Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-000765

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55190/2022
LP/03214/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

M R A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Rutherford, Counsel, instructed by Rodman Pearce Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the remaking, under section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal promulgated on 5 February 2024, allowing the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision of 7 November 2022 to refuse his asylum and human rights’ claims. Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Kelly, on the application of the Secretary of State, set aside the First-Tier Tribunal’s decision for error of law (see annex below), on two bases, firstly that the judge had not determined whether the appellant’s posts were genuine or contrived, because it was only if his posts were genuine that the issue would arise about whether the appellant was likely to delete his Facebook account in a timely fashion before returning to Iran, and secondly that the judge had not made a properly reasoned assessment of the risk that the appellant’s accepted low profile activities in the UK would have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. He preserved the First-Tier Tribunal’s adverse findings about the appellant’s claimed activities in Iran.
The issues before me
2. At an earlier hearing in front of me on 22 January, the parties had agreed that the issues to be determined were:
(i) Whether the appellant’s political/Facebook activities in the UK were genuine or contrived or a mixture of both;
(ii) Whether the appellant’s activities in the UK would have come to the adverse attention of the authorities before the appellant’s return and if so the risk as a result;
(iii) Whether if not, they would come to the adverse attention of the authorities on the appellant’s return and the risk as a result;
(iv) Consideration of the HJ (Iran) principles insofar as not already considered within the scope of the previous issues.
3. The First-Tier Tribunal Judge had decided, and those findings were preserved, that she did not accept any part of the appellant’s account regarding his claimed activities distributing leaflets for KDPI in Iran or that his friend had been arrested and disclosed his name to the Iranian authorities.
4. The respondent had accepted in the refusal letter that the appellant had engaged in low-level political activities in the UK. At the time of the asylum interview in October 2022, he had attended one demonstration, in March 2022, and subsequently submitted screenshots of his social media posts showing him attending that demonstration. He told the First-Tier Tribunal judge at the appeal hearing that he had also attended a demonstration in May 2023. That claim of attendance was not challenged before her, and the judge accepted that attendance [14].
This hearing
5. The documentary evidence before me was in the error of law bundle which contained all the material which had been before the First-Tier Tribunal and a supplementary bundle containing a supplementary witness statement of the appellant and Facebook posts, some of which were translated. I have taken all that evidence into account.
6. The appellant gave evidence through a Kurdish Sorani interpreter, confirming the truth of his witness statements, and he was cross-examined and re-examined and I asked some brief questions.
7. Following the evidence, I heard submissions from both representatives which I summarise briefly below.
8. Mr Ojo submitted that the appellant had only attended 2 demonstrations in the UK, with a gap of more than a year between them, and a gap of virtually two years between the second demonstration and today’s date. That was, he submitted, a clear indication that the appellant was not genuinely politically motivated as he claimed. He did give a reason for not attending more demonstrations including finance and that he lived in a different city, but part of the reason he said he had not attended was because on the two occasions he had taken part he had been under 18 and therefore he was helped on those occasions by social services to attend demonstrations, and he could not afford to come to London without that help or support. However, at the time of the second demonstration, he was in fact over 18. He had not provided a full explanation in his witness statement about why he had not attended further demonstrations or the efforts he had made to try to attend demonstrations. He had asked what he could do other than post on Facebook and attend two demonstrations, but he could have been distributing leaflets for example. He had not been consistent about whether he had met anyone of any significant profile at the demonstrations, and when he was questioned, it turned out that the person was not politically famous.
9. The appellant only explained for the first time in cross-examination that he was illiterate in Kurdish and that he needed help operating Facebook. This was not in his witness statement as one might have expected. The appellant did not seem to know the contents of the posts very well; he was not aware of the number of likes he had received, and he had not given a credible explanation of why he would continue posting on Facebook despite the fact he might be putting his relatives at risk. Mr Ojo commented that there was also an issue about whether the Facebook posts had been manipulated. We did not know when they were posted. The appellant said he was aware of the “download your information” function on Facebook, but that information had not been provided. Taken in conjunction with the other credibility points, Mr Ojo submitted that there were clear pointers that the appellant’s political activity in the UK was contrived. Mr Ojo submitted that there was no evidence that the appellant had been monitored by the Iranian regime; the photos of pictures being taken of demonstrators at pdf page 8 of the recent evidence were not taken at the two demonstrations the appellant had attended. He could be expected to delete his Facebook account before the application for an emergency travel document, and he would not be of interest to the authorities following XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 bearing in mind his minimal role in sur place activity.
10. Ms Rutherford referred me to her skeleton argument. She invited me to find that the appellant’s activities were genuinely motivated. It was sensible and plausible that he had only been able to attend two demonstrations given he did not live in London and did not have funds available. This was consistent with what he had said in asylum interview. He had routinely posted on Facebook relating to Kurdish rights and demonstrations and he was doing what he could to encourage others to attend. It was not clear that there were other political activities available to him. He readily accepted where he had had made a mistake and it was not his words on the posts. We did not have the download your data function, but it was accepted that there had been Facebook posts and there was now a quantity of Facebook posts which would cause him problems if they came to the attention of the authorities. It did not appear that he realised that the dates were not on the screenshots. He explained that he got involved because of freedom of expression. It was unlikely that as a Kurdish man he would not support Kurdish rights, and the posts reflected his belief that Kurdish people should have more rights and freedoms. He was determined to continue spreading the message and to spread information more widely.
11. Ms Rutherford stated that given the number of posts and that he had attended two demonstrations and posted about them, his activities may already have come to the attention of the authorities. In any event, at the pinch point of return basic internet searches would take place and as he had left illegally and was Kurdish he would come to the authorities’ attention. Ms Rutherford agreed that if I found the appellant’s activities were not genuine, I could come to a different conclusion. She agreed that it might be difficult for her to say that the appellant could not delete his Facebook account at the earliest opportunity if he were not involved in genuine political activity.
Discussion and findings
12. Although the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for his actual or perceived political opinion, and the burden of proof is on an appellant, I remind myself that the standard of proof is low, below the balance of probabilities, namely a reasonable degree of likelihood, which can also be expressed as a reasonable chance or a serious possibility.
Are the appellant’s political activities at least partly genuine?
13. My starting point is the First-Tier Tribunal Judge’s preserved finding that she could not accept the appellant’s account of his political activities in Iran. It follows from that finding that the appellant was not telling the truth about his political activities in Iran and claimed asylum on a false basis on arrival in the UK. Of course, I bear in mind that the appellant was only 17 when he arrived, but it does mean that he is not a person on whose word I can rely generally.
14. Ms Rutherford was right to remind me that as a young Iranian of Kurdish ethnicity it would be unlikely that the appellant would not support Kurdish rights. The appellant has explained in his witness statement in response to the reasons for refusal that he posts on Facebook to bring awareness to the public with the hope that one day Kurds will gain their freedom and in his recent witness statement that he wanted to create more awareness on how the Iranian regime has been persecuting the Kurds (paragraph 4) and he wants to show the atrocities committed by the Iranian authorities (paragraph 6), he attended demonstrations to show his support for his people and to show his protest against the regime (paragraph 8).
15. However the statements the appellant has made about his political activity in his witness statements are very general and moreover are still linked with his false claims of political activity in Iran. In his statement in response to the reasons for refusal letter the appellant explains that he attended the demonstration and subsequently became interested in politics “because of how I was treated by the Iranian authorities” in that he had to flee because of fear of persecution (paragraph 10). In his recent witness statement, he explains that when he fled Iran because of his fear of being killed, he embarked on a dangerous journey on his own and without his family and “this dreadful situation and experience I had to go through motivated me to be more political in the UK and do something to create awareness” (paragraph 9).
16. Not only does the appellant’s witness statement make links between his current political activity and his original falsely based asylum claim, it does not tell the full truth about his postings on Facebook. Whilst the appellant did not hide in his asylum interview that he had not been to school and was illiterate (question 11) and referred to not going to school in his first witness statement, he did not explain in his witness statement that he was still being helped to operate Facebook. In cross-examination the appellant said that he could not read and write Kurdish but was not bad at reading and writing English. He said that one of his friends had helped him open a Facebook account and showed him how to post. His Facebook account was only used to post political material. He still needed assistance operating Facebook. A friend would write down any Kurdish posting, although the views and the opinions were all his. He said he had not mentioned the help from a friend because there was no need as the views, the opinions and the ideas were all his.
17. The appellant was asked if he posted any original comments himself or forwarded comments from other people and he said that it was his own views and opinions. He would put his view about the video, about the picture. Mr Ojo asked the appellant in cross-examination whether he could point to any printouts which demonstrated that he had articulated his views himself without the assistance of someone else and he said they were all his. However in cross-examination this broke down somewhat. The appellant said that p 10 of his recent bundle (p 11 on the pdf reader) was done with his friends together; the writing on the picture at p 11 (p 12 on the pdf reader) was done with the help of his friends because his friends were good at writing in English and Kurdish. The appellant’s attention was drawn to p 39 of the bundle (p 40 pdf reader) which was a poster advertising a demonstration. He said first that he and his friends had written the words in Kurdish above the picture and the rest of the writing was taken from the website, and then said that the writing above was not his writing.
18. Moreover, as Mr Ojo put to the appellant, not all the information in the Facebook account is the appellant’s posts. Although the appellant was not referred to examples, there are examples of posts by a person with the initials CMA (see p 27 and 29 bundle (ps 28 and 30 on the pdf reader)) and a post in the first person about a demonstration which the appellant did not attend on 8 October 2023 containing photographs which are not of the appellant (p 24 bundle, p 25 pdf reader) and a post at p 37 (p 38 pdf reader) which seems to be simply a copy or a forwarded post of a report from a Kurdish political party. Many of the other posts read as if they are copied from news reports. Even the post which the appellant specifically maintained after cross-examination he had articulated himself, as he said it was what he told a friend and the friend had written it down (p 7 bundle, p 8 pdf reader) appears in the same English form with a different combination of photographs at p 18 and p 29 appellant’s bundle (ps 19 and 30 pdf reader). Although I do not have the complete post, the two words in (presumably) Kurdish Sorani which can be seen above the English text at ps 18 and 29 of the appellant’s bundle look the same as the last two words at p 7.
19. I consider it is significant for someone who said in his witness statement that he was posting on Facebook to create awareness, that the appellant did not seem to have any idea of how many likes he received on average, or what was the least or the most likes he had received. One would expect that a person who was trying to create awareness would engage with his audience by taking note of what sort of posts were the best received or received the most comments.
20. I also consider the appellant’s evidence about his consideration or lack of consideration about the effects the posts might have on his family to be telling. He was asked whether he was concerned that his relatives might be placed in danger in Iran, but his answers gave very little evidence of reflection that his relatives might be caused problems or weighing up the risks. Of course, genuine activists do carry on despite the risk to their families, but they might consider posting under a pseudonym or at the very least showing some consideration of the problems and evaluating the overall benefits of posting against the risk to those they love.
21. Whilst I do not doubt the appellant has a Facebook account and has made posts with the help of others on Facebook, the evidential weight I can place on the screenshots is, in any event limited. Although the appellant said he was told to use the “download your information” function and a friend of his did that, that is not what has been put in evidence. What has been put in evidence are incomplete screenshots, only a few bearing dates and those that do, not being in a consistent date order. I simply cannot tell whether the posts have been edited, whether they came from someone else’s account, or whether they have always been public.
22. I appreciate that it would be difficult for the appellant to attend every demonstration because of lack of finances but the appellant has been in the UK for almost 3 ½ years and only attended 2 demonstrations. I understand that before he was 18 it would have been particularly difficult for him and he explained in interview that he had only been once to a demonstration because it was difficult for him financially, but it was simply not right as he said first in cross-examination that he was under 18 on both occasions when he attended demonstrations. He has, at least since the lodging of the appeal with the First-Tier Tribunal, lived in the Luton area which, I am aware, is less than 40 miles from Central London and accessible by bus/coach. I appreciate that even cheap coaches are still a cost, but I am also aware that many Iranian asylum seekers living outside Greater London relying on government support do attend demonstrations outside the Embassy, no doubt saving their very limited funds so that they can attend occasionally. That almost two years have passed since the last demonstration the appellant attended, is, I conclude telling.
23. Pulling everything together, the appellant made a false asylum claim on arrival in the UK. He is not, even now, concerned to tell the truth. His recent witness statement still refers to being motivated to get involved in politics because of the risk to him in Iran and his first responses in cross-examination to questions were to make what were obvious exaggerations or not to tell the full truth (the posts were all his own views and opinions, he was under 18 at the time he attended the second demonstration, that he could name a famous activist). Against this background, the appellant has only attended a couple of demonstrations, without, I find a reasonable explanation for his attendance being so limited. He has made anti-regime posts on Facebook but has needed help to make those posts but whilst of course that in itself does not mean the posts were not motivated by a genuine desire to express his political opinions, the appellant does not appear to have engaged with his intended audience, to have done much more than pass on or copy the reports or thoughts of others, or reflected on the difficulties continued posting (if indeed his posts have always been public) would cause his family. Whilst considering as I have explained above that the appellant would, by reason of his ethnicity, have a motive to support Kurdish rights and be against the Iranian regime, taking everything together I am not satisfied, even to the low standard applicable, that the appellant has attended demonstrations and is posting on Facebook as an expression of genuine political belief. I consider the appellant’s actions demonstrate he has no real interest in politics. I consider that he has attended demonstrations and posted solely to provide him with a basis for claiming asylum.
Would the appellant’s activities have come to the attention of the authorities before his return
24. Whether the appellant would be at risk as a result of the demonstrations he attended is to be considered with reference to the factors in BA (demonstrators in Britain – risk on return – Iran) CG [2011] UKUT 36, relating to the nature of sur place activity (how will demonstrators be characterised by the regime, role in demonstrations and political profile, extent of participation, publicity attracted), the identification risk (surveillance of demonstrators, regime’s capacity to identify individuals), factors triggering inquiry on return (person’s profile, immigration history), consequences of identification, identification risk on return.
25. Anyone who expresses dissent would be characterised by the Iranian authorities as a person having a political profile against the regime and an opportunistic political activity would not be distinguished as such by the regime. However although the Iranian authorities do attempt to identify people participating in demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy the nature of the level of the sur place activity would heighten the determination of the Iranian authorities to identify the demonstrator whilst in the UK and to identify him on return [BA [65]]. The appellant has produced photographs from his Facebook account showing officials at the Iranian Embassy taking photographs out of the window, presumably of demonstrators, but the photographs do not show that they were taken at the two demonstrations the appellant attended. Even if photographs were taken at those demonstrations, it does not follow that the appellant would be identified. BA refers to the lack of facial recognition technology and the haphazard nature of checks at the airport. The Upper Tribunal concluded in BA [66] that for the infrequent demonstrator who plays no particular role in demonstrations and whose participation is not highlighted in the media there is not a real risk of identification and therefore not a real risk of consequent ill-treatment, on return.
26. The appellant does not claim to have played any role other than as a demonstrator at the two demonstrations he attended. The three pictures he submitted to the respondent of his attendance at the demonstration in March 2022 show him facing away from the Embassy. Each photograph shows him (with others in one photograph) holding up 3 different A4 size pieces of paper with anti-regime slogans on them. There are three photographs from the Facebook material the appellant produced of the demonstration in May 2023. In one the appellant is on his own wearing a high visibility jacket some distance from the other demonstrators in a street facing the camera, holding up two A4 sized pieces of paper bearing anti-regime slogans, another shows an individual who is not the appellant, the other shows a group of young men facing away from the embassy on the other side of the road, one holding up the same pieces of paper the appellant was holding up; the appellant (although it is not clear) looks like the individual crouching at the extreme left of the group wearing ordinary clothing and not holding anything. The appellant also has photographs in the Facebook material he produced of the March 2022 demonstration – there are two additional photographs, but they are of the back of people’s heads. They do not obviously show the appellant.
27. Bearing in mind that the appellant has not even been photographed with anti-regime banners (as opposed to normal sized pieces of paper) and the photographs showing him holding pieces of paper do not obviously show him facing the Embassy, even if he does appear in a photograph which comes to the attention of the regime, there is nothing to indicate from the level and nature of the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations that they will be concerned to identify him.
28. The appellant has posted on Facebook, even if I can place little evidential weight on the posts given the absence of the “download your information” material. However although the Iranian state monitor social media, as is explained in the headnote of XX:
1) There is a disparity between, on the one hand, the Iranian state's claims as to what it has been, or is, able to do to control or access the electronic data of its citizens who are in Iran or outside it; and on the other, its actual capabilities and extent of its actions. There is a stark gap in the evidence, beyond assertions by the Iranian government that Facebook accounts have been hacked and are being monitored. The evidence fails to show it is reasonably likely that the Iranian authorities are able to monitor, on a large scale, Facebook accounts. More focussed, ad hoc searches will necessarily be more labour-intensive and are therefore confined to individuals who are of significant adverse interest. The risk that an individual is targeted will be a nuanced one. Whose Facebook accounts will be targeted, before they are deleted, will depend on a person's existing profile and where they fit onto a "social graph;" and the extent to which they or their social network may have their Facebook material accessed.
2) The likelihood of Facebook material being available to the Iranian authorities is affected by whether the person is or has been at any material time a person of significant interest, because if so, they are, in general, reasonably likely to have been the subject of targeted Facebook surveillance. In the case of such a person, this would mean that any additional risks that have arisen by creating a Facebook account containing material critical of, or otherwise inimical to, the Iranian authorities would not be mitigated by the closure of that account, as there is a real risk that the person would already have been the subject of targeted on-line surveillance, which is likely to have made the material known.
29. There is nothing to indicate that the appellant would appear to be high profile on any social graph. There is no evidence of any public groups he is part of or any well-known activists he is Facebook friends with. The only name the appellant gave when asked for a famous activist turned out on further questioning to be a person he described as someone like himself, not a prominent person or leader.
30. Before the First-Tier Tribunal the appellant produced a report from Dr Ghobadi. Dr Ghobadi endorses the conclusion of the Home Office CPIN as being consistent with background information [86]. He refers to a great deal of evidence that the Iranian authorities monitor social media including those using social media in foreign countries [100]. He endorses the conclusions of BA and XX at [108] saying “It is not such that any criticism of the Iranian authorities on social media regardless of the person’s profile would bring them to the adverse attention of the Iranian regime. The potential punishment for posting contents critical of the Iranian authorities on the one hand depends on the content and severity of criticism and, on the other hand, and more importantly, the profile of the person who has posted them. In other words, the higher the profile of a government critic is, the more serious the fear of reprisal can be expected from the Iranian authorities.” He explains that it is unlikely that the appellant would be of great interest to the authorities merely for attending anti-regime demonstrations unless he had already come to their adverse attention or he was one of the organisers, although he explains since the death of Zhina Amini in September 2022, the authorities are less tolerant of any form of dissidence [112]. He explains that when monitoring social media, the authorities are mostly interested in those who are high profile, journalists, writers and celebrities although he says that is not always the case, as the labourer and blogger Beheshti who was arrested and died under torture in 2012 was not a high-profile activist [113]. I note that Dr Ghobadi nowhere says that he has seen the appellant’s Facebook pages or posts. The appellant’s witness statement of March 2022 which the expert saw did not mention posting on Facebook and the later asylum interview, which the expert also saw only mentions posting briefly, in the context of posting photos of attendance at demonstrations. It is in that context that Dr Ghobadi says (at [113]) “As such, regardless of the appellant’s profile, I cannot rule out the plausibility (sic) that he might have come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities due to his online activities” and in his conclusion [138] “it is impossible to state with certainty that he has not come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities due to his online activities and for his attending protests against the Iranian regime.”
31. I consider Dr Ghobadi is therefore saying no more than that he cannot rule out the possibility that the appellant might have come to the attention of the authorities because he attended demonstrations and there are some photos of the demonstrations available on Facebook. He is right that the possibility cannot be ruled out, but as Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Kelly observed in his error of law decision, that is not the same as whether there is a real risk that the appellant’s low-profile activities would have come to the attention of the authorities.
32. Bearing in mind the lack of evidential weight I can give to the Facebook material given my findings about the appellant’s credibility and the lack of the “download your information” material, I can really be satisfied only that the appellant has made a few posts which could be seen as anti-regime which have at some stage been publicly available on Facebook and that there are pictures of the appellant at two demonstrations, not showing him to be more than an ordinary participator, which have also at some stage been publicly available on Facebook. I am not satisfied he would appear on a social graph as having any links to persons of interest to the Iranian regime. Following XX the conclusions of which Dr Ghobadi endorses, I am not satisfied that the appellant would fall into the category of a person of particular interest, who would already have been the subject of targeted social media surveillance.
33. I am not satisfied therefore even to the low standard applicable that the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations and his activity on social media would already have come to the attention of the authorities.
34. Because I have not been satisfied that the appellant’s activities are genuine, I consider the appellant can delete his Facebook account. I appreciate Ms Rutherford raised in her skeleton argument issues about the unpredictable nature of when any ETD application would be made and so when the appellant’s Facebook account would have to be deleted for such deletion to be effective in terms of his profile not being located, but the appellant can simply delete his Facebook account immediately. He does not use his Facebook account for contacting friends or keeping in touch generally and so there is no reason why he cannot close it immediately to mitigate any risk.
35. I appreciate that the appellant said he would not delete his Facebook account, but I consider that he would. He is not a person on whose word I can rely and given my findings, there would be no reason for him not to delete his Facebook account. Taken in conjunction with my other findings this means that I am not satisfied, even to the low standard applicable, that the appellant’ activities would come to the attention of the authorities before his return.
Whether the appellant’s activities would come to the adverse attention of the authorities on return, and if so, the risk to him as a result
36. The country guidance case of HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 explains that the mere fact of being a returnee of Kurdish ethnicity without a valid passport, even if combined with illegal exit does not create a risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. It also explains that Kurds expressing peaceful dissent or who speak out about Kurdish rights also face a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment, even low-level political activity can involve the same risk, and the authorities adopt a “hair-trigger” approach in the sense that the threshold for suspicion is low, and the reaction of the authorities is likely to be extreme. That case also set out that there would be questioning on return. Although Ms Rutherford submitted in her skeleton argument that questioning at the airport was likely to include the appellant’s activities in the UK and his social media activities, there is no background material to indicate this would be so, unless the Iranian authorities already knew about the appellant’s activities and I have found there to be no real risk that they would. The country guidance case of SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 308 explains that there is not an automatic assumption that because a person has sought asylum they must be deemed to have tried to conduct propaganda against Iran [16] and the country guidance is that an Iranian male in respect of whom no adverse interest has previously been manifested by the Iranian state does not face a real risk of persecution/breach of his Article 3 rights on return to Iran on account of having left Iran illegally and/or being a failed asylum seeker. Dr Ghobadi in his expert report refers only to questioning by the Iranian authorities on return about the appellant’s reasons for leaving the country [124].
37. If the appellant is questioned about his reasons for leaving the country, then he can be expected to tell the truth, i.e. that he left the country for a better life elsewhere. On the First-Tier Tribunal’s findings he did not leave the country because of risk of persecution for political activities. There is no reason why the appellant would volunteer the details of his false asylum claim or that he had a Facebook account or any sur place activities in the country. If he were directly asked about whether he had a Facebook account, I find he would lie. There is no reason for him to tell the truth, he has not told the truth to the authorities in this country and as he did not open the Facebook account for genuine political reasons it is not problematic to say that he will not tell the truth and therefore not be at risk (see [100] XX). As I have said above, there is no background material and no expert evidence to indicate that the appellant would face detailed questioning about his activities in the UK, if there is nothing to alert the Iranian authorities to such activities. I appreciate and accept that the appellant is not a supporter of the Iranian regime, but the appellant will not be asked to prove his loyalty to the Iranian state (see [98] and [99] of XX). The appellant not having come to the attention of the Iranian authorities before he left Iran and they having no reason to suspect him by reason of finding material on Facebook, he would not be at risk by reason of prolonged questioning leading to Article 3 ill-treatment, nor would there be any other reason for his ill-treatment at the point of return, as Dr Ghobadi confirms that the appellant would not face severe punishment merely for having left the country illegally.
Consideration of HJ (Iran) principles and conclusion on international protection
38. The appellant, is, I accept, not a supporter of the Iranian regime. I find however he would not want to take part in political activity on return. Of course he would be persecuted if he did attempt to take part in anti-state political activity in Iran, but I find the reason for his not taking part in political activity is because the appellant is, like many people, even if they are not supporters of the political regime in power, not particularly interested in political activity but rather in just getting on and living his life. I have found the appellant is not a genuine activist and the only reason he involved himself in any political activity in the UK was simply to provide a basis for his asylum claim.
39. As I do not consider that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant’s activities at demonstrations and on social media have already come to the attention of the Iranian authorities, I am not satisfied even to that lower standard that they would so come at the pinch-point of return, and I have found that the appellant would not wish to involve himself in political activity on return, the appellant’s claims for international protection do not succeed, neither would his return breach Article 3 ECHR.
Article 8 ECHR
40. It was not submitted to me that the appellant’s return would breach Article 8 ECHR if he could not otherwise succeed. I am not satisfied that the appellant meets the requirements of immigration rules, because I am not satisfied that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Iran. He has been away from Iran for approaching 4 years, but he grew up in Iran and there is nothing to indicate he has lost touch with his Kurdish culture and heritage. He says he is not in contact with his family, but even if he is right, there is nothing to indicate on the facts I have found that his family would have moved from their home and so the appellant can return to his home area and resume contact with them.
41. Even if Article 8 is engaged because of the length of the appellant’s stay in the UK and therefore his private life, I am satisfied that his removal would be proportionate. The maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest, and I am satisfied that public interest outweighs the appellant’s private life to which I only give little weight as he has never had any leave to remain in the UK.
42. The appellant’s removal would not breach Article 8 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
On remaking, I dismiss the appellant’s appeal.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 July 2025

Annex (error of law decision)

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: UI-2024-000765
(PA/55190/2022)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Promulgated

03/10/2024

Before

Deputy upper tribunal JUDGE Kelly

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

MRA
(Anonymity Ordered)
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms H Gilmore, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms G Rutherford, Counsel instructed by Roman Pearce Solicitors

Heard at Field House on the 18th September 2024

Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008

Unless and until the Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of his family. This direction applies both to the appellant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to the parties in accordance with their status in the First-tier Tribunal; that is to say, I shall refer to MRA as “the Appellant” and to the Secretary of State as “the Respondent”.
2. Although the First-tier Tribunal did not make an anonymity order, I shall do so until such time as all appeal rights have been exhausted. This is with a view to preserving the appellant’s anonymity until such time as his status has been finally determined.
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Iran. The respondent refused his protection claim on the 7th November 2022. First-tier Tribunal Judge Young-Harry allowed his appeal against that refusal on the 5th February 2024. The Respondent has been granted permission to appeal against Judge Young-Harry's decision and thus the matter came before me.
Background
4. The appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal was that he and a friend (‘Raza’) had distributed leaflets on behalf of a Kurdish separatist party (the KDPI) and that the appellant’s uncle had subsequently informed him that his life would be in danger if he remained in Iran. This was because Raza had been arrested and informed the Iranian authorities of the appellant’s involvement in distributing KDPI leaflets. Further or in the alternative, the appellant claimed that he was at risk of ill-treatment on return to Iran due to his political activities in the UK, which included posts of a political nature on Facebook.
Findings of the First-tier Tribunal
5. In summary, the First-tier Tribunal Judge found that the appellant’s account of his political activities in Iran contained several inconsistencies and implausibilities. The judge did not therefore accept, “any part of the appellant’s account regarding his claimed activities or difficulties in Iran” [13]. So far as the appellant’s posts on Facebook were concerned, the judge found that “if” the Iranian authorities became aware of them, they would give rise to a risk on return, “even if contrived”, and that, “although the appellant can delete his account, he is not required to” [16].
The grounds of appeal and submissions
6. The grounds of appeal can be conveniently summarized as follows:
(1) The judge erred in assuming that the appellant was under no obligation to delete his Facebook account prior to his return to Iran, without first making a finding as to whether his claimed fears on that account were genuine or contrived;
(2) The judge erred in failing to make a finding as to whether there was a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant had already come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities by reason of his political activities in the United Kingdom.
7. By way of amplification of those grounds, Ms Gilmore drew attention to the fact that the judge had also failed to make an explicit finding that the appellant’s Facebook posts were critical of the Iranian government
8. In response to the first ground, Ms Rutherford realistically accepted that the judge had erred in failing to make the necessary factual finding as to whether the appellant’s posts on his Facebook account were genuine or contrived, and thus whether he would likely delete the account if faced with return to Iran. She also accepted that, “the timely closure of an account neutralises the risk consequential on having had a “critical” Facebook Account, provided that someone’s Facebook account was not specifically monitored prior to closure” [XX (PJAK –sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC), at paragraph 103]. She nevertheless submitted that this error was immaterial because, even were the Tribunal to have found that the appellant’s Facebook posts were contrived, the Secretary of State would not give him sufficient notice of an application for the issue of an emergency travel document (ETD) so as to enable him to make a ‘timely’ closure of the account (30 days) and thus to avoid its discovery by the Iranian authorities.
9. In response to the second ground, Ms Rutherford drew my attention to the fact that in the letter explaining the reasons why his protection claim had been refused, the Secretary of State had accepted that the appellant had provided photographic evidence to support his claim to have attended a demonstration in March 2022, in which he is bearing explicitly anti-regime placards outside the Iranian Embassy in London (paragraphs 37 to 44 of the letter). This provided a sufficient evidential basis to support a finding that the appellant was at risk of having already come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities. Given that the Secretary of State also accepted that the appellant had posted those photographs on his Facebook page, it also provided an answer to Ms Gilmore’s submission that the judge had failed to make an explicit finding that his Facebook account was critical of the Iranian regime.
Analysis
10. The sentence in the judge’s decision that gives rise to the first ground reads as follows: “Although the appellant can delete his account, he is not required to”. This sentence appears to be based upon a misreading of the guidance given at paragraphs 99 to 103 of XX (Iran). After contrasting the position where political loyalty (as opposed to neutrality) is required by militias operating in a receiving country, the Tribunal made the following observations:
99. The key differences in our case are that the Iranian authorities do not persecute people because of their political neutrality, or perceived neutrality; and a returnee to Iran will not face an unpredictable militia, but a highly organised state. In our case, a decision maker is not falling into the trap of applying a test of what a claimant “ought to do,” in cases of imputed political opinion. That was counselled against by Beatson LJ in SSHD v MSM (Somalia) and UNHCR [2016] EWCA Civ 715.
100. Instead, in deciding the issue of risk on return involving a Facebook account, a decision maker may legitimately consider whether a person will close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account, prior to the application for an ETD: HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596. Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions. If the person will refrain from engaging in a particular activity, that may nullify their claim that they would be at risk, unless the reason for their restraint is suppression of a characteristic that they have a right not to be required to suppress, because if the suppression was at the instance of another it might amount to persecution. It is difficult to see circumstances in which the deletion of a Facebook account could equate to persecution in this sense, because there is no fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention to have access to a particular social media platform, as opposed to the right to political neutrality.
101. The second part of our answer relates to Lord Kerr’s concern about whether an analysis of what a person will do is too speculative or artificial an exercise. We accept Mr Jaffey’s submission that there may be cases where the exercise is too speculative, particularly in the context of a volatile militia. That is not the case here.
102. We consider that it may be perfectly permissible for a decision maker to ask what a returnee to Iran will do, in relation to a contrived Facebook account or fabricated protection claim. Whether such an inquiry is too speculative needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis, but factors which may point to that question not being impermissibly speculative include: where a person has a past history of destroying material, such as identification documents, or deception or dishonesty in relation to dealings with state officials; whether the government has well-established methods of questioning (in the Iranian state’s case, these are well-documented and therefore predictable); and whether the risks around discovery of social media material, prior to account deletion, are minimal, because a personal’s social graph or social media activities are limited.
What difference does a critical Facebook account (whether deleted or not) make to the risk faced by someone returning to Iran?
103. Closure of a Facebook account 30 days before an ETD is applied for will, in our view, make a material difference to the risk faced by someone returning to Iran, who has a “critical” Facebook account. The timely closure of an account neutralises the risk consequential on having had a “critical” Facebook account, provided that someone’s Facebook account was not specifically monitored prior to closure. In contrast, where a critical account has not been closed, the application for an ETD is likely to prompt a basic Google search of a name; and may prompt more targeted surveillance of that Facebook material. Discovery of material critical of the Iranian regime on Facebook, even if contrived, may make a material difference to the risk faced by someone returning to Iran. The extent of the risk they may face will continue to be fact sensitive. For example, an Iranian person of Kurdish ethnic origin may face a higher risk than the wider population.
11. It is thus clear that the issue for the judge to determine was not, as she suggested, whether the appellant was “required” to delete his account. Rather, it was whether the appellant was likely to do so should he be faced with the prospect of returning to Iran. To decide that question, the Tribunal was first required to decide whether the appellant’s posts were genuine or contrived. As previously noted, Ms Rutherford conceded at the hearing that the judge had erred in failing to make an explicit finding that the posts were genuine when assuming that the appellant would not delete them prior to his return. Neither was such a finding implicit within the judge’s reasoning, given that she had earlier found that his account of claimed political activities in Iran lacked credibility. I moreover do not accept Ms Rutherford’s submission that the option of deleting a Facebook account does not provide a feasible means of neutralising the risk of discovery by the Iranian authorities due to the appellant not receiving notice of the timing of an ETD application. The unpredictability of the timing of an ETD application will of course be a feature of every case. However, the question whether a particular claimant will decide to delete their Facebook account within the window of opportunity provided by exhausting all appeal rights against an adverse decision in the First-tier Tribunal is a matter that will inevitably be fact-sensitive.
12. Turning to the second ground, whilst it is true that the Secretary of State accepted that the appellant had been politically active in the UK, the question of whether this activity would have come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities clearly remained in contention. Both the judge and Dr Ghobadi (the expert whose report was before the Tribunal) acknowledged that the appellant was, “not high profile”. This probably amounted to the same thing as the Secretary of State’s characterisation of him as “low profile”, from which she concluded that there was not a real risk of him having come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities. However, having acknowledged at paragraph 19 that the appellant was “not high profile”, the judge appears to have adopted Dr Ghobadi’s approach that it was, “not possible to know for certain if he will come to the attention of the authorities or if they are already aware of his online activity and the fact that he has attended demonstrations” [emphasis added]. There are few (if any) things in life of which it is possible “to know for certain”. What was required of the judge, however, was a reasoned assessment of whether there was a real (as opposed to fanciful) risk that the appellant’s ‘low profile’ activities in the UK would have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. In undertaking that task, it was necessary to have regard to the assistance that can be derived from the guidance provided in the cases of BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC); SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 00308 (IAC); HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 and XX (Iran) (above). Whilst the judge made extensive references to those cases, she did not ultimately make the risk assessment that they required of her.
13. I thus have no doubt that both grounds of appeal are made out and that the judge’s decision concerning the risk to the appellant arising from his sur place activities should be set aside and remade. That said, there has been no challenge to the judge’s adverse findings concerning the appellant’s claimed activities in Iran; whether by way of cross-appeal (either side being entitled to appeal a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, even ‘the winner’) or otherwise. Those findings should therefore be preserved, and the scope of the remaking will accordingly be confined to an assessment of the risk that the appellant’s activities in the UK have and/or will come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities. That is not something that will require extensive fact-finding, and it is accordingly appropriate for it to be determined in the Upper Tribunal.
Directions to the parties
14. The parties are directed as follows:
(i) Any further evidence must be served by the parties upon each other and lodged with the Tribunal by no later than 4 pm on Monday the 25th November 2024;
(ii) The respondent must serve upon the appellant and lodge with the Tribunal a skeleton argument in support of her position by no later than 4 pm on Monday the 2nd December 2024;
(iii) The appellant must serve upon the respondent and lodge with the Tribunal a skeleton argument in support of his position by no later than 4 pm on Monday the 9th December 2024;

Listing instructions
15. I direct that the appeal be re-listed on the first available date on or after Monday the 16th December 2024 with a time estimate of 2 hours, and that a Kurdish (Sorani) interpreter be booked to attend the hearing.
16. All the primary findings of fact that were made by the First-tier Tribunal concerning the appellant’s claimed activities in Iran are to be preserved.
Notice of Decision
17. The appeal is allowed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal to allow the appellant’s appeal is set aside, but subject to the preservation of all its findings of fact.

Judge Kelly: David Kelly Date: 25th September 2024

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal