UI-2024-001887

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 08 Apr 2026
• Promulgation date: 24 Jun 2026
• Publication date: 10 Jul 2026
• Last updated on: 10 Jul 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-001887
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/50382/2020
IA/00833/2020

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

DM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Pipe of Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms S Rushforth, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 8 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and his family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appealed against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the judge’) dated 2 June 2023, dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 7 September 2020 to refuse his protection and human rights claim, made in the context of a deportation order dated 20 January 2020.

2. In an error of law decision dated 4 July 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Owens and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Murray allowed the appeal insofar as it related to the judge’s dismissal of the appeal on Article 8 grounds. The judge’s dismissal of the appeal on all remaining grounds was upheld. The error of law decision is annexed below.

3. The following findings were set aside: those in respect of the mental health of the appellant’s wife and children; the findings that it would not be unduly harsh for the appellant’s wife or qualifying child to remain in the United Kingdom without the appellant; those in respect of Article 8 and consequential proportionality assessment; and, the finding that the appellant is a danger to the community.

4. The following findings were preserved: the judge’s findings in respect of the appellant’s protection appeal at [39] to [53]; and, the undisputed facts at [30], save in respect of the parties’ ages and the educational situation of the children.

Background

5. The appellant is a citizen of Jamaica born on 16 August 1976. He entered the United Kingdom on 7 October 2001 on a six-month visit visa but overstayed. On 22 November 2002, the appellant applied for indefinite leave to remain as the spouse of an individual settled or with international protection in the United Kingdom. That application was refused on 14 March 2003, as the respondent was not satisfied the parties intend to live permanently with each other or that the marriage was subsisting.

6. On 14 November 2003, the appellant was convicted of conspiracy to supply Class A drugs and sentenced to 5 years and six months’ imprisonment. In February 2005, the appellant was issued with a notice of liability to deportation, and was deported to Jamaica on 22 December 2005, pursuant to a deportation order made on 22 February 2005.

7. The appellant married his wife, a British citizen, in October 2006 in Jamaica. He then re-entered the United Kingdom in late 2007 using a false passport. On 21 March 2015, the appellant applied for his deportation order to be revoked. His appeal against refusal of that application was ultimately unsuccessful, appeal rights being exhausted on to September 2019. During this time, the appellant’s two elder sons were born.

8. Further representations were made on 25 September 2019 and 16 October 2019, accepted as constituting protection and human rights claims. It is the respondent’s refusal of those claims to which this appeal relates.

9. The error of law decision was sent to the parties on 7 July 2025. On 24 September 2025, the respondent notified the appellant and the Tribunal that he had been granted leave to remain until 18 December 2027 and requested that the appeal be treated as abandoned pursuant to s104(4A) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Notification under s104(4A) was given by an Upper Tribunal Legal Officer on 25 September 2025 and the remaking hearing listed for 21 October 2025 was vacated. However, on 6 November 2025, the respondent invited the Tribunal to re-instate the appeal, on the basis that she had not in fact granted leave to the appellant. The appeal was reinstated by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell in a decision dated 25 November 2025 with the matter of costs being resolved subsequently by consent.

Anonymity

10. I see no reason not to continue the anonymity order made earlier by both the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal. Consequently, I shall refer to the appellant’s wife as W, and to his elder child and younger child as C1 and C2 respectively.

Remaking

11. I had the benefit of a consolidated bundle (a 683-pp pdf) comprising not only the evidence before the judge, the judge’s decision and the error of law decision, but also approximately 120 pages of updated evidence not before the judge. The respondent made no objection to admission of that evidence. The appellant and W each gave evidence on the basis of their witness statements and were cross-examined by Ms Rushforth. The representatives each made oral submissions, supplementing in Mr Pipe’s case his very helpful skeleton argument. Whilst I refer below only to those matters necessary to understand my decision, I took the submissions and the evidence to which I was referred into account in their entirety.

The Law

12. Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 sets out those considerations to which this Tribunal must have regard when determining whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches a person’s rights under article 8 ECHR and as a consequence would be unlawful under s6 of the human rights act 1998.

13. In all cases, the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest (s117B(1)). Little weight should be given to a private life established at a time when a person’s immigration status is precarious (that is to say when an individual enjoys anything less than indefinite right to remain in the United Kingdom) or his presence unlawful (s117B(4)(a) and s117B(5)). Little weight should be given to a relationship with a qualifying partner that is established when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully (s117B(4)(b)). Little weight does not mean no weight at all; moreover, this general approach can be overridden where there are compelling reasons to do so (Rhuppiah v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 803).

14. The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest (s117C(1)). The more serious the offence committed by the criminal, the greater the public interest in deportation (s117C(2)). However, per s117C(3) the public interest does not require the deportation of a person sentenced to a period of imprisonment of less than four years if one or both of the exceptions prescribed by ss117C(4) and (5) apply. Otherwise, or if the individual has been sentenced to at least four years imprisonment, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those two statutory exceptions (s117C(6)).

15. Specifically, ss117C(4) and (5) provide:

‘(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.’

16. It is not in issue that the appellant is a foreign criminal. Neither is it in issue that W is a qualifying partner and that C2 is a qualifying child (as now is C3).

17. The test to be applied when deciding whether deportation gives rise to unduly harsh consequences was confirmed by the Supreme Court in KO (Nigeria) at [41] and its application considered in the subsequent paragraphs:

‘41. Having rejected the Secretary of State’s case on the unduly harsh test it is necessary to consider what is the appropriate way to interpret and apply the test. I consider that the best approach is to follow the guidance which was stated to be “authoritative” in KO (Nigeria), namely the MK self-direction:

“… ‘unduly harsh’ does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. Rather, it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. ‘Harsh’ in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb ‘unduly’ raises an already elevated standard still higher.”

42. This direction has been cited and applied in many tribunal decisions. It recognises that the level of harshness which is “acceptable” or “justifiable” in the context of the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals involves an “elevated” threshold or standard. It further recognises that “unduly” raises that elevated standard “still higher” - ie it involves a highly elevated threshold or standard. As Underhill LJ observed at para 52, it is nevertheless not as high as that set by the “very compelling circumstances” test in section 117C(6).

43. Whilst it may be said that the self-direction involves the use of synonyms rather than the statutory language, it is apparent that the statutory language has caused real difficulties for courts and tribunals, as borne out by the fact that this is the second case before this court relating to that language within four years. In these circumstances I consider that it is appropriate for the MK self-direction to be adopted and applied, in accordance with the approval given to it in KO (Nigeria) itself.

44. Having given that self-direction, and recognised that it involves an appropriately elevated standard, it is for the tribunal to make an informed assessment of the effect of deportation on the qualifying child or partner and to make an evaluative judgment as to whether that elevated standard has been met on the facts and circumstances of the case before it.’

18. The Supreme Court then set out the general principles applicable to the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test at [46]-[52]:

46. Under section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act deportation may be avoided if it can be proved that there are “very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”.

52. The difference in approach called for under section 117C(6) as opposed to 117C(5) was conveniently summarised by Underhill LJ at para 29 of his judgment as follows:

“(A) In the cases covered by the two Exceptions in subsections (4)-(5), which apply only to medium offenders, the public interest question is answered in favour of the foreign criminal, without the need for a full proportionality assessment. Parliament has pre-determined that in the circumstances there specified the public interest in the deportation of medium offenders does not outweigh the article 8 interests of the foreign criminal or his family: they are, given, so to speak, a short cut. The consideration of whether those Exceptions apply is a self-contained exercise governed by their particular terms.

(B) In cases where the two Exceptions do not apply - that is, in the case of a serious offender or in the case of a medium offender who cannot satisfy their requirements - a full proportionality assessment is required, weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee and his family against the public interest in his deportation. In conducting that assessment the decision-maker is required by section 117C(6) (and paragraph 398 of the Rules) to proceed on the basis that ‘the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2’.”

53. In Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] 1 WLR 4203 at para 50 Sales LJ emphasised that the public interest “requires” deportation unless very compelling circumstances are established and stated that the test “provides a safety valve, with an appropriately high threshold of application, for those exceptional cases involving foreign criminals in which the private and family life considerations are so strong that it would be disproportionate and in violation of article 8 to remove them.”

54. As explained by Lord Reed in his judgment in Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60; [2016] 1 WLR 4799 at para 38:

“… great weight should generally be given to the public interest in the deportation of [qualifying] offenders, but … it can be outweighed, applying a proportionality test, by very compelling circumstances: in other words, by a very strong claim indeed, as Laws LJ put it in the SS (Nigeria) case [2014] 1 WLR 998. The countervailing considerations must be very compelling in order to outweigh the general public interest in the deportation of such offenders, as assessed by Parliament and the Secretary of State.”

55. How Exceptions 1 and 2 relate to the very compelling circumstances test was addressed by Jackson LJ in NA (Pakistan). In relation to serious offenders he stated as follows:

“30. In the case of a serious offender who could point to circumstances in his own case which could be said to correspond to the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 and 2, but where he could only just succeed in such an argument, it would not be possible to describe his situation as involving very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. One might describe that as a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 or 2. On the other hand, if he could point to factors identified in the descriptions of Exceptions 1 and 2 of an especially compelling kind in support of an article 8 claim, going well beyond what would be necessary to make out a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2, they could in principle constitute ‘very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2’, whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to application of article 8.”

In relation to medium offenders he stated:

“32. Similarly, in the case of a medium offender, if all he could advance in support of his article 8 claim was a ‘near miss’ case in which he fell short of bringing himself within either Exception 1 or Exception 2, it would not be possible to say that he had shown that there were ‘very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2’. He would need to have a far stronger case than that by reference to the interests protected by article 8 to bring himself within that fall back protection. But again, in principle there may be cases in which such an offender can say that features of his case of a kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2 have such great force for article 8 purposes that they do constitute such very compelling circumstances, whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to article 8 but not falling within the factors described in Exceptions 1 and 2. The decision-maker, be it the Secretary of State or a tribunal, must look at all the matters relied upon collectively, in order to determine whether they are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation.”

He also emphasised the high threshold which must be satisfied:

“33. Although there is no ‘exceptionality’ requirement, it inexorably follows from the statutory scheme that the cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be rare. The commonplace incidents of family life, such as ageing parents in poor health or the natural love between parents and children, will not be sufficient.”

56. When considering whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above Exceptions 1 and 2, all the relevant circumstances of the case will be considered and weighed against the very strong public interest in deportation. As explained by Lord Reed in Hesham Ali at paras 24 to 35, relevant factors will include those identified by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) as being relevant to the article 8 proportionality assessment. In Unuane v United Kingdom (2021) 72 EHRR 24 the ECtHR, having referred to its earlier decisions in Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50 and Üner v The Netherlands (2006) 45 EHRR 14, summarised the relevant factors at paras 72-73 as comprising the following:

“• the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant;
• the length of the applicant’s stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled;
• the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant’s conduct during that period;
• the nationalities of the various persons concerned;
• the applicant’s family situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple’s family life;
• whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship;
• whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age; and
• the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled …
• the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; and
• the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.”

57. The weight to be given to the relevant factors falls within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities. As Lord Reed explained in Hesham Ali at para 35:

“35. While the European court has provided guidance as to factors which should be taken into account, it has acknowledged that the weight to be attached to the competing considerations, in striking a fair balance, falls within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities, subject to supervision at the European level. The Convention on Human Rights can thus accommodate, within limits, the judgments made by national legislatures and governments in this area.”’

Consideration

19. The appellant has lived in the United Kingdom continuously since 2007. He had previously lived in the United Kingdom between 7 October 2001 and 22 December 2005, albeit precariously for the first 6 months and unlawfully thereafter, during which time he began a relationship with W. They married whilst he was in Jamaica in the intervening 2 years, and they now have two children, C1 born in October 2003 and C2 born in October 2008. That the appellant’s relationships with W, C1 and C1 are genuine and subsisting and that they all live together are preserved facts. The latter three are all British citizens who have resided in the United Kingdom all their lives and have extended family here.

20. It is manifest that deportation, although lawful, would substantially interfere in the family’s right to respect for family and private life. The question, as is usually the case, is whether that interference is proportionate.

21. Save for two years in Jamaica, the appellant has lived in the United Kingdom for around 25 years. Whilst over 2 years of that time would have been spent in custody, that is nevertheless a long time. However, all but 6 months of it were unlawful and all of it precarious. Indeed, his presence since 2007 has been in breach of an extant deportation order. Nothing I have read or heard persuades me that I should give more than little weight to the appellant’s private life in this country.

22. The appellant will inevitably be much less familiar with daily life in Jamaica than he would have been when he re-entered the United Kingdom in 2007. However, he lived there for first 25 years of his life, survived there for two years after a 4-year break, and faces no language barrier on return. The appellant and W’s respective claims that he would be unable to get work or be able to earn enough to survive were, they admitted, speculation. It is not challenged that the appellant has no family, contacts or assets to return to in Jamaica. However, the judge’s rejection at [52] as fabrication of the appellant’s claim to have been shot at in Jamaica is a preserved fact, as is the judge’s finding that the appellant would be of interest to any gang there [53] and that he could therefore return safely to Jamaica without any real risk of serious harm [54].

23. There is medical evidence that the appellant has been diagnosed with mixed anxiety and depressive disorder, obstructive sleep apnoea, essential hypertension, and gastro-oesophageal reflux, for which he takes medication (including mirtazapine and propranolol for the anxiety and depression). However, I do not accept that the evidence shows that these are significantly debilitating conditions; on the contrary, the appellant claims that he wants to and would be working if his immigration status allowed. Moreover, there is no evidence that he would be unable to access any necessary treatment and medication in Jamica.

24. Consequently, I do not accept that the appellant faces any very serious obstacles to reintegration.

25. The appellant was convicted on 14 November 2003 of conspiracy to supply Class A drugs and sentenced on 19 November 2003 to 5 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. He has not since then been convicted of any crime. However, that does not mean to say that he has been a law abiding citizen. He re-entered the United Kingdom in breach of a deportation order and using a false passport. He then ‘kept his head down’ (another preserved fact) for some 10 years after the making of the deportation order, knowing throughout that he was in the country unlawfully. There is little satisfactory evidence of the appellant’s integration into society beyond his obvious family life, and I am unpersuaded that he is socially and culturally integrated into the United Kingdom notwithstanding the time he has lived here. That said, the conclusions I reach below would apply equally even if I had accepted his social and cultural integration.

26. The appellant does not, in short, meet Exception 1. Nevertheless, I take into account all of the matters above when considering the application of s117C(6) below.

27. A primary consideration is the best interests of C2, and in particular how they would be affected by the appellant’s deportation. C2 was permanently excluded from mainstream education in December 2023 and sent to a Pupil Referral Unit, St Matthias Academy. However, the anxiety caused to C2 by his father’s situation is reported by the Unit as having had a significant detrimental impact on his progress, to the extent that he had ceased attending the Unit by May 2025. C2 had been mental health support whilst at the Unit from ‘Off the Record’. However, funding was linked to the academic placement and so treatment ceased when C2 left the Unit. He is on the waiting list for further mental health treatment through the NHS but was told that treatment has not yet started.

28. The appellant relies on a report from Mai Kelly, Consultant Counselling Psychologist, dated 14 May 2025. Whilst the report was commissioned to give a comprehensive assessment of the appellant, Ms Kelly assessed the psychological state of each family member. In her abstract, Ms Kelly noted that C2 ‘emerges as the most acutely at-risk individual among family members, with suicidal ideation, clinical OCD, and high scores on all psychological measures.’ At paragraph 4.4 of her consideration of the background, she stated:

‘[C2] is currently 16 years old and presents, in my professional View, with the most acute mental health concerns in the family. He is diagnosed with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and severe Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD), and he exhibits chronic depressive symptoms. He has engaged in significant self—harming behaviours, including an episode requiring stitches. He also presents with neurodiverse traits, including sensory sensitivities and ritualistic behaviours. [C2] is no longer attending mainstream school and is being educated through a pupil referral unit. His psychological state is directly impacted by the threat of his father’s removal, which he experiences as life—threatening and destabilising. He has repeatedly stated that if his father is deported, he believes he will kill himself. These disclosures are reportedly being monitored by his GP and school mental health services.’

29. In her psychological assessment at paragraph 5, Ms Kelly reported of C2:

‘[C2] is the younger son of [DM], currently aged 16 and preparing for GCSES. He presents with a highly concerning psychological profile, marked by chronic suicidality, ritualistic compulsions, and impaired functioning across multiple domains. His psychological scores were:

PHQ-Q: 26/27 (severe depression, with suicidality at 3/3 on item 9)
GAD-7: 20/21 (severe anxiety)
OCI-R: 54/72 (OCD percentile: 99.4%, clinical threshold exceeded)

[C2]’s distress is fundamentally tethered to his father’s legal status. He describes his father as his “anchor,” without whom he would "not survive." His suicidal risk is not theoretical—it is documented and recent, with a severe episode of self-harm requiring medical intervention within the past year. His OCD symptoms—rituals involving light switches, singing, and hypervigilant checking—function as anxiety—management mechanisms under chronic familial threat.

This clinical presentation is consistent with findings from Carey et al. (2019), which link parental deportation proceedings to acute mental health deterioration and suicidality in adolescents. Moreover, neurodevelopmental vulnerability appears likely: his difficulties with concentration, sensory processing (vibrational sensitivity), and communication are all suggestive of an underlying neurodivergent profile, possibly ADHD or ASD. These complexities heighten his risk further in the absence of his father’s stable presence.’

and of the whole family, in summary:

‘The [DM] family operates within a psychologically co—dependent structure, one shaped by chronic immigration stress, financial precarity, and ongoing psychosocial adversity. [DM]'s role in this system is central. He provides psychological containment for [C2], stabilisation and presence for [C1], and physical, emotional, and caregiving support to [W] and her mother.

There is robust evidence from family systems theory and trauma literature (e.g., Walsh, 2016; Fazel et al., 2012) that when a foundational family member is forcibly removed, vulnerable members experience emotional collapse. This risk is most acute in [C2], whose suicidality is directly tied to the threat of his father’s deportation.’

30. Her risk assessment for C2 is found at paragraph 6.3:

‘[C2] is the most acutely at—risk individual in the family unit. He exhibits high suicide risk, confirmed by:

• PHQ—Q score of 26/27 with 99 = 3/3
• GAD-7 score of 20/21 (severe anxiety)
• OCI—R : 54, placing him at the 99.4th percentile for OCD symptomatology
(Wootton et al., 2015)

He has a documented history of serious self—harm requiring medical attention, daily intrusive OCD rituals, and persistent suicidal ideation. He reported explicitly that if his father is deported, he will kill himself. His functioning is markedly impaired—he is disengaged from school, socially isolated, underweight, and reports pervasive distress with few protective factors. His psychological state is highly unstable and dependent on his father's presence for emotional regulation and perceived safety.’

and her summary for C2 at paragraph 8.2:

‘[C2] is at exceptional psychological risk if his father is removed. His psychological testing (PHQ-9: 26/27; GAD-7: 20/21; OCI-R: 54, >99th percentile) suggests clinical levels of depression, anxiety, and OCD-related compulsions. Young individuals facing parental separation—particularly in cases of involuntary removal—have markedly elevated odds of experiencing psychiatric distress. A longitudinal analysis by Zayas and Heffron (2016) demonstrated that children of deported parents are more than twice as likely to develop PTSD and long-term adjustment disorders.

Given his developmental stage, ongoing suicidal ideation, and intense emotional dependency on his father, the risk of long-term trauma is substantial. Research by Brabeck et al. (2014) found that adolescents facing deportation of a parent experienced significantly increased rates of internalising disorders and self—harm. These effects are not transient: even where reunification occurs, the psychiatric sequelae often endure (Barajas-Gonzalez et al., 2021). Clinically, the anticipated outcome for [C2] includes worsening depression, worsening OCD symptoms, and severe identity disruption—an outcome also aligned with trauma—related psychopathology described by Scheeringa et al. (2022)’

31. C2’s history of self harm is remarked upon in the more recent social worker report by Philip Whittaker (dated 22 February 2023), in which he expressed the opinion that the most significant impact of the appellant’s deportation would be on the mental health of C1 and C2. He was also of the view that the risk of suicide for C1 and C2 (a concern expressed to him by the appellant) was then low but likely to escalate. Manifestly, it is Ms Kelly’s opinion that, for C2, there has been notable escalation. Ms Kelly’s expertise was not challenged, nor was it suggested that C2 had been exaggerating his symptoms to Ms Kelly..

32. I am told, and have no reason to doubt, that C2’s mental health was significantly impacted by the respondent mistakenly informing his father that he had been granted leave to remain only to reverse her position shortly afterwards.

33. I am satisfied that the appellant’s deportation would be unduly harsh on C2, and consequently on his mother, W.

34. Of course, the appellant must show very compelling circumstances above and beyond the statutory exceptions. However, the extent to which the exceptions are met (or exceeded) is relevant to that assessment, when weighing the factors in the appellant’s favour against the public interest.

35. The latter is clearly very weighty. The appellant committed a serious crime for which he was sentenced to a period of imprisonment 1 ½ years in excess of the 4-year threshold. He used a false passport to re-enter the United Kingdom only 2 years after being deported, and has remained here unlawfully since. These factors reinforce the public interest.

36. In the appellant’s favour, however, is the absence otherwise of any re-offending, and his having voluntarily brought himself to the authorities’ attention (albeit some 10 years after the making of the deportation order). It is also weighs in the appellant’s favour that he now accepts culpability for his offence. Moreover, I am satisfied for those reasons that the appellant has rebutted the presumption under s72 of the 2002 Act that he is a danger to the community.

37. The appellant’s private life in the United Kingdom and his own state of health weigh very little in the balance. His ability to speak English is a neutral factor, as is any financial independence from the State (which in any event was not a point pushed with any force by either party). Neither do I give significant weight to the appellant’s family life with W and the effect of his deportation again on her personally; she married him in the knowledge of his deportation and the reasons for it, and was well aware that he had returned and was remaining illegally.

38. What is of considerable weight on the appellant’s side is the effect of deportation on C2 (and consequently the family as a whole). The expertise of Ms Kelly was not challenged, and I have set out above her observations and conclusions about the effect of deportation on C2. She considers him at great psychological risk if the appellant is deported, and to be a significant suicide risk should that happen. Since that assessment, C2’s mental state improved, I accept, when the appellant was mistakenly told he had been granted leave, but then became worse again when that turned out to have been a mistake. That is what I was told by the family and their evidence on the point was not seriously challenged.

39. I have born in mind throughout the very significant public interest in the appellant’s deportation but do find on balance that the effect of deportation on C2 in particular and consequently the whole family is sufficiently far beyond the ‘unduly harsh’ threshold as to constitute very compelling circumstances such as to make deportation disproportionate.

40. For these reasons, I allow the appeal.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss the appeal on Article 8 grounds involved the making of an error on a point of law and is set aside.
2. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss the appeal on all other grounds is maintained.
3. The decision under Article 8 is remade and the appeal is allowed on human rights grounds.
4. I have considered whether to make a fee award and have decided not to. The appeal was allowed on the basis of evidence not before the original decision-maker.


Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


18 June 2026


Annex

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-001887
HU/50382/2020
First-tier Tribunal No: IA/00833/2020


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Decision & Reasons Issued:

7 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MURRAY

Between

DM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Office
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Pipe Instructed by Khan & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Rushforth, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008,the appellant and any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the judge”) promulgated on 2 June 2023, dismissing his appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds against a decision dated 7 September 2020, refusing his protection and human rights claim in the context of a deportation order having been made against the appellant on 20 January 2020.
Background
2. The appellant’s immigration history is set out in detail in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal at [2]. In summary, the appellant is a citizen of Jamaica who entered the UK on 7 October 2001 on a 6 month visit visa. He then overstayed. On 14 November 2003, he was convicted of conspiracy to supply Class A controlled drugs and was sentenced to five years and six months imprisonment. In February 2005 the appellant was issued with a notice of liability to deport. He was deported to Jamaica on 22 December 2005 after a deportation order was signed. The appellant then re-entered the UK using a false passport in breach of the deportation order in late 2007. In 2015 he lodged a human rights claim. The appeal against this decision was ultimately dismissed in 2019. Further submissions were made on 25 September 2020, this time including a claim for international protection. The decision refusing that application is dated 20 January 2020 and is the decision under challenge. The decision of the judge is as a result of an earlier appeal decision being set aside and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
3. The judge heard evidence from the appellant and his wife. There was a large number of documentary evidence before the judge including a 842 page bundle, a 145 page additional bundle and skeleton arguments as well as review and response documents. These included social work and medical reports as well as witness statements.
4. The judge turned first to the protection claim. He found that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption pursuant to s72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) that he has been convicted of a particularly serious crime and is a danger to the community. He then found that the appellant was not at risk of serious harm in Jamaica as a result of gang related violence because the appellant is an “ordinary person” who has not been involved in gang related activities and has not been expressly targeted by organised crime groups.
5. The judge turned to Article 8 ECHR. The judge considered the report of the independent social worker as well as medical and school evidence. The judge made detailed findings on all of the members of the family, having had regard to the evidence.
6. The judge decided that the appellant could not meet either Exception at s117C(4) nor (5) on the basis that the appellant had not demonstrated that there would be “very significant obstacles” to his integration into Jamaica and because he had not demonstrated that it would be “unduly harsh” for his wife or qualifying child to remain in the UK without him. The judge weighed up the factors in support of the appellant’s case, against the appellant’s case and factors which were neutral and decided that in this appeal there were no very compelling circumstances over and above the Exceptions which outweighed the public interest in deportation.
7. The judge dismissed the appeal on protection, Article 3 and Article 8 ECHR human rights grounds.
Grounds of appeal
8. The grounds of appeal were lengthy and granted in part. There was a case management hearing as a result of this, giving guidance on partial grants of appeal as well as the need to formalise legally concise grounds of appeal. This case has now been reported as Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal, Limited Grant of permission) [2025] UKUT 00150. The panel commented on the grant of the grounds and the grant of permission in this appeal at [41] to [45] noting that some of the grounds on which permission was granted appear to overlap with grounds in which permission was not granted and we note in particular the panel’s comments at [44] in this respect.
9. We list only those grounds in respect of which permission was granted.
a) Making a material misdirection in law/ making an irrational finding.
The judge’s finding that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption that he is a danger to the community is arguably irrational in light of the lengthy period of non-offending (since 2003). The appellant’s unlawful entry in 2007 does not rationally mean that he is still a danger to the community when he has been living with his family, voluntarily declared his presence to the respondent and has no further convictions and his only conviction was in 2003. Too much weight has been placed on the unlawful entry when assessing risk.
b) Failing to consider material evidence/ failing to consider material matters.
In assessing whether the appellant is a danger to the community, the judge has failed to consider material matters which were supported by evidence. The judge failed to consider the evidence in the appellant’s witness statements that he has taken responsibility for his actions. The judge has failed to explain why he rejected the evidence in the witness statements.
e) The judge arguably makes contradictory findings about the youngest child’s anxiety/self-harm. The judge is critical of the assessment made by the independent social worker but then accepts at [67] that the youngest child suffers from anxiety. The judge’s acceptance at [67] undermines his criticism of the social worker for not considering if the child was exaggerating or if there were alternative causes for the scratching/bruising.
f) The judge has failed to consider material evidence contained within the witness statements made by the appellant’s wife in relation to her mental health, and the evidence of the independent social worker about the appellant’s wife. The judge has placed too much weight on the lack of formal diagnosis in respect of the wife’s mental health and failed to explain what weight he placed on her own evidence.
Permission to appeal
10. Permission to appeal was granted in part by First-tier Tribunal Judge Monaghan 25 April 2024 in respect of grounds (a), (b) ( e) and (f).
11. There was no rule 24 response, but Ms Rushforth indicated that the respondent opposes the grounds of appeal.
Submissions
12. Both parties made brief submissions which are recorded in the record of proceedings and to which we will refer below.
Discussion and analysis
Grounds a and b
13. We deal with these two grounds together because they overlap. We firstly comment that the decision is a lengthy and detailed decision from which it is apparent that the judge took great care to consider the evidence and make relevant factual findings.
14. We also note and take into account that it is not necessary for a judge to provide a digest of all of the evidence in a case or even address every piece of evidence or every issue provided that it is clear that an overall view of the evidence in the context of the whole has been taken and that the findings are rationally supported by cogent reasons open to the judge on the evidence. In R (Iran) and others v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982, Lord Justice Brook held that there was no duty in a judge in giving reasons to deal with every argument and it was sufficient if what was said demonstrated the basis on which the judge had acted. This approach was adopted and applied by the Upper Tribunal in Budhathoki (Reasons for decision) [2014] UKUT 00341. In this appeal the judge set out at [6] the evidence before him and at [7] stated that he had considered all of the documentary evidence. The judge does not rehearse the documentary evidence in detail but refers in his decision and reasons to the evidence that was relevant to his decision. We agree that this is an entirely appropriate method of dealing with the evidence.
15. Ground a is a challenge to the judge’s finding that the appellant has failed to rebut the presumption that he is a danger to the community. 16. We state firstly that we agree with Mr Pipe that although this ground is irrelevant to the assessment of risk under the Refugee Convention or Article 3 ECHR because there is no challenge to the finding that the appellant is not at risk of serious harm in Jamaica, it could potentially be material to the overarching Article 8 ECHR proportionality assessment.
17. At [27] the judge set out the issues in the appeal. At [27.1] the first issue was whether the statutory presumption under section 72 of the NIA Act 2002 had been rebutted.
18. The main authority in respect of the risk of serious harm is EN (Serbia) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 630 where Stanley Burton LJ states at [45] and [46];
“45. These remarks apply with equal force here. Moreover, I see no need for any gloss on the express words of Article 33(2). The words “particularly serious crime” are clear, and themselves restrict drastically the offences to which the Article applies. So far as “danger to the community” is concerned, the danger must be real, but if a person is convicted of a particularly serious crime, and there is a real risk of its repetition, he is likely to constitute a danger to the community.
46. The Appellants submitted that Article 33(2) requires that the danger to the community must be causally connected to the particularly serious crime of which the person has been convicted. I would accept that normally the danger is demonstrated by proof of the particularly serious offence and the risk of its recurrence, or of the recurrence of similar offence. I would also accept that the wording of Article 33(2) reflects that expectation. But it does not expressly require a causal connection, and I do not think that one is to be implied. By way of example, I do not see why a person who has been convicted of a particularly serious offence of violence and who the State can establish is a significant drug dealer should not be liable to refouled under Article 33(2). In any event, it seems to me that a disregard for the law, demonstrated by the conviction, would be sufficient to establish a causal connection between the conviction and the danger. If so, the suggested added requirement of a causal connection has little if any practical consequence”.
19. At [30] the judge set out the undisputed facts which included that the appellant had not been arrested charged or convicted of a crime since his conviction on 14 March 2003, that he entered the UK in 2007 with false documents to facilitate his return and that he did not pursue his immigration matters prior to 2015 because he was “keeping his head down”.
20. The judge considered the issues of criminal offending and reform from [31] to [34].
21. At [33] the judge said:
“I find that the appellant’s use of a false passport and deception to enter the UK together with his subversion of immigration laws application within the UK by remaining in the UK unlawfully between 2007 and 2015 significantly weighed against the appellant’s claims that he has reformed/rehabilitated”.
22. The appellant’s evidence in this respect was set out in a statement dated 10 June 2021 as follows and repeated in near identical terms in a statement dated 30 March 2023:
“I take full responsibility for my actions. Going to the flat in Ransley House on that fatal day to hang around with people whom I had known for only a short period of time was a bad choice. I am very remorseful for what has happened. My deepest sympathy goes out to anyone who has fallen victim to any Class A drugs or any illegal substance. I am now fully aware of the devastating and negative impact Class A drugs have on peoples [sic] lives and the destruction it can cause to communities. I am now a totally reformed person. I do not hang out with anyone who is involved in any type of illegal activities. I was 25 years of age with this happened. At that age whilst I was a grown adult and should have been able to distinguish between right and wrong, I was naive to a lot of things back then. I am now 44 years of age and I have learned so much from this mistake that it is still haunting me almost 18 years later.….”
23. The judge manifestly had regard to theses witness statements and is not required to set out all of the evidence as stated above. The judge was also entitled to have regard to other evidence in respect of the appellant’s rehabilitation and reform including the evidence in the social worker report.
24. The social worker report 2019 states as follows:
“In November 2003 M was convicted for an illegal substance offence and served five and a half months in prison. He has always strongly disputed any involvement with illicit substances”.
25. The 2023 report corrects the length of the sentence and states that “He accepted that he had made mistakes in the past and he was truly sorry for these as they were a great burden to him.
26. The judge also recorded at [34] the appellant’s evidence given in cross examination as follows:
“In the social worker’s report dated 2019, considered below, the appellant indicated that “I wasn’t involved in any criminality. I’m not criminally minded”;. he was not aware of any illegal substances and it was his friends have [sic] flat and the appellant had only been to the flat on one occasion when it was raided. This was put to the appellant under cross examination. The respondent’s representative stated that he report indicated that the appellant was not taking responsibility for his actions. The appellant was asked if that was fair. The appellant stated that it was fair in one respect, the appellant maintained that he had not engaged in criminal activities. The appellant stated that that he took responsibility for the choices that he had made to associate himself with people at the flat that was raided and who were convicted of supplying class A drugs. The implication being that the appellant maintains his position that he was not involved in the conspiracy to supply class A drugs. On the basis of the appellant’s evidence, notwithstanding his conviction for supplying class A drugs, I find that he still fails to take responsibility for his actions which weighs against reform/ rehabilitation”.
27. Firstly, the judge was manifestly aware that the appellant claimed to have taken full responsibility for his actions in his statements, but it is tolerably clear from the decision that the judge preferred the evidence that the appellant gave to the social worker in 2019 and which he confirmed in oral evidence before the judge that he had not been involved in criminality himself, although he had been associated with those who were.
28. The appellant was found to be guilty of conspiracy to supply Class A drugs after a trial. The criminal judge in the sentencing remarks characterised this as a “full scale organised drug operation in which several properties in a block of flats were being utilised”. The jury would have heard significance evidence and clearly rejected the appellant’s evidence that he was a visitor who was not involved.
29. The judge was manifestly entitled to find that a continued denial of involvement in criminality on the day of the hearing despite the conviction, indicated a lack of recognition of culpability and to prefer that evidence to the evidence in the witness statement in which, if read carefully, the appellant also appears to distance himself from responsibility by stating that he should not have associated himself with people whom he had not known for long.
30. Ground (b) is not made out. The judge has taken into account all of the evidence and was entitled to find that the appellant was still denying culpability. This was relevant to the issue of whether the appellant is a danger to the community.
31. The real question however, is whether the judge’s assessment that the appellant has not rebutted the presumption that is a danger to the community was rational in the light of the considerable time that had elapsed since the offence was committed and whether it was irrational to take into account the illegal entry in 2007 (16 years earlier) and the appellant’s unlawful presence in the UK for a period of 8 years before coming forward in 2015.
32. We return to the test in EN. The task of the judge was to decide whether there was a real risk that the appellant would repeat his serious offending or whether there would be a recurrence of a similar offence. The offence took place in 2003. It is the appellant’s only conviction. There have been no further convictions since the appellant returned to the UK in 2007. There was no evidence before the judge that the appellant has been involved in any criminal activities in connection with drugs ( or indeed any other criminality) since he was deported from Jamaica in 2005. The judge elsewhere makes findings that the appellant is not connected with any gangs or gang culture. The appellant is now 44 years old and the offending took place when he was 25.
33. Although we are satisfied that it was open to the judge to rely on the appellant’s continued denial of involvement in assessing the risk to the community, we are satisfied that the most significant evidence of his rehabilitation is the lack of offending over a period of 18 years and the fact that the offence in 2003 was his only offence. We are satisfied that the appellant’s illegal entry to the UK in 2007, and the fact that he thereafter did not come forward to 2015, in the context of this appeal, is immaterial to the assessment of whether he has rebutted the presumption that he is a danger to the community in 2023 because of the time lapse and the long period of lack of offending. We are satisfied that there is no rational connection between the re-entry in 2007 and the finding that the appellant has failed to rebut the presumption . We are therefore satisfied that the judge erred by taking this immaterial factor into account when considering whether there was a real risk that the appellant would commit a serious offence in 2023.
34. In a different factual context, had for instance, the offending and re-entry been recent and occurred within in a short passage of time, this may have been a material factor but in this appeal (despite the appellant’s continued denial of culpability) the evidence strongly points in the other direction, that is that there is no real risk of the appellant reoffending or committing a serious offence and the judge erred in finding this to be the case.
35. We have had regard to the various authorities in relation to the adequacy of reasons and interference with factual findings. We refer to the words of Dingemans LJ in Terghazi v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2017 at [45];
“A further principle which it is relevant to note is that, even if an appellate court is entitled to hear an appeal because of an error of fact (because the appeal court has jurisdiction to hear appeals on facts) appellate courts should be very cautious in overturning findings of fact made by a first instance judge. This is because first instance judges have seen witnesses and take into account the whole “sea” of the evidence, rather than indulged in impermissible “island hopping” to parts only of the evidence, and because duplication of effort on appeal is undesirable and increases costs and delay. Judges hearing appeals on facts should only interfere if a finding of fact was made which had no basis in the evidence, or where there was a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence so that the decision could not reasonably be explained or justified” (our emphasis).
36. We also take into account the words of Reed LJ in Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] UKSC 41 at [62];
“It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appellate court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.”
37. We take into account in this respect the high threshold to demonstrate that a finding is irrational.
38. Having regard to the above authorities, we have come to the view that this is one of the rare instances where the judge’s finding that the appellant had failed to rebut the presumption that he was a danger to the community was irrational for the reasons we have set out above. Ground a is made out.
39. We will deal with the materiality of this error below.
Ground (e)
40. The judge summarises the contents of the social work reports from [56] to [58]. At [59] the judge sets out various criticisms of the report. He expresses concern that when the expert assessed the youngest child’s anxiety he did not do so against recognised diagnostic criteria and did not consider whether the child could be feigning or exaggerating symptoms to support his father’s claim, or whether the anxiety could be attributed to other causes. The judge also points to a lack of scarring evidence to demonstrate that the scars on the child’s arm were caused by self-harm. He also comments that the report does not consider what other support might be available to the children in the absence of the appellant. The judge gives limited weight to the reports for these reasons.
41. At [62] the judge considered the medical evidence in relation to the youngest child including a letter from Maytree Surgery which was four years old. There was no updated medical evidence. A letter from his school dated 2019 indicated that the child was exhibiting distress at school and a further letter from secondary school also opined that the removal of his father would cause him damage to his mental health and negatively impact on his education.
42. At [67] the judge finds that the appellant’s youngest child suffers from anxiety and that he has at times manifested in self-harm by picking at his arms. The judge also accepts that the uncertainty surrounding the deportation has been a contributory factor to the appellant’s child’s anxiety and self-harm and that the trauma of the appellant’s removal has the potential to exacerbate the appellant’s youngest child’s anxiety.
43. The grounds of appeal assert that the judge’s findings at [67] undermine the judge’s critical assessment of the social work report. In our view, the judge’s findings at [67] are based on a holistic view of the evidence before the judge including the social work report, the school letters and witness statements and appear to be in line with the evidence. However there is some force in the argument, that having criticised the social work report for not considering whether the child was feigning or exaggerating symptoms and a lack of scarring evidence that the findings at [67] appear to undermine these criticisms. Our understanding of the evidence is that the remainder of it (GP/school/ witness evidence) supported rather than undermined the conclusions of the social worker. We are therefore satisfied that the reasons given for giving little weight to the report are inadequate. We are in agreement that this ground is made out because the supporting evidence was consistent with the evidence of the social worker whose expertise has not been criticised or called into question by the respondent and it is not tolerably clear in these circumstances why the judge gave the reports little weight. We are satisfied that the judge erred in respect of his approach to the reports. This has a bearing on the judge’s findings at [70] that the child’s anxiety can be managed in the family and through the NHS.
Ground (f)
44. Ground f asserts that the judge failed to engage with what the social worker said about the appellant’s wife. The social worker records as follows:
“I spoke with Miss P privately for approximately 20 minutes. She explained that she was finding it difficult to cope. She was working night shifts as a support worker and only getting 3 hours sleep in the daytime. She rarely woke refreshed and had got used to feeling tired most days.
Miss P was casually dressed, she made little eye contact. Her speech was normal in pitch, rate and tone and she spoke with a slight Bristol accent.
Subjectively, Ms P’s mood was always low in the winter time but she was trying to keep everyone's spirits up. She explained that when at work as a mental health support worker, she put on a “mask”. She felt less able to hide her despair at home. She referred to their finances and commented they had not been out for a meal at a restaurant for years and having a day trip out with the family was unaffordable. Miss P explained that their finances were tight because of the cost of living pressures and any luxuries were unaffordable.
Ms P described having a “dark cloud” looming over them that was always there. She found that she could not “switch off” and found it difficult to concentrate. She denied any thoughts to harm herself or others, however she had noticed that her mood had become more irritable recently and referring to their financial situation felt “the pressure is on”.
She described how she felt compelled to check that their front door was locked shut every time she walked past it. She would check it a couple of times. She had noticed that the children had started copying this behaviour. This appeared to be the only checking behaviour”.
45. The social worker’s own conclusion was that Ms P would experience a crisis in her mental health if the appellant were to be deported as would all members of her family and that the pressure on Ms P would increase because the appellant is also performing a caring role for her mother who has arthritis and Ms P would need to take on that role as well as be the sole parent for the children.
46. In her own witness statement, the appellant’s wife describes how the situation is overwhelming and is taking a “serious toll on her mental health”. She describes herself as being emotionally distraught and struggling with the relentless strain.
47. At [77] to [80] the judge made findings in respect of the appellant’s wife. The judge found that the appellant’s wife is the breadwinner for the family and that she has been assisted by the presence of the appellant to undertake day to day tasks for the children including attending parents evenings, school pick-ups drop offs etc. The judge then found that the reality is that because the older child is now an adult and the younger child 14, the day to day care required is reduced. The judge found that the appellants removal would not have a significant impact on his wife’s ability to care for the children or financially support the children. The judge then went onto find that separation will lead to a significant and emotional distress but found that she has demonstrated resilience over a number of years, can obtain familial support and can visit the appellant in the future to mitigate her emotional distress.
48. The judge evaluated the evidence of the wife’s mental health issues. The judge stated that he did not underestimate the stress that the financial situation and the uncertain immigration status had put her under. However, the judge referred to the lack of any medical evidence that she had a mental health diagnosis or of the level of severity or deterioration which would be prompted by the appellant’s deportation. He concluded;
“On this basis I find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that his wife’s mental health will be adversely affected due to his deportation”.
49. We are satisfied that despite the long and detailed decision the judge failed to take into account the detailed evidence of the appellant’s wife mental health problems as set out by the social worker and in her witness statement and oral evidence. It is not clear what the judge made of this evidence and if he meant to reject it, why he rejected it. We are satisfied that this undermines his conclusion that she failed to demonstrate that her mental health would be adversely affected due to her husband’s deportation. We are therefore satisfied that ground f is made out.
50. We are satisfied that the errors in grounds f and e fed into the judge’s conclusions at [87] that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the effect of deportation on the children would be unduly harsh and at [90e] where the judge finds that Ms P had not demonstrated that her mental health would be adversely affected and that this is a neutral factor in the balancing exercise. These errors are therefore material to the outcome of the appeal because it cannot be said that the consideration of very compelling circumstances would inevitably lead to the same conclusion had these errors not been made.
51. We are also satisfied that the error at a is also material because the judge’s finding that the appellant still represents a danger to the community is likely to have affected the way he approached the overall balancing exercise in conjunction with the other errors.
Disposal
52. Both parties agreed that given that the protection part of the decision is not challenged and that this appeal has already been remitted once, that it would be appropriate for the appeal to be retained at the Upper Tribunal. I am in agreement because this is the normal position and the Upper Tribunal will be able to determine the appeal more swiftly.
53. The Tribunal permits the appellant to rely on the additional evidence produced in the rule 15(2A) notice dated 15 August 2024.
Preserved findings
54. The following findings are preserved.
a) The findings in respect of the protection appeal at [39] to [53] are preserved.
b) The undisputed facts at [30] are preserved (save in respect of the ages of the appellant, children and the educational situation of the children).
Findings which are set aside.
55. The findings in respect of the appellant’s wife’s mental health and that of the children are set aside.
56. The finding that it would not be unduly harsh for the appellant’s wife or qualifying child to remain in the UK without the appellant is set aside.
57. The proportionality exercise and findings in respect of Article 8 ECHR at [83] to [92] are set aside.
58. The finding that the appellant is a danger to the community is set aside.

Notice of Decision
1. The decision that the appeal is dismissed on Article 8 grounds is set aside.
2. The decision dismissing the appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and Article 3 ECHR grounds is maintained.
3. Those findings which are preserved are set out above at [54] are preserved.
4. Those findings which are set aside are at [55] to [58].
5. The Article 8 aspect of the appeal is adjourned for re-making at Cardiff County Court with a time estimate of one day. No interpreter is required.
Directions
6. We note that some time has elapsed since the hearing by the First-tier Tribunal on 28 April 2023 and it would be helpful for the Tribunal to have updated statements in order to evaluate the current circumstances of the family.
7. Any further evidence is to be uploaded to the Tribunal and served on the respondent no later than 14 days prior to the hearing.
8. Both parties are to produce skeleton arguments to be uploaded/ served on the Tribunal no later than 48 hours before the re-making hearing.


R J Owens

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 July 2025