Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-000925
UI-2024-000926
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/06719/2019

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

18 December 2025

Before

LORD JUSTICE DOVE
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

A A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

OPEN DECISION

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Husain KC, Ms L Dubinsky KC, Ms E Mitchell instructed by Charles Douglas Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr R Kellar KC, Mr M Smith instructed by the Government Legal Department

Heard at Field House on 2 to 4 July and 17 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

This determination has been anonymised in accordance with the confidentiality order which is attached to this decision. As that order makes clear, reporting restrictions are also in place which prohibit the publication or disclosure of the identity of the appellant, or of certain witnesses in these proceedings, or of any matter liable to lead to their identification in connection with these proceedings. Additional protections apply in relation to two expert witnesses referred to as “CM” and “PT”. These protections are to be strictly observed, and the determination itself is to be treated in accordance with paragraphs 17-18 of the order.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. Given the exceptional nature of this case, we have produced a summary error of law decision (the open decision) together with a detailed error of law decision (the closed decision) which are the subject of the amended confidentiality order attached.
2. The appellant appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) made in 2023 dismissing their appeal against the refusal of their protection claim on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds under Articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The appellant does not pursue their appeal on Article 8 or Article 18 grounds.
3. The FTT allowed the appellant’s appeal under Article 3 ECHR. The respondent cross-appealed against this decision to allow the appeal on human rights grounds. Permission was granted in respect of both appeals by the First-tier Tribunal in 2024.

Background
4. The appellant’s country of citizenship is referred to as the requesting state (RS). For the purposes of this appeal, the appellant is accused of serious offences in RS. The extradition courts concluded that there was a prima facie case against the appellant in respect of the extradition charges. It is the appellant’s case that the charges are fabricated and persecutory. The appellant should not be excluded from protection under the Refugee Convention. The appellant will be subject to prolonged detention and denied a fair trial.
5. It is the respondent’s case that the charges are not persecutory and the appellant’s claim does not engage the Refugee Convention, but in any event, the appellant should be excluded under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention because there are serious reasons for considering they have committed a serious non-political crime. There would be no breach of Articles 3, 5 and 6 if the appellant returned to RS to face trial. The respondent relied on assurances given in the extradition proceedings in relation to prison conditions.

Summary of the FTT’s findings
6. The FTT found that the extradition offences were serious and there were serious reasons for considering that the appellant had committed the offences. The FTT did not accept the prosecution in and of itself would amount to persecution. The FTT concluded that none of the extradition charges were persecutory.
7. The FTT found that there were serious reasons for considering the appellant committed a serious non-political crime outside the UK and, pursuant to Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention, the appellant is excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention. For the same reasons, the appellant is excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection pursuant to paragraph 339D (iv) of the Immigration Rules.
8. The FTT did not accept there was a real risk that the appellant would suffer a flagrant denial of their right to a fair trial under Article 6 or that any period of detention will amount to a flagrant breach of Article 5 .
9. The FTT concluded that there was a real risk that the appellant would be exposed to treatment in breach of Article 3 ECHR whilst in detention.

APPELLANT’S APPEAL
10. The appellant appeals on four grounds. The FTT erred in law in finding:
(i) The appellant was excluded from refugee and humanitarian protection;
(ii) The extradition charges were not persecutory and the appellant did not face a real risk of persecution for a Convention reason;
(iii) The appellant’s removal would not breach Article 6 ECHR;
(iv) The appellant’s removal would not breach Article 5 ECHR.

Conclusions and reasons
11. In coming to our conclusions, we have taken into account the detailed skeleton arguments by both parties, the oral submissions and documentary evidence to which we were referred. Insofar as we have summarised the parties respective positions we have considered all of the written and oral arguments and the authorities referred to in the authorities bundle.
12. We remind ourselves that we are bound, unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the FTT has taken the whole of the evidence into consideration. The mere fact that the FTT does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that it overlooked it. The FTT must consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in the decision) and the weight which the FTT gives to it is pre-eminently a matter for the FTT. We can set aside a decision on the basis that the FTT failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the FTT’s conclusion was rationally insupportable. We acknowledge that reasons for the decision will always be capable of having been better expressed and we should not subject the FTT’s decision to a narrow textual analysis: Volpi and Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464.

Ground 1: Exclusion under Article 1F
13. There is no challenge to the FTT’s finding that the extradition offences are serious. The test to be applied is not in dispute: Al-Siri v SSHD [2012] UKSC 54: “The reality is that there are unlikely to be sufficiently serious reasons for considering the applicant is guilty unless the decision maker can be satisfied on the balance of probabilities. But the task of the decision maker is to apply the words of the Convention (and the Directive) in the particular case.”
14. Mr Husain submits that the FTT erred in concluding there were serious grounds for considering the appellant had committed a serious crime because the FTT failed to consider the key elements of the offence. The FTT’s analysis was based on fundamental misunderstandings of the evidence and the appellant’s case. In the alternative, the FTT’s findings were procedurally unfair because the appellant was not cross-examined on these issues.
15. Mr Kellar submits that the FTT were aware of the distinction between a prima facie case and serious grounds for considering the appellant had committed a serious offence. The FTT was entitled to rely and place weight on the findings in the extradition proceedings. There was no procedural unfairness.
Analysis
16. We assume the FTT has taken into account all the evidence unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. On reading the decision as a whole, the FTT clearly considered the appellant’s own evidence in which the appellant addressed the matters raised by Mr Husain in submissions. The weight to be attached to the evidence was a matter for the FTT. The FTT properly and adequately assessed whether there was sufficient evidence to show on the balance of probabilities that the appellant had committed the extradition offences. We find the FTT was acutely aware of all the matters raised by Mr Husain and considered them in arriving at its conclusions. These matters were set out in detail in the appellant’s written closing submissions and there are no compelling reasons to show they were not considered. The FTT’s conclusions were not perverse.
17. Any failure to put matters to the appellant in cross-examination did not give rise to unfairness. Applying Chen v Ng [2017] UKPC 27, we find there was no procedural unfairness in the conduct of the proceedings before the FTT.
18. We find there was no error of law in the FTT’s finding that there were serious grounds for considering the appellant had committed the extradition offences.

Ground 2: Persecution
19. It is not in dispute that if the extradition charges are persecutory in nature the appellant could not be excluded from refugee protection. There was no challenge to the FTT’s finding that there must be a causal link between the Convention reason and the treatment that is feared. In this case, the prosecution of the extradition offences. It is settled law that the ground on which the appellant relies need not be the only or even the primary reason for the apprehended persecution. It is enough that the ground relied on is an effective reason: Fornah v SSHD [2006] UKHL 46 at [17]. The FTT found that the prosecution in and of itself did not amount to persecution.
20. Mr Husain accepts the FTT correctly directed itself and submits the FTT erred in law in rejecting the real possibility of a malicious prosecution on the basis of timing alone. In finding that the charges could not be persecutory because there was some credible basis for them, the FTT failed to consider its own findings and failed to engage with expert evidence which was dispositive of the case. The FTT’s finding, that the prosecution was not malicious, was perverse given the FTT largely accepted the expert evidence.
21. Mr Kellar submits the FTT asked themselves whether the prosecution in all the circumstances amounted to persecution: was it disproportionate, discriminatory or fundamentally without merit. The FTT relied on the findings of the extradition courts and its own findings. It was open to the FTT to conclude that the existence of credible evidence was a persuasive factor tending to show the prosecution did not amount to persecution and the appellant’s criticisms did not amount to an error of law. The FTT took a holistic approach to the evidence, explicitly considered the expert evidence and reached a view on that evidence which was clearly available to it.
Analysis
22. We find the FTT considered the appellant’s case in detail and did not narrowly restrict its analysis to timing. The FTT considered all the matters relied on in the submissions of Mr Husain, including the expert evidence, and gave cogent reasons for its conclusions. The FTT did not proceed on the basis the charges could not be persecutory because there was some credible basis for them. The FTT considered all the matters relied on by the appellant in the context of all the evidence including the expert evidence.
23. The FTT considered the particular facts of the appellant’s case. The FTT did not adopt a narrow approach or require the appellant to meet a more demanding test. The FTT’s analysis demonstrates that it properly directed itself in law when assessing whether the appellant had established a causal link between a Convention reason and the treatment that is feared.
24. The question of whether there is a causal link is a matter for the FTT and its findings were not contrary to the expert evidence. Mr Husain’s submissions are based on an alternative view of the evidence. There were no compelling reasons to show the FTT had not taken into account all the evidence and its findings were open to the FTT on that evidence. It cannot be said the conclusion that the charges and prosecution were not persecutory was one which no reasonable Tribunal could come to on the evidence before it.
25. There was no challenge to the FTT’s conclusion that, in finding the appellant was excluded from the Refugee Convention, the FTT was not required to consider whether the charges against the appellant were persecutory having regard to the criminal justice system as a whole. Having found there was no error of law in excluding the appellant from the Refugee Convention, and given our conclusions above, there was no material error of law in any alleged failure to consider whether the appellant’s ill-treatment in detention would amount to persecution for a Convention reason.
26. The FTT took into account all relevant matters and considered the evidence in the round. The FTT’s findings were open to it on the evidence and the FTT gave adequate reasons for its conclusions. We conclude there was no error of law in the FTT’s finding that the extradition charges were not persecutory.
Conclusions on Exclusion (grounds 1 and 2)
27. The main thrust of the appellant’s challenge to the FTT’s finding on exclusion is that it failed to take into account relevant matters and/or make findings on relevant issues or that its conclusions were perverse. For the reasons given above, we find the FTT properly directed itself in law and grounds 1 and 2 are not made out. The appellant is excluded from refugee and humanitarian protection.
28. There was no material error of law in the FTT’s finding that there are serious grounds for considering the appellant has committed a serious non-political crime outside the UK and Article 1F of the Refugee Convention applies.
29. There was no material error of law in the FTT’s finding that the extradition charges are not persecutory and the appellant is excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention. For the reasons given, there was no material error of law in the FTT’s finding that the appellant is excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection under paragraph 339D(iv) of the Immigration Rules.

Ground 3: Article 6
30. The FTT found that the expert evidence was balanced and consistent. The FTT made the following findings:
“140. … While we accept an individual judge may be influenced, we do not accept that the judiciary has a whole would be influenced to the extent that the appellant could not have a fair trial.”
…
“195. Having weighed all the evidence, ….. we do not accept that there is a real risk of a breach of the principles of a fair trial guaranteed by article 6 which is so fundamental as to amount to a nullification, or destruction of the very essence, of the right guaranteed by that article.”
…
“199. In conclusion, we find that while there are flaws, the evidence does not show that the appellant would be unable to enforce [their] rights or correct legal or procedural errors such that [the appellant] would suffer a flagrant denial of [their] right to a fair trial.”
31. Ms Dubinsky submits the FTT made a material error of fact amounting to an error of law or perverse conclusion. She submits the FTT erroneously discounted the overwhelming evidence of political capture of the judiciary on the basis that it was not uniform and failed to apply the correct test of a real risk of a flagrant breach. She submits the fact that there were some judges capable of affording a fair trial cannot negate a real risk that the appellant will encounter those who were not. Despite identifying the correct test, the FTT failed to apply it. The FTT misstated the test and discounted factors which, taken cumulatively, would amount to a real risk. The FTT reversed the test in finding there was a real risk there would not be unfairness. Had the FTT properly directed itself it could not conceivably have found that the mere possibility of a fair trial negated any real risk of a flagrant denial of the right to a fair trial. Ms Dubinsky submits the FTT rejected relevant expert evidence without good reason. It is not an answer that the appellant can seek a remedy to abuses. The issue is whether there is a real risk of abuse and tainting of a fair trial.
32. Mr Kellar submits the FTT explicitly and fully addressed the Article 6 test and its conclusion in relation to Article 6 protection offered by the courts was consistent with that test. The ability of the appellant to correct any errors before judges who are willing and able to uphold the rule of law is a sufficient safeguard to protect the appellant’s right to a fair trial. The FTT’s overall conclusion at [199] demonstrated the FTT was properly focused on the procedure as a whole. The FTT applied the correct test, weighed the evidence before it with considerable care and came to a reasoned decision on the facts that the high test was not met. The FTT reached a rational conclusion that there was no real risk of a flagrant denial of the appellant’s right to a fair trial based on its findings of fact which were open to the FTT on the evidence.
Analysis and conclusions
33. We conclude that the FTT considered the trial/court proceedings before coming to its conclusions on Article 6. The investigative process was only one aspect of its assessment of whether the appellant was at risk of an unfair trial and it is clear that the FTT considered all the evidence in the round in coming to its conclusions. The FTT took into account expert opinion and considered the examples in the context of all the evidence. The FTT’s conclusion that the judiciary is prepared to intervene was open to it on the evidence and the appellant had a remedy which they was able to exercise.
34. We were referred to Rwanda v Nteziryayo [2017] EWHC 1912 (Admin) at [74] with reference to RB (Algeria) v SSHD [2009] UKHL 10. The test to be applied was whether there had been a complete denial or nullification of the appellant’s right to a fair trial. The deficiencies in the trial should be such as fundamentally to destroy the fairness of the prospective trial. Before the deportation of an alien will be capable of violating Article 6, there must be substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that (i) there will be a fundamental breach of the principles of a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 and (ii) this failure will lead to a miscarriage of justice that itself constitutes a flagrant violation of the victim’s fundamental rights. And at [98]: The necessary risk will not be established by merely formal badges of lack of independence. The risk required must comprise a real risk of substance, a risk of a truly serious denial of justice. We also note [92]: The high test lies in the degree of denial of a fair trial if the risk eventuates.
35. We find the FTT properly directed itself on the test to be applied at [193] to [195] consistent with the authorities referred to above. We are not persuaded that the failure to refer to “real risk” in two previous paragraphs demonstrates the FTT applied the wrong test when considering Article 6. Nor are we persuaded that the FTT reversed the test to be applied. The FTT considered all of the expert evidence and accepted there is a real risk that any investigation into the appellant will be subject to political influence and that there is a degree of political influence and capture in the courts. The FTT considered the evidence cumulatively and gave adequate reasons for its conclusions in respect of the fairness of court proceedings.
36. The failure to specifically refer to expert evidence does not mean the FTT did not take it into account. The FTT stated it had considered all relevant evidence but focused on that most pertinent to its findings.
37. It is apparent from the nature of the risks the FTT did accept will arise for the appellant (listed in the appellant’s skeleton argument) that the FTT considered the cumulative impact of its factual findings. The FTT’s conclusion that there would be no breach of Article 6 was open to the FTT on the evidence before it. There was no material error of law in the FTT’s findings on Article 6 and, having reviewed the evidence, we find the appellant would not be a real risk of a complete denial or nullification of their right to a fair trial.

Ground 4: Article 5
38. The FTT assessed the risk to the appellant on the basis of the appellant’s particular circumstances and took into account the expert evidence and the process of applying for bail.
39. In summary, Ms Dubinsky submits the FTT failed to address whether the refusal of bail would give rise to a real risk of arbitrary prolongation of the appellant’s detention and failed to make a finding and/or to give reasons for why the period of detention before the conclusion of any trial was not grossly disproportionate.
40. Mr Kellar submits the FTT reached a clear and adequate conclusion that, in the appellant’s case, there is no period of detention before the conclusion of any trial which would amount to a breach of Article 5. Any alleged error in the FTT’s conclusion was not material. The FTT found that the appellant would be able to seek bail and the matters which the court will consider are consistent with the safeguards provided by Article 5.
Analysis and conclusions
41. The FTT concluded, after considering the expert evidence, that any period of detention would not breach Article 5 (our emphasis). The FTT clearly did not consider that the period of detention was disproportionate given the nature and gravity of the extradition offences. We find that the FTT considered the length of detention before the conclusion of any trial and whether it was proportionate and concluded, on the particular facts of the appellant’s case, that any period of detention would not amount to a flagrant breach of Article 5. This finding was open to the FTT on the expert evidence.
42. We find that the FTT considered the expert evidence, the test for granting bail and the factors that will be considered by the court. The FTT’s finding that the appellant will be able to seek bail was open to it on the evidence before it.
43. The FTT considered all the evidence in the round and the decision must be read as a whole. We agree with the FTT’s findings and reasons. We find the FTT’s conclusions were open to it on the evidence and the FTT’s reasons were adequate. There was no material error of law in the FTT’s findings on Article 5 of the ECHR.

RESPONDENT’S APPEAL
44. The respondent appeals the decision to allow the appeal under Article 3 ECHR on four grounds:
(i) The FTT failed to adequately engage, or give satisfactory reasons for rejecting, the respondent’s submissions on the law in the RS;
(ii) The FTT failed to consider whether its findings were consistent with the extradition courts;
(iii) The FTT failed to apply the correct test, namely that in Horvath v SSHD [2000] UKHL 37;
(iv) The FTT failed to give any or adequate reasons for finding the appellant would not be able to rely on speciality protection in civil proceedings.

Conclusions and reasons
45. We adopt the same approach to the respondent’s appeal as that set out above at [12] of this decision. Mr Kellar first addressed Ground 3 and then considered Grounds 1, 2 and 4. We follow the same order in our analysis below.
46. The FTT concluded there is a real risk that during any period of detention for the purposes of questioning and/or investigation, the appellant will be subjected to treatment that amounts to torture or which is inhuman or degrading. The FTT placed significant weight on the expert evidence. The FTT found that mechanisms by which abuses that have already occurred can be investigated did not amount to sufficiency of protection. The FTT found that, when transferred for hearings concerning the extradition offences, the assurances were reliable and the appellant would not be at risk. However, the assurances did not apply to transfers for hearings in respect of non-extradition offences.

Ground 3: Failure to apply the correct test: Horvath
47. Mr Kellar submits the FTT fell into error in failing to apply the correct test and consider whether the assurances were sufficient to protect the appellant from the various risks of violence the appellant claimed they would suffer. In doing so, the FTT failed to apply the same approach as in the extradition proceedings. Although the FTT referred to sufficiency of protection, the FTT failed to cite relevant case law or apply the test of whether the RS is willing and able to provide sufficient protection. The FTT found there was insufficient detail in the assurances but there was no reference to the assurances in the subsequent paragraphs and nothing to suggest the FTT considered whether the assurances engaged with the risks under consideration. Mr Kellar submits that, applying Horvath, the RS is willing and able to provide security to the appellant.
48. Ms Dubinsky submits the FTT, a specialist tribunal, can be assumed to know the test and there was no need to set it out or refer to authority: AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49 at [30]. It was apparent that it was at the heart of the FTT’s analysis of the accepted expert evidence. The FTT gave the assurances a careful reading and considered whether their practical application would avert the risk of harm. It was not for the FTT to fill the gaps in the assurances or read in protections which were missing. The FTT accepted the RS would act in good faith and adhere to the assurances. However, the assurances did not suffice, without more, to establish sufficiency of protection.
Analysis
49. We are not persuaded by Mr Kellar’s submission that the FTT failed to apply the correct test because, applying AH Sudan, it is not clear that the FTT misdirected itself. It is apparent from the reasoning in the decision that the FTT did consider whether, notwithstanding the assurances, the RS is willing and able to protect the appellant. It cannot be said that the FTT was unaware of the test and that, given the nature and complexity of this case, it needed to cite well-known authority.
50. In addition to Horvath, Mr Kellar also relied on R (Bagdanivicius) v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1605, Dean v Lord Advocate [2017] UKSC 44 and Chawla (No.2) [2018] EWHC 3096. We find the FTT applied the relevant test and its approach is consistent with Dean and Chawla. The FTT assessed the adequacy of the assurances in the light of all the information available and considered whether the RS and the undertakings given in the assurances provide the appellant with sufficient protection from non-state agents.
51. We are satisfied the FTT carried out a fact sensitive evaluation of how the assurances will operate in practice. In coming to this conclusion, the FTT accepted the assurances were given in good faith and would be adhered to. The FTT had the benefit of expert evidence and it was not suggested the FTT could not rely on that evidence to come to a different conclusion to that in the extradition proceedings. The respondent disagrees with the FTT but has failed to identify a material error of law as alleged in ground 3.

Ground 1: Failure to engage with the respondent’s submission
52. Mr Kellar submits that on a proper application of the sufficiency of protection test, the assurances demonstrated willingness and the relevant provisions of domestic law in the RS demonstrated an ability to protect on the part of the RS. It was well established that the assurances should be respected and they were clear and unequivocal. The courts would be mindful of the assurances and the speciality principle.
53. Mr Kellar submits the FTT made no reference to the detailed submissions made by the respondent on the provisions of domestic law in the RS and the FTT gave no reasons for rejecting those submissions. The FTT failed to refer to evidence in cross-examination which was helpful to the respondent. The FTT’s engagement with the assurances and the speciality principle was insufficient. If the FTT had engaged with the respondent’s submissions and applied the correct test it may have found the RS is willing and able to protect the appellant.
54. Ms Dubinsky submits the FTT’s conclusion, that detention and questioning in non-extradition offences are not covered by the principle of speciality, was amply supported by the unanimous evidence of three expert witnesses and was not challenged by the respondent. The assurances only apply to the appellant’s detention for the extradition offences.
Analysis
55. The FTT found that speciality does not operate to prevent an investigation into offences other than the extradition offences and the appellant is liable to be detained for questioning in respect of non-extradition offences. The FTT found that the assurances do not apply to the place or conditions of detention for the purpose of investigations not relating to the extradition charges.
56. Again, we remind ourselves that any failure to specifically refer to the respondent’s submissions does not mean the FTT overlooked them absent compelling reasons to the contrary. In any event, it is apparent that those submissions were rejected and the expert evidence preferred. The FTT gave adequate reasons for coming to this conclusion.
57. We agree with Ms Dubinsky’s submission that the FTT were entitled to find on the expert evidence that speciality does not apply to detention and questioning for non-extradition offences and the assurances only apply to the extradition offences.

Ground 2: Inconsistency
58. This ground can be dealt with very briefly. Mr Kellar accepted the decision in the extradition proceeding was not binding on the FTT. The FTT had substantially more evidence than the extradition courts. The respondent did not challenge the FTT’s findings that speciality does not apply to investigations into non-extradition offences. The respondent did not produce expert evidence and the FTT were entitled to rely on the expert evidence before it. There was no material error of law in the FTT’s failure to consider whether its findings were consistent with the extradition proceedings.

Ground 4: Civil proceedings
59. The respondent’s submissions before the FTT were premised on actions at some point in the future or on application by the appellant. The FTT clearly rejected those submissions on the basis the FTT has to decide whether there would be a breach of Article 3 at the date of hearing. There is no substance to the challenge under ground 4.
60. Mr Kellar submits the FTT proceeded on the flawed assumption that speciality did not apply to civil proceedings. He submits this was not accepted and no concession was made by the respondent. However, this submission does not undermine the FTT’s findings of fact as at the date of hearing.
61. Ms Dubinsky submits the assurances only applied to the extradition offences and the respondent did not challenge this finding or suggest that the FTT’s analysis of the assurances was perverse.
Analysis
62. We find the FTT were entitled to rely on the expert evidence that speciality did not apply to civil proceedings. There was no evidence to show otherwise. We conclude the appellant’s removal to RS would breach Article 3 and the following findings were open to the FTT on the expert evidence before it. The speciality principle does not apply to civil proceedings. The assurances apply only to the extradition offences.
Conclusions on Article 3
63. We are of the view that the grounds do not challenge the FTT’s findings that the appellant would be at risk of Article 3 treatment during any period of detention for the purposes of questioning and/or investigation for the non-extradition offences. Speciality does not apply to criminal investigations. The respondent’s Article 3 appeal cannot succeed on that basis.

CONCLUSION
64. For the reasons given above, we find there was no material error of law in the decision of the FTT.

Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed
The respondent’s appeal is dismissed

J Frances

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 December 2025

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL UI-2024-000925 &
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER) UI-2024-000926
B E T W E E N:
AA
Appellant
- and -
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
________________________________________________
AMENDED OPEN CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER
_______________________________________________

UPON the First-tier Tribunal having considered it necessary and appropriate to order restrictions on open justice in connection with these proceedings
AND UPON the First-tier Tribunal having granted the Appellant and the Respondent permission to appeal against its decision
AND UPON the Upper Tribunal having considered it necessary and proportionate, pursuant to rules 5, 14 and 37 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, s 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, and s 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, to extend the restrictions ordered by the First-tier Tribunal
AND UPON the Respondent having confirmed that she had no objection to the same
AND UPON hearing from counsel for both parties at a Case Management Review hearing on 4 March 2025
AND UPON the Upper Tribunal confirming and declaring that the previous anonymity and confidentiality orders made by the First Tier Tribunal on 8 July 2022, 23 September 2022 and 17 November 2023, and by the Upper Tribunal on 8 April 2025 and 1 September 2025, shall remain in force save as expressly varied below
AND UPON the Upper Tribunal handing down anonymised (“OPEN”) and confidential (“CLOSED”) versions of its decision on 18 December 2025
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
Anonymity for the Appellant
1. The Appellant’s name is to be withheld from the public and is not to be disclosed in connection with these proceedings.
2. There is to be substituted for all purposes in these proceedings, in place of references to the Appellant by name and whether orally or in writing, references to the letters “AA”.
3. There must be no publication or disclosure of the Appellant’s identity or of any matter liable to lead to his identification in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
Anonymity and associated protections for witnesses and experts
4. The names of the witnesses/experts referred to in the proceedings as “BA”, “KD”, “MR”, “X”, “AAB”, “EN”, “YK”, “CM” and “PT” are to be withheld from the public and are not to be disclosed in connection with these proceedings.
5. There is to be substituted for all purposes in these proceedings, in place of references to each witness/expert by name and whether orally or in writing, references to the relevant ciphers identified in paragraph 4 above.
6. There must be no publication or disclosure of the identity of any of the witnesses/experts referred to in paragraph 4 above, or of any matter liable to lead to their identification in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings. In particular, this order prohibits the:
a. publication and/or release by way of newspaper, magazine, leaflet, journal or any other paper form;
b. broadcast, disclosure and/or release in any audio or television format on radio, satellite, cable, television or telephone; or
c. publication and/or release on any internet site or electronic/digital forum or public computer network
of such matters by any person.
Additional protections in relation to experts CM and PT
7. The following additional protections shall apply in respect of experts CM and PT.
8. The provisions of paragraph 6 above shall be extended to any information that would or might tend to identify CM or PT’s location, professional affiliations, researchers, or sources.
9. Information which would or might tend to identify CM or PT, or their locations, professional affiliations, researchers, or sources, in connection with these proceedings will be referred to (for the purposes of this Order and Schedule 2) as “CM/PT Protected Information”.
10. The Appellant shall make available to the Tribunal and the Respondent, if and as required in connection with the proceedings, versions of any document containing CM/PT Protected Information (including, for the avoidance of doubt, any reports, statements, submissions, applications or correspondence and Annex 1 to the CLOSED decision of the First-tier Tribunal) in which the CM/PT Protected Information information is redacted. Unredacted versions shall be made available only in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 11-12 below and the provisions of Schedule 2.
11. Disclosure of unredacted versions of any document referred to in paragraph 10 above is to be made only to:
a. the Appellant and his legal representatives;
b. judges of the Upper Tribunal tasked with making decisions in respect of these proceedings;
c. judges of a court tasked with considering any appeal or application for permission to appeal against a decision of the Upper Tribunal in these proceedings;
d. the persons named in Schedule 1.
12. The persons identified in paragraph 11 above must not show, provide, summarise, gist, or otherwise disclose unredacted versions of the documents referred to in paragraph 10 above (or any part thereof), or any CM/PT Protected Information, to any person not identified in paragraph 11.
13. The persons identified in paragraph 11(b) and (d) above must continue to comply with the terms set out in Schedule 2 of this order.
Confidentiality arrangements in relation to CLOSED decision of First-tier Tribunal and the CLOSED decision of the Upper Tribunal
14. The CLOSED decision of the First-tier Tribunal in these proceedings and its annexes, and the CLOSED decision of the Upper Tribunal must be not be disclosed, in whole or part, to any person other than:
a. the Appellant and his legal representatives;
b. judges of the Upper Tribunal tasked with making decisions in respect of these proceedings;
c. judges of a court tasked with considering any appeal or application for permission to appeal against a decision of the Upper Tribunal in these proceedings;
d. the persons named in Schedule 1.
save by order of the Tribunal pursuant to paragraph 16 below.
15. The persons identified in paragraph 14(b) and (d) above must, in dealing with Annex 1 to the CLOSED decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (which contains CM/PT Protected Information), comply with the terms set out in Schedule 2 of this order.
16. Any person seeking leave to disclose the whole or any part of the CLOSED decisions or the annexes to the CLOSED decision of the First-tier Tribunal must make an application to the Tribunal on 7 days’ written notice to both parties. The parties must be permitted at least 14 days to make submissions in writing in respect of any such application and may apply to be heard in respect of the same
Arrangements in relation to the OPEN decision of the First-tier Tribunal and the OPEN decision of the Upper Tribunal
17. Any dissemination or publication of the OPEN decision of the First-tier Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal in these proceedings, or any part or summary thereof, must be accompanied by the full text of this Order.
18. For the avoidance of doubt, the ability to disseminate the OPEN decisions and/or their contents is without prejudice to and does not affect the operation of paragraphs 3, 6 and 8 above.
Restrictions on access to documents
19. Any non-party wishing to obtain inspect a copy of any document filed with or produced by the First-tier or Upper Tribunal in connection with these proceedings must do so on application to the relevant Tribunal and on 7 days’ notice to both parties. The parties must be permitted at least 14 days to make submissions in writing in respect of any such application and may apply to be heard in respect of the same.
20. The OPEN version of this order shall only refer to individuals named in Schedule 1 at paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 17 and 18 by their initials.
21. A non-party may not obtain or inspect a copy of any document filed with or produced by the First-tier or Upper Tribunal and to which they might otherwise have access unless it has been produced or edited, including redacted, so as to comply with this Order.
Hearing in private
22. The hearing of the appeal in these proceedings, and any related hearing (or part thereof) at which documents or information protected by this Order are to be referred to, will be in private.
Saving provision
23. This Order does not restrict the disclosure of information relating to these proceedings:
a. to law enforcement; regulatory agencies (specifically the Bar Council, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, the Law Society or the OISC); any other judge in the course of considering an application, appeal or other challenge in connection with these proceedings; or administrative staff of the tribunals or courts in connection with such an application, appeal or challenge; or or administrative and legal staff of the tribunals or courts.
b. where disclosure is otherwise required by law.
Duration and variation
24. This Order remains in force until further or other order. Failure to comply with its terms may amount to a contempt of court.
25. Any person wishing to apply to vary or discharge this Order must make an application to the Upper Tribunal on 7 days’ written notice to both parties. The parties must be given at least 14 days to make submissions in writing in respect of any such application, and may apply to be heard in respect of the same.

Note
26. Schedules 1 and 2 referred to in this Order are part of the closed material and are not attached to this Order or the OPEN decision.

J Frances
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 December 2025