serious harm from non-state actors, should he return to his hometown” (my emphasis). In considering whether the appellant can internally relocate, At paragraphs [24] and [25], the judge said
“24. …There is no evidence before me that his activities in exposing the sexual abuse and exploitation of children extended beyond Morrinhos. I also do not accept that he was targeted outside Morrinhos.
”25. I consider the fact that the Appellant's activities and his ill-treatment were localised mean that he may be able to internally relocate…. Brazil is a very large country with a number of cities to which I consider the Appellant could relocate. I consider internal relocation will remove the risk of serious harm…”
15. Reading paragraphs [19] to [25] of the decision as a whole, it is clear that the judge found that the risk faced by the appellant is local to Morrinhos and he could not be satisfied the authorities are capable of providing the appellant with adequate protection in that area. However it does not follow that the appellant would be at risk elsewhere. The judge found the appellant would not be at risk elsewhere and that it would not be unduly harsh for him to internally relocate to another area. As Mr Forrest accepts, although there was a wealth of background material before the Tribunal, there was nothing specific to the question of internal relocation in that material.
16. The judge was impressed by the evidence of the witnesses relied upon by the appellant and noted the appellant has in the past received their support. It was open to the judge to conclude there is no reason to believe they would not support the appellant on return to Brazil.
17. The brevity of the judge’s consideration of the question of internal relocation is not to say that the judge did not have regard to all the relevant evidence before the Tribunal in reaching the decision. The judge identified the core issue in this appeal. The Judge undoubtedly had regard to the risk faced by the appellant on return and applied the correct test. The assessment of such a claim is always highly fact sensitive task. The judge was required to consider the evidence as a whole and in my judgment he plainly did so, giving adequate reasons for his decision. The requirement to give adequate reasons means no more nor less than that. It is not a counsel of perfection. An appellate court should resist the temptation to subvert the principle that they should not substitute their own analysis and discretion for that of the judge by a narrow textual analysis which enables it to claim that the judge misdirected themselves.
18. Reading the decision as a whole, I am satisfied that the judge's decision was based upon the evidence before the Tribunal. The findings and conclusions reached by the judge are neither irrational nor unreasonable, or findings that are wholly unsupported by the evidence. The judge reached a decision that was open to the Tribunal on the evidence.
19. It follows that I am satisfied that there is no material error of law in the decision of the FtT and I dismiss the appeal.
Notice of Decision
20. The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
21. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge McGrade promulgated on 10 November 2023 stands

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 May 2025