Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-000651

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01552/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

ED
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: The appellant in person, unrepresented
For the Respondent: Ms S Simbhi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 4 April 2025
Decision and Reasons
Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Zimbabwe. Her appeal against the respondent’s decision of 4 November 2021 to refuse her international protection and human rights claim was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) Judge Cansick (“the judge”) for reasons set out in a decision promulgated on 20 August 2023.
2. The appellant claims the decision of the judge is vitiated by material errors of law. The grounds of appeal were prepared by the appellant, who is a litigant in person. She claims, her removal from the UK would be in breach of Article 3 and 5 of the ECHR because she will be subjected to torture and degrading treatment on return to Zimbabwe. She claims the judge found the appellant’s sur place activities with ‘ROHR’ and ‘Vigil’ to be genuine. She would therefore be someone considered to be of high profile on return and she would be unable to pass the screening test on arrival at the airport in Harare without being identified as a person of interest. She claims she will be at risk on return throughout Zimbabwe, and that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that a person who opposes the regime will be at risk in Zimbabwe. The appellant also claims that her removal from the UK will be in breach of Article 8 ECHR. She has two siblings in the UK and her son, his wife and their children have now also moved to the UK. The appellant claims her removal will have an impact on her grandchildren. The appellant claims she has been living in the UK for over 20 years and has established a solid connection with the British community.
3. Permission to appeal was granted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Wilding on 28 March 2024.
The Background
4. The appellant has a lengthy immigration history and I therefore say a little more about the appellant’s circumstances and the background to the decision of the FtT judge.
5. The appellant first arrived in the UK in 2002 leaving her husband and children behind in Zimbabwe. She was granted leave to enter and remain as a student. On 10 January 2008 she returned to Zimbabwe to attend her mother’s funeral. She returned to the UK on 25 January 2008 and has remained in the UK since. On 20 January 2009 she was refused further leave to remain as a student and on 24 February 2009 she claimed asylum. That claim was refused by the respondent on 23 April 2009 and the appellant's appeal against that decision was dismissed by FtT Judge Obhi on 19 June 2009. At that time, the appellant did not claim to be politically active but said that she received threats because of her involvement, in her work in a school, in granting permission for children to be absent from school and those children later left the country. Although Judge Obhi found the appellant to be a generally truthful witness, she was not persuaded that the death of the appellant’s mother was relevant to events the appellant claimed had occurred in 2002. Judge Obhi found the appellant had not been persecuted in the past and concluded that she would not be at risk on return because of past events. Judge Obhi considered whether the appellant’s activities in the UK could have brought her to the attention of the Zanu-PF. The judge was told that the appellant had not been active politically since her arrival in the UK, and the judge found that the appellant will not be at risk on return because of her activities in the UK. Having considered the relevant country guidance and background material, Judge Obhi dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
6. In October 2010, the appellant made further submissions to the respondent. The appellant relied on fresh evidence, not available in 2009, that because her brother had been granted refugee status in South Africa as a member of the MDC, and he and his family had been harassed by Zanu PF members, she would face risk by association. The claim was refused by the respondent on 25 October 2011 but gave rise to a further right of appeal. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed by FtT Judge Robertson for reasons set out in a decision dated 13 December 2011. Judge Robertson accepted the appellant made no attempt to join any organisation until her previous appeal had been dismissed. She had joined ZAPU in March 2010. Judge Robertson found the appellant had engaged in low-level activities with ZAPU and is pursuing links with ROHR simply to bolster her asylum claim. Judge Robertson did not accept that the appellant’s limited activities would bring her within the profile of an activist who would be identified as of adverse interest to the regime. Judge Robertson said there was no credible evidence to suggest that the appellant’s activities will be known to the authorities’ in Zimbabwe and rejected the appellant’s claim that she is separated from her husband and he is being investigated for being a traitor. Judge Robertson said that taking the appellant’s claim at its highest, she has been in the United Kingdom since 2002, she is a failed asylum seeker and she will not be able to show loyalty to the regime on return. She will not be subjected to interrogation by the authorities (the second stage questioning) or that she would be asked to demonstrate loyalty to the regime bearing in mind the lack of any profile. Having considered the relevant country guidance and background material, Judge Robertson concluded the appellant has not established that she will be at risk on return.
7. Since those two decisions of the FtT, the appellant made further submissions to the respondent on 22 August 2012 and 31 July 2013. Each time, the respondent refused the claims made by the appellant and refused to treat the further submissions as a fresh claim so that no right of appeal arose.
8. The appellant made further submissions to the respondent on 4 March 2019 and it was the respondent's decision of 4 November 2021 that gave rise to the decision of FtT Judge Cansick.
The Decision of FtT Judge Cansick
9. The judge noted that there are two issues in the appeal as set out in paragraph [12] of the decision. First, whether the appellant’s sur place activities mean she is at risk of persecution on return to Zimbabwe. Second, whether the appellant meets the requirements of paragraph 276ADE of the immigration rules, and in particular whether there would there be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Zimbabwe; (paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi))
10. As far as the international protection claim is concerned, the judge noted, at [18], that it has been more than 11 years since the decision of FtT Judge Robertson and that the activities of the appellant in the UK, since that date, were not disputed by the respondent. The judge summarised the appellant’s activities at paragraphs [18] and [19] and said, at [20] and [21]:
“20. …The accepted activities indicate someone who has been substantially involved with ROHR and Vigil since the decision of Judge Robertson. I also found the appellant’s evidence at the hearing of her commitment to ROHR and Vigil came across as genuine. Given the undisputed activities of the appellant since the last decision, and her credible evidence on her commitment to such at the hearing, I depart from the previous finding and find that the appellant’s sur place activities are genuine.
21. However, the genuineness of the belief is not in itself determinative as to if there is a risk of persecution on return. The issue instead being what the effect on return will be from those activities. ”
11. The judge referred to the guidance set out in CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00059 (IAC) and at [24], noted that the appellant is from Bulawayo and has family there. The judge referred to the expert evidence of Dr Hazel Cameron that was relied upon by the appellant at paragraphs [25] to 28] of the decision. That included claims that the Central Intelligence Office in the Zimbabwean Embassy in London will have monitored the appellant’s activities in the UK, and that as a result of the appellant’s activism in the UK, she is at risk of being identified by the government of Zimbabwe as an opponent and would be targeted if she continues such activism. The judge also noted the evidence of the expert is that the appellant would not merit second stage interrogation off-site on her arrival at Harare airport, but would be subject to post-airport monitoring by state intelligence officers.
12. The judge however rejected the claim that the appellant would have a significant profile on return. The judge accepted the general human rights situation in Zimbabwe detailed in the report and the potential targeting of individuals in relevant categories, but said the expert has not demonstrated why the appellant falls into such a category. The judge noted that if the appellant has a significant profile, it is difficult to see why the appellant would not merit second stage interrogation off-site on her arrival at Harare airport. The judge noted the expert provides no examples of human rights violations against members of ROHR in Zimbabwe. The judge said, at [28], that even if the appellant did have a significant profile in Zimbabwe she will be returning to Bulawayo. The evidence of the expert is that the appellant would not be subject to second stage interrogation at the airport so there is no reason to conclude she would not be able to return there. The judge referred to the country guidance in CM¸ that had not been addressed by the expert, and concluded that there are no grounds for departing from the guidance set out regarding those returning to Bulawayo.
13. The judge addressed the submissions made by counsel regarding relevant legislation introduced in Zimbabwe at paragraphs [30] to [33] of the decision. The judge referred to the Patriots Bill 2021 (passed through the Senate as the Criminal Law Codification and Reform Amendment Bill 2020) and was satisfied on the evidence before the Tribunal that there is no information as to how the law operates in practice. The Judge also considered the Non-Governmental Organisation bill, that pre-dates the country guidance and the Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Bill 2021. The judge concluded that none of the legislation relied upon provided any justification for departing from the country guidance. The judge concluded, at [33]:
“I find that the appellant has not demonstrated she has a significant political profile in Zimbabwe. Even if she did have such a profile she would be returning to Bulawayo, where she will not come to adverse attention. The appellant has not demonstrated that it is justified to depart from the relevant country guidance or that she is at risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Zimbabwe and therefore I dismiss the appeal on asylum grounds. I also dismiss the appeal on humanitarian protection and Article 2/3 ECHR grounds for the same reasons as above.”
14. The judge addressed the appellant’s Article 8 claim at paragraphs [34] to [44] of the decision, noting at [35], that paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) requires there to be very significant obstacles to the applicant’s integration into the country to which she would have to go if required to leave the UK. The judge said, at [36], that having rejected the appellant’s international protection claim, the matters relied upon by the appellant do not establish any significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration. At paragraph [35] the judge refers to the health of the appellant and noted that there is no evidence that the appellant would not be able to receive adequate treatment in Zimbabwe. As far as the appellant’s length of residence in the UK is concerned, the judge noted, at [38] that the appellant has now been in the UK for over 15 years since her brief return to Zimbabwe and that she had also spent more than five years in the UK before 2008. The judge noted the appellant’s ties to the UK, but went on to say:
“38. …However, the appellant has still spent the majority of her life in Zimbabwe. She would not have problems understanding the culture there. She has five adult children there. Although it is stated by the appellant that they would not be able to support her, I see no reason why they would not be able to do so. Also I see no reason why she would not continue to receive support from her siblings in the UK if needed. The appellant also worked as a teacher in Zimbabwe. This and her activities with ROHR in the UK show she is educated and resourceful. I consider she would be able to work in Zimbabwe.
39. Although the appellant has been away from Zimbabwe for some time, I consider that the support she will have there, her knowledge of life in Zimbabwe and education and experience means there will not be significant obstacles to her integration. There is also no reason why she cannot continue her relationship with her siblings and other friends in the UK by means of modern communication from Zimbabwe. All these matters demonstrate that there would not be any significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Zimbabwe.”
15. The judge had regard to the relevant public interest considerations at paragraphs [40] to [43] of the decision weighing those factors that weigh in favour of, and against the appellant. At paragraph [44], the judge said:
“I find the matters in favour of the appellant’s private life do not outweigh the strong public interest in effective immigration control. The factors going to the appellant’s favour are not such that maintaining the refusal would give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences. The refusal does not therefore breach Article 8 ECHR.”
The Hearing of the Appeal Before Me
16. The appellant adopted her Grounds of Appeal and had prepared a written note of her submissions. The appellant claims her son and his family arrived in the UK in August 2022 and that is relevant to her Article 8 claim with ever closer ties to the UK. She submits that she has for all intents and purposes remained in the UK continuously since her arrival in 2002, and therefore as at the date of her further submissions made in March 2019 she had been in the United Kingdom for a period of about 17 years. She had been in the UK for a period of 19 years when the respondent reached a decision and had been in the UK in excess of 20 years by the time of the decision of Judge Cansick in August 2023. The appellant submits her return to Zimbabwe in January 2008 was limited to a period of under three weeks to attend the funeral of her mother. The appellant submits the judge failed to have adequate regard to her combined residence of a period over 20 years and to attach due weight to the length of her residence.
17. In reply, Ms Simbhi submits paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) applies where, at the date of application the applicant has been continuously resident in the UK for less than 20 years and there would be very significant to the applicant’s integration into the country where they would have to live. Ms Simbhi submits the judge gave adequate reasons for finding no very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration in Zimbabwe. The protection claim was dismissed by the judge for reasons that were open to the judge on the evidence and the judge clearly had regard to the appellant’s length of residence in the UK. Little weight attached to the private life in accordance with s117B. The appellant had not acquired 20 years continuous residence in the UK at the time of the application. The judge did consider the length of residence but was entitled to attach little weight to the private life established during the 20 years.
Decision
18. Although the appellant’s son, his wife and their children came to the UK in 2022, there was little information before the FtT regarding the background to their arrival in the UK. It is however uncontroversial that other members of the appellant’s family continue to live in Zimbabwe. As the judge said at paragraph [24] of the decision, the appellant is from Bulawayo and has family there.
19. It is helpful to begin by considering the decision of the judge regarding the international protection claim made by the appellant. The judge considered the risk upon return by reference to the country guidance set out in CM. He was right to do so. That is the most recent country guidance relevant to Zimbabwe. In view of the appellant’s previous occupation, the only other relevant country guidance is that set out in NN (Teachers: Matabeleland/Bulawayo: risk) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00198 (IAC). That does not assist the appellant and does not take her claim for international protection any further. In NN, the Upper Tribunal said:
“The “geographical filter” identified in EM and Others (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 98 (IAC) and confirmed more recently in CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00059 (IAC) is equally applicable to teachers. Thus, a teacher will generally not face a heightened risk on return to Zimbabwe, on account of his or her occupation or former occupation alone, if his or her destination of return is (a) rural Matabeleland North or Matabeleland South, where a returnee will in general not face a real risk of harm from Zanu-PF elements, including the security forces, even if he or she is a MDC member or supporter; or (b) Bulawayo, where the returnee will in general not face such a risk, even if he or she has a significant MDC profile.”
20. The decision in CM plainly sets out the position as to risk on return at the airport and the guidance covers what happens in terms of screening at Harare airport. The Upper Tribunal in CM examined up-to-date evidence about ‘Returns to Zimbabwe’ at paragraph [181(d)] of the decision and at paragraphs [202] to [205], set out their conclusions. Here, the judge relied upon the evidence of the expert, as he was entitled to, which was that the appellant would not merit a second stage interrogation, off site, on her arrival at Harare airport.
21. Upon a careful reading of the decision of the FtT, it is in my judgment clear that the judge had proper regard to the expert evidence that was relied upon by the appellant and the country guidance decision of CM. The judge had in mind the screening that occurs at the airport and considered whether, on the evidence before the Tribunal, the appellant would be subjected to the second stage. In reaching the decision the judge had regard to the appellant’s sur place activities in the UK.
22. The assessment of such a claim is always highly fact sensitive task. The judge identified the core issues in this appeal. The judge was required to consider the evidence as a whole and in my judgment he plainly did so, giving adequate reasons for his decision. The Judge undoubtedly had regard to the risk faced by the appellant on return and applied the correct test. The judge correctly applied the country guidance and found that the appellant was not someone who had a profile which would be likely to bring her to the attention of the authorities either based on her activities in Zimbabwe or in the UK. In essence, even on the expert evidence before the Tribunal, the appellant’s profile was not such that she would be subjected to the second stage interrogation. The findings and conclusions reached by the judge are neither irrational nor unreasonable, or findings that are wholly unsupported by the evidence.
23. The requirement to give aadequate reasons means no more nor less than that. Reading the decision as a whole, I am satisfied that the judge's decision to dismiss the appeal on asylum and humanitarian grounds was based upon the evidence before the Tribunal. The judge reached a decision that was open to the Tribunal on the evidence.
24. Turning then to the appellant’s claim on private life grounds, in her decision the respondent noted that in order to meet the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1)(iii) an applicant must show that at the date of their application they have lived continuously in the UK for at least 20 years (discounting any period of imprisonment). The respondent said that the applicant claimed to have entered the UK on 25 January 2008 and had therefore lived in the UK for 11 years and 1 month. The respondent therefore concluded the appellant has not lived continuously in the UK for at least 20 years. The respondent went on to consider the other relevant eligibility requirements for leave to remain on private life grounds and said that in order to meet the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi), an applicant must show that they are aged 18 or above and that there would be very significant obstacles to their integration into the country to which they would have to go if required to leave the UK. The respondent concluded the requirement is not met by the appellant.
25. On appeal to the FtT it is my judgment clear that the judge completed the “broad evaluative assessment” at paragraphs [37] to [39] of the decision that is required when considering whether there are very significant obstacle to reintegration. The threshold is a high one. The focus of the appellant’s claim before me is that although she had not acquired and overall 20 years continuous residence in the UK since 2002 at the date of her application or the respondent’s decision, she had acquired 20 years residence by the time her appeal was heard. The short absence from the UK of just under three weeks in January 2008 when the appellant returned to Zimbabwe to attend her mother’s funeral was to be disregarded.
26. As the Court of Appeal said in Alam v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] 1 W.L.R 17, the decision in C (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 40, [2008] 1 W.L.R. 1420, does not state any general rule of law that would bind a court in its approach to all cases where it is certain that an applicant would succeed in an application for Entry Clearance. By analogy here, the appellant claims that although she may not have met the requirement for 20 years continuous residence when her application was made, the requirement is now met. The Court of Appeal in Alam held that the case law on immigration had developed significantly since C (Zimbabwe), which was decided before Part 5A of the 2002 Act had come into force. Further, at the time of C (Zimbabwe), there had been no provision in the Rules in respect of art.8 claims, whereas by the time of the instant decisions, Appendix FM of the Rules applied.
27. Here, the judge accepted the appellant has established a private life in the UK. The issue in the appeal was whether the decision is proportionate. The requirement set out in the immigration rules is that the applicant must have been continuously resident in the UK for more than 20 years on the date of application. The applicant cannot therefore on any view have met the requirements of the immigration rules. She had not on any view been continuously resident in the UK for a period in excess of 20 years when she made her claim. In Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60, Lord Reed emphasised that the failure to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules is a relevant and important consideration in an Article 8 assessment because the Immigration Rules reflect the assessment of the general public interest made by the responsible minister and endorsed by Parliament.
28. In reaching his decision, the judge was required to have regard to the public interest considerations set out in s117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Section 117A(2) of the 2002 Act expressly requires that in considering the public interest question, the court or tribunal must (in particular) have regard to, in all cases, the considerations listed in section 117B. They were referred to in paragraphs [41] to [43] of the decision. The judge referred to the relevant public interest consideration and the factors that weigh in favour of and against the appellant. At paragraph [43], the judge, quite properly noted that section 117B(5) of the 2002 Act requires that little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person’s immigration status is precarious.
29. Standing back, it was in my judgment open to the judge to conclude as he did at paragraph [44] that the matters in favour of the appellant's private life do not outweigh the strong public interest ineffective immigration control. The judge accepted the appellant has established a private life in the UK. The issue in the appeal was whether the decision is proportionate. Reading the decision as a whole, it was undoubtedly open to the judge to conclude that the scales fall on the side of the public interest and the respondent’s decision is proportionate.
30. A fact-sensitive analysis of the evidence was required. The judge identified the core issues in this appeal as set out by the parties. I am satisfied that standing back, reading the decision as a whole, the judge's decision was based upon the evidence before the Tribunal. The fact that the appellant may now be able to meet the requirements of Appendix Private life is not to say that the judge erred in law in reaching his decision. It is open to the appellant to make the relevant application, and the respondent will no doubt consider any such application on its own merits by reference to the immigration rules.
31. It follows that I am satisfied that there is no material error of law in the decision of the FtT and I dismiss the appeal.
Notice of Decision
32. The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
33. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Cansick promulgated on 20 August 2023 stands.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 June 2025