Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-000632

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/56269/2022
IA/09712/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

23rd June 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HUTCHINSON

Between

MU
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr B Lams of Counsel, instructed by Raklaw Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Nigeria, born on 9 July 1952. She states that she arrived in the UK in September 2005. The appellant applied to the respondent for leave to remain on 7 July 2021. That application was refused on 7 September 2022. Her appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Bennett (“the judge”) on 2 January 2024, after a hearing on 14 December 2023.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Loughran, on 8 April 2025, on the basis that it was arguable that the judge had erred in-law: by considering that he had not been provided with any evidence from the Red Cross, in his assessment of the appellant’s credibility; by considering it was open to the appellant to request a witness summons for her niece to attend the hearing, without also considering that it was her evidence that they had fallen out within a couple of months of the appellant entering the UK in 2005; and in rejecting the appellant’s account of being a victim of domestic violence, when the respondent had not rejected it in the Reasons for Refusal Letter. It was also arguable that the judge had engaged in speculation by concluding that the Nigeria authorities would have stopped the domestic violence, without considering relevant country guidance evidence.
3. The matter came before me to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law and if so whether any such error was material, and whether the decision needs to be remade.
Submissions – Error of Law
4. In the grounds of appeal and in oral submissions by Mr Lams, for the appellant, it is argued in short summary as follows:
5. Ground 1 argued that the judge required corroboration, which is not a requirement in immigration law and there was no mention of the Red Cross in either the refusal letter nor in the respondent’s review. Mr Lams confirmed to the Upper Tribunal that this was raised at the oral hearing by the judge. It was submitted that the Red Cross itself states that its letters are not to be relied on as evidence in the legal proceedings or asylum claims. It was submitted that it was substantively and procedurally unfair.
6. Ground 2 argued that the judge erred in impugning the appellant’s credibility because no witness summons had been issued for the appellant’s niece. The respondent had not applied for such a summons; nor did the court, either by way of directions before the hearing nor at the hearing, consider whether such a summons should be issued. It was submitted that the judge’s approach was irrational in drawing a negative credibility inference from the fact that the appellant did not request a witness summons for her niece, including if it were accepted that she had fallen out with her, as claimed by the appellant. Judicial notice should be taken of the fact that the Tribunal rarely exercises its witness summons powers.
7. In relation to ground 3, it was argued that the judge erred in ignoring the oral evidence of the appellant that she fell out with her niece within a couple of months of entering the UK in 2005 and this oversight vitiated the judge’s interpretation of the appellant’s witness statement, which the judge construed to the effect that the appellant had had more recent contact with her niece. The judge’s findings at [23](j)(2) at page 24 of the determination referenced this. There are two very similar witness statements: one dated 13 April 2022 and another dated 27 February 2023. It was submitted that the judge’s reasoning, that the phrase in the appellant’s 2022 witness statement that “are helping and supporting my everyday needs” was a reference to the appellant’s friends and niece, was only a possible, not a necessary reading of the sentence. It was submitted that the preceding sentence read: “During that time I was very distressed and anxious as I had nowhere to stay”. It was submitted that “that time” clearly referred to the period when the appellant had left Nigeria and had recently arrived in the UK in 2005, as is apparent from reading the preceding paragraph. The appellant’s statement at paragraph 16 went on to state that “I have my friends in the UK who are my family now” with no mention of her niece.
8. Ground 4 submitted that the judge erred in extrapolating facts from the appellant’s account at [23](f)(2)(ii) of the determination at page 22. It was submitted the judge wrongly rejected the appellant’s evidence to the contrary in relation to the Nigerian authorities recorded at [6](l)]of the determination at page 10. It was submitted that the judge had made a cultural assumption about what may be unacceptable in the UK being unacceptable in Nigeria, with such assumption not borne out by the CPIN, at 8.1.2, which indicates that one percent of women who experienced physical or sexual violence sought help from the police, with sources recording that victims of domestic violence are turned away, with police officers considering it a private or family matter.
9. It was submitted that the appellant’s account of domestic abuse had not been rejected by the respondent, with no suggestion that she should be disbelieved on the basis that somebody would have gone to the authorities in her situation.
10. Although there was no Rule 24 response, in oral submissions from Ms Clewley, in summary it was argued that there was no material error in the judge’s findings, which it was submitted were properly open to the judge.
Conclusion - Error of Law
Ground 1
11. In the context of the judge’s credibility assessment, which begins at page 19 of the decision, paragraph [23] the judge provided comprehensive reasons for concluding that the appellant was not a credible witness.
12. The judge at [23](a) found that the appellant had tried to give the impression in her evidence that all four of her children had been living at the family home at the time of the final incident of domestic violence, that they had been young and had been taken away by Mr STU, whereas in oral evidence it emerged that only the 2 younger children had been taken away. The judge went on to note, in unchallenged findings, a number of discrepancies and inherent improbabilities in the appellant’s evidence about her children.
13. It was in the context of these findings, where the judge made a series of adverse credibility findings about the appellant’s evidence about her children, that the judge then considered at [23](k) that there was no evidence of any attempts made by or on behalf of the appellant to trace her children, whom the judge did not accept she was not in contact with (or could not make contact with). As part of those reasoned findings, the judge considered that the Red Cross provide a free tracing service for individuals who have lost contact with members of their family.
14. It was not a case therefore, of the judge rejecting the appellant’s evidence because she had not contacted the Red Cross. It was open to the judge to take issue with what the judge found to be the lack of reasonable endeavours by the appellant to contact her family and the lack of evidence, where such ought to have been available, that the appellant’s four adult children would be unable to assist and maintain her on return.
15. Whether or not the appellant had made such efforts to reconnect with her family was relevant to the judge’s consideration of the issues before him, including whether there would be very significant obstacles on return to the appellant’s integration, whether there was any breach of the UK’s obligations under Article 3; and whether there were any exceptional circumstances such that the refusal of leave would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences.
16. The appellant was on notice that the issue of claimed lack of contact was at issue on appeal. The respondent’s review dated 5 May 2023, at paragraph 5, acknowledged that the appellant claimed that she would have a lack of income, food and shelter in Nigeria. However, the respondent highlighted that the appellant had children who remain in Nigeria and “in the absence of any evidence to the contrary” it was not accepted by the respondent that the appellant had not maintained contact with her children in Nigeria since arriving in the UK.
17. It was open to the judge therefore, to consider in the context of the oral hearing, amongst other considerations, the various ways in which such contact might have been made by the appellant.
18. The judge’s findings must be considered in the round, the judge having had regard to the whole sea of evidence before him, whereas the grounds before the Upper Tribunal seek to island hop.
19. It was only, having considered the appellant’s claim to not have had any communications with her children, in considerable detail at [23](i) and [23](j) that the judge went on at [23](k) to consider that the appellant had not made any attempts to find/make contact with her children, including considering the Red Cross. I take into account that it is not disputed that the judge put this to the appellant at the hearing; it was not procedurally unfair with the appellant’s representative having an opportunity to respond to this issue at the hearing. Mr Lams (who also appeared below) confirmed that he had made no request for an adjournment in relation to this issue, where such an option would have been available to the appellant had there been any procedural or other concerns about the judge’s line of clarifying questions.
20. At [32] (b) the judge considered in relation to contact, that it could have been made either via the Red Cross or otherwise. It is apparent therefore that the consideration of the Red Cross was not determinative.
21. It was open therefore to the judge to find, in the wider context of a series of adverse credibility findings in relation to the appellant’s claimed lack of contact with her children, that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by her failure to provide evidence in respect of efforts to trace her family, including through the Red Cross, where the judge found, in essence, that such ought reasonably to have been available. Given the weight of those findings, any claimed error cannot be material.
Grounds 2 and 3
22. The judge at paragraph [23](j) made adverse credibility findings about the appellant’s evidence in relation to her niece, including that the witness statements that she had provided made no mention of any falling out with her niece and referred to the appellant being supported by her niece and friends. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that her witness statements would indicate that she was referring to having assistance from her niece at the time of arrival and assistance from her friends more currently.
23. At paragraph 13 of her April 2022 statement the appellant indicated: ‘During that time, I was very distressed and anxious as I had nowhere to stay. However, I found support from my niece, friends who are helping and supporting with my everyday needs. I have been living in the UK for many years now and I have created my social circle who are very supportive to me.’
24. At paragraph 13 of her February 2023 statement the appellant indicated: ‘During that time, I was very distressed and anxious as I had nowhere to stay. However, I found support from my niece and friends in the UK who are helping and supporting with my everyday needs. I have been living in the UK for many years now and I have created my social circle who are very supportive towards me.
25. Mr Lams submitted that, including considering the subtle grammatical difference between these two statements, it indicated that the appellant was probably talking about support from her niece when she came to the UK. I do not agree. The paragraphs are almost identical, with no indication, when considered holistically, that any differences were anything other than a typographical slip.
26. The judge was entitled to consider as he did, at paragraph [23](j), that there was no evidence from the appellant’s niece to support the appellant’s evidence, where such ought to have been available. As part of those findings, the judge took into consideration the appellant’s explanation that she had fallen out with her niece, which was why she stated she had not provided any evidence from her. The judge went on to consider both the April 2022 and February 2023 witness statements, with the judge specifically referencing that the April 2022 statement omitted (in error in the judge’s view) the word ‘and’.
27. Although the appellant went on to state at paragraph 16 of both statements, that her friends were her family, at no point in either witness statement did the appellant state that her niece was helping her in 2005 but that they had since fallen out and that it was now only her friends who supported her. Considering the natural reading of the terminology used in both witness statements, the appellant did not exclude that her niece might be continuing to help her. Despite the fact that the appellant made a second clarifying statement, she failed to raise the issue of falling out with her niece.
28. Whilst Mr Lams submitted that this was because the respondent had not raised the issue of the niece, as noted, the appellant was on notice that the respondent did not accept that she was not in contact with her family in Nigeria. It was open to the judge, in considering the credibility of that claim, and the appellant’s credibility generally, to take into account all the available evidence. There is no error in the judge attaching the weight he did to the fact that the appellant only raised in oral evidence, as summarised at paragraph [6](h) of the decision and reasons, that she had had no contact or that she had fallen out with her niece.
29. The judge did not misunderstand the evidence before him in relation to the appellant’s claim to have fallen out with her niece in 2005, but rather rejected that evidence. It was open to the judge to draw the adverse inferences that he did in relation to the lack of efforts to contact her niece and for the niece to provide evidence in support of the appellant’s appeal.
30. The judge, at [23](j) set out a number of issues on which the appellant’s niece might have been able to provide clarification. The judge found that it was an obvious and easy thing for the appellant to assert that she had fallen out with her niece. It was open to the judge to find that this had not been mentioned in either of the witness statements and for the judge to draw the inference he did from the wording of those statements. The judge then went on to consider and discuss what actions the appellant might have taken including noting that there was no explanation why a witness statement had not been taken from the niece.
31. The judge also considered that he had not been provided with any documentary evidence to indicate, for example (and it is clear that the judge was considering different possibilities rather than making a definitive finding of what the appellant should have done) that the appellant’s solicitors had written to the niece and invited her to submit a witness statement, together with any reply. The judge went on to also consider that it would have been open under the relevant procedural rules, to request the issue of a witness summons.
32. The mention of a witness summons must therefore be considered in the context of the judge’s wider consideration of the lack of any endeavour by the appellant to see if her niece would be willing to attend and there is no material error in such consideration, which was reflective of what the judge found to be the complete lack of any effort by the appellant to contact her niece. This finding must also be considered in the context of the judge’s adverse credibility findings in relation to the appellant’s evidence in respect of her niece, and that their claimed falling out was only raised on the day of the appeal hearing in oral evidence. There was no material error in that approach.
Ground 4
33. The grounds submitted that the judge erred in rejecting the appellant’s account of domestic violence, including considering that the respondent had not rejected the appellant’s account of domestic violence and submitted that the judge speculated in relation to the authorities intervening on domestic violence.
34. In respect of the latter point, the judge at [23](f)(2)(ii) is clearly not assessing, or even speculating about, whether there is an effective response in Nigeria to domestic violence. The judge’s findings must be considered properly, in the wider context of the fact that the judge at paragraph [23](f)(2)(ii), is considering whether the appellant’s adult son, a 32 year old man at the time, would have been in the position to make any efforts to support her.
35. The judge was making findings in relation to what the judge found to be an obvious and inherent improbability in the appellant’s oral evidence about her eldest son, knowing of the violence inflicted on her by her husband that:
(1) her son should have ‘pleaded’ for her to return to the family home; and
(2) that he would not either have made arrangements for her to live elsewhere, given that he was 32 years old at the time and could therefore have expected to have the means to do so; or
(3) that if he had not had the means to make arrangements for the appellant to live elsewhere, that he himself would not have returned to the family home and spoken to Mr Stu;
(4) and/or assisted the appellant in making a complaint “either to the police or Family Court or have otherwise ensured that Mr STU left the family home and ceased using violence on her”.
36. This was not a finding therefore, as characterised by Mr Lams, of the judge making any assumptions that the appellant would have been assisted by the authorities in Nigeria. Rather, the judge considered the range of options that would have been open to the appellant’s son in assisting her.
37. One of those many options, was her son assisting her in making a complaint to the police or the family court. The judge was making findings in relation to whether or not the appellant had an ongoing relationship with her children. In reaching the reasoned credibility findings that he did, it was open to the judge to discuss what avenues might have been followed. This was not a finding about the effectiveness of the police and those findings were open to the judge.
38. The crux of the respondent’s refusal was that the appellant would have support from her children on return to Nigeria. The judge was therefore required to consider all of the evidence before him including whether her children could support her, and domestic violence was very much a key part of that consideration and whether contact was maintained.
39. A proper reading of the judgment fairly and as a whole, discloses that where the judge considers domestic violence it is in the context of whether the appellant has a relationship with her children or whether she has lost touch as she claimed, and even if she has whether she could get back in contact with them. It was entirely open to the judge, in the context of reaching those comprehensive and holistic reasons, to make the assessment he did.
40. The findings must be considered in the context of the detailed and wide-ranging assessment undertaken by the judge in paragraph [23] where the judge noted many inconsistencies and implausibilities, not related to domestic violence. Any claimed error is not therefore material.
Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not disclose a material error of law and shall stand.
I do not set aside the decision. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed

M M Hutchinson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 June 2025