Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-001050

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54565/2023
LP/02376/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

SK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Cleghorn via CVP, instructed by the Northeast Law Centre
For the Respondent: Mr A McVeety, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 16 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) promulgated following a hearing at Bradford on 4 January 2024, in which the Judge dismissed the appeal against the refusal of further submissions on protection grounds, made on 4 February 2023.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity, born in 1983, from the IKR. His immigration history shows that he claimed to have arrived in the UK on 11 January 2016 and to have claimed asylum two days later. That claim was refused on 17 July 2017 and the appeal against that decision dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a determination promulgated on 21 August 2017, which was upheld on appeal by the Upper Tribunal. The Appellant became appeal rights exhausted on 12 May 2020 but was not removed.
3. The Appellant states since coming to the UK he has converted to Christianity and asserts his family have found out about his conversion and that they believe he has dishonoured them and that they intend to kill him. He also fears that if he practices his faith in Iraq he will be persecuted.
4. The Judge sets out the agreed issues in dispute that he was required to determine at [13] of the determination as being:

a. Would the Appellant be a risk of persecution upon return to Iraq due to his religious conversion?
b. If this is accepted, will the Appellant be able to seek sufficient protection, and
c. Would the Appellant be able to safely and reasonably relocate in the IKR?

5. The Judge identifies that it was agreed that to answer those questions the Judge was required to resolve on the balance of probabilities, whether the Appellant’s family had found out about his conversion and, if so, whether they have threatened him.
6. Before the Judge the Appellant’s solicitor acknowledged that the Appellant had not provided any evidence to undermine the earlier adverse credibility findings in the first determination, in particular the finding that he has his CSID.
7. The Judge’s findings are set out from [16] which can be summarised as follows:

a. The Respondent accepts that the Appellant has converted to Christianity but does not accept he had demonstrated that he will be at risk in Iraq as the background material shows that the State does not persecute Christians and the Appellant had not demonstrated he will be at risk from others [16].
b. The Judge accepted he could put weight upon the evidence of Mr Day, the Recording Brother of the Middlesbrough Christadelphian Church, as the Judge had no reason to doubt what he says [30].
c. However, the Judge finds the remainder of the evidence unsatisfactory, records not being able to understand why the Appellant had not provided full access to his Facebook account page in the months before he received alleged threatening messages which the Judge states he is driven to conclude, in light of the previous adverse credibility findings, was deliberate and that the Appellant has something to hide [31].
d. The Judge found Appellant’s evidence in respect of contact with his family unsatisfactory, as prior to the appeal he had always maintained since 2015 he had no contact with members of his family yet be claimed to have restored contact with a cousin in late June 2023, but had not provided any evidence of the contact and had not provided any evidence of his subsequent contact with his sister. The Appellant’s explanation for not providing such evidence was found to be unsatisfactory [32].
e. The Judge was also troubled by the Appellant’s evidence regarding contact with his uncle which was said to be relying upon a coincidence which the Judge records, but which the Judge found was “very suspicious” and that the Applicant could have allayed such fears by providing to access to a Facebook account but did not do so [33].
f. Although the Judge attached weight to the evidence of Mr Day it was found that did not overcome the unsatisfactory nature of the remainder of the evidence, especially as Mr Day had not suggested he examined the Appellant’s Facebook activity [34].
g. The Judge does not accept that even if it is assumed the messages the Appellant relied upon were from his uncle and cousin, the first time he had any contact with his family in over eight years was after the Respondent had refused his fresh claim. The Judge’s finding is that the timing of the claim in this regard was very suspicious as a result of the previous Judge finding the Appellant lacked credibility and the failure of the Appellant to provide a more fuller picture of his Facebook activity. The Judge finds cumulatively the concerns about that evidence were not displaced by the positive findings in respect of Mr Day [35].
h. The Judge finds the Appellant had not satisfied him that (i) the Appellant’s family have found out he has converted to Christianity, and (ii) his family have threatened him as a result of the conversion, or (iii) anyone in Iraq is aware of his conversion [36].
i. The Judge was not satisfied, on the totality of the evidence, the Appellant had established that if returned to Iraq he will be at risk of suffering serious harm because of his conversion to Christianity [37].
j. In relation to whether the Appellant would be at risk if he practised his faith in Iraq, the Judge records the Appellant has not suggested the authorities would persecute him for being a convert, instead claiming his family and tribe would view it as an insult to their honour for him to have converted, as they are against apostasy and react badly to people converting from their religion. The Judge finds the Appellant’s fear is plausible, referring to country material that shows Christian converts with a Muslim background can be pressurised by their extended family and may face threats from family members, tribal leaders, and the surrounding society [39].
k. However, the Judge records in light of concerns about the reality of the Appellant’s evidence he had not demonstrated his family may take an adverse interest in him or that his background is as claimed [40].
l. In the alternative, assuming the Appellant believes the family will take an adverse interest in him the Judge went on to consider whether the Appellant could relocate to another part of the IKR or Iraq. The Judge accepts there are no members of the Appellant’s faith in Iraq although there are Christian churches in the IKR. The Judge notes evidence from Mr Day that after the Appellant was moved from Middlesbrough and accommodated in Bradford he had mainly been attending services online and that neither the Appellant nor Mr Day suggested that the Appellant could not access those services in Iraq. It was also open to the Appellant to attend one of the Christian churches in the IKR [41].
m. The Appellant will be aware of the social norms in the IKR [42].
n. The Appellant has a CSID which will enable him to travel to his home area and obtain his INID. The Judge was satisfied a visit to his home area for those purpose would not give rise to a real risk from his family or local community discovering his conversion to Christianity [43].
o. The Judge accepts the Appellant may face some difficulties in practising his faith, and that he may be discriminated against, but he likely to have to access to online services even if deprived of the physical company of followers of his particular faith, but there are other Christians. The Judge finds not being satisfied there is a real risk of (i) the Appellant being persecuted, and/or (ii) that the difficulties or challenges will prevent him practising his faith in Iraq [44].
p. The Appellant had not satisfied the Judge he could not reasonably be expected to relocate to another part of the IKR [45].
q. On the totality of the evidence the Appellant had not discharged the burden of proof showing a real risk of his being persecuted in Iraq because of his religious beliefs, leading to the asylum claim being dismissed [46].
r. The Appellant was not entitled to a grant of Humanitarian Protection and had established that removal would breach his rights pursuant to Article 3 ECHR. The Judge records it being conceded that the Appellant’s Article 8 appeal should stand or fall with his Asylum/Article 3 grounds [49].

8. The Appellant sought permission to appeal which was refused by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal and renewed to the Upper Tribunal, where permission to appeal was granted on one limited ground, the operative part of the grant being in the following terms:
The sole ground upon which I grant permission is para 8 of the renewed grounds. Although the appellant will need to establish for the purposes of the EOL hearing that there was evidence before the judge that he is “particularly outspoken”, as contended at para 8 of the renewed grounds, it is nevertheless arguable that the judge did not consider the risk of members of the community in the place of relocation discovering the appellant’s conversion in the future, given the evidence of Mr Day (para 27 of the judge's decision), which the judge appears to have accepted, that “… during the past year and a half, [the appellant] has been the most active evangelizing member of us all”. The judge finds at para 41 that the appellant has mainly been attending the services of his church online but arguably fails to say whether this includes the appellant’s ability to evangelize.
Discussion and analysis
9. Ms Cleghorn relied upon her skeleton argument dated 8 June 2025. In that it is argued that the Appellant finds it difficult to see how [4] – [6] of the grounds can properly be separated from [10] – [11] as it is stated his evangelism is inextricably linked to the broader risk from members of the community including traditional authorities.
10. It was submitted that risk arises as the Appellant is outspoken and it will present a risk to him on return to Iraq.
11. The claim it is not possible to separate the grounds on which permission to appeal was sought is noted, but permission was refused with the exception of one issue. In relation to the paragraphs of the grounds on which permission was refused the Upper Tribunal judge wrote:
Paras 4-6 of the renewed grounds contend, in essence, that [the Judge] erred by failing to consider whether the appellant would be at risk of persecution from the authorities in Iraq on account of his conversion to Christianity. This ground ignores the fact that the thrust of the appellant ’s evidence was that he would be at risk of persecution at the hands of his family and members of the community who are aware of his conversion.
Para 7 of the renewed grounds contends that the judge failed to consider the risk of persecution from the appellant's family and community and whether there would be sufficient protection for the appellant. This ground simply ignores the judge's findings at para 36 and assessment at paras 37-45.
Para 9 is linked to para 8 and does not raise any separate issue. Paras 10-11 ignore the judge's assessment of the Facebook messages at para 21 onwards.
12. The skeleton argument suggests the Appellant is particularly outspoken in the practice of his faith as noted in the letter of Mr Day dated 31 August 2023. That letter states the Appellant has been the most active evangelising member of the congregation.
13. The Grounds assert that the issues the Judge was required to consider was whether (i) Christian converts are persecuted in Iraq, (ii) what the Appellant would do if he returned to Iraq, (iii) whether he would be discreet, (iv) and if he decided to be discreet about his faith why he would do that. The Grounds assert the Judge failed completely to consider risk that stems from the Appellant’s practice of his faith as an apostate in Iraq.
14. In relation to the Judge’s findings regarding the Appellant’s ability to practice his faith on return by accessing online services and attending Christian churches, Ms Cleghorn submitted it is impossible to see how the Appellant can ‘break bread’ online. Mr Day referred to coming to fellowship, prayer, doctrine and the breaking of bread memorial service, which binds members of the congregation together. It was argued that the Appellant will be permanently deprived of the practice of the central tenants of his religion.
15. In relation to the finding that the Appellant could attend another Christian church, it is argued this is flawed as a result of the failure to assess the risk of an apostate attending a Christian church in Iraq, and that in finding this was an option the Judge conflated church attendance with somebody who was born into that faith.
16. Ms Cleghorn also asserted Christian faiths have significant differences in doctrinal structure and authority and there was a failure to consider the theological basis of the Appellant’s religious beliefs by presupposing attendance at any Christian church will enable him to practice his faith properly.
17. The starting point has to be the core findings of the Judge at [38] and [41] that the Appellant had not proved he faced any risk on the evidence from family or the authorities if returned. The findings from [41] onwards are findings in the alternative. The core finings have not been shown to be findings outside the range of those reasonably available to the Judge on the evidence. The Judge clearly considered the evidence with the required degree of anxious scrutiny. The findings are adequately reasoned.
18. In reply to Ms Cleghorn, Mr McVeety submitted that the Tribunal should be careful and guard against a hypothetical risk from unknown persons which was the basis of the Appellant’s argument.
19. I agree with that submission principle as the test is the existence of a real risk.
20. I find the submission made by Ms Cleghorn that the Judge’s finding the Appellant could attend services online meant the Judge erred in law, has no merit. Claiming otherwise ignores the finding that this is a way in which he could attend services with the congregation if returned to Iraq. The challenge ignores the fact that the Appellant has since his move from Middlesbrough attended services of the Christadelphian church precisely in this way, no doubt a result the suggestion of Mr Day or another member of the congregation, with no evidence that this was not permitted or somehow deprived the Appellant of being able to follow or practice his faith. I also note the comment in the letter from Mr Day that [SK] has also attended Bradford meeting online (Being a small and rather elderly Ecclesia/church, their pattern of attendance is more by zoom than face-to-face) indicating online attendance is not only accepted but the norm in some congregations.
21. There was nothing before the Judge to show that attending services remotely, if this was the only option, will have any negative impact upon the Appellant’s beliefs.
22. There was also nothing before the Judge in the evidence to warrant a detailed discussion in relation to the theological beliefs of the various Christian churches in the determination. It was not an issue the Judge was asked to consider.
23. The Judge was entitled to find the Appellant could attend another Christian church if he wished. It had not been made out on the evidence that he would not be able to do so for practical or spiritual reasons.
24. In relation to the submission the Judge failed to consider risk to the Appellant as an apostate in this regard, the Judge found the Appellant had not proved any risk, but that he could internally relocate if necessary. It was not made that if he attended a Christian church elsewhere it will be known that he had converted from Islam. The Judge would have considered that when looking at issue of risk in the determination. This is an experienced judge with considerable knowledge of dealing with similar cases.
25. Mr McVeety also raised the issue of how the Appellant could evangelise if he was attending services online, especially as those who would be visible to him would be fellow members of the church. Reference is made in the grounds to the evidence of Mr Day in this respect where he writes:
The Home Office have accepted that SK is a genuine convert to Christianity. I can say with confidence that of all the hundred and five members of our Ecclesia, during the past year and a half, SK has been the most active evangelizing member of us all. He has confidently spoken out and encouraged more people to come and listen to the Gospel message than anyone else, and I include myself in that number and all our UK members. In his relatively short time with us he has shown us all an example of commitment to follow.
26. There was insufficient evidence before the Judge to show where the Appellant was evangelising and it is not made out that he caused any difficulties for himself in doing so. There is no indication of who the Appellant had spoken to about the church and whether this included other asylum seekers. It is also interesting to note Mr Day’s comment that he had done so more than any member of the congregation in the UK indicating there is no obligation upon church members to do so, as otherwise one would have expected to have seen evidence confirming that other members of the church had acted in this way.
27. Ms Cleghorn asserted the Judge conflated the evidence when finding the Appellant faced no risk from the authorities as the authorities would be composed of a mixture of tribal and state authorities. I do not find such a submission made out on the evidence as the Judge in the determination specifically refers to family and tribe and also considered all the evidence in which such matters, if relied upon by the Appellant, would have been raised.
28. It was accepted the Appellant had not claimed he will face a risk or feared state authorities, but he claimed he had dishonoured his family and tribe which created a real risk. The finding of the Judge, however, is that that tribe and the family are unaware of the Appellant’s conversion to Christianity. The Judge was entitled to find there was any known breach of family or tribe honour made out on the evidence.
29. The Judge refers to the Appellant’s tribe being the Bilbas [39] who are predominantly based in the Erbil Governorate of the IKR. The Appellant claimed that he lived in the Ninewah region of Iraq. The First-tier judge who dismissed the Appellant’s earlier appeal noted, following the Appellant’s asylum interviews, that he claimed his home area is now part of the Ninewah Governorate although in the late 1980s and early 1990s was considered part of the Erbil Governorate.
30. It was not made out it would be unreasonable for the Appellant to internally relocate to another part of the IKR, such as Sulaymaniyah. It was not made out that the Appellant will be unable to internally relocate to any other governorate as noted at [51] of the Refusal letter. The evidence before the Judge did not establish the Appellant would face any risk from his family or tribe outside his immediate home area.
31. The Judge was correct to note there would be no real risk to the Appellant as the authorities in the IKR are more accepting of Christian converts and Christianity as a whole. There was insufficient evidence before the Judge to show that it is an obligation or duty upon the Appellant as a member of the Christadelphian community to evangelise. Whereas with organisations such as the Jehovah’s Witness that is a requirement demonstrated by their much more aggressive approach to outreach work and recruitment. Although it is accepted there is a Christadelphian Bible Mission which operates in Africa, Europe and the Middle East, there was insufficient evidence before the Judge to establish that the Appellant would need to do missionary work. In simple terms, it was not made out before the Judge the Appellant would act in such a manner if returned to Iraq that would give rise to a real risk of persecution, or if he would act discreetly solely to avoid the risk of persecution. Those are findings reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
32. Contrary to the submissions, the Judge did consider the issue of family and tribal reaction and honour in his primary finding which has not been shown to be outside the range of those reasonably open to him on the evidence. It is that factual finding the Appellant is claiming was a finding not reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
33. The guidance to appellate judges from the Court of Appeal is abundantly clear, one should not interfere with a decision of Judge below unless that decision is ‘plainly wrong’ – see Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at [2], Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26], and Hamilton v Barrow and Others [2024] EWCA Civ 888 at [30-31].
34. I do not find it has been established the Judge failed to consider all relevant aspects of the appeal, the Judge clearly considered and determined those matters which he was asked to consider as set out in the agreed issues earlier in the determination. Any suggestion in submissions to the Upper Tribunal that the Judge erred in not considering different issues does not establish material legal error.
35. The Judge’s findings in relation to the agreed issues have not been shown to be findings outside the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence. The Judge’s reasons for dismissing the appeal have not been shown to be ‘plainly wrong’.
36. On that basis the appeal is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
37. The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to be materially erred in law. The determination shall stand.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 June 2025