Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-001349
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/55827/2023
LH/06762/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

23rd July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

KIRAN RAI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M West, instructed by Gordon Thompson Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant a Nepalese national born on 2nd June 1995 appealed against the respondent’s decision dated 6 April 2023 refusing the appellant’s application for entry clearance as the adult dependent child of a former member of the Brigade of Gurkhas. The Appellant’s parents and sister were granted a settlement visa on 6 April 2022.
2. The appeal was made under s82 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 on the basis of human rights only.
The respondent’s decision
3. The respondent’s decision on 6th April 2023 determined that the appellant was 27 years old (he was now 30) when he applied and had provided no evidence and provided no information that would lead the Entry Clearance Officer to consider that he was unable to care for himself and no exceptional circumstances. He had provided limited details to his personal circumstances, domestic arrangements or financial commitments in Nepal. The Entry Clearance Officer accepted he may receive some financial assistance from his father but had not demonstrated that he was genuinely dependent on him. The application was refused under paragraph EC-DR 1.1(d) of Appendix FM. It was noted that the applicant had been divorced and that he and his former spouse were married on 2nd September 2011, had two children and thereby it was concluded they had formed an independent family unit. The information showed that he lived as part of a family unit from 2011 to 2022 and thus had lived separately from the sponsor. It was acknowledged that he received some financial support from the father but had not demonstrated that he was financially and emotionally dependent on him.
4. The Entry Clearance Officer noted Gurung & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] ECWA Civ 8 (21 January 2013) where it was found if a Gurkha can show that, but for the historic injustice, he would have settled in the UK at a time when his dependant (now) adult child would have been able to accompany him as a dependent child under the age of 18, that is a strong reason for holding that it is proportionate to permit the adult child to join his family now.
5. The Entry Clearance Officer also cited the test laid down in Kugathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31 (21 January 2003) and Ghising and others [2013] UKUT 00567 (IAC) which confirmed where it was found that Article 8 family life was engaged, and but for the historic wrong, the appellant would have been settled in the UK, this would ordinarily determine the outcome of the Article 8 proportionality assessment in the Appellant’s favour.
6. However, the Entry Clearance Officer was not satisfied that the appellant had demonstrated "real" or "committed" or "effective" support from his parent(s) or demonstrated that Article 8 was engaged.
The FtT appeal
7. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) on 22nd January 2024. The judge found that notwithstanding the appellant’s marriage, he was financially supported by his father. However, by the time of the hearing before the FtT, the appellant’s father had passed away, and the appellant had thus failed to establish ‘a current and ongoing family life between himself and his deceased father’. Thus Article 8 was not engaged on family or private life grounds.
8. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal in 2024 on the basis the judge had misdirected himself and failed to take into account relevant evidence and made factual errors. Inter alia the grounds noted the immigration rules themselves were changed between the date of decision and the date of the hearing. Thus, on 5 October 2023 Appendix Gurkha was introduced which – unlike the former rules under Annex K – no longer required the former Gurkha parent of a relevant child to still be alive at the date of application: see AF(GHK)12.3.
9. An error of law was found and the FtT decision set aside. The matter came before me for remaking.
Documentation.
10. Further documentation was provided in the form of an appellant’s bundle which contained updated witness statements of the appellant, the mother and the sister, financial documentation, a letter from the Dharan Sub Metropolitan Municipality of Ward No 5 in Nepal dated 20th January 2026. I was also provided with the bundle from the FtT which included the decision of the Entry Clearance Officer under appeal.
Oral evidence
11. Both the sister of the appellant, Ms Sanju Rai, and the appellant’s mother Mrs Mina Kumari Rai, gave oral testimony through a Nepalese interpreter. They adopted their statements.
12. Ms Rai, told the Tribunal that her brother had no education and after he left school, he just stayed at home with his mother and father and that without an education it was very difficult to find a job and that was why he did not do anything.
13. His wife wanted to go shopping for the children and she just took the children as he could not provide. We were told that for 11 years the family were supported through the pension fund of the father for simple house expenses, but the wife demanded more.
14. When asked whether support was now provided, bearing in mind the said emphasis on the parent providing for children, I was told the sister-in-law was contactless.
15. Ms Rai told the Tribunal that the mother sent £100 per month to the appellant through RIA transfers and her brother received it as an IME in cash. The mother transferred the money to her account in Nepal and from that account to the brother. Ms Clewley pointed out that the there was an assertion that there were cash transfers but also payment directly into the brother’s account. In fact, more was sent that merely £100. The explanation was that the brother did not have work and that there could be emergencies and the appellant paid for utilities and medical expenses from the same money. The mother received universal credit and sent money from that. When questioned why she stated the mother sent Rs 20,000 and not Rs40,0000 the witness said the amount could vary and that there were other brothers as well and he gave them money for daily use. The entirety of the war pension went to the brothers and they shared the money. She confirmed the other brothers lived with the appellant. The mother received Rs 25000 (circa £100) as a war pension and £600-£700 on universal credit per month. When asked how the mother could afford her living expenses if she were giving the majority of her money to her sons, the witness replied that she worried about her sons and that is what she did, she managed from what was left. The witness confirmed that the mother lived with her and that the witness worked earning approximately £1200-1300 per month and she paid the rent of £750 per month. When the brother came, he would work and when it was pointed out that he could do manual labour or work in a factory he would be able to take care of the mother.
16. She said that the appellant spoke to her mother every day for about an hour and if she did not, she was very sad. The brother offered emotional support. The mother was born in 1964 and was 61 years old. The appellant was living with his wife for one or two years before they got married at the mother’s house. They were married for 11 years and the relationship lasted for 13 years. The children were 10 or 11 years old. The wife would come and go, probably to her family home which was one or two days away. She was asked why she was not certain where she would go when they all lived together. She did not have a phone number.
17. She added that the family home was very remote and any spare money was spent on medical expenses. She was asked how the brothers intended to support themselves after the mother had died and responded that the appellant would work here and support them. She said that the legal expenses were paid for by borrowing money from relatives like the uncles from the village. No one would help the appellant if he needed it. He was lent money to fund his legal fees.
18. It was confirmed there was no list of expenses in the bundle. Neither the appellant nor his brothers had ever worked.
19. Mrs Rai, the appellant’s mother, gave oral evidence, and she adopted her witness statements. She stated she was not educated and she gave her money to her daughter. She received Rs 25400 per month as a war pension. This money she used to send to the appellant in Nepal. When asked if she sent money to her other sons, she said everything was included in this and all three sons lived together and they spent money together on foods and living in the house built by her husband. They had never worked and paid for the gas and electricity out of the money sent to them. There was no space to grow anything. The appellant had no source of income ‘at the moment’. The children were with the daughter in law. She stated they did not know where they were staying. She sent £100 per month and on the income left they managed. She spoke to the appellant once or twice on Viber sometimes daily and sometimes weekly. She talked about the same as before her husband died. Until now the sons had not worked and not done anything. Until now she had been taking care of them. She confirmed that she had visited Nepal in November 2023 and in 2025. The daughter in law had left and they did not know where she was. The mother stated she left 9 or 10 years ago in about 2014/215 and was asked why then they were married until April 2022 when they were divorced and she stated that they were living in the home from 2011 to 2022.
20. In submissions, Ms Clewley stated that the essential evidence of a breakdown of costs was missing. There was no schedule of costs from the appellant mother and sister or how they supported themselves or indeed how the appellant lived. It was not even clear how much was sent. There were no statements from the brothers on the amount they spent. There was no evidence of the steps to find work and why they were not successful. Financial support was not in itself sufficient and whether the sums sent went to the core of the living expenses. She referenced the case of Kumari. There was no information on whether the money was going to core expenses.
21. The appellant had been married for 11 years and had two children. That the wife liked to spend money was inconsistent with the decision to marry the appellant in the first place. The appellant had formed his own family life separate from that of his parents.
22. Although the emotional support was said to be from the appellant being dependent on his mother in fact the evidence pointed in the other direction. Calling a mother after the passing of her husband was what was expected.
23. In terms of the visits the mother had visited on 2 occasions in 2023-2024 and again in September to November 2025. This however merely showed she visited her own country. The letter from the Dharan Municipality of 20th January 2026 was said to be for official purposes but did not confine itself to relevant issues but commented on whether the appellant was being sent money remittances.
24. Rai v ECO, New Delhi [2017] EWCA Civ 320 was discredited in IA at [75] and [76] and [77] and discussed at [128]. The test now was that dependency was required not merely support.
25. Ms Clewley submitted that family life was not engaged. She repeated that there was no breakdown of costs of living from the appellant and on the one hand the money transferred was said to be only Rs 20,000 but higher amounts were being transferred. The appellant was living with his two brothers and there were no statements from them. The appellant had been married for 11 years before and had two children. He now received money from his mother and supplemented by cash remittances. He is not working and had no day-to-day commitments and there was no reason why he did not walk to his wife’s material home and see the children. The financial evidence was insufficient.
26. In relation to the emotional support this was presented as the appellant being dependent on his mother, but he was living with other adults (brothers) and did not require support from his mother. His contact with his mother after the death of her husband was no more than expected. The letter from the Dharan sub metropolitan municipality as to the property went beyond what was normally to be expected in an official letter. The appellant had married after the father discovered he could apply for settlement and that indicated a breaking of family life.
27. Mr West relied on the previous skeleton argument, and he acknowledged the modification of the test in IA [2025] EWCA Civ 1516.
28. He advanced that, on balance, the mother and daughter had been credible witness. Taking a holistic view of the evidence, it was broadly consistent. Article 8(1) was the key issue and the threshold for engagement of family life was low. The appellant had lived in his family home for his entire life and had shown family life. Mobeen see [2021] EWCA Civ 886 at [46] referred to the additional elements of emotional and financial dependency. Even when the appellant was married he and the children lived in the family home. The family life was not broken. The appellant did not have a job. In terms of him not working the cultural context needed to be understood. The appellant lived in a remote area. The sister was now working in a factory in the UK but, as uneducated, had not worked before in Nepal.
29. It was open to the Tribunal to attach weight to the letter from the Municipality and significant amounts of money were transferred each month to the appellant and this was reflected in the bundle. The question was whether family life existed at the date of the departure of the family. The father came in 2023, and the appellant had divorced by that point, and he was single and his children gone to live with their mother. Paragraph 7 of the appellant’s witness statement referenced the money sent to him monthly and at [8] that he spoke to his mother daily. The presenting officer had not sought to challenge the bank statements. The passport stamps were shown. Jharna Chowk was 10 kilometres from Dharan, and I was told it took an hour to get there. There was no adverse immigration history and in effect if family life were found the appeal should be allowed.
30. Mr West relied on the bundle. On balance the mother and daughter had been credible witnesses and dependency had been shown. There were additional elements of dependence. Rai at [39] was still relevant. The appellant was uneducated and had to rely on his parents. The mother had made long visits to see her son, and this was shown by the passport stamps. There is a good deal of evidence. The context coloured the application of article 8(1). Had the father, who had been discharged in 1971, been able to settle years ago he would have settled with this appellant. I was invited to allow the appeal.
Discussion and conclusions
31. The family were granted a settlement visa to enter the UK on 6th April 2023, and the appellant had applied simultaneously with his mother and sister to settle in the UK and using the funds secured by borrowing by his parents. The father died on 8th November 2923 some 6 months after their arrival in the United Kingdom, and, it was submitted in effect, that the sponsor and wife had only departed for the UK in June 2023 and in effect their family life had been maintained.
32. The question of family life is fact sensitive. Previously Rai at para 17 had set out the relevant test as being “…what may constitute an extant family life falls well short of what constitutes dependency…”
33. IA v Secretary of State however, at [10] held
‘The real, effective or committed support test is lower than the additional elements of dependence test.’
34. At [50] IA cited various principles from Kumari v Netherlands Application no. 44051/20 as follows:
‘family life for the purpose of Article 8 of the Convention is normally limited to the core family (see Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, §§ 94 and 97, ECHR 2003-X) and that there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate "additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties"
…
‘Financial dependency on its own has never been considered sufficient to constitute additional ties of dependency, and accordingly family life between adult family members.’
35. IA advances at [68] that
‘As will appear, we do not think that he [Sedley LJ] was right to think that the need for additional elements of dependency should be read down to an irreducible minimum of real, committed or effective support, that need for additional elements of dependency should be read down to an irreducible minimum of real, committed or effective support.’
36. An earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Gurung [2013] EWCA Civ 8, comprising a senior panel of the Master of the Rolls, Sullivan LJ and Patten LJ, specifically held at [45] and [50] that
‘45.Ultimately, the question whether an individual enjoys family life is one of fact and depends on a careful consideration of all the relevant facts of the particular case….’
37. The test in Rai at para 17 had set out the relevant test as being “…what may constitute an extant family life falls well short of what constitutes dependency…” but as to Rai, IA at [77] said this
‘It is worth pointing out that, in our judgment, this approach lost sight of the ECtHR authorities we have mentioned (prior to Rai – such as S v. UK and A W Khan - see [42]-[45] above), and of Beoku-Betts at [39], that made clear that the test was "additional elements of dependency", rather than "real, committed or effective support".
38. Ultimately thus at [116] Laing LJ in IA opined
‘We are clearly of the view that the correct test is the one enunciated by the ECtHR in Kumari at [35] and by the House of Lords in Beoku-Betts at [39].’
39. The House of Lords decision in Beoku-Betts [2008] UKHL 39 held as follows:
"[R]elationships between adults do not necessarily benefit from protection under article 8 of the Convention unless the existence of additional elements of dependence, other than normal emotional ties, can be proven."
40. I was told that I should treat the mother as a vulnerable witness in accordance with the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance and AM (Afghanistan) [2017] EWCA Civ 1123. However, the mother was born in 1964, thus 61 years old, and I was given no medical evidence as to any cognitive issues nor indeed any medical evidence of frailties and on that basis, apart from the fact that she was giving evidence in court in a foreign land, there was no reason to conclude she was unable to give oral evidence. She appeared well able to give evidence through a Nepalese interpreter.
41. A factor in this appeal is that the appellant was married in 2011 and said to have been divorced in 2022 immediately before the application for the father, mother and sister to leave for the UK. There is no doubt that the appellant had formed his own ‘core’ family unit. The appellant, however, maintained that the whole family unit had always been dependant on the father and he continued to be now dependant on the mother. They had all lived together in the family home.
42. It was the appellant’s case that he remained living rent free in the family home in Nepal, the same as he always had and – on the evidence – as he always will be allowed to so do. Until his father’s death this was due to the support of his father, the owner of the house. Thereafter it was due to the support of his mother who has inherited the house – as she stated in her oral evidence at the appeal hearing - from her late husband. The appellant and his parents and sister all lived with him in the same house in Nepal until recently, specifically 30 June 2023 (when they entered the UK).
43. In her statement of September 2023, the mother referred to the appellant as single and unemployed and confirmed that the appellant was living ‘in our house at Jharna Chowk, Dharan Sub Metropolitan City ward no 5, Sunsari district, Nepal.’ She added ‘We have been taking care of our son, Kiran, since he is single and unemployed.’
44. The first witness statement of the mother specifically referred to the house in which the appellant lived in as ‘our’ house but for the remaking hearing before me a letter from the Dharan Sub-Metropolitan City confirmed that the government did not issue land ownership Certificate to the owners as the house was built on public land but the family ‘have been permanently residing for a long period of time in the house’ and prior to their departure the appellant was living with the family. This letter did record that ‘After the death of Mr Lal Bahadur Rai on 8th November 2023 , the house’s ownership is automatically transferred to Mrs Mina Kumari Rai as she is the family head now.’, but the fact is that the house was built on land which was public land and this was confirmed in the Municipality letter. Indeed, the mother’s evidence was also that the house was built on the land for the ‘homeless’. I thus do not accept that the house was merely at the largesse of the family rather than the local municipality.
45. I also agree with Ms Clewley’s submissions that the letter appeared to depart from its remit of confirming house ownership and official purposes when referring to the emotional ties and finances of the family, but it was clear as to the ownership of the land on which the house was built which was publicly owned.
46. The evidence before me to establish that the mother and sister provide financial support to the appellant since the death of the appellant’s father was presented although some of it in duplicate form. There were bank account statements provided showing the transfer of funds to the appellant and RIA receipts confirming cash funds from the appellant’s mother. The appellant confirmed in his statement of September 2023 that his father had transferred NR 20000 (then approximately £125 and now £100) to his account which he used to buy food items clothes and for household expenses and that his monthly expenses were Rs 20,000 on average. Ms Clewley submitted there were contradictions in the evidence as to whether Rs 20,000 or in fact Rs 40,000 was sent.
47. There is a letter on file from the late father dated 4th May 2023 to Gurkha Finance confirming that he had cancelled the mother’s authority to operate the account and transferred authority from the mother to the appellant to conduct the account and it was requested that the bank should approve all the appellant’s transactions forthwith. In July and August 2023 withdrawals by the appellant are listed on the account of Rs 20000 in each month. There is no indication that that instruction was cancelled but the father’s death must have intervened.
48. On 16th November 2025 the mother wrote to Gurkha Finance stating that Rs 20,000 be transferred from her account to that of the appellant’s Ac No ***********494-000001 and until further notice from the mother. This transfer did not commence until after the appeal had commenced. There were transfers of RS 20,000 evidenced in November 2025, December 2025.
49. Prior to that there were cash transfers via the Post Office from the mother to the appellant on 13th March 2024 (£120), 8th April 2024 (£150), 7th May 2024 ((£186.05), 9th July 2024 (£118.11), 12th August 2024, (£129.62), 4th February 2025 (£102.99) 17th March 2025 (£50), 9th December 2025 (£102.99), (a number of these were duplicated in the bundle). Evidence of RIA transfers were also produced dated 24th April 2025 (£63) 8th September 2025 £100
50. There is a letter from Gurkha Finance dated 21st January 2026 regarding Account No ***********560-00001 (in the name of the mother) confirming a regular transfer in the sum of Rs 20,000 to the appellant from his mother.
51. The statements of the account ***********494-000001 of the appellant showed a credit in the sum of Rs 20,000 for January, February, March and April 2026.
52. Additionally, there were RIA transfers of cash of £97.01 on 1st April 2026 for ‘family assistance’, 26th March 2026 of £57.01, 24th February 2026 of £97.01, on 23rd January 2026 of £97.01. The appellant in his witness statement of 2023 and February 2026 stated, ‘In addition, my mother also transfer money to me by way of remittance for my love and affection towards me’.
53. During her oral evidence, however, the mother in fact said that the sister had control of the finances. Bearing in mind the mother in her statement dated 20th September 2023 at [2] confirmed that she could not read or write Nepali, could not add numbers higher than 10, could not read a calendar and could not read write or speak English I do not accept that it was the mother who organised the financial transfers or wrote the letters to arrange any transfer. The transfers were ostensibly to the appellant but from the evidence it was not clear how much was retained by the appellant. As pointed out, there were no statements from the brothers as to their financial circumstances.
54. Both the mother and sister said the appellant had never worked. The sister said the house where the appellant lived was in a very remote area 10 kilometres away from Dharan, but the mother stated that the house was connected to gas and electricity. Even the address identifies that it is in a municipality of Dharan. I find it curious that being in a very remote area that the house would be connected to both gas and electricity. Moreover, as pointed out at the hearing Dharan is a tourist city. In effect I did not find it credible that the appellant had never worked in the whole of his life. I was not presented with statistics showing very high unemployment near a tourist city and I simply do not accept that neither the appellant nor either of his two brothers had ever worked (which is the evidence given), even seasonally or even temporarily. That was simply not credible. Ms Rai was very confident, when asked, that the appellant could secure work on entry to the UK despite him being wholly uneducated which was the main reason she gave for the appellant and his siblings being unable to get work in Nepal.
55. The mother also told the court that she in fact gave her money to her daughter and that they manage notwithstanding that she gave most of her war pension and extra cash from her universal credit to the appellant (and indeed which was questioned). I conclude that it is the sister who organises the cash transfers. The sister works and the mother lives with the sister and the rent paid on their joint accommodation is approximately £750 per month which the sister said she paid. In effect the sister is providing the funds for the mother to transfer her pension and universal credit (benefits) to the appellant and his brothers.
56. The expenses of the appellant were not set out. There was no schedule as to the costs. He has two brothers who also live in the home but there was no detail as to their income or expenses or how much of the money sent is transferred to them, save that they also do not work. It was not clear whether the funds provided for essential needs for mere extras. The appellant’s witness statement of 4th February 2026 at [3] and both the sister and mother said the money was transferred for ‘his’ [the appellant’s] needs and made no mention of the money which went to the brothers. This was not satisfactorily addressed.
57. In the father’s (sadly now deceased) statement dated 13th September 2023 he confirmed at [6] that the appellant ‘shares money with his brothers’. There was no indication of the split of the transferred funds.
58. I also found the evidence in relation to the appellant’s ex-wife not credible. The Tribunal was told by the sister, Ms Rai, that the wife had lived with the appellant for two years and then married him but that she liked money and shopping. It is not credible that having lived with an unemployed brother for two years she would then decide to marry him knowing that he was without work and dependent on his father. At that point the family were without the universal credit said to now fund some of the money transfers. The father’s statement referenced that they could not access funds as the mother was too young and friends assisted them on entry to the UK.
59. It would appear from the documentation that the appellant and his wife divorced on 27th April 2022 prior to the departure of the father, mother and sister for the UK (as noted the appellant applied with them but was refused). According to the oral evidence of the mother, the children had been taken by the mother when she left on divorce and the wife was uncontactable and they did not know where she was. The sister, in fact, said she had gone to the family home, but the mother said they did not know where she had gone.
60. Further, the sister said there was no telephone at the house of the appellant’s family’s ex-wife. The sister gave evidence that she lived two days walk away but could not be contacted by telephone because there was no phone. That was contradicted by the witness statement of the appellant dated 19th September 2023 at [3] where the appellant actually states that she went to ‘live in her maternal home’ and that he ‘called her but she did not pick up phone’. If they had all been living together as stated prior to the appellant’s family moving to the UK, I do not accept that the sister would not know whether there was a phone or that the mother did not know where she was. I was not being provided with an accurate picture of the circumstances. Again, I do not accept that, bearing in mind the evidence (see [12] of the mother’s statement dated 20th September 2023) which itself emphasised the very strong cultural family connection and responsibility taken by parents, that the family would not know where the children were or the son would had never provided for them save through the father’s pension/income but moreover that he had not even tried to find where the children were. At the very least the evidence of the mother and sister was contradictory as to the ex-wife and lacking as to the provision for the children.
61. The mother told the court, contrary to the appellant’s witness statement and the sister’s oral evidence that she spoke to the appellant ‘sometimes daily’ but ‘sometimes weekly’. In her witness statement of February 2026, she said she spoke to him every day. The appellant said he spoke to her daily, and the sister told the court that she spoke to the appellant daily for an hour each day and would be sad if she did not. I found that this evidence was contradictory and also reversed the emotional dependence from the appellant on the mother to the mother on the appellant. The online calls are recorded in relation to the mother but bearing in mind there are said to be a number of people in the house the person receiving the call could be any one of a number of people. The mother indicated the sister organised the calls. The screenshots of the mother and appellant appeared to represent a number of calls but do not underline emotional dependence in the circumstances of a large family.
62. It is clear from the file that both the mother and sister have visited the appellant, funds permitting, twice since they entered the UK in 2023. The mother travelled to Nepal to visit the appellant from 19th November 2023 to 1st January 2024 (42 days) and again from 12th September 2025 to 18th November 2025 (66 days) the mother was in Nepal. That can be seen from the appellant’s witness statement of February 2026. The visits have been for extended periods (months) rather than very quick trips, but it is also clear that there is extended family in the form of trips, brothers and uncles who will lend money in Nepal. I accept that following the death of the father the mother may well have become closer to her son and vice versa, but I am not persuaded owing to the contradictions that the support is more than normal emotional ties. It would be expected that a mother and son would contact each other and visit.
63. Overall, I found the evidence unreliable. The sister failed to explain adequately why the appellant had never had a job even one with no education. Initially her stance was that it was not possible to obtain work without an education, but she then said he did try to find but never found work. I was not presented with any employment statistics. To suggest that a male in his prime had never worked not even temporary work and that he had never provided any financial support to his wife and children is not plausible. Even his father stated the appellant had never had a ‘proper job’. His sister told the tribunal that he never found a job which I simply do not accept. To suggest that there was no building or agricultural or tourism work (and it was pointed out at the hearing that Dharan is a tourist centre) is in my view is simply unsustainable. I am not suggesting that the appellant has to work but that the evidence presented was simply not plausible and reliable and I am not persuaded, as the ECO pointed out, that the full picture of the appellant’s and his family circumstances was being drawn by the witnesses.
64. On the test as articulated in IA, I am not persuaded there is family life between the appellant and his mother (or indeed sister) in the UK, or the appellant had family life at the point of departure of the mother and father to the UK. The appellant had a family of his own for many years and still has children in Nepal, and although I am told he has no contact with them, I found the evidence relating to the wife and family unreliable. Addressing Beoku-Betts, I rely on my consideration of the emotional relationship with the mother above. I consider that the appellant lives on land which is in fact publicly owned and as his mother said, it is land which is for the homeless (even if they built a house there) and from the evidence, he has a right to remain on the land notwithstanding the mother’s claim to the structure. The picture on the finances was not clear and incomplete.
65. As such the first hurdle of Razgar [2004] UKHL 27 is not fulfilled. No exceptional circumstances were put forward. Additionally, the Secretary of State properly applied the Immigration rules and the relevant test under Agyarko [2017] UKSC 11 of any unjustifiably harsh consequences was not fulfilled.

Notice of Decision
Appeal dismissed.

Helen Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Signed 22nd July 2026