Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos:
UI-2024-001019, UI-2024-001020
UI-2024-002411, UI-2024-002413

First-tier Tribunal Nos:
DC/50034/2021, DC/50048/2021
DC/50052/2021, DC/50175/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 12th January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PERKINS
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

FATMIRE ISAKU
EGLANTINA ENDACOTT
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

MARINELA ISAKU
ERALD ISAKU
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr D Bazini, Counsel, instructed by Warren Grant Immigration
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at on

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellants Fatmire Isaku and Eglantina Endacott and the respondents Marinela Isaku and Erald Isaku are members of the same family. Hereinafter they are identified as “the claimants” or by their first names. We hope it will not appear discourteous to refer to them by their first names in this Decision and Reasons. No discourtesy is intended and identifying them as indicated makes for clarity.
Background
2. Fatmire is married to Islam. He is not a party in these appeals before the Upper Tribunal. The other appellants are their children. Eglantina was born in 1981, Marinela was born in 1982 and Erald was born in 1987. They each identified as nationals of Kosovo. They were each given British citizenship by naturalisation. It became apparent that they are not nationals of Kosovo but nationals of Albania and the Secretary of State deprived them of their British nationality which, she said, had been obtained dishonestly. They each appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeals of Fatmire, Islam and Eglantina were dismissed. Fatmire and Eglantina have appealed that decision to the Upper Tribunal. The appeals of Marinela and Erald were allowed and the Secretary of State has appealed that decision to the Upper Tribunal. Those, in extreme summary outline, are the appeals before us now.
3. Both parties had prepared bundles for the hearing and the Secretary of State’s bundle was supplemented after Mr Terrell noticed that some things had been inadvertently left out. Fatmire was given permission to appeal broadly because it was arguable that by reason of her mental health she was not involved in the dishonesty and this point was not considered properly by the First-tier Tribunal Judge. Eglantina was given permission to appeal because it was arguable that the best interests of her children had not been considered properly. They were also allowed to appeal on the ground that their claim on human rights grounds was not considered properly. Eglantina presently lives with her family in Switzerland.
4. The Secretary of State was permitted to appeal the decision to allow the appeals of the remaining two claimants. In the case of Marinela it was arguable that the First-tier Tribunal Judge had erred because the judge decided, wrongly, that her having obtained British nationality dishonestly in the sense that it was obtained under a false name was irrelevant because she was a child at the time and not responsible for any of the dishonest acts. It is the respondent’s case that Marinela subsequently continued the fraud in adult life and that was a proper reason to deprive her of her acquired British nationality and the judge ought not to have reached the decision that he did, at least without giving more explanation. Essentially the same point was made with regard to the remaining claimant, Erald.
5. Unremarkably there was no oral evidence before us and we decided that the most sensible way forward was to hear submissions from each party in respect of each of the four claimants separately, Mr Bazini opening cases where the claimants were the appellants and Mr Terrell opening cases where the Secretary of State was the appellant.
Fatmire Isaku
6. We began with the case of Fatmire. She appealed a decision of the Secretary of State on 3 February 2021. She was given the notice of decision to deprive of British nationality dated 3 February 2021. In summary outline, this identified the claimant by the name used in these proceedings as a person who was born in 1952 in Tirana in Albania. She had held herself out to be a person with a similar name who was born in 1958 in Pristina in Kosovo. The letter explained that she was issued with a certificate of naturalisation as a British citizen on 1 February 2012. It was the Secretary of State’s view that that citizenship had been obtained fraudulently and she should therefore be deprived of it. In the letter the Secretary of State said that she had reminded herself that in law a “false representation” meant an erroneous one made dishonestly rather than innocently. An application for naturalisation as a British citizen was received on 21 September 2005 and on 3 January 2006 the application was refused on good character grounds because the appellant had not declared that she had recently been convicted of theft. A similar application was refused on 2 August 2007 because she had not provided satisfactory evidence that she had the required knowledge of language and life in the United Kingdom.
7. On 24 August 2008 she made her third application to naturalise as a British citizen. The application form repeated the pretence that she had been born Kosovo in 1958 and used the name similar to her Albanian name that she had used before. The same form identified her husband as a man born in March 1954 in Berrnic in Kosovo. She said that she did not have any criminal convictions and she indicated she had not engaged in any other activities which might indicate that she was not a person of good character. That application was refused in August 2008 because of her failure to declare her conviction for theft.
8. On 24 October 2011 she made a further application to naturalise as a British citizen, again repeating the wrong information about her name, date of birth and place of birth and wrong information about her husband. Presumably she had declared her conviction but she indicated that she had not engaged in any other activities that might indicate she was not a person of good character and she was naturalised as a British citizen on 1 February 2012.
9. On 5 December 2019 she was referred to the Status Review Unit for consideration of deprivation of her nationality. Another government department had found a copy of an Albanian family certificate giving her true name and date of birth and place of birth in Albania. The same information also showed that her husband and children were Albanian nationals and not Kosovans. Fatmire was asked to respond and identification checks were made with the help of the British Embassy in Tirana. Legal representatives acting for her said how Fatmire had left Albania and was frightened for her own safety and she continued lies told by her husband so that he was not returned to Albania. Fatmire raised mental health issues supported by documentary evidence which, according to the refusal letter, “have been considered”.
10. The Secretary of State reminded herself of published guidance to the effect that people are responsible for their own applications and must take responsibility for what they choose to do. Particularly, it did not excuse Fatmire because, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, her husband may have initiated and supervised her lies. The Secretary of State acknowledged that there were health problems but said there was no evidence that they would not be addressed in Albania. Fatmire’s status in the United Kingdom was essentially dependent upon her husband’s which had been obtained dishonestly. The Secretary of State resolved to take away that which had been gained. The letter reminded Fatmire that it was not presently proposed to remove Fatmire and if such a decision was made there would be an opportunity to consider the implication of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
11. Before us, Mr Bazini relied particularly on the grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Helpfully these look carefully at the First-tier Tribunal’s approach to the medical evidence which, he argued, was not considered properly by the judge.
12. At paragraph 61 of the Decision and Reasons the judge refers to there being insufficient “significant mitigation of her responsibility for maintaining the deception”. Mr Bazini pointed out, we find correctly, that the word “significant” is not part of the policy. It is not clear that this additional requirement introduced by the judge was material but it was certainly unhelpful.
13. It was argued that the judge was also wrong in his consideration of the policy because the policy made plain that the ordinary consequences of being involved in deception could be excused “where there is evidence of some form of mental or physical impairment that can clearly be shown to have impacted on the subject’s judgment at the time the material fraud took place”. The policy made it plain that there needed to be clear evidence of a lack of free will and/or a lack of sound judgment before an applicant whose application was inaccurate in the way that occurred here should not be treated as dishonest. It was Mr Bazini’s case that the judge had just not engaged with this part of the guidance. There was medical evidence accepted by the judge that the appellant may have had trouble making decisions. The grounds expressly accept, as is plainly the case, that Fatmire had previously given a false account of her background but it was Mr Bazini’s contention that that did not necessarily mean that she had not been unwell and incapable of fully appreciating what she was doing at all material times. There was medical evidence that Fatmire appeared to be suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and in 2012 she had medication for her depression and PTSD. When her case was heard by the Social Security Tribunal in 2007 it was confirmed that she needed continuous supervision when she went out. It was Mr Bazini’s contention that the First-tier Judge did not do enough to explain why “in my judgment” there was not sufficient evidence to provide mitigation of her responsibility.
14. It was also the contention in the grounds that the judge’s approach to Article 8 was wrong. There was evidence that it could take 303 days on average for any kind of leave to replace a deprivation appeal and that this was too long to leave her in a state of uncertainty. Even though there was no decision to remove Fatmire, Article 8 had to be considered.
15. Mr Terrell argued that the judge in fact got everything right. The judge had applied his mind to Fatmire’s state of mind and had concluded that although she may have had trouble making decisions that was insufficient to lead to a different conclusion.
16. This is an argument which is theoretically attractive but the reality is that the judge has not given reasons for his conclusion. Medical evidence pointed to Fatmire having significant mental health problems that impacted to some extent on her day-to-day living. What was required was consideration of the medical evidence and how it may have explained or contributed to her conduct. Once it was clearly understood what Fatmire could be expected to comprehend, inasmuch as this was possible to discern, then, if she had been perceptive at all, how, if at all, that diminished perception mitigated her responsibility. With respect to the judge, it is not clear that he did this and it needed to be so that his reasoning could be understood.
17. The Article 8 consideration was also wrong and did not pay regard to evidence suggesting that the state of uncertainty consequent on the deprivation decision could have been a lot longer than the judge assumed. Also there was no basis for saying that the public interest was increased by reason of the nature of deceit. The deceit was established and if Fatmire was culpable it almost certainly followed that a deprivation decision was in the public interest but we do not see how the degree of culpability, if it could not be excused, increased or diminished the public interest in depriving her of her improperly acquired nationality.
18. We have no hesitation in saying that the judge was wrong in dealing with Fatmire’s case.
Eglantina Endacott
19. We now consider Eglantina.
20. The judge’s consideration of Eglantina’s case starts at paragraph 49 of the Decision and Reasons. The notice of the decision to deprive her of British nationality is dated 22 February 2021. This points out that Eglantina was issued with a certificate of naturalisation as a British citizen on 11 July 2007 but at that time, although known by the name she presently uses, she claimed falsely to have been born in 1983 in Berrnic in Kosovo. The respondent concluded that her nationality had been obtained fraudulently.
21. In the Notice of Deprivation, at paragraph 32, the Secretary of State acknowledged that her decision to deprive Eglantina in these circumstances is a matter of discretion and the Secretary of State said that she had taken into account matters raised in a solicitor’s letter of 17 March 2020 but decided that deprivation was reasonable and proportionate. The Secretary of State considered Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Secretary of State concluded that there was no unlawful interference with her private and family life consequent on deprivation of British nationality.
22. In his Decision and Reasons, the judge noted that the main point taken by Mr Bazini in the First-tier Tribunal was that the Secretary of State had made no proper finding on the best interests of the children. The judge said at paragraph 49:
“I am not persuaded that that is correct, or that any such omission is substantial or significant in the Respondent’s reasoning. The potential impact on the best interests of the children that was identified in Eglantina Endacott’s response to the notification by the Respondent that it was considering depriving her of her British citizenship was the potential that losing her British nationality may lead to her losing her right to remain in Switzerland where she presently resides with her family, including her two British citizen children, and that living in Switzerland would mean that she would not be granted leave to remain in the UK and might therefore be separated from her British family if they move back to the UK”.
23. The judge directed himself to determine whether or not on this point the Secretary of State had acted rationally and concluded that she had. At paragraph 54 of the Decision and Reasons the judge said:
“The discernible best interests of Eglantina Endacott’s children are to remain living as part of a household with her and their father, and to maintain the relationships they are said to enjoy with their extended family living in the UK through visits. Those are primary considerations. However, I find that there is no reason to find that those interests will be significantly impacted by the deprivation of their mother’s British citizenship”.
24. The judge had the assistance of an expert report which found that there was almost no risk of Eglantina having to leave Switzerland if deprived of her British citizenship and whilst there was a greater risk of her enjoying less secure status in Switzerland than is presently the case in that event she would be given five years of residence which appeared to be renewable. Her deprivation of British citizenship would not necessarily exclude the possibility of her returning to the United Kingdom as a visitor or indeed as the wife of a British national.
25. Overall the judge found the Secretary of State was entitled to make the decision that she did and the judge upheld it.
26. In his grounds supporting an application for permission to appeal in the case of Eglantina Mr Bazini, realistically and sensibly, accepted that it was clearly open to the Secretary of State to find that Eglantina had obtained her citizenship by means of deception. He reiterated that it was also for the First-tier Tribunal Judge to decide if the Secretary of State had acted lawfully in consideration of discretion. He relied on the case of Chimi [2023] UKUT 00115 and contended that the judge was wrong to say at paragraph 49 or 50 that:
“I am not persuaded that that is correct, or that any such omission is substantial or significant in the [Secretary of State]’s reasoning”.
27. The contention that Eglantina could come to the United Kingdom was based on speculation and there was not a clear finding on the best interests of the children.
28. Mr Bazini further maintained the judge was wrong to seek to minimise the Secretary of State’s error. If there was a public law error the judge should not guess how the Secretary of State might have exercised it but should recognise that there was an error and the decision was unsound unless the only outcome was the one that was achieved. The high test on “inevitable” was set out at paragraph 56 of Chimi. He said that the Secretary of State should have specifically addressed the best interests of the children and then considered what was probably likely to happen to them in the event of the mother being deprived of her acquired British nationality.
29. Additionally, it was said that the judge was wrong to think in terms of a delay of eight weeks when the evidence produced by Eglantina was an average of 303 days.
30. Before us Mr Bazini reiterated that the Secretary of State had a clear obligation to make a reasoned decision on the best interests of the children and she had not done that. The judge decided that deprivation would not really make much impact on Eglantina who would continue to live with her family in Switzerland. These conclusions might, at first glance, seem the same but they are not. He argued that what the judge should have done was to have predicted on the balance of probabilities the consequences of deprivation and, unless the effects would have made no difference at all, the failure to make proper findings about the best interests of the children was terminal. The Secretary of State’s decision was, he submitted, unsustainable.
31. Mr Terrell argued, contrarily, that the Secretary of State and then the judge had decided the case properly. Mr Terrell said that the best interests of the children, as decided by the judge, was that they remained with their parents and, whether or not Eglantina was deprived of her British nationality, it was likely that Eglantina and her family would remain together in Switzerland for the foreseeable future.
32. We found this the most challenging of the appeals before us. There is no finding on the best interests of the children and that is an omission but there is plainly merit in Mr Terrell’s contention that the omission is immaterial. Finding that a public law error could not make a difference is a perfectly proper reason for a tribunal to uphold the Secretary of State’s decision but, we find, that it is something that should only be done when it is completely clear the mistake was entirely irrelevant and we are not satisfied about this. There needed to be clear consideration and findings on the evidence of the probable effects of deprivation and these were not made. We cannot uphold a decision because it might be right. It needs to be explained.
33. Upon reflection we have decided that Eglantina’s case was wrongly decided.
Marinela Isaku
34. We now consider Marinela.
35. The notice of a decision to deprive Marinela of British nationality is dated 15 February 2021. Marinela’s real date of birth is believed to be in September 1982. She claimed a false identity using the same name but a date of birth in September 1985. She achieved her majority in September 2000.
36. Marinela was issued with a certificate of naturalisation on 7 September 2005. It was her case that she had entered the United Kingdom clandestinely on a lorry in October 1999 with her father and brother and her father claimed asylum nominating her as a dependant. She signed a statement confirming as true various false claims about her nationality and fear of return to her own country. This was signed when she was 17 years old. Her father was refused asylum but appealed, maintaining various lies and the appeal was allowed. Marinela was granted indefinite leave to remain as a Kosovan in March 2001. As is apparent from what is said above Marinela was by then an adult.
37. On 11 April 2001 Marinela applied for a Home Office travel document maintaining the pretence that she was from Kosovo and could not obtain a passport from Kosovo because she was a refugee from there.
38. Marinela applied to naturalise as a British citizen in February 2005 and repeated the lie about her being born in Kosovo in 1985. Marinela answered in the negative the standard question “Have you engaged in any other activities which might be relevant to the question of whether you are a person of good character?” Marinela was then naturalised as a British citizen.
39. The Secretary of State reminded herself of appropriate guidance including guidance that a child should not be assumed to be complicit in the making of false representations. The Secretary of State found explicitly that Marinela was not to be blamed for the false nature of her asylum claim but also said that Marinela had the opportunity after attaining her majority and before the claim was concluded of telling the truth. The policy provided a presumption of complicity where a person applies for asylum or other kind of leave. It was the Secretary of State’s view that by reason of continuing with the asylum claim after her 18th birthday she was continuing with the deception even though she was not complicit when the process began. Further, Marinela continued with the deception after achieving her majority when she completed her application for a Home Office Travel Document (HOTD) which was signed by her father because Marinela was not then aged 18.
40. Marinela acted fraudulently by claiming not to be able to obtain a passport from her national authorities by pretending that the national authority was Kosovo. Further, when Marinela applied for naturalisation she answered in the negative the standard question about her good character. Marinela claimed to have done nothing which “might be relevant to the question of whether you are a person of good character”.
41. Marinela was reminded that the contents of the form were very far reaching and required her expressly to:
“say whether you have been involved in anything which might indicate that you are not of good character. You must give information about any of these activities no matter how long ago this was”
and she was warned that checks would be made.
42. Mr Terrell’s skeleton argument is particularly succinct on this point where he describes the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s reasoning that the deception was not material because it did not conceal any past fraud is a “non sequitur”. As explained above, Marinela had asserted that she was of good character when, presumably, she knew full well that her status as a refugee was based on the dishonest pretence that she was a younger person from Kosovo.
43. We have considered Mr Bazini’s observations and submissions but we find this a major obstacle for Marinela. The point was just not considered and that makes the decision unsound.
Erald Isaku
44. Erald was given notice of his deprivation of nationality on 7 May 2021. He had claimed to be about eighteen months younger than is truly the case and to have been born in Pristina in Kosovo rather than in Albania. He was really born in 1987 and so achieved his majority in April 2005.
45. Erald asked for indefinite leave to remain in May 2008 and asked for expedition in 2009. Both letters made reference to his essentially dishonest asylum claim. The Secretary of State did not accept that Erald had claimed asylum on arrival. He did claim an HOTD in August 2010 where he repeated the false “Kosovan” details of his identity and signed a declaration that he had given true information. When he applied to naturalise as a British citizen on 1 May 2014 he confirmed his false Kosovan identity and said that he knew of no reason why he should not be considered a person of good character. He was naturalised on 8 July 2015.
46. We looked very carefully at the refusal letter in the case of Erald. He achieved his majority in April 2005. It was his case that he had entered the United Kingdom in 1999. He applied for asylum in a false identity which claim he maintained in response to questions from the Secretary of State. His notice of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal in May 2004 repeated the lie that he was Kosovan. His appeal was allowed on Article 8 grounds in November 2004. In May 2005 he was given three years’ discretionary leave. In March 2006 he applied for a travel document in his false identity, he was by then an adult. In 2008 he applied for an extension of his stay, again maintaining his false identity and date of birth. In May 2008 he applied for indefinite leave to remain which was granted in 2010 and he applied for a travel document in a false name. He applied to naturalise in his false identity on 1 May 2014. He repeated the lie that he and his parents were Kosovan and he was naturalised as a British citizen in 2015. In March 2021 he admitted that he was Albanian.
47. In the refusal letter the Secretary of State made clear that it was accepted that Erald was not complicit in the initial fraud. He was too young. However, he repeated the fraud when he applied for a travel document and extension of his stay and the Home Office said that the examining officer had been told the truth. The appellant would have failed on character grounds to be given British nationality.
48. Paragraph 46 of the Decision and Reasons is interesting. The judge clearly appreciated that Erald had claimed protection as a child dishonestly and had repeated the dishonest claim in his adult life but regarded it as part of the same act of deception that could not be held against him because of the terms of the policy. We just do not follow this. We cannot agree that the case was outside the policy.
49. Mr Bazini argued that the judge had found that the claimant was not part of any deception and those findings were not challenged. We do not agree. Maybe the refusal letter could have been more explicit but we do not agree that any fair reading of the decision could lead one to doubt that the complaint was that although Erald could not be blamed for lies told on his behalf when he was a child, he had adopted them later on. It was not the Secretary of State’s case that it was somehow acceptable to continue the dishonesty. Rather, it was plain from the refusal letter that it was continuing the dishonesty that was complained about. The judge did not find that Erald had not continue the dishonest claim but that somehow it did not matter. We incline to the view that it matters very much but the conclusion must be explained.
50. The judge was wrong.
Disposal
51. We now have to decide what to do with these appeals.
52. The appeal of Fatmire is allowed. We set aside the decision and direct that the case be heard again in the First-tier Tribunal before a different judge.
53. We do not in any way wish to imply anything about the strength of the case except to say that if we were confident that it could only be resolved one way we would have decided it on the material before us. We are satisfied that the judge did not deal properly with the evidence that Fatmire was not capable of forming the necessary intent at the necessary time. There is no finding that she was not capable and we do not suggest that she was not capable but there is certainly evidence which suggests that she may not have been capable and this needs to be looked at very carefully and it was not.
54. The appeal of Eglantina is allowed. We set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and direct that the appeal be heard again in the First-tier Tribunal by a different judge.
55. The problem is that that the judge did not really engage with the case of Eglantina. We listened carefully to how Mr Terrell put his case and understand there may be concerns about how material any errors were but there is no clear finding about the best interests of the children or clear finding about what would happen. Mr Terrell made clear points which might be the kind of point that would persuade the judge to say that her appeal should be dismissed but there is nothing to persuade us that the case was decided properly. It too needs to be heard again. It may have been amenable to re-determination in the Upper Tribunal but we find it important to keep all the appeals together.
56. For the purposes of disposal, Marinela and Erald’s case for these purposes can be considered together. They were not considered properly in the First-tier Tribunal. The judge did not understand properly the reasons for deprivation. In each of their case we set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and direct that their cases are heard again by a different judge.
Notice of Decision
57. In the case of Fatmire and Eglantina the claimants’ appeals are allowed and will be heard again in the First-tier Tribunal.
58. In the cases of Marinela and Erald the Secretary of State’s appeals are allowed and will be heard again in the First-tier Tribunal.

Jonathan Perkins

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 December 2025