Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-000596
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53335/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26 January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

Between

KM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Halliday
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Edinburgh on 14 January 2026

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a male citizen of Iraq. He appealed to the First-tier Tribunal against a decision of the Secretary of State dated 13 July 2022 to refuse his claim for international protection made in further submissions dated March 2022. A previous appeal against a refusal of the appellant’s claim for international protection had been dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal on 27 August 2008. The First-tier Tribunal judge hearing that appeal had described the appellant’s claim as ‘wholly fabricated.’ No successful appeal against that decision was made but the appellant did not leave the United Kingdom nor was he removed.

2. The First-tier Tribunal, in a decision dated 6 November 2023, dismissed the appellant’s second appeal based on his further submissions. The appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal. Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Lewis, by a decision dated 26 March 2025, allowed the appellant and set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The judge directed a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal. Following a transfer order, the resumed hearing took place before me at Edinburgh. At that hearing, the appellant gave evidence with the assistance of a Kurdish Sorani interpreter. I reserved my decision. I have remade the decision and now give my reasons.

3. The issues remaining for determination in the appeal are summarised by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Lewis at [15-16]:

15. The judge’s findings focused on an assessment of future risk arising from the ‘Iraqi authorities’. Sufficiency of protection was raised in the appellant’s skeleton argument before the judge. It was necessary for the judge to make a discreet determination as to whether the threat(s) the appellant claimed were made to him had been made. If a threat had been made, the judge would then need to consider who the threat was from and whether such threat posed a future risk to the appellant from the state, or a non-state actor.

16. It follows that the judge did not demonstrably determine whether the threats received by Facebook messenger were made as alleged or at all and if they were made, the risk to the appellant on return.

4. The burden of proof is upon the Appellant. As per the decision in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 the single standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. I must determine whether it is reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted on return to Iraq for his sur-place activities in the United Kingdom.

5. The appellant was extensively examined in chief by Mr Halliday. He was cross examined by Mr Mullen, Senior Presenting Officer, who appeared for the Secretary of State. He was asked about a series of threats that he claims to have received in July - September 2022 from three individuals, Barzan, Sharef and Hewa Akoyee. He received further threats in February 2025 and May 2025 from a Facebook group called the Kurdistan Counter Terrorism Group. The appellant says in his statement of 28 May 2025 that the threats came after ‘I was posting a lot.’ [5]. The appellant says that Barzan is a member of the Parastan which, in turn, is connected to the KDP. The appellant is convinced the individuals who attacked him online are working for the Kurdistan government. In some of his posts, the appellant had made comments about the former dictator, Saddam Hussien, which had not been wholly negative and these comments had attracted abuse and threats online.

6. In reaching my findings of fact, I have had regard to all the evidence. I have sought to distinguish peripheral from ‘core’ parts of the appellant’s account. I am aware (as was the First-tier Tribunal judge) that the fact that the appellant has previously been found to have given ‘wholly fabricated’ evidence does not necessarily mean that he is lying about every aspect of his claim. Equally, the fact that the appellant did not successfully appeal the Tribunal decision in which it was found that he had fabricated evidence is also relevant to my analysis. Applying the principles in Devaseelan (Second Appeal, ECHR, Extra-Territorial Effect) [2002] UKIAT 702, the findings of fact of the first judge who considered the appellant’s claim in 2008 form the starting point of my consideration.

7. I found the appellant to be a very poor and untruthful witness. I do not find that he has received genuine threats from any of the individuals referred to in his evidence or any other person. I find that he holds no political views which would expose him to any kind of risk on return to Iraq. I find that he has staged the Facebook and Messenger exchanges which he claims are evidence of threats.

8. I have reached those findings for the following reasons. First, the appellant’s reasons for fearing the claimed threats made no sense. The most recent threats in 2025 purportedly have been made by individuals who claim to know that the appellant lives in Scotland as they refer to that fact in the messages. These individuals claimed to be able to harm the appellant if they chose in ‘every city.’ Notwithstanding the extent of the threat, the appellant said that he was not afraid that he would be targeted in Scotland (where he is known by his online correspondents to be living) but was convinced that he would be at risk in Iraq (where he has not lived for many years). Despite apparently having been threatened in Scotland, the appellant had not made any enquiries as to how he might report these threats to the Scottish police. He had never thought of reporting the threats to companies operating Messenger and Facebook. He confirmed that he had never met any of the people who he claims now threaten him. I find that he could not recognise them or vice versa. Even so, in some way which the appellant could not explain, these individuals would pose a threat to him in Iraq. The appellant’s claims are absurd and not credible.

9. Secondly, the appellant could not explain why, notwithstanding, as he said in response to a question which I asked him, that he had remained active on Facebook in the period 2022 to 2025 he did not receive any threats in the period. I find that, had the appellant been active online in the period 2022-2025 as he claims, then had the threats against him been genuine those threats would have continued during that period. As it is, the ‘threats’ seem to occur only at times when they may assist the appellant in his appeals to the IAC. I find that the ‘threats’ resumed in 2025 to coincide with the appellant’s case reaching the Upper Tribunal on appeal. Moreover, the appellant has, in my opinion, sought to exaggerate these ‘threats’ by incorporating references to his living in Scotland. However, doing so has, as I noted above, rendered the entire enterprise absurd.

10. Thirdly, when asked how he know the individuals making the threats were who they claim to be, he replied, ‘normal people can’t threaten. Only those in power can.’ This statement makes no sense. Social media is full of those who do not possess power who threaten others. The appellant’s response underlines his hazy understanding of what he actually seeking to achieve by fabricating the threats. None of the appellant’s evidence regarding his sur place activities had the ring of truth.

11. Fourthly, the appellant will have been living continuously in the United Kingdom for 18 years in February 2026. The people in Iraq who he claims would harm him have never met him. Even if they have threatened the appellant (which I find they have not), it is not reasonably likely that they would be aware that he had returned to Iraq and, even if they were aware, it is not likely that they would recognise or locate him. It is not credible that the state authorities would assist these individuals in locating the appellant. The appellant’s claim in his latest statement that ‘these individuals will be motivated to threaten me because they will get more recognition and reward from the party if they threaten people like me’ also makes no sense; It is, frankly, incredible that such people would expect to further their own political careers in Iraq by showing that they had threatened online an obscure failed asylum seeker who has been living in the United Kingdom for nearly 18 years and who has no political profile and no genuinely held political opinions at all. I find, as Mr Mullen submitted, that the appellant has fabricated the ‘threats’ probably with the help of friends. I find that the appellant is not at risk on return to Iraq on account of any of his sur place activities in the United Kingdom. I find that the appellant holds no political opinions which would place his at risk from anyone in Iraq.

12. The appellant has a valid CSID which has been shown to a Tribunal on a previous occasion. Equipped with that document, he will have no problem returning to his home area and living there peacefully.

13. In the circumstances, I remake the decision dismissing on all grounds the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State dated 13 July 2022.

Notice of Decision

I have remade the decision. the appellants’ appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State dated 13 July 2022 is dismissed on all grounds.

C. N. Lane

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 22 January 2025