Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-001124
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/53865/2023
LH/04743/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

HMN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Entry Clearance Officer
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Hodgetts, instructed by Gya Williams UK Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Rushforth Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 19 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity owing to the sensitive nature of the proceedings.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of FtT Judge Webb (the judge) who on 3rd December 2025 dismissed the appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds against the Entry Clearance Officer’s refusal dated 8th August 2022 of the appellant’s application under paragraph 297(i)(f).

2. The appellant a Somalian national was born on 27th December 2006 and at the date of application was 15 years old and lived with a family friend TW in Hargeisa, Somaliland.

Grounds of appeal

3. A key issue was whether there were serious and compelling family or other considerations which made exclusion undesirable. The sponsor, an NHS domestic assistant, entered the UK in 2008 as a refugee and was granted British citizenship in 2016. She located her father in 2019 and made contact with her half sister, the appellant, when she travelled to Hargeisa. From then on, she supported the family financially. She stayed with them for elongated periods of time and visited again in 2020 and 2021. The father died on 22nd July 2021. The sponsor left the appellant in the care of a family friend Mrs TW and with whom the father and appellant lived before his death.

4. The judge accepted the sponsor and appellant were related as claimed and shared family life and the sponsor was credible about the circumstances of her father’s death and the mother abandoned her as a child. The judge rejected the sponsor’s claim that TW was unwell and that the appellant’s epilepsy was appropriately being treated. The judge found there was no evidence the appellant faced a specific threat of gender based violence and found the best interests of the appellant were to remain in Somalia.

5. The grounds specifically stated the judge erred because:

(i) there was a failure to take relevant evidence and/or factors into account when assessing the best interests of the child and para 297(1)(f). The judge correctly took into account Mundeba (s55 and para 297(1)(f)) Democratic Republic of Congo [2013] UKUT 88 (IAC) but the assessment was vitiated by failure to take into account relevant evidence. The witness statement of the appellant and her views were ignored. This statement was in the supplementary bundle at pages 14-15. This stated that she did not get all her needs met, that she was feeling lonely after her father’s death, and her health was worsening. Further the judge failed to take into account the age of TW which was 73 years old.

What was absent from the determination was an assessment of these humanitarian circumstances that

a. the sponsor was separated from her family in 2007 and spent years trying to relocate her family
b. the sponsor found her father in 2019 and started taking care of the appellant.
c. the judge proceeded on the basis that the appellant spent her entire life in Somalia but the appellant has been in self governing Somaliland since 2019. It was irrational to state she had a settled existence.

(ii) it was irrational to find that TW was not unwell and failed to take into account her age.

(iii) failure to record oral evidence of the sponsor and irrational and inconsistent findings on the efficacy of medical treatment with reference to the sponsor’s oral evidence that she had to pay for treatment.

(iv) there was an unlawful proleptic assessment of the child’s best interests such as where the judge stated

39……Given the appellant’s age and the evidence that I have referred to, I find this is not a strong submission, and the current arrangements could continue until such time as the appellant is able to start an independent life. In making this finding I have considered the appellant is due to turn 17 on 27 December 2023.”

It was clear the decision should have been based on facts as at the time of the hearing. It was accepted that the judge could take into account the reasonably foreseeable consequences.

(v) failure to take into account country guidance in relation to gender based violence. Any failure to take into account country guidance may be an error of law. There was an FGM risk as a form of gender based violence. Further there was a risk of gang rape.

(vi) irrationality; the assessment of the best interests of the child was so cursory as to be irrational. The assessment was based on one sentence only.

The Hearing

6. I had before me a composite bundle filed by the appellant’s solicitors and a skeleton argument from Mr Hodgetts dated 12th August 2025 and on which he relied.

7. In relation to ground (i), Mr Hodgetts submitted that various factors were not taken into account, particularly the humanitarian and reunification issues and the history and life experiences of the sponsor and appellant. The judge found that the sponsor was credible. The sponsor had sought to find her family through the Red Cross but only located her father in 2019 through word of mouth. Sadly the father died in July 2021 leaving the appellant alone. The sponsor was her only relative. TW was in ill health. The judge rejected the written evidence that TW was unwell and that the current arrangements could continue. The judge made a finding that the appellant was thriving in Somalia and repeated that 3 times within the decision. The judge did not take all the relevant factors into account. The witness statement of the appellant, a child, was ignored. It was important to take into account the appellant’s emotional and psychological state following the loss of her father. There was a supplementary bundle in which the witness statement gave the views of the child which should have been addressed. She stated she did not get all her needs met, was feeling lonely and her health worsened (epilepsy).

8. Nor was the age of TW taken into account. She was 73 years old. Although Somaliland is not internationally recognised it was self governing and although technically part of Somalia the appellant was in effect a refugee there having fled from Afgoye in the south. She had not lived a settled existence in Somaliland. For the sponsor the appellant was the only family. The judge only cursorily noted that the appellant wished to come to the UK and that was insufficient to take into account the appellant’s wishes. Nor did the judge consider the humanitarian factors. Further, none of the persecutory factors were taken into account when finding the appellant lived in stable circumstances. The best interests assessment found on limited evidence was flawed.

9. Secondly, there was a rejection of the written evidence of TW that she could not look after the appellant. The judge should have engaged with this evidence. That TW was not ill because the appellant had done well at school was a non-sequitur.

10. On ground (iii) there was a failure to record any oral evidence of the sponsor and an irrational and inconsistent finding on the effectiveness of medical treatment. At [10] – [13] the judge failed to record any of the oral evidence given. It was not possible to assess what the judge made of the oral evidence Both notes of counsel were consistent that the sponsor did not accept that her half sister was being appropriately treated and was contrary to the judge’s finding at [41]. The sponsor’s evidence and the judge’s findings were at odds. The supplementary bundle contained medical evidence as to the sponsor’s heath which was inconsistent with the judge’s findings. AK (Failure to assess witnesses’ evidence) Turkey [2004] UKIAT 00230 identified that it was good practice to summarise the material parts of the evidence. It was accepted that the absence of medical evidence of TW’s health may be relevant it was still incumbent on the judge to make a reasoned assessment of the sponsor’s evidence on this issue.

11. In relation ground (iv), MS (Ivory Coast) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 133 was cited such that the Tribunal should consider the facts as they are at the date of hearing. It was accepted that judge’s could take into account the reasonably foreseeable consequences at the date of the hearing but that was not what was happening here. It was not open to the judge to make such an assessment that the appellant would be starting and independent life in over a year’s time. That was a proleptic assessment on an assumed future. The judge referred to the appellant being able ‘to start an independent life’. That was an error of law.

12. On ground (v), Mr Hodgetts advanced that the judge failed to take into account a risk of sexual violence to single females without family protection and failed to take properly into account the on women facing gender based violence in Somalia dated 2018 (the CPIN) on such risks. This was a child female who had no parents nor family but living with a former friend of her father and I was referred to [42] and [43] of the decision. Although the CPIN of 2018 on which the judge relied incorporated the conclusions of AMM and others (conflict humanitarian crisis; returnees; FGM) Somalia CG [2011] UKUT 00445 (IAC) and the guidance in AMM details the risk of FGM, in failing directly to consider AMM or any country guidance the judge failed to consider a material factor going both to the risk of gender based violence generally to the assessment of paragraph 297(i)(f) and the best interests of the child. The judge needed to consider the caselaw. As stated in AMM the protection of single females is to be determined by whether she has access to male protectors. In MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC) at [406] it was specific categories who were at risk such as ‘single women and female single head of households with no male protection…’. The judge had ignored the risk set out. That the appellant had not been subject to a ‘specific threat’ was not to the point; under Article 15(c) specific threat was not a requirement. It was not argued that the appellant was from a minority clan but the fact was that the appellant was from a minority clan.

13. At ground (vi) irrationality, the judge assessment of best interests was so cursory as to be irrational. Although the judge stated the appellant was thriving, she did not take into account her emotional or psychological state after the death of her father .

14. Ms Rushforth submitted that not quoting from the witness statement was not an error. It was apparent throughout that the judge had taken into account the evidence. The judge stated at [19] that not every point had been set out within the determination and at [28] referred to the wishes of the appellant. It is apparent that the judge was aware the appellant wishes to come to the UK. Grounds (ii) and (iii) effectively demand a preference for the evidence of the sponsor. At ground 2 there was no error in stating that there was no medical evidence. There are some very healthy 73 year olds. If TW had a medical issue this should be in evidence. The letter from TW merely stated that the sponsor was sick and did not say what was wrong with her. That ground was a disagreement. At ground 3 the judge gave weight to medical evidence but the sponsor was simply stating that it was insufficient in relation to the appellant. It was open to the judge to prefer the medical evidence. There was no issue with the appellant suffering from epilepsy and even though the sponsor’s evidence was that the treatment was not working, the school letter evidence was that she was well cared for.

15. In relation to ground (iv), the judge gave a best interests assessment and the appeal decision was not a long term assessment. There was no proleptic assessment when observing the appellant would soon turn 17.

16. In ground (v), the cases cited did not relate to Somaliland and the judge did refer to the CPIN. AMM specifies that the particular circumstances apply and Ms Rushforth referred to the headnote at [17] as to whether the parents favoured FGM or not. In relation to gang rape again the CPIN stressed at 2.38 that a woman if single a female may be vulnerable if she had no support network but it depended on the facts.

17. Ground (vi) was not arguable because it was open to the judge to conclude as she did not least in reliance on the evidence of the school. Much was made of the school letter but it was very positive about the appellant and did undermine the appellant’s case. Mr Hodgetts responded that at 5.1.2 of the CPIN highlighted that all households in Somaliland had FGM. He submitted that the judge should have engaged with the oral evidence. The appellant had an unmet emotional need.

Conclusions

18. I address each ground in turn.

19. Ground (i) At [4] of his decision the judge set out the background material and referenced the supplementary bundle. As the judge explained at [19] he had not set out every point or piece of evidence, only those most important to his decision.

20. As Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 confirms, not only should an appeal court not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was ‘plainly wrong’, and I note the judge had the benefit of oral evidence before him, but additionally at 2(iii) Volpi held

(iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.

21. A reading of the decision overall demonstrates that the judge was fully aware of the circumstances of reunification between the appellant and sponsor and the appellant’s circumstances which were referenced throughout, that the appellant and sponsor were related as claimed through the father, the nationality of the appellant, aware of the father’s death [33], and that the appellant’s mother had abandoned her [35] and [46] and the living conditions of the appellant.

22. The letter from the appellant dated 22nd November 2023 reads as follows:

22/11/23
My name is HMN , Im currently live with Mrs TW for up to four years now. She is so kind to me, Even before my father’s death. But I feel lonely now since my dad passed away. I do not get all my needs, because I cannot ask as I used to my dad.
My health worsens nowadays and I take medications, which I do not feel much
better. I was diagnosed as having epilepsy when I was younger.
I wish to come closer and live with my sister to feel familyhood.
I’m so kindly requesting from you to accept me to joint and live with my sister.
Thank you
Hamda

23. It is not evident that the judge simply ignored the appellant’s letter. From reading the decision it can be seen that the judge was aware of where the appellant lived, who she lived with, was aware of the death of the father, addressed the issue of epilepsy and her health condition, noted her circumstances at [46] and, in particular, at [47] noted that the appellant evidently wished to live with the sponsor. There was no psychological report on the appellant and the judge was entitled to address the evidence as he did. Although not a point taken by the judge, I note separately that there was no formal translation of this document in accordance with the Senior President of Tribunals Practice Direction dated 1st November 2024.

24. The supplementary bundle also included a letter from Al-Jazeera College dated 25th November 2023, almost the same date as the appellant’s letter, identifying the appellant as a ‘golden student’ and ‘bright and honest in all behavioural activities’. The judge was entitled to place weight on that letter.

25. The views and condition of the appellant were not from a reading of the decision as a whole ignored.

26. It is important to note that the main bundle before the FtT which ran to 1298 pages (and which was duplicated within that bundle) included photographs, call logs and financial receipts and focused on the financial circumstances of the sponsor centring on the payslips and bank statements of the sponsor in the United Kingdom and establishing the relationship through DNA documentation. The material focussed on the financial picture of the sponsor and not the circumstances of the appellant. The written evidence of the sponsor in her statement dated 22nd June 2023 was that TW had lived in the same house for many years and knows ‘everyone in the community and is very well respected’ [11]. The focus of the witness statements of the sponsor including the statement of 12th August 2022 was that she was a refugee, of the financial circumstances and ill health of her father, how she located him and was related to the appellant and that she was the only family of the appellant. It is not sustainable that the judge was not aware of these circumstances.

27. Similarly the skeleton argument focussed on the circumstances of the appellant. The material consisted predominantly of the circumstances of the sponsor and not those of the appellant.

28. A substantial amount of material (over approximately 400 pages) was produced for the error of law hearing but this was not before the FtT. Not to have considered this material was not an error of law.

29. The supplementary bundle included a letter from TW of one page and dated 23rd November 2023 and her passport which clearly gave her date of birth. It is not sustainable to suggest that the judge did not know of TW’s age.

30. There was also a medical prescription dated 20th November 2023 a further assessment from the Hargeisa Nuerology (sic) and multispeciality (sic) hospital dated 21st November 2023 and an untranslated letter from the appellant.

31. The medical evidence in relation to the appellant was clearly taken into account at [41]. The judge referenced the medical evidence and the sponsor’s own evidence and concluded that it showed that the appellant was ‘receiving treatment and her condition is being controlled properly’. In the next sentence judge found that the appellant ‘has been diagnosed with epilepsy, but that she is receiving appropriate treatment’. It was unarguably open to the judge to prefer the documentary medical evidence which was dated immediately prior to the hearing to that of the sponsor and which is in effect what the judge did.

32. Although in the grounds it was advanced that what was absent from the determination was an assessment of these humanitarian circumstances, the judge took into account the evidence identified above and the limited humanitarian circumstances that were put before him. I repeat that the bundle of evidence provided with the proposed Rule 15(2)A application and which may have gone to underline humanitarian issues was evidence was simply not before the judge and the judge cannot be criticised for not considering material that was not before him.

33. It is clear that the findings in relation to the child’s best interests were given at [44] having considered all of the evidence and where the judge stated clearly that in assessing the appellant’s best interests he considered the sponsor would be able to provide for her in the UK but that the appellant ‘is nearly 17 years old and has spent her entire life in Somalia. She is attending school, there is no evidence that she is fluent in English, she is being properly cared for in stable circumstances and she is receiving appropriate medical treatment. Having taken those factors into account I find that it is currently in the appellant’s best interests to remain in Somalia living in her current circumstances’. Those findings were rational and cogent.

34. In relation to ground (ii) the threshold for irrationality is very high. In the context of what I have said above I do not accept that the judge erred through irrationality. As stated in R (Iran) [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at [11]

‘It may be helpful to comment quite briefly on three matters first of all. It is well known that "perversity" represents a very high hurdle. In Miftari v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 481, the whole court agreed that the word meant what it said: it was a demanding concept. The majority of the court (Keene and Maurice Kay LJJ) said that it embraced decisions that were irrational or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense (even if there was no wilful or conscious departure from the rational), but it also included a finding of fact that was wholly unsupported by the evidence, provided always that this was a finding as to a material matter.’

35. There is no indication that the judge failed to take into account the age of TW. Merely that she was 73 at the time does not render her, per se, incapacitated or sick and that does not logically follow. The judge evidently considered the letter of TW and noted that the letter ‘suggests that TSW is unwell and has not been able to look after the appellant over the last seven months’. It was entirely open to the judge to reject that assertion on the basis that there was no medical evidence particularly when medical evidence had been provided for the appellant.

36. In ground (iii) the assertion that there was a failure to record the sponsor’s evidence does not disclose an error in the circumstances. The judge made continual references to the sponsor’s evidence throughout the decision and although she accepted her evidence on some aspects of her evidence, it was not incumbent upon the judge to accept all the sponsor’s evidence. At [41] the judge noted the sponsor relied on the appellant’s diagnoses of epilepsy.

37. The judge clearly considered the medical evidence which was brief and did not identify that the appellant’s epilepsy was poorly controlled. The medications and prescriptions were also noted. Given the medical reports and the school reports and their description of the appellant it was unsurprising that the judge preferred and relied on the medical evidence itself. That was not an error. Nor does the fact of the sponsor paying for medical care render the judge’s conclusions flawed. It may be good practice to record all the sponsor’s evidence as referenced in AK (Failure to assess witnesses’ evidence) Turkey but judges are not obliged to do so particularly if evidence is audio recorded. Again as stated in the Senior President of Tribunals Practice Direction reasons should be concise and focused upon the disputed issues and the reasoning proportionate. Reading the decision as a whole demonstrates the judge has identified and gave reasoning on the key issues.

38. (iv) the reference in the grounds to ‘proleptic assessment’ stems from [39] where the judge is in fact responding to the submission of counsel who suggested that the ‘current arrangements are not a long term or viable prospect’. In reply the judge is simply, having set out the evidence, responding that this ‘was not a strong submission and the current arrangements could continue until such time as the appellant is able to start an independent life’. The judge was simply replying to that assertion and making an accurate observation that the appellant was due ‘to turn 17 on 27 December 2023’.

39. (v) in terms of failure to take into account country guidance, this was not an asylum claim in which the judge is obliged to consider country guidance cases. I have already pointed out there was very limited evidence in relation to country circumstances and humanitarian issues (save for the personal circumstances of the appellant) and as Ms Rushforth noted the appellant was living in Somaliland. Albeit that Mr Hodgetts pointed to issues within Somaliland, the judge did at [42] consider the CPIN dated April 2018 to which he was referred and the section at 4.5 on Somaliland. The CPIN placed in the evidence before the Upper Tribunal for the Rule 15(2)A application was dated from July 2024. AMM and others (conflict humanitarian crisis; retunes; FGM) Somalia CG [2011] UKUT 00445 (IAC) was referenced within the CPIN dated 2024 as was MOJ & Ors. I note paragraph 406 in MOJ identified the UNHCR recommendations as to who was vulnerable as a starting point. AMM considered the situation in south and central Somalia generally (Somaliland is north west of Somalia) and not specifically regarding women and MOJ & Ors referenced return to Mogadishu. The appellant was not a ‘lone woman’ returning to Mogadishu. It was open to the judge to conclude as follows:

42. In his submission Mr Joseph referred me to the Home Office CPIN on women fearing gender-based violence in Somalia, dated April 2018, specifically the section on Somaliland at 4.5. There is no suggestion that the appellant faces a specific threat, rather that the general conditions means that she would be at risk as a teenage girl.

43. The evidence to which I was referred does show that gang rape is a problem in Somaliland, and that in more than half of cases the victim was a child. However, the evidence also shows that those who are at the margins of society, who do not have access to sanitary facilities, or live in IDP camps are more likely to be at risk. The appellant is living in stable conditions, attending school and is being financially supported by the sponsor in the UK. I find the appellant’s situation is such that although I am unable to say there is no risk of gender-based violence against her, it is not a strong factor.

40. Nothing was produced to me to demonstrate that the judge failed to take into account relevant material before him or that his findings on this aspect of the appeal were flawed. He acknowledged that there was a risk and he was entitled to factor in that there had not been a ‘specific risk’ to the appellant personally [47]. That of course would be relevant.

41. (vi) the consideration of the best interests of the child was not simply cursory as asserted. The judge considered the evidence before him, was aware of the ages of those involved, was aware of the relationships and the medical conditions. It was open to the judge to rely on the reference from the school which was dated immediately before the appeal and found the appellant was considered to be a ‘golden student’ and ‘bright and honest in all behavioural activities’. It was not unreasoned to state that the appellant was ‘thriving’ on the basis of the school letter. That the appellant was at the relevant time suffering with epilepsy or not being cared for was not reflected in the school report nor in the medical evidence. There is no indication that the judge failed to appreciate the contents of the appellant’s letter (notwithstanding the difficulties with the letter than I have identified above) or the emotional and psychological state of the appellant. The judge acknowledged that the appellant clearly wished to live with the sponsor [47] (and vice versa) and that her life chances and opportunities in the UK would be better [47] but ultimately found that there were not serious and compelling family or other considerations that made the appellant’s exclusion undesirable [48]. The conclusions of the judge who did go on to consider Article 8 ECHR were entirely open to him, founded on cogent reasoning and do not disclose any material error of law.

42. I find no material error of law in the decision of the FtT.

Notice of Decision

The FtT decision will stand and the appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

Helen Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11th September 2025