Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-000519
First-tier Tribunal No: DC/00012/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
29th August 2024

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMITH
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

ALFRED HENAJ
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Saleem, Malik & Malik solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on Monday 5 August 2024

DECISION
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. By a decision promulgated on 29 April 2024, the Tribunal (myself sitting with Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Chana) found an error of law in the decision of First- tier Tribunal Judge Swaney itself promulgated on 12 December 2023, allowing the Appellant’s appeal. By reason of the errors found, we set aside Judge Swaney’s decision and gave directions for a re-making of the decision in this Tribunal. Our error of law decision is appended hereto for ease of reference.
2. The facts are summarised at [2] to [5] of the error of law decision and we do not repeat them. As a result of the directions made in the error of law decision, an amended bundle was filed by the Respondent. That runs to 352 pages (pdf) and is referred to below as [B/xx]. We also had before us skeleton arguments from the Appellant (filed on 16 May 2024) (“the ASA”) and from the Respondent (filed on 26 July 2024 in accordance with directions as extended by the Tribunal).
3. In addition, we had a supplementary bundle filed by the Appellant running to 47 pages (pdf) to which we refer below as [SB/xx]. That bundle was not filed in accordance with the directions given. The bundle was uploaded on 1 August 2024. No direction was given for the Appellant to file further evidence nor was any sought.
4. The documents included in the supplementary bundle are largely directed at a complaint which the Appellant has made about his previous solicitors who were acting at the time that deprivation action was commenced (Simon Noble solicitors). We come to the detail of that evidence below. Mr Saleem suggested that this evidence was important because it may shed light on why the Appellant did not make representations prior to the Respondent’s deprivation decision made on 20 December 2019 (“the Decision”). The Decision (at [B/111-118]) is that under appeal. As such, much if not all of what the Appellant now has to say about his circumstances was not before the Respondent when she made the Decision and could not therefore be taken into account, in accordance with the legal approach as it is now understood following the Supreme Court’s judgment in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Begum [2021] UKSC 7 (“Begum”) .
5. The Appellant has also written to the Status Review Unit and asked for reconsideration of the Decision. Mr Saleem submitted that the Decision should be reconsidered on grounds of procedural fairness given the Appellant’s complaint made about his previous solicitors. He invited the Respondent to agree to withdraw the Decision now under appeal and to reconsider in light of the Appellant’s further evidence.
6. For his part, Mr Terrell submitted that the supplementary bundle should not be admitted, filed as it was only a few working days prior to the hearing. He also rejected Mr Saleem’s suggestion that the Decision should be withdrawn. He said he would only advise withdrawal if the Decision were not legally sustainable, and he continued to consider that it was.
7. Having heard submissions, we indicated that we would admit the supplementary bundle but gave Mr Terrell time to consider that evidence.
8. Having reconvened, Mr Saleem applied for an adjournment on the basis that we should await the outcome of the complaint which the Appellant had made against his former solicitors and allow time for the Status Review Unit to decide whether to reconsider the Decision.
9. In response, Mr Terrell pointed out that reconsideration would be a separate process (even if the Respondent were minded to agree to that course). If the Respondent refused to reconsider the Appellant’s case based on further evidence and if the Appellant were dissatisfied with the response, it would of course be open to the Appellant to challenge that decision by way of judicial review. We do not express any view about the merit of any such challenge, but Mr Terrell was right to point out that option.
10. As to the complaint against the former solicitors, Mr Terrell rightly submitted that the allegations made are serious and those solicitors should have the opportunity to respond to those allegations but, again, those are all matters of which the Respondent was unaware at the time of the Decision. Mr Terrell was neutral in relation to the adjournment request on this second issue.
11. Having heard submissions, we refused the adjournment request. Reconsideration is a separate process and could, if necessary, take into account any admission from the former solicitors as to the complaints made. The complaint can be taken forward outside the appeals process. It was not in the interests of justice to delay the hearing of the Appellant’s case further.
THE ISSUES AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
12. As an appeal against a deprivation decision, we follow the guidance laid down by this Tribunal in Chimi (deprivation appeals; scope and evidence) Cameroon [2023] UKUT 00115 (IAC) (“Chimi”) (which takes into account the judgment in Begum) as follows:
“(1) A Tribunal determining an appeal against a decision taken by the respondent under s40(2) or s40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 should consider the following questions:
(a) Did the Secretary of State materially err in law when she decided that the condition precedent in s40(2) or s40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 was satisfied? If so, the appeal falls to be allowed. If not,
(b) Did the Secretary of State materially err in law when she decided to exercise her discretion to deprive the appellant of British citizenship? If so, the appeal falls to be allowed. If not,
(c) Weighing the lawfully determined deprivation decision against the reasonably foreseeable consequences for the appellant, is the decision unlawful under s6 of the Human Rights Act 1998? If so, the appeal falls to be allowed on human rights grounds. If not, the appeal falls to be dismissed.
(2) In considering questions (1)(a) and (b), the Tribunal must only consider evidence which was before the Secretary of State or which is otherwise relevant to establishing a pleaded error of law in the decision under challenge. Insofar as Berdica [2022] UKUT 276 (IAC) suggests otherwise, it should not be followed.
(3) In considering question (c), the Tribunal may consider evidence which was not before the Secretary of State but, in doing so, it may not revisit the conclusions it reached in respect of questions (1)(a) and (b).”
13. The Appellant does not focus on issue (1(c)) relying on Article 8 ECHR. Although the Appellant mentioned facts in the course of his oral evidence which might be material to an Article 8 claim (such as the implications of deprivation on “his young family”), we were not provided with any evidence about the details of the Appellant’s family or private life. Mr Saleem confirmed that this was deliberate. If removal (or here probably deportation) action is taken against the Appellant, he would at that stage provide evidence of his circumstances relevant to such a claim.
14. The Appellant does not admit that the condition precedent is met. We come to the detail of his evidence and the evidence relied upon by the Respondent below.
15. The Appellant also takes issue with the exercise of the Respondent’s discretion to deprive.
16. In summary, therefore, our focus is on stages (1(a)) and (1(b)) of the guidance in Chimi. Although those are two separate stages, the errors asserted by the Appellant overlap both stages. It is therefore convenient to consider the alleged errors together.
17. Mr Saleem also relied on the guidance given in Kolicaj (Deprivation: procedure and discretion) [2023] UKUT 294 (IAC) (“Kolicaj”). That is as follows:
“1. The requirements of procedural fairness are highly fact-sensitive but will normally require that the Secretary of State notifies an individual that she is minded to deprive them of their citizenship, so as to afford them an opportunity to make representations. The Secretary of State might lawfully dispense with that step, however, where there is proper reason to believe that the individual would attempt to frustrate the process upon receipt of such notification.
2. Where the Secretary of State seeks to deprive a person of British citizenship under s40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981, she may lawfully dispense with the 'minded- to' step where there is a clear and obvious risk of the individual renouncing any other citizenship so as to render themselves stateless and engage the statelessness proviso in s40(4).
3. The power to deprive a person of their citizenship under section 40 of the 1981 Act and the jurisdiction on appeal under section 40A were explained in Ciceri (deprivation of citizenship appeals: principles) [2021] UKUT 235 and Chimi (deprivation appeals; scope and evidence) Cameroon [2023] UKUT 115 (IAC). Where the Secretary of State determines that the condition precedent for exercising that power is made out, she must then exercise her discretion as to whether to deprive that person of their British citizenship in the light of all the circumstances of the case. It follows that even if the decision of the Secretary of State in relation to the condition precedent is free of public law error, the decision might nevertheless be unlawful where she fails to exercise her discretion, or where the exercise of that discretion is itself tainted by public law error.”
18. Reliance is placed on Kolicaj mainly in relation to an issue of procedural fairness relying on what are said to be the failures of the Appellant’s previous solicitors.
19. Mr Terrell sought in his skeleton argument to categorise the issues raised in the ASA as follows:
(1) Failure to take into account relevant documents relating to the Appellant’s asylum claim including the record of interviews and previous Tribunal decisions ([29-30] and [32-35] of the ASA).
(2) Failure to give the Appellant notice of intention to deprive ([31], [41-46] of the ASA). To that we can now add the allegation of procedural unfairness arising from the Appellant’s more recent evidence about the conduct of his previous solicitors.
(3) Failure to take into account the Appellant’s account that, as a Roma gypsy, and as a child, he had moved around which may explain his presence in Albania ([38] of the ASA).
(4) Taking into account irrelevant documents or perversity in relying on the documents from Albania as establishing nationality; it is said that those documents confirmed that the Appellant had never been issued with an Albanian identity document or passport ([39] of the ASA).
(5) Failure to take into account that the documents from Albania do not show when the Appellant obtained Albanian nationality ([40] of the ASA).

EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS
20. We have considered all the documentary evidence and the Appellant’s oral evidence but refer below only to that which is relevant to the issues for our determination.
The Appellant’s Evidence
21. The Appellant has provided two witness statements dated 17 June 2022 ([B/84-86] and 5 June 2024 ([SB/11-14]) which he adopted as his evidence. We refer to those below respectively as the First Statement and the Second Statement. We heard oral evidence from the Appellant. He was cross-examined by Mr Terrell.
22. The Appellant’s First Statement sets out his case about his nationality as follows:
“2. I did not disclose to the Home Office that I was able to obtain either Albanian or Kosovan identity because when I first entered the UK, I stated I was a Roma gypsy, my family told me I was born in Kosovo, but we travelled. We never had a fixed address. We moved around a lot. My family settled in Albania after I had moved to the UK.
3. I did not disclose that I had lived within Albania and that I was moving from one country to another as I was a Roma gypsy and we never stayed in one place. We would always travel from place to place. We would spend one year in different cities, and towns. We travelled back and forth between Albania and Kosovo, but before I came to the UK, I spend my life in Kosovo.
4. I cannot provide documents to demonstrate I lived in Kosovo before coming to the UK because I never had a home address, we would sleep in tents wherever we stopped. We never had any documents with the address on it so we cannot trace were [sic] we stayed. If we ever had any issues, we would figure them out within the family. If we were sick, we would not use medicine, we would take teas and home remedies.
5. In Albania and Kosovo, they would refuse to assess us at the hospital due to our race and skin colour. They saw us as Roma gypsies only and nothing else. In addition, it was part of our culture to not visit hospitals as we had grown to know we would never receive the medical care we required from hospitals so we would not go. We could not get treated.
6. My birth certificate was registered in Albania, but I was born in Kosovo. I spoke to my mother after I was informed by the home office, and my mother explained to me that they travelled from Kosovo to Albania and registered me in Albania.
7. I would have never found out I was Albanian if it was not for the Home Office. I did not know the roots of where I came from. I knew I was a Kosovan national, and I never questioned it.
8. I cannot provide any documents to prove my parents are of Kosovan nationality. I was always told I was born in Kosovo; I do not know when my parents registered me in Albania. When I received the letter from the Home Office, that is when I became aware my birth was registered in Albania. In Albania, you can register for a birth certificate after a long time of being born.
9. I have never been informed that I was an Albanian nationality [sic]. I was told I was born in Kosovo. I found out when the home office wrote to me. It was news to me. I believe I was born in Kosovo. I have never had an Albanian passport; The home office holds a copy of an Albanian passport. I was to check the issue date of the passport. It has my name and photo on it, but I have never possessed an Albanian passport. I never owned that passport; I did not know it existed. I believe it is fraud as I have never been in possession of any Albanian ID or documents. I have always used a travel document to fly.
10. I gave all the information honestly and truthfully. When I found out I was not Kosovan, I was shocked. All the information I had given was my honest belief and so when I found out it was false, I was very surprised and shocked.
11. I have given all the information to the best of my knowledge. I did not have a reason to lie. If I knew I was registered in Albania, I would have declared it. I was unaware that I am an Albanian national and it came as a surprised to me when I found out from the Home Office.
12. I have never had any documents issued to me from the Albanian or Kosovan authorities. Therefore I could not give any additional evidence. During my asylum interview, I mentioned that my father was a missioner, but I was told he was killed at war, because he had been away so long that the Roma community assumed he was killed. When I returned to Albania from England after 6 years of being in the UK, my mother had settled in Albania because of the Kosovan war, and that is when I found out my father was alive. I did not speak to my family for 6 years whilst I was in the UK as there was no way of contacting them by phone.
…
17. I could not tell the Home Office that I was an Albanian national when applying for my naturalisation because I did not know I was Albanian. I was never requested from the Home Office or my previous solicitors to provide my birth certificate. If I had been asked to provide such evidence, I would have figured out my nationality and I would have informed the Home Office. I never tried to find out where my birth certificate was. I never had the need to trace my birth certificate.”
23. The position of both parties following Begum and Chimi is that the Tribunal has to review the Decision rather than establish facts for itself. As this statement was not before the Respondent at the time of the Decision, it could not be taken into account. However, even if that were not the position, we would have some concerns about the Appellant’s evidence for the following reasons.
24. There are internal inconsistencies even within the First Statement. For example, at [3] of the statement, the Appellant says that he lived his life in Kosovo before coming to the UK but in the very same paragraph says that he and his family travelled backwards and forwards between Albania and Kosovo.
25. The Appellant also says that his mother registered his birth in Albania even though he was born in Kosovo but then says that he did not know when his parents registered him in Albania. It is not clear whether he now accepts that he was born in Albania as the birth certificate shows.
26. We sought clarification from the Appellant that his parents are still alive, and he confirmed they were. This is the third hearing of the Appellant’s appeal (including the error of law hearing) and yet even now he has provided no evidence from his parents about the circumstances of his birth and registration. When we asked why he had not done so, he said he could but did not know and had not been advised that he should. However, that is the same answer as he gave to Judge Swaney (as we pointed out). Indeed, it was a common theme of the Appellant’s oral evidence that where gaps were identified in his evidence, he asserted that he could plug them with other evidence. He tried to give oral evidence even during closing submissions.
27. The Appellant also apparently accepts in the First Statement that he knows there is in existence an Albanian passport bearing his name and photograph which is contrary to his pleaded case that he has never had an Albanian passport and Mr Saleem’s submissions suggesting that there is no such passport.
28. We turn then to the Second statement which deals with the facts which he says underlie his case that the Respondent’s decision is procedurally unfair. That reads as follows:
“6. It was on the 05 March 2019, that the Home Office wrote to me advising me that they intend to take deprivation action against me. At the time, I instructed Simon Nobel [sic] Solicitors. They took my instructions, and they made representations to the Home Office on the 21 March 2019, that they wanted further information from the Home Office as to the reasons behind their decision. It was not until the 28 May 2019, that the Home Office informed me that they believed that I was Albanian and not a Kosovan. I wish to confirm I was then advised by the Home Office to make a subject access request.
7. Unfortunately, my previous solicitors, Simon Nobel [sic] Solicitors did not get in touch with me and did not ask me as to what my response was to the allegation that I was an Albanian and not a Kosovan. They did not come the second time to visit me to take instructions. I was not aware of any correspondence from the Status Review Unit. I was not contacted by my solicitors in writing and I was disappointed that nothing was being communicated with me.
8. As a result of not receiving any progress to my case, I then instructed Malik & Malik Solicitors to deal with my case in November 2021. They then contacted my previous solicitors for the file of papers and carried out a review of my case and advised me that the Home Office had taken deprivation action against me following a decision on the 08 July 2021. It was then that I came to know that all my appeal rights were deemed to have been exhausted.
9. My solicitors then took a statement from me, which was to the effect that I had received the correspondence of March 2019, that I had been in prison since 24 March 2016 and that I had been informed by the offender management unit at HMP Ford that I had been deprived of British Citizenship. This was to the best of my knowledge communicated to me in October/ November 2021. At the time I called Simon Nobel [sic] Solicitors and told them that it has been two years that I have not been told about the progress of my deprivation case.
10. I was advised by Simon Noble Solicitors that I should forget about my British Citizenship, and I was given no advice in regard to deprivation. I was told that I should make an application for leave to remain as I had been here for a long time. It was then that I told them that I had been in the UK, with my partner, and they tried to make an application on the 12 November 2021. Thereafter, they then received a letter from the Home Office requesting for my biometrics to be taken on the 26 November 2021.
11. Whilst I was completing the form, he asked if I had any nationality [sic] to prove my identity in order to support my application for private life under the ten-year route. I told him that I’ve never had any other nationality or identity other than British nationality. It was then that he told me that it was difficult for him to proceed with this case and then the issue of my deprivation came to light, and it was then that I realized that I was being provided with poor advice and that should have exercised my right of appeal. I then decided to instruct my new solicitors, namely, Malik & Malik Solicitors.”
29. The Appellant goes on to set out his case on procedural unfairness. He accepts that the Respondent did inform him of her intention to deprive him of his British citizenship and that he was asked to provide “a mitigation/explanation”. He says that this did not happen because he was in prison at the time and unable to get a second opinion from another solicitor and that Simon Noble Solicitors did not inform him of the consequences of not responding. He says that now he has had the opportunity to explain his case that he is a Roma gypsy and was unaware prior to the Respondent’s letter that he is Albanian, he should be given the opportunity to have that explanation considered by the Respondent.
30. There is in fact a third statement apparently signed by the Appellant on 10 February 2022 and therefore pre-dating either the First Statement or Second Statement (“the Third Statement”). The Third Statement appears in the supplementary bundle ([SB/15-17]). It was not before Judge Swaney even though it pre-dates the First- tier Tribunal hearing. Mr Saleem did not refer to it or ask the Appellant to adopt it. We are therefore unclear whether it was signed and dated as it appears to be in February 2022. The Third Statement repeats part of what is said in the Second statement about the conduct of the Appellant’s former solicitors. It suggests that the Appellant intended at that time to make a complaint about his previous solicitors. However, there is no reference to complaints made about his previous solicitors in the First Statement which post-dates the Third Statement by only a few months. We therefore view the Third Statement with a certain amount of circumspection.
31. In any event, the only documentary evidence we have of a complaint being made against the Appellant’s previous solicitors is a letter dated 5 June 2024 to Simon Noble solicitors ([SB/9-10]) apparently sent under cover of an e-mail from Malik & Malik dated 10 June 2024 ([SB/8]). We do not need to set out the letter of complaint. The chronology is broadly as set out in the Second Statement. His complaint is that he was not advised of the importance of making representations in response to the Respondent’s letter dated 5 March 2019 nor assisted in making representations following the Respondent’s letter dated 28 May 2019 and that he was not informed of the Decision dated 20 December 2019 giving notice of deprivation with a right of appeal.
32. The complaint was, on the face of the evidence, made less than two months ago. It is therefore unsurprising that there has been no response. The views of Simon Noble Solicitors are not known. They have not accepted the criticisms of their conduct, nor the chronology put forward by the Appellant.
33. In response to questions asked of the Appellant about the complaint, the Appellant sought to suggest that he had made a complaint himself at an earlier stage. He said that this was in 2022 and that it had been made by text and email. However, although, once again, the Appellant said that he could provide evidence of this given time, he has not done so. We do not accept that such a complaint was made for the following reasons.
34. First, the Appellant makes no reference to a complaint having been made either in the First Statement or more importantly in the Third Statement which deals with the solicitor’s conduct. Although the Third Statement suggests that the Appellant intended to make a complaint, there is no confirmation in the First Statement that he had done so. Had a complaint been made at that time, we find, that statement would have said so.
35. Second, the chronology as set out by the Appellant in his oral evidence was internally inconsistent. He said he made the complaint himself before he had found another lawyer, that is to say Malik & Malik. However, he instructed them prior to the date when he now says he made the earlier complaint.
36. Third, the Appellant also said that he made a complaint at the same time to the Ombudsman but, although they had asked for further details, he had not pursued this. Again, there is no documentary evidence as there would have been had a complaint been made to the Ombudsman and the Ombudsman’s office had replied.
37. In any event, we find that the evidence of the Appellant about the alleged poor conduct does not impact on the fairness of the Respondent’s actions for the following reasons.
38. First, the Appellant accepts that he received the letter from the Respondent dated 5 March 2019. He says that this did not indicate that the Respondent thought him to be Albanian and not Kosovan. However, that letter (at [B/326]) says as follows:
“The Secretary of State is in possession of information confirming that you provided the false place of birth and nationality as 'Mitrovice, Kosovo', instead of your true place of birth and nationality which is 'Fratar, Fier, Albania', in order to obtain status in the United Kingdom fraudulently.”
Whilst we accept that not much detail is there provided, the main allegation is there set out. The potential consequences for the Appellant’s citizenship are also explained in that letter. The Appellant is asked for any explanation he may have for what are said to be the false representations.
39. Second, the letter was addressed to the Appellant then at HMP Belmarsh and not to his solicitors. He would therefore have been aware of its content. Although the Appellant said in his oral evidence that there was some delay in getting the letter due to a transfer between prisons, he accepted that he had instructed Simon Noble after he received that letter, and Simon Noble first wrote to the Respondent on 21 March 2019 ([B/328-330]).
40. Third, although correspondence was thereafter with Simon Noble solicitors as they were instructed after the March 2019 letter, the 28 May 2019 letter ([B/331]) did no more than repeat the information which the Respondent had received from the Albanian authorities as set out in the March 2019 letter. As set out in the Decision ([24] at [B/115]), by a further letter in September 2019, Simon Noble were given a further opportunity to obtain the evidence they sought. They were advised to make a subject access request for it.
41. Although we accept that there is no evidence that Simon Noble did thereafter make a subject access request or correspond further with the Respondent, we do not know the reasons for this. It is notable for example that the Appellant says in the First Statement at [15] and [16] that he has suffered in the past from mental illness and that this “had an impact on [his] decision-making” so that “when the deprivation matter started, [he] was affected a lot and it triggered [his] stress and depression”. There is no medical evidence to support the assertions of problems at that time although there is a letter suggesting some issues in December 2021 ([B/87- 88]). Those assertions are in any event inconsistent with the Appellant blaming his then solicitors for failing to act even though, on the face of it, he did so when signing the Third Statement apparently a few months earlier.
42. It may be speculative to suggest that the failure of Simon Noble Solicitors to make a subject access request or correspond further in relation to deprivation was due to a failure by the Appellant to provide instructions. The evidence in the First Statement does however indicate that there may be some other explanation for the solicitor’s inaction. It would for that reason be equally speculative for us to accept the Appellant’s assertion of poor conduct by those solicitors absent their response.
Other Evidence
Evidence from the Albanian authorities – “the Albanian Documents”
43. The evidence on which the Respondent relies is to be found at [B/323-325]. The information is supplied by the British Embassy in Tirana following checks made of the Albanian authorities. The results of the checks are set out as follows:
“In response to your letter dated 15/10/2018 with reference NAT-77-2018, with regard to the request for Information on the verification of the civil status components, we would like to inform that following verification with the National Civil Status Register of the year 2010, it is found that:
AN Albanian national is registered on the National Civil Register of Albania with the provided details (name and surname): Alfred HENAJ, 05071980, father's name Hasan, mother's name Dallandyshe;
The family is registered as living in an unspecified—address in Kremenar, Fratar,- Albania.' current family composition consists of the subject only.
Checks, conducted with the Agency for Civil Registrations at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kosovo, have produced the following results:
NO national is registered on the National Civil Register of Kosovo with the provided details (name and surname): Alfred Henaj, 05071980, father's name Hasan, mother's name Dallandyshe, claimed place of birth, Mitrovice, Kosove.”
44. The letter goes on to explain that due to the Memorandum of Understanding a printout of the management information could not be provided because of its restricted status (which may explain why the Respondent required a subject access request to release the information to the Appellant). However, a photograph and personal details are provided. Those include a personal number, against the entry “passport” that no details are held of current passport number, but a number is given for an expired passport and that no details are held of the Appellant’s identity card. The birth certificate and registration certificate appear at [B/321- 322].
45. It appears from the Albanian Documents that the Appellant was registered as born in Albania. We accept that we have no explanation why the Appellant appears as the only family member residing at the address given. It is the Appellant’s assertion that his parents have settled in Albania. However, nor do we have any evidence from the Appellant or his parents engaging with that point. In any event, the information was taken from the register in 2010. By that time, the Appellant was an adult. It is difficult to understand the Appellant’s case that he was unaware of his place of birth if, as the records suggest, he was registered as living at an address in Albania as an adult and that the same register has it recorded that he was born in Albania. Although 2010 is after the date when the Appellant was recognised as a refugee and given leave to remain, it is prior to the application for naturalisation.
46. We are of course reviewing the Respondent’s decision rather than reaching our own findings on the evidence. However, we find that the Albanian Documents support an assertion that the Appellant was born in Albania and was registered as living there in the Civil Register dated 2010. Although the Appellant had already been in the UK for some years prior to 2010, he spent several months in Albania in the course of 2010 (see application for settlement at [B/293]). As such, the fact that he might have been registered at an address in Albania at that time is not inconsistent with the chronology of the Appellant’s case.
47. The Albanian Documents also support the Respondent’s assertion that the Appellant is an Albanian national. Although the authorities had no details of his current passport or identity documents at that time, they provided a number for an earlier expired passport. The Appellant appears to accept in the First Statement that the Respondent had an Albanian passport for him, but he says that it was not his. He thereafter asserts that he has never held an Albanian passport. The apparent inconsistency may be explained by the Appellant not accepting that the passport was issued to him, and we do not place weight on any inconsistency for that reason.
Asylum documents
48. The asylum documents are at [B/141-236]. We accept that those show that the Appellant has always claimed to be of Roma ethnicity living in Mitrovice, Kosovo before coming to the UK. He asked for an Albanian interpreter (although asked in the alternative for a Roma speaker). There was evidence in any event that Roma living in Kosovo did speak Albanian.
49. The interview records and statements are not inconsistent with the Appellant’s evidence in this appeal save for minor inconsistencies. In his asylum interview, the Appellant said that his father had been killed by the KLA whereas he confirms now that his father is alive. He has however sought to explain that change of evidence in the First Statement. There is however an inconsistency about the whereabouts of the family prior to the Appellant coming to the UK. When asked in his asylum interview about the main areas of Roma population, the Appellant said that he did not know as he did not travel a lot. That is inconsistent with what is said in the First Statement that the family travelled a lot and in particular back and forth between Albania and Kosovo. The Appellant relies on this as explanation for how he may have come to be registered as born in Albania. There is however no mention in the asylum interview of the Appellant having ever been in Albania.
50. Although the Appellant was at first disbelieved by the Tribunal as to his Roma ethnicity, that decision was set aside. The case thereafter proceeded on the basis that the Appellant was of Roma ethnicity, although some doubts were expressed about this by the subsequent Tribunal. His appeal was however allowed on the basis that he was of Roma ethnicity and came from Mitrovice, Kosovo. The Respondent’s onward appeal failed, and the Appellant was recognised as a refugee on the basis that those of Roma ethnicity were at risk of ill-treatment in Kosovo (in particular in Mitrovice).

Naturalisation application
51. The Appellant’s naturalisation application is at [B/290-319]. We do not need to dwell on the detail of that application. The deception relied upon is the Appellant’s insistence that he is of Kosovan nationality and his assertion that he was born in Mitrovice, Kosovo. The Respondent relies on the Albanian Documents as showing that the Appellant was born in and had lived in Albania.
The Decision
52. As both parties accept, the exercise for this Tribunal to undertake is a review of the Decision.
53. Having set out her policy in relation to deprivation, the Respondent provides particulars of the material deception which is relied upon ([8] to [22]). As we have noted above, the deception relates to the Appellant’s place of birth and nationality. As an Albanian national, the Appellant would not have been recognised as a refugee. Accordingly, his refugee status, his leave to remain granted on that basis and his naturalisation are all said to be impacted by the false representation as to place of birth. The Respondent also provides detail in that part of the Decision about the asylum claim made by the Appellant and the Tribunal’s determination of that claim.
54. The Respondent then sets out the initial decision-making process to which we have already referred. As it may be relevant to the issue of procedural unfairness, we set out what is said at [25] of the Decision as follows:
“It is clear that you would not have required sight of the Home Office files in order to provide your full representations to the SSHD in response to the serious allegations put to you in terms of the fraud. It is reasonable to surmise that you would be aware of your true identity, the important aspects of the representations you have provided to the SSHD throughout your immigration history and be able to provide evidence to support your representations. However, you failed to provide your full representations to the SSHD despite being given more than an enough time to do so.”
55. The lack of mitigation is thereafter relied upon by the Respondent as indicating that the Appellant was seeking to avoid the consequence of his actions. The lack of explanation is also relied upon. The deception was considered to be deliberate. At [29] of the decision, the Respondent said this:
“It is acknowledged that the decision to deprive on the grounds of fraud is at the Secretary of State’s discretion. In making the decision to deprive you of citizenship, the Secretary of State has taken into account the following factors, which include the representations made by your legal representative in their letter dated 21 March 2019 and concluded that deprivation would be both reasonable and proportionate.”
DISCUSSION
56. We adopt the formulation of the issues as put forward by Mr Terrell (see [19] above). It is however convenient to take issues (1) and (3) together and (4) and (5) together. We begin however with issue (2) being procedural unfairness.
Failure to Give Notice of Intention to Deprive/ Procedural Unfairness
57. As Mr Terrell submitted and we accept, there is no confirmation at present that the Appellant’s former solicitors were guilty of any misconduct. We have the Appellant’s assertions as to what happened, but we have found that the Appellant complained about their conduct only two months ago. We have not accepted that there was any earlier complaint due to inconsistencies in the Appellant’s evidence and lack of any supporting evidence of such a complaint.
58. We accept Mr Terrell’s submission that we should be slow to find that the previous solicitors failed the Appellant absent any acceptance by that firm of the complaint made. There is a suggestion in the Decision that the Respondent was herself concerned about the absence of representations and therefore gave a further opportunity to the Appellant to obtain the documents relied upon. However, as we have already observed, there could be other explanations for the lack of communication from the solicitors at that time.
59. The Respondent could not know that the Appellant blames his former solicitors for failure to make representations. He has only raised this as a reason at the eleventh hour. It was not raised before Judge Swaney. We have already noted that the Third Statement which did raise this as an issue was not apparently put before her. It was not in the Appellant’s bundle as before the First-tier Tribunal. So far as we can tell, it was produced for the first time in the supplementary bundle filed only a few days prior to this hearing before us.
60. In any event, the Appellant accepts that he received the 5 March 2019 letter. That undermines his case that the Respondent did not give him notice of intention to deprive. The Appellant therefore knew or ought to have known, first the allegation being made, second the consequences of deprivation and third that an explanation was being sought. He provided none.
61. Mr Saleem submitted that there had not been a sufficient exercise of discretion by the Respondent. However, given the lack of information from the Appellant, it is difficult to see what more the Respondent could have said beyond what is set out at [29] of the Decision (see citation at [55] above).
62. For those reasons, we do not accept that the Respondent’s decision-making process was procedurally unfair. In accordance with the guidance given in Kolicaj, the Respondent did give notice to the Appellant of her intention to deprive him of his citizenship. She did not know, nor could she have been expected to know what is now said by the Appellant about his reasons for not providing an explanation in response to the Respondent’s evidence. In any event, for the reasons we have already given we do not accept that the evidence we have at present shows that the Appellant’s former solicitors were at fault for his failure to provide an explanation.
Failure to take into account the basis of the asylum claim/ asylum documents
63. The Respondent set out in the Decision the background to the Appellant’s naturalisation which includes detail of the asylum claim made by the Appellant and eventually accepted by the Tribunal.
64. As Mr Terrell pointed out, it is difficult to see what of that background is relevant to the deprivation case. Even if the Appellant’s Roma ethnicity were to continue to be accepted in the face of the Albanian Documents, his status as an Albanian national would, as the Respondent points out, undermine his case to be at risk on that account on return to Kosovo as he would have been returnable to Albania.
65. We have already pointed out that there are some inconsistencies between the Appellant’s evidence in his asylum claim and his evidence now as regards the family’s travel between Kosovo and Albania. It is said in the ASA that the family travelled a lot and had no fixed address prior to the Appellant coming to the UK. However, as we have already pointed out and was reiterated by Mr Terrell, the Appellant not only said the converse as regards frequency of travel in his asylum interview but also said that he had lived at his last known address in Kosovo for all his life (see answer to question [4] at [B/163]). He made no mention of ever having been in Albania. We find that his evidence now that the family travelled a lot between those two countries is designed to provide an explanation for why he might not know that he was born in Albania and did not therefore lie in his naturalisation application. We are satisfied that it does not provide that explanation because his evidence now is inconsistent with his evidence at the time of the asylum claim.
66. The Respondent took into account the background to the Appellant’s asylum claim and the asylum documents. She was entitled to conclude, as Mr Terrell submitted, that this did not assist the Appellant’s case as to the deception. As we have also found, if anything, that evidence undermines the Appellant’s explanation as to the deception.
Failure properly to consider the Albanian Documents/Perversity
67. Mr Saleem suggested that the Albanian Documents should not be given weight because it was not clear how that evidence had been obtained. He submitted that the position may have been different in 2002 from that now. However, as we have already pointed out, the Albanian Documents rely on evidence taken from the Civil Register in 2010. That was on any view prior to the Appellant’s application for settlement and then naturalisation.
68. It is suggested that the Appellant’s mother may have registered his birth at some later stage. However, we have no evidence from the Appellant’s mother about this. We ignore Mr Saleem’s submission that the Appellant’s birth was registered by his mother much later when she wanted assistance from the Red Cross. There is no evidence to that effect and, if anything, it is inconsistent with the Appellant’s own case that he does not know when his mother registered his birth.
69. Mr Saleem also suggested that the Albanian Documents do not show that the Appellant is Albanian. The Albanian authorities had not been asked for the passport. However, the evidence shows that they have no details of a current passport or identity document. That does not mean that those do not exist. In any event, it would be unsurprising if the Albanian authorities did not have details of any current passport or identity document as the Appellant has been a British citizen since 2012. The Albanian authorities have provided details of an earlier expired passport. We are satisfied that the Respondent was entitled to rely on this as evidence that the Albanian authorities recognise him as one of their nationals. She was entitled to conclude based on this evidence that the Appellant is an Albanian national.
70. We also reject Mr Saleem’s assertion that it was perverse for the Respondent to rely on the birth certificate and family certificate in the face of the Appellant’s own evidence. Perversity is of course a very high threshold. We do not accept that the Appellant has made out his case on this point. In any event, for the reasons we have given we find that the Appellant has failed to explain why reliance should not be placed on the Albanian Documents.
Conclusion on condition precedent and exercise of discretion
71. For the foregoing reasons, we are satisfied that the Respondent was entitled to conclude that the Appellant had exercised deception.
72. We are also satisfied that the Respondent exercised her discretion to deprive lawfully. Mr Saleem drew our attention in the ASA to the case of Ahmed and others (deprivation of citizenship) [2017] UKUT 118 (“Ahmed”). Quite apart from the fact that Ahmed pre-dates the Supreme Court’s judgment in Begum, the guidance in that case does no more than state the uncontroversial principle (at (v)) that the Respondent has a wide margin of appreciation in deprivation cases. That does not assist the Appellant.
Human Rights
73. As we have already noted, we had no or very little information about the Appellant’s family and private life and it was confirmed by Mr Saleem that this was a deliberate omission. As such, when we reach stage (1(c)) of Chimi, we have next to nothing against which to balance the deprivation decision which we have concluded is lawful.
74. The only argument put forward in this regard in the ASA (at [25]) is that the Decision is disproportionate because it fails to take into account that the Appellant had “innocent, plausible explanations” to counter the Albanian Documents. However, we have found that the Appellant has failed to provide an explanation of the Albanian Documents, and we have also concluded that the Decision is lawful. For that reason, the Appellant’s argument that the Decision is disproportionate must fail for the same reasons.
CONCLUSION
75. The Respondent was entitled to conclude that the Appellant had exercised deception and to exercise her discretion to deprive the Appellant of his British citizenship based on the Albanian Documents. The Decision is a lawful one. Even taking into account the evidence which the Appellant now puts forward which the Respondent did not have, we are satisfied that the allegation of deception is made out. We have no evidence about the impact of the Decision on the Appellant’s family and private life. We therefore conclude that the balance under Article 8 ECHR falls firmly in the Respondent’s favour.
76. For those reasons, we dismiss the Appellant’s appeal.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

L K Smith
Upper Tribunal Judge Smith
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 August 2024

APPENDIX: ERROR OF LAW DECISION

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-000519
First-tier Tribunal No: DC/00012/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

……………29/04/2024…………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMITH
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHANA

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

ALFRED HENAJ
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms J Heybrook, Counsel instructed by Malik & Malik solicitors

Heard at Field House on Wednesday 3 April 2024

DECISION AND DIRECTIONS
BACKGROUND
1. This is an appeal brought by the Secretary of State. For ease of reference, we refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal. The Respondent appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge J K Swaney promulgated on 12 December 2023 (“the Decision”) allowing the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision dated 20 December 2019 giving notice of the Respondent’s intention to deprive him of his British citizenship.
2. The Appellant came to the UK on 26 August 2002 and claimed asylum on the basis that he was Alfred Henaj, a Kosovan national, born in Mitrovice and that he is a Roma Gypsy. His appeal was eventually allowed on asylum and human rights grounds. The Judge found the Appellant to be a credible witness. The Appellant was therefore granted asylum and leave to remain for a period of five years. He was then granted indefinite leave to remain on 31 March 2011 and citizenship on 4 September 2012.
3. The Appellant has received convictions whilst in the UK including on 29 June 2016 for conspiracy and supply of a Class A drug. He was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment.
4. On 5 March 2019, the Respondent notified the Appellant that he had reason to believe that the Appellant had obtained his citizenship by fraud. He believed that the Appellant was in fact born in Fratar, Fier, Albania. He therefore gave notice of intention to deprive the Appellant of his nationality.
5. Representations were made by the Appellant’s solicitors on 21 March 2019, requesting sight of the documentation on which the Respondent was basing his decision. The Respondent replied on the basis that the Albanian Ministry of Interior had supplied the Respondent with the Appellant’s genuine Albanian personal certificate and birth certificate. Copies of the documents were not provided. The Appellant was told that he needed to make a subject access request if he wanted the documents. The Appellant did not otherwise provide any explanation or evidence to refute the allegations made. On 20 December 2019, the Respondent made the decision here under appeal.
6. Judge Swaney heard evidence from the Appellant and found for herself that the condition precedent was not met. She accepted at [29] of the Decision that the documents relied upon by the Respondent met the evidential burden as to fraud. However, she thereafter found that the Appellant had explained why those documents could not be relied upon. She found the Appellant to be a credible witness, relying in part on the consistency of his claim to be a Roma Gypsy which had been accepted by an earlier Tribunal. She raised questions about the documentation on which the Respondent had relied which she said were not resolved. She concluded that the Appellant had provided an innocent explanation and that the Respondent had not discharged the legal burden of proving the fraud. She therefore allowed the appeal.
7. The Respondent appeals the Decision on essentially two grounds:
Ground one: The Judge has misdirected herself in law by determining for herself whether the Appellant had obtained his citizenship by fraud rather than asking herself the question whether the Respondent was entitled to be satisfied that he had done so.
Ground two: The Judge’s findings lacked adequate reasons and were also irrational.
8. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Dainty on 14 February 2024 for the following reasons so far as relevant:
“..3. It is arguable that [26] (and by consequence also the following findings) of the decision is wrong in law as running contrary to the approach in Begum, not least because such an approach would open the door to the consideration by the judge of fresh substantive evidence on the fraud rather than limiting herself to the evidence before the Respondent and to the judge being the primary fact finder rather than conducting a review on public law principles.”
9. We had before us a bundle running to 319 pages which included the core documents for the appeal, as well as the Appellant’s and Respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal. We do not need to refer to the documents save for the Decision given the nature of the challenge.
10. The matter comes before us as an error of law hearing. As such, the only issue for us to determine at this stage was whether there is an error of law in the Decision. If we conclude that there is, we have to consider whether to set aside the Decision in consequence. If we do so, we either have to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal or re-make the decision in this Tribunal, if necessary, at an adjourned resumed hearing.
11. Having heard submissions from Mr Terrell and Ms Heybrook, we indicated that we found an error of law to be made out on the first ground. We were satisfied that this error was material and affected the entirety of the Decision. We therefore indicated that we would set aside the Decision and we gave directions for a resumed hearing in this Tribunal for re-determination of the appeal.
12. We indicated that we would set out our reasons in writing which we now turn to do.
DISCUSSION
13. The focus of the Respondent’s challenge is to [24] to [27] of the Decision which reads as follows:
“24. In this appeal the fact of fraud is in issue. The appellant claims that he did not engage in fraud and gave his correct identity as he knew it to be when he arrived in the United Kingdom and at all times subsequently.
25. The condition precedent in section 40(3) of the 1981 Act is that naturalisation was obtained by means of fraud, false representation, or concealment of a material fact. In other words, the fraud, false representation, or concealment of a material fact was material to the grant of naturalisation. For ease of reference, I will refer to fraud in the rest of this decision. In doing so, I am also referring to misrepresentation and concealment of a material fact.
26. While I am only able to determine whether the condition precedent is satisfied on public law grounds and by reference to evidence that was before the decision maker, the same is not true of whether fraud was employed. Whether or not there was fraud is a matter of fact to be determined on the basis of the available evidence. I have noted paragraph (2) of the guidance given by the Upper Tribunal in Chimi (deprivation appeals; scope and evidence) Cameroon [2023] UKUT 00115 (IAC), but I find that this does not apply to the establishment as a matter of fact whether there was fraud, it is specifically stated that it applies to paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) of the guidance. I have not found any authority which contradicts my view, and I was not referred to any. If fraud is made out, I must then adopt the structured approach set out in Chimi.
Was there fraud, false representation, or concealment of a material fact?
27. I find that the usual test for establishing fraud applies. Firstly, it is for the respondent to adduce evidence to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that this did in fact occur. If the respondent discharges that burden, it is then for the appellant to show again on the balance of probabilities that there is a plausible, innocent explanation. If the appellant can do that, the respondent must then establish on the balance of probabilities that the appellant’s innocent explanation should be rejected.”
14. The guidance given in Chimi reads as follows:
“(1) A Tribunal determining an appeal against a decision taken by the respondent under s40(2) or s40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 should consider the following questions:
(a) Did the Secretary of State materially err in law when she decided that the condition precedent in s40(2) or s40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 was satisfied? If so, the appeal falls to be allowed. If not,
(b) Did the Secretary of State materially err in law when she decided to exercise her discretion to deprive the appellant of British citizenship? If so, the appeal falls to be allowed. If not,
(c) Weighing the lawfully determined deprivation decision against the reasonably foreseeable consequences for the appellant, is the decision unlawful under s6 of the Human Rights Act 1998? If so, the appeal falls to be allowed on human rights grounds. If not, the appeal falls to be dismissed.
(2) In considering questions (1)(a) and (b), the Tribunal must only consider evidence which was before the Secretary of State or which is otherwise relevant to establishing a pleaded error of law in the decision under challenge. Insofar as Berdica [2022] UKUT 276 (IAC) suggests otherwise, it should not be followed.
(3) In considering question (c), the Tribunal may consider evidence which was not before the Secretary of State but, in doing so, it may not revisit the conclusions it reached in respect of questions (1)(a) and (b).”
15. Judge Swaney was clearly aware of the guidance in Chimi. She referred to it expressly. It is though entirely unclear and indeed mystifying how she was then able to direct herself that, applying that guidance, she had first to determine for herself whether fraud had been employed as a matter of fact. The guidance in Chimi is clear. It is self-contained. It does not permit of any fact-finding exercise in relation to the condition precedent. That issue is to be determined on public law grounds.
16. Judge Swaney also concluded that her approach was not inconsistent with other case-law. Again, that is a difficult conclusion to reach having regard to the basis of the guidance in Chimi which is explained at [24] to [41] of the decision in that case.
17. That makes clear that the guidance starts with the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Begum [2021] UKSC 7 (“Begum”). Whilst that was a case concerning deprivation on grounds of national security, the Supreme Court’s analysis was based in part on previous decisions of this Tribunal in the naturalisation context. As was said by the Supreme Court in that case, the issue for the Tribunal (in that case SIAC) and the Court of Appeal was not whether SIAC or the Court of Appeal was satisfied that Ms Begum posed a risk to national security but whether the Secretary of State was entitled to be so satisfied.
18. By analogy, in this case, and following the guidance in Chimi, the role of Judge Swaney was to determine whether the Respondent was entitled to be satisfied that citizenship had been obtained by fraud and not whether she was entitled to be so satisfied. Whilst I accept that the Begum case arises in a different context, having regard to the guidance in Chimi, which applies that (binding) authority to the naturalisation context, it was not open to the Judge to take the approach which she did.
19. Ms Heybrook was unable to explain to us how the Judge was entitled to depart from the guidance in Chimi at least absent case-law disagreeing with that approach. She referred us to the Court of Appeal judgments in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 (“Ullah”) and Shyti v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 770 (“Shyti”) in an attempt to uphold Judge Swaney’s approach. We did not find either case of assistance.
20. We accept that in Ullah the Court of Appeal did not apply the Begum approach. There is no reference to Begum at all. That is surprising given what was said by the Supreme Court (albeit we accept not arising in a case in the naturalisation context). It is also surprising given other cases including guidance given by this Tribunal in not only Chimi but other cases (see the summary of case-law at [24] to [41] in Chimi). However, the judgment does not therefore express any view about the correctness of that case-law nor reach a conclusion that the Begum approach does not apply (necessarily since it was not considered). It is therefore not authority for the proposition that the guidance in Chimi is wrong.
21. In Shyti, the Court of Appeal expressly declined to decide whether the Begum approach should be applied in the naturalisation context as its view would be considered to be obiter in light of its conclusion. Again, therefore, that is not authority for any proposition that the guidance in Chimi should not be applied by the First-tier Tribunal.
22. In any event, neither judgment was referred to by Judge Swaney (nor in the case of Ullah could it have been since that judgment post-dates the Decision).
23. As we accepted in the course of discussions with Ms Heybrook, it may be that some of Judge Swaney’s reasoning for finding in the Appellant’s favour may be relevant to the issue of whether the Respondent was entitled to be satisfied that he had employed deception or fraud or made false misrepresentations, particularly having regard to the documents on which reliance was placed by the Respondent. However, the Judge having misdirected herself to the law and adopted the wrong approach, the Decision contains material errors. We therefore set it aside.
24. We indicated that we would retain the appeal for re-making in the Upper Tribunal. There is limited fact-finding to be carried out.
25. We gave directions for the Respondent to file a full bundle in order to overcome deficiencies which Mr Terrell identified with the bundle currently before the Tribunal in order to ensure that all relevant documents are before the Tribunal at the resumed hearing.
26. We also directed the filing of skeleton arguments by both parties. We considered that to be particularly important so that the Appellant could reconsider his case based on the documents and his account and put his arguments in a way which meets the legal approach which we have set out above.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Swaney promulgated on 12 December 2023 involves the making of an error of law. We set aside the Decision. We make the following directions for the rehearing of this appeal:
DIRECTIONS
1. By no later than 4pm on Friday 3 May 2024, the Respondent shall file with the Tribunal and serve on the Appellant a full bundle including all documents relevant for the re-making of the decision.
2. By no later than 4pm on Friday 17 May 2024, the Appellant shall file with the Tribunal and serve on the Respondent his skeleton argument.
3. By no later than 4pm on Friday 31 May 2024, the Respondent shall file with the Tribunal and serve on the Respondent his skeleton argument in response.
4. The resumed hearing will be listed before Upper Tribunal Judge L Smith on the first available date after 10 June 2024, face to face with a time estimate of ½ day. No interpreter is required unless the Appellant requests one.

L K Smith
Upper Tribunal Judge Smith
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 April 2024