Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-001730

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58430/2022 IA/00229/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

JK
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Mr T Merck, Counsel instructed by AJ Bradley and Co
For the Respondent: Mr A Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Edinburgh Tribunals Hearing Centre on 14 May 2025
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Sierra Leone. He was born in July 2007 and is now 18 years old. In July 2021, when he was 14, he made an application to enter the UK as a child of someone in the UK with refugee leave or humanitarian protection. The application was refused by the respondent on 1 November 2022. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) Judge Fox (“the FtT judge”) for reasons set out in a decision dated 4 December 2023. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The decision of the FtT judge was set aside by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Wilding for reasons set out in a decision dated 21 February 2025 (“the error of law decision”). This decision must therefore be read alongside that error of law decision.
2. In the error of law decision, the Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge noted the appellant does not challenge the finding of the FtT judge that the appellant cannot meet the requirements of the immigration rules. The Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge was however concerned that the FtT judge had not had regard to, and made findings upon material evidence. The Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge was also concerned that no clear finding was made as to whether Article 8 is in fact engaged. The decision of the FtT judge was therefore set aside and it was directed that the decision will be remade in the Upper Tribunal. It is against that background that the appeal was listed for further hearing before me.
The Preserved Findings
3. The Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge recorded at paragraph [21(b)] of the error of law decision that the following findings of the FtT are preserved:
“14. The Appellant claims to be the adoptive son of the sponsor and his wife. He is not related to his adoptive family by blood or marriage. They acknowledge this. They provide a detailed history as to how the Appellant came to be adopted by them and this is fully outlined in the various statements attached to the papers. I have no reason to take issue with that history.
15. However, to be identified as a child of the family unit, adopted as in this case, regard must be had to The Adoption (Recognition of Overseas Adoption Order 2013.
16. The adoption of the Appellant is, at best a de facto adoption. The adoption papers, and supporting arguments from the sponsor and Ms. Lau are insufficient to demonstrate that the Appellant can meet the requirements of the above adoption legislation as well as Paragraph 352D (i). Sierra Leone is not a country whose adoption orders are recognised by the UK. The source of the adoption papers and the history surrounding them does not override the recognition of such documents from Sierra Leone. Miss Lau does not challenge this either in her submissions or in the skeleton argument. The Appellant cannot be taken as a child of the family, adopted or otherwise, so as to meet the requirements outlined in the Immigration Rules.
17. As noted above I am happy to accept that there may be some form of adoption that took place. This does not bring the Appellant within the Immigration Rules.
…
23. Photographs have been provided in the papers and the sponsor and his wife have identified the Appellant in those photographs. I have no reason to doubt their evidence on this.
24. While the sponsor and his family remained in the country, the Appellant's father visited his son. There is no evidence that the Appellant’s Father and blood family are not still in contact (save for the mere averment of the sponsor) particularly since the sponsor and his family moved to the UK. There is no evidence of attempts to contact the Appellant’s blood family, prior to hearing. This omission has not been explained. That blood family still remain in the Appellant’s home country, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
25. I accept that the Appellant has resided with the sponsor’s family for a period of time 2015-2020. The degree of bonding within that time frame is yet to be established.”
The Hearing of the Appeal Before Me
4. The appellant’s sponsor, his wife and one of their children attended the hearing and gave evidence before me with the assistance of an interpreter translating the Krio and English languages. I was satisfied that the interpreter arranged by the Tribunal and the sponsor and his wife were able to understand and communicate in a language they understand. At the outset of the hearing Mr Merck confirmed that the issue in the appeal is the appellant’s Article 8 claim outside the immigration rules. He confirmed that the appellant relies upon the evidence of the appellant, sponsor, his wife and their children.
5. The sponsor, who I refer to as [AC] is a national of Sierra Leone. He adopted his statements dated 1st February 2023, 5th September 2023, 25 November 2024, and 22 April 2025. He confirmed that the biological father of the appellant is Mohammed Kanneh (“Mr Kanneh”), a friend of his. He claims he no longer has any contact with Mr Kanneh and he does not know whether he is alive or not. AC claimed he has not been able to contact Mr Kanneh since he fell ill. In his witness statement dated 14 February 2023, AC claims Mr Kanneh had told him he was sick and having problems with his kidneys. AC confirmed in his evidence in chief that when they last spoke Mr Kanneh did say he was having problems with his kidneys.
6. AC describes the relationship between him and the appellant as a ‘father and son relationship’. He described having met Mr Kanneh when he went to Kono city for business. Mr Kanneh assisted him and they became friends. They spoke about the appellant and Mr Kanneh asked AC to assist with the appellant’s schooling in Freetown. AC consulted his wife, who I refer to as [HC], and she agreed that they would look after the appellant and provide him with a quality education in Freetown. When AC returned to Kono he met with Mr Kanneh again and they followed a tradition by which the appellant was handed over to AC. AC returned to Freetown and Mr Kanneh took the appellant to Freetown to join AC and HC. Mr Kanneh stayed in Freetown for one night with the appellant before returning home to take care of his business. AC said in his oral evidence that he had taken on the responsibility for the appellant because Mr Kanneh did not have the means to provide the appellant with a quality education and to provide a better life.
7. In cross examination, AC said that he had been doing business with Mr Kanneh for about three months when he was asked to adopt the appellant. He said they had built a relationship and Mr Kanneh wanted him to look after his son. The appellant lived with AC and HC from 2015 and until AC left in 2020. Mr Kanneh kept in touch with the appellant and visited them. Mr Kanneh would bring rice and palm oil as a show of appreciation to AC and HC for looking after his son. AC accepted there had been no formal court approved adoption because of the costs, but said they had gone to a ‘justice of the peace’ who signed the documents for them. The costs of the formal court adoption process would have had to be paid by Mr Kanneh but he could not afford that. AC said that he too could not afford the relevant costs and fees.
8. In answer to questions put to AC for clarification, AC confirmed that he had first met Mr Kanneh in 2014. He said the appellant’s mother had passed away after that and that the appellant’s mother was still alive when Mr Kanneh had asked AC to look after the appellant and provide him with an education. She was still alive when the appellant had first come to live with them and she passed away whilst the appellant was living with them. She had never visited the appellant when he was living with AC and HC, and all that AC knew about her death was that “she fell ill”. AC said that he had last spoken to Mr Kanneh after he had arrived in the UK. Mr Kanneh had called him and when AC had subsequently tried to call Mr Kanneh, he could not get through to him. AC said that he had last spoken to his sister-in-law (i.e. HC’s sister) in 2024. He said that he has not spoken to her since because she did not take care of the appellant and left him on the streets. He said the appellant is now living in an orphanage, and has done so since 2024. He speaks to the appellant weekly. I asked AC about the breakdown in the relationship between the appellant and AC’s sister-in-law. He explained that the appellant was refused entry clearance to the UK and was left in the care of his sister-in-law when HC travelled to the UK with their children. He said his sister-in-law has eight children and that after HC travelled to the UK, his sister-in-law left. Her husband had come to take care of his own children but there was no-one left to care for the appellant. AC said that there had been some misunderstanding between his sister-in-law and her husband and “she left to go to the countryside to do business”. That was in 2023, after HC had arrived in the UK.
9. In re-examination, AC said that he has tried to reassure the appellant that he should remain patient because he does not find life easy in the orphanage. He confirmed that the appellant speaks to the family often although they would like to speak more.
10. HC was called to give evidence and adopted her witness statement dated 14 February 2023. In cross-examination she said that the appellant had lived with their family since he was eight years old. He was about fourteen years old when she left Sierra Leone to come to the UK. She said that the appellant’s father was ill at the time and so she had left the appellant living with her sister. When asked what is wrong with Mr Kanneh, HC said that “He has blindness. He has gone blind”. When asked why AC had claimed Mr Kanneh had problems with his kidneys and made no reference to him having gone blind, HC maintained that after her arrival in the UK, she had learnt that Mr Kanneh had gone blind.
11. By way of clarification, I asked HC about the health of Mr Kanneh. She said that when she was travelling to the UK she met a friend of her husband who did business in the same village as Mr Kanneh. He had told her that Mr Kanneh had gone blind. I asked her where she was when she was told that and she said that she was at the airport about to catch the flight to the UK. When she arrived in the UK she informed her husband.
12. HC said that she had last spoken to her sister about four months ago and her sister was in Waterloo, Freetown at the time. She was told that the appellant had been living on the streets but is now in ‘Deepeyewater’, in an orphanage that is owned by AC’s friend. I asked her why the appellant was not living with her sister. She said that her sister had ‘left for the country’ and there was not enough food for all the children. She explained that her sister had gone to the provinces to buy food and goods for her business. She claimed she did not ask her sister whether she would be returning home following the visit to the provinces.
13. In re-examination, HC said that when she last spoke to her sister, her sister was in the province and she understood she would be returning home although she did not ask her other questions. She claims that she was told that the appellant had left and she “didn’t bother to go any further than that”. She said that when she speaks to the appellant he has confirmed that he has left her sister’s home. When asked about the health or Mr Kanneh and whether he had gone ‘partially blind’ or ‘blind’, HC confirmed that she was told that he had gone blind and cannot see.
14. Finally, I heard evidence from one of the son’s of AC and HC, who I shall refer to as [IC]. He is now fifteen years old and adopted his statements dated 22 April 2025 and 14 March 2023. He confirmed that when he lived in Sierra Leone he had lived with his parents and siblings, including the appellant. When asked how he now maintains contact with the appellant, IC said that he is able to speak to the appellant via his father’s friend. As the appellant does not have a phone, when his father’s friend visits the appellant, usually at weekends to check up on him and take food to him, his father’s friend calls the family and they are able to speak to the appellant. In re-examination, IC said that he does not know whether his father’s friend simply visits the appellant or stays with him.
15. At the conclusion of the evidence I heard submissions from each of the representatives. They are a matter of record and I do not recite them at length in this decision.
16. In summary, Mr Mullen submits the appellant has failed to establish that he has an Article 8 family life with AC, HC and their children. He is not a blood relative and there is no formal adoption. He submits that at its highest the appellant has established a private life with AC, HC and their family, but has at least one blood relative, his father, living in Sierra Leone. Mr Mullen submits the evidence of the witnesses is unreliable as far as the appellant’s circumstances are concerned, and that on any view, the refusal of entry clearance is not disproportionate.
17. For his part, Mr Merck accepts there is no evidence before the Tribunal from the orphanage in which the appellant is said to be living, although there is a photograph (page 136 of the consolidated bundle) of the appellant at or near the orphanage. Mr Merck accepts the evidence of the death of the appellant’s mother and the health of Mr Kanneh is limited to the written and oral evidence of AC and HC. He accepts there is no independent or expert evidence regarding the health of the appellant or the circumstances in which he continues to live in Sierra Leone . He submits that on the evidence there is sufficient to demonstrate that the appellant has established a family life with AC and his family and that the departure of the rest of the family from Sierra Leone has had an impact on the appellant’s living arrangements. There is evidence of the relationship the appellant has established with the children of AC and HC and the appellant has been left distressed and with a feeling of solitude. There is evidence of the appellant’s educational achievements between October 2015 and August 2021 and he was described by the ‘Rising Academy Network’ as being hardworking and someone who had served the role of a school prefect for two years. Mr Merck submits AC and HC have voluntarily assumed responsibility for the appellant and that the decision to refuse entry clearance so that he can continue living with his adoptive family is disproportionate.
Decision
18. The appellant has appealed the respondent’s decision to refuse his application for leave to enter the UK under s.82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 on the ground that the decision is unlawful under s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The appellant relies upon Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). The burden of proof is upon the appellant to show, on the balance of probabilities, that he has established a family and/or private life and that the refusal of entry clearance as a result of the respondent’s decision, would interfere with that right. It is then for the respondent to justify any interference caused. The respondent’s decision must be in accordance with the law and must be a proportionate response in all the circumstances.
19. In reaching my decision I have had regard to all the evidence before me, whether or not it is referred to. I have also had regard to the submissions made by the representatives both in writing and orally before me although I do not consider it necessary to address everything that is said. I have had in mind throughout, the preserved findings that are set out at paragraph [3]. I have also had regard to the witness statement of the appellant dated 25 March 2025, in which he confirms he is now living in an orphanage in the Deepeyewater area of Freetown. He sets out the circumstances in which he came to be living at the orphanage.
20. The appellant was a child aged fourteen when he made his application to the respondent. There is a preserved finding that AC and HC have provided a detailed history as to how the appellant came to be adopted by them and there is no reason to take issue with what they have said about that. There is also a preserved finding that there may be some form of adoption that took place, albeit that does not bring the appellant within the Immigration Rules.
21. The appellant had been living with AC, HC and their children since 2015. There is in the evidence before me a letter dated 9 August 2021 from the ‘Rising Academy Network’ that confirms the appellant was registered for enrolment into one of their network of schools on 15 October 2015 until 2021. There is reference to “regular visits by his adopter/foster father, AC, between 2015 and 2018. The letter states AC has demonstrated a commitment to the appellant’s academic work and attended meeting regularly and was paying his school fees.
22. I accept that the appellant lived with AC and HC between 2015 and 2020 until AC left Sierra Leone and then with HC, until she and their children left Sierra Leone in January 2023. There are photographs in the evidence before me of the appellant, at home with the children of AC and HC. I accept the evidence of AC that he came to an agreement with Mr Kanneh in 2015 that the appellant should live with AC and his family so that the appellant could be provided with a ‘better life’ and an ‘education’ in Freetown. Although there was no formal court approved adoption there is evidence that I accept in the form of a document headed ‘Agreement for the Adoption of My child’ between AC and Mr Kanneh which confirms that Mr Kanneh has agreed ‘in principle’ to give his son, the appellant for adoption to AC. The agreement serves also as consent for the appellant, whenever the need arises, to travel with AC.
23. Although the appellant is not the biological child of AC and HC, ‘ family life’ for the purposes of Article 8 can extend beyond biological relationships and can include the relationship between an adopted child and adoptive parents and a foster parent and fostered child. I am prepared to accept that the appellant has established a family life with AC, HC and their children. In any event, I accept the appellant has lived with AC, HC and their children for several years and even if the relationships they have established did not amount to ‘family life’ for the purposes of Article 8, they undoubtedly do form part of the private life the appellant has undoubtedly established over the years. I therefore accept the appellant has established a family and/or private life with AC, HC and their children and Article 8 is engaged.
24. I find that the decision to refuse the appellant leave to enter has consequences of such gravity as to engage the operation of Article 8. I accept that the interference is in accordance with the law, and that the interference is necessary to protect the legitimate aim of immigration control and the economic well-being of the country. The issue in this appeal, as is often the case, is whether the interference is proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved.
25. In reaching my decision, I have had regard to the best interests of the appellant who was a child at the date of the respondent’s decision. In CAO (Respondent) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) (Northern Ireland) [2024] UKSC 32, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning and effect of Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 ("Section 55") and its interaction with Article 8 ECHR. The Supreme Court confirmed that the best interests of the child must be treated as a primary consideration in relation to decisions affecting that child. That does not imply that it is the most crucial factor and 0ther factors must be weighed against it and may even outweigh it. In ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4, Lady Hale confirmed that the best interests of a child are “a primary consideration”, which, she emphasised, was not the same as “the primary consideration”, still less “the paramount consideration”.
26. As a starting point, I readily accept that the best interests of a child are usually best served by being with both or at least one of their parents. Here, the appellant does not seek to join his biological parents in the UK, but to join AC and HC, who have been, to a large extent, responsible for the care of the appellant for a period of about eight years between 2015 and 2023. There is however a preserved finding that whilst AC, HC and their children remained in Sierra Leone, the appellant's father visited his son. The FtT judge noted there was no evidence that the appellant’s father and blood family are not still in contact with the appellant (save for the mere averment of the sponsor) particularly since AC and HC moved to the UK. The FtT judge said there was no evidence of attempts to contact the appellant’s ‘blood family’, prior to the hearing before the FtT. The FtT judge said the appellant’s ‘blood family’ still remain in the Sierra Leone, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
27. The evidence before me regarding the death of the appellant’s biological mother is limited, inconsistent and vague. The appellant claimed in his application (made on 26 July 2021) that his “mum passed away in 2014”. That is at odds with the evidence of AC that the appellant joined him and his family in Freetown in 2015 and that the appellant’s mother was alive at the time. AC said in his evidence that the appellant’s mother had passed away whilst the appellant was living with them although he could provide no details of the cause of her death. It is simply contrary to common sense and human behaviour that shortly after AC and his wife assumed responsibility for the care of the appellant, they would not have been curious about the cause of the death of the appellant’s mother. AC was of an age that he would clearly have some recollection of his mother and was likely to ask questions himself regarding the death of his mother, at a time when his father had continued to visit him. Furthermore, in her witness statement, HC claims the appellant’s mother had been seriously ill. She claims the appellant’s mother was brought to Freetown to receive medical treatment, but the hospital could not help her. She was taken back to the village where she later passed away. HC claims Mr Kanneh was then struggling to look after the appellant properly and asked them to take the appellant. Contrary to the oral evidence of AC, on HC’s account of events, it was the death of the appellant’s mother that caused his father to ask for assistance rather than the appellant’s mother passing away after the appellant had gone to live with AC and HC in Freetown.
28. On 16 August 2022, the respondent made further enquiries with the appellant’s representatives (AJ Bradley & Co) regarding the application made by the appellant. The respondent expressly noted that the appellant claims his mother has passed away and requested a ‘death certificate’ to support the claim. The appellant’s representatives responded by email on 22 August 2021 and said that AC is waiting for a copy of the death certificate to be sent to him. Despite the lengthy passage of time, the death certificate has not been provided either to the respondent, the FtT or in support of the hearing of the appeal before me.
29. On the evidence before me, I cannot be satisfied that the appellant’s mother has passed away as he claims. In any event, even if she has passed away, it is clear from the evidence and I find, that the appellant’s biological father, who maintained contact with the appellant whilst the appellant lived with AC and HC, remains in Sierra Leone. I reject the evidence of AC that he no longer has any contact with Mr Kanneh and that he does not know whether he is alive. Having entrusted the care of the appellant to AC and HC, there is no credible reason why Mr Kanneh should cut off all communication with AC. The evidence of AC is that he last spoke to Mr Kanneh after AC had arrived in the UK. Mr Kanneh plainly had the contact details for AC. There is no credible reason for AC not to also have had the contact details for Mr Kanneh. The evidence of AC was clear that Mr Kanneh was ill and that he was suffering from ‘kidney problem’. He has never made any mention of Mr Kanneh having problems with his vision or to have lost his sight. The evidence of AC is entirely at odds with the evidence of HC who claims that at the airport, just as she was about to leave Sierra Leone, she was told that Mr Kanneh had gone blind and that she had informed her husband about that. She could offer no explanation as to why her husband believed Mr Kanneh’s ill-health related to a ‘kidney problem’. I do not accept the evidence of AC that he no longer has any contact with Mr Kanneh and I find that Mr Kanneh continues to have contact with his son, as he did prior to the departure of AC and HC from Sierra Leone.
30. I also reject the evidence that the appellant is no longer cared for by HC’s sister who was looking after the appellant when HC left Sierra Leone in 2023. In her witness statement dated 14 February 2023, HC acknowledged, at paragraph [13] that the appellant has his father and aunt to turn to in Sierra Leone albeit she does not consider it to be in his best interests to live with either of them. In his witness statement dated 23 March 2025 the appellant claims that when HC left Sierra Leone he was staying with his aunt. He claims she stopped taking care of him and that they later found out that she had gone to the provinces. He claims her husband used to come to the house but was not taking care of the appellant. He claims he left the house in 2024 and was found in a ghetto area and taken to the orphanage.
31. There is no evidence before me that the appellant is in fact living in an orphanage. That is particularly curious because in her evidence before me, HC claimed that the appellant is in an orphanage that is owned by AC’s friend. It is in my judgment evidence that would readily be available. I do not accept that the appellant was effectively abandoned by his aunt because she had gone to the provinces. In their evidence it was clear to me that AC and HC sought to give the impression that the appellant had, in effect, been abandoned by his aunt. AS claimed that after HC travelled to the UK his sister-in-law left and her husband came to take care of his own children leaving no-one to care for the appellant. HC claimed her sister had ‘left for the country’. It was however clear from the evidence that I heard, and I find that when the appellant, AC and HC refer to HC’s sister having gone to the provinces or country, that is not a reference to her having abandoned her family and responsibilities, but reference to her having travelled to the provinces to buy food and goods to sell to earn an income. I was left in no doubt that HC’s sister travels to the provinces and returns home to her family.
32. In any event, even if the appellant is now living in an orphanage, whilst I accept that life will be difficult for him, he is able to maintain his relationship with his biological father, and I find he will be able to receive at least some support from his aunt, who has provided care for him since HC left. The appellant was plainly well cared for and with assistance, had the opportunity to establish a ‘better life’ and to benefit from a better education. I accept that the appellant’s separation from AC, HC and their children must be unpleasant for him just as much as it is unpleasant for them. However, his ability to join AC, HC and their children in the UK, a family with whom he lived between 2015 and 2023, must be weighed against the loss of the appellant’s relationship with his biological father in particular.
33. In Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60, Lord Reed emphasised that the failure to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules is a relevant and important consideration in an Article 8 assessment because the Immigration Rules reflect the assessment of the general public interest made by the responsible minister and endorsed by Parliament. As set out by the Court of Appeal in TZ (Pakistan) [2018] EWCA Civ 1109, compliance with the immigration rules would usually mean that there is nothing on the respondent’s side of the scales to show that the refusal of the claim could be justified. At paragraphs [32] to [34], the Senior President of Tribunals confirmed that where a person meets the rules, the human rights appeal must succeed because ‘considerable weight’ must be given to the respondent’s policy as set out in the rules. Conversely, if the rules are not met, although not determinative, that is a factor which strengthens the weight to be attached to the public interest in maintaining immigration control.
34. The importance of, and weight to be given to immigration control has been underscored by Parliament in s117 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (as amended). S117B(4) of the Act provides that little weight should be given to a private life that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully and s117(5) provides that little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person’s immigration status is precarious. The appellant is not in the UK and the appellant established his family and private life with AC, HC and their children at a time when he had no real expectation that he would be permitted to join the family in the UK. I do however attach due weigh to the family and private life established by the appellant during the time that he lived with AC, HC and their children.
35. I have also considered whether refusal of leave to enter would be a “fair balance” for the purposes of Article 8(2) ECHR. In reaching my decision I have regard to all the evidence before me and carried out an evaluative assessment of the circumstances the appellant finds himself in.
36. There are factors that weigh in favour of the appellant: (i) I accept the appellant went to reside with AC, HC and their children in 2015 when he was eight years old and that he continued to live with the family and they assumed responsibility for him until 2023; (ii) I give due weight to the family and/or private life the appellant has established at a time the appellant was a child and for reasons entirely outside his control. (iii) The appellant has completed his education; (iv) the appellant no longer has the emotional and physical support that he previously benefited from and is unable to live with the children of AC and HC with whom he will inevitably have established some bonds.
37. The appellant no doubt wishes to live in the UK with AC, HC and their children, and to build upon his achievements but that does not equate to a right to do so. Factors that weigh against the appellant include (i) the fact that the appellant maintains ties to Sierra Leone where his parents or at least his father lives and with whom the appellant maintains contact. (ii) the absence of any reliable or cogent evidence that the appellant could not live a full and successful life in Sierra Leone with the support of his biological father, (iii) in the event that the appellant lives in the UK, that would sever his relationship with his biological father.
38. In my final analysis and in carrying out the balancing exercise, I have also had regard to the respondent’s policy as set out in the immigration rules. The appellant is unable to satisfy the requirements of the immigration rules. I have also had regard to the public interest considerations set out in s117B of the 2002 Act. I acknowledge that the maintenance of immigration control is in the public interest. I find the appellant’s protected rights, whether considered collectively or individually, are not in my judgement such as to outweigh the public interest in the maintenance of immigration control.
39. It follows that in my judgement, the decision to refuse the appellant leave to enter is in the public interest and not disproportionate to the legitimate aim.
40. Accordingly, I dismiss the appeal on Article 8 grounds.
Notice of Decision
41. The respondent’s decision to refuse entry clearance is not unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 July 2025