UI-2024-002325
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-002325
First-tier Tribunal No: DA/00382/2019
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
30th June 2025
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON
Between
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and
CHRISTIAN LOUIS QUADJOVIE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms S Saifolahi of Counsel, instructed by Kalsi Legal Aid Solicitors
Heard at Field House on 20 May 2025
DECISION AND REASONS
1. In a decision promulgated on 6 December 2024, (annexed to this decision), the Upper Tribunal found an error of law in the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Beach promulgated on 24 April 2024 in which Mr Quadjovie’s appeal against the decision to deport him under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (the “EEA Regulations”) dated 17 October 2018 was allowed. That decision was set aside with preserved findings of fact. This is the re-making of the appeal. For ease I continue to refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal, with Mr Quadjovie as the Appellant and the Secretary of State as the Respondent.
2. The Appellant is a national of France, born on 4 February 1999, who claims to have first entered the United Kingdom in 2009 (although the Respondent claims he left at some point and re-entered in 2014).
3. The Appellant’s criminal convictions in the United Kingdom are as follows.
• On 25 October 2011, he was convicted of exposure and sexual assault on a female under the age of 13; for which he was sentenced to a supervision and rehabilitation order.
• On 28 October 2016, he was convicted of possession of a knife; for which he was sentenced to a nine month referral order, a costs order and payment of a victim surcharge.
• On 6 December 2016, the Appellant was convicted of possession of a class B drug, for which he received a three month referral order and a costs order.
• On 23 August 2017, the Appellant was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to supply class A drugs, for which he was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment in a young offenders institution.
• He was convicted in November 2020 of possession of a Class A drug, the sentencing information for which is unavailable.
• He was convicted in May 2022 of possession of a Class B drug, the sentencing information for which is unavailable.
4. The Respondent made a decision to deport the Appellant on 17 October 2018 on the basis that he posed a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to public policy and his deportation would not be disproportionate. The detail of that decision is set out in the decision annexed and need not be repeated here.
The appeal
Legal framework
5. Regulation 23 of the EEA Regulations provides: so far as relevant:
…
(5) If the Secretary of State considers that the exclusion of the EEA national or the family member of an EEA national is justified on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health in accordance with regulation 27 the Secretary of State may make an order prohibiting that person from entering the United Kingdom.
(6) Subject to paragraphs (7) and (8), an EEA national who has entered the United Kingdom or the family member of such a national who has entered the United Kingdom may be removed if –
…
(b) the Secretary of State has decided that the person’s removal is justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health in accordance with regulation 27; …
6. Regulation 27 of the EEA Regulations provides, so far as relevant:
(1) In this regulation, a “relevant decision” means an EEA decision taken on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health.
(2) A relevant decision may not be taken to serve economic ends.
(3) A relevant decision may not be taken in respect of a person with a right of permanent residence under regulation 15 except on serious grounds of public policy and public security.
(4) …
(5) The public policy and public security requirements of the United Kingdom include restricting rights otherwise conferred by these Regulations in order to protect the fundamental interests of society, and where a relevant decision is taken on grounds of public policy or public security it must also be taken in accordance with the following principles –
(a) the decision must comply with the principle of proportionality;
(b) the decision must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the person concerned;
(c) the personal conduct of the person must present a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society, taking into account past conduct of the person and that the threat does not need to be imminent;
(d) matters isolated from the particulars of the case or which relate to considerations of general provision do not justify the decision;
(e) a person’s previous criminal convictions do not in themselves justify the decision;
(f) …
(6) Before taking a relevant decision on the grounds of public policy and public security in relation to a person (“P”) who is resident in the United Kingdom, the decision maker must take account of considerations such as age, state of health, family and economic situation of P, P’s length of residence in the United Kingdom, P’s social and cultural integration in the United Kingdom and the extent of P’s links with P’s country of origin.
(7) …
(8) A court or tribunal considering whether the requirements of this regulation are met must (in particular) have regard to the considerations contained in Schedule 1 (considerations of public policy, public security and the fundamental interests of society etc.)
7. Schedule 1 to the EEA Regulations includes provision on the application of considerations of public policy and public security in paragraphs 2 to 6, which so far as relevant, include:
3. Where an EEA national or the family member of an EEA national has received a custodial sentence, or is a persistent offender, the longer the sentence, or the more numerous the convictions, the greater the likelihood that the individual’s continued presence in the United Kingdom presents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting the fundamental interests of society.
4. Little weight is to be attached to the integration of an EEA national or the family member of an EEA national within the United Kingdom if the alleged integrating links were formed at or around the same time as –
(a) the commission of a criminal offence;
(b) an act otherwise affecting the fundamental interests of society;
(c) the EEA national or family member of an EEA national was in custody.
5. The removal from the United Kingdom of an EEA national or the family member of an EEA national who is able to provide substantive evidence of not demonstrating a threat (for example, through demonstrating that the EEA national or the family member of an EEA national has successfully reformed or rehabilitated) is less likely to be proportionate.
6. …
8. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 to the EEA Regulations sets out the fundamental interests of society as follows:
For the purposes of these Regulations, the fundamental interests of society in the United Kingdom include-
(a) …
(b) maintaining public order;
(c) preventing social harm;
(d) …
(e) protecting public services;
(f) excluding or removing an EEA national or family member of an EEA national with a conviction (including where the conduct of that person is likely to cause, or has in fact caused, public offence) and maintaining public confidence in the ability of the relevant authorities to take such action;
(g) tackling offences likely to cause harm to society where an immediate or direct victim may be difficult to identify but where there is wider societal harm (such as offences related to the misuse of drugs or crime with a cross-border dimension as mentioned in Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union);…
(h) combating the effects of persistent offending (particularly in relation to offences, which if taken in isolation, may otherwise be unlikely to meet the requirements of regulation 27);
(i) protecting the rights and freedoms of others, particularly from exploitation and trafficking;
(j) protecting the public;
(k) …
(l) …
The Appellant’s evidence
9. The Appellant’s original written statement is unsigned and undated and it is not known precisely when it was prepared, but it seems reasonable to infer this was around 2021 for the purpose of his initial appeal hearing. The Appellant states that he lived in Belgium until 2009 and then moved to the UK with his mother and two brothers, his father was not around. The only language the Appellant knows well is English and he is unable to communicate in French which he has not needed to speak since he moved to the UK. The Appellant describes integrating well and being a good student at primary school, doing athletics and regularly going to church; but living in a bad area with a lot of drug use. The family were evicted from their home in 2011 and were placed in temporary accommodation, including in a one bedroom flat with kitchen facilities shared with drug addicts and the Appellant describes needing to share a bed with his brother; all in bad areas with drug use. The family moved to a new property in 2014 which was better, but in November 2020 the Appellant was attacked outside of his house, being stabbed twice with a machete and run over by a car, with a window also being smashed. The police intervened but no one was caught.
10. The Appellant describes his life as starting to get out of control after starting in secondary school, being expelled for sexual exposure after five months which affected his mental health and he describes himself as timid, having low self-esteem and problems with communication. He states that he was bullied, felt out of place and moved between different school places, which involved fighting and a further exclusion from one. He moved to Newhaven Centre which was more of a youth club for troubled young offenders to socialise, during which time he started smoking and tried cannabis. He was excluded from another school after that, had a short period at a different Newhaven Centre and then moved to John Roan school where he stayed to the end of his GCSEs and participated in athletics and football.
11. After school, the Appellant had few good exam grades, did not want to pursue further education and instead chose to socialise with the wrong peers and other similar people with no ambition. He had no employment prospects, low confidence and was exploited by friends.
12. At the time of the statement, the Appellant was 21 years old and subject to rigorous tagging conditions. He stated that he is a reformed character and all he cares about is family and trying to make something out of his life; with the ongoing support of his mother. The Appellant describes the restrictions on his life in terms of education, work and benefits, recovery from the knife incident and he and his mother suffering from poor mental health.
13. In what is titled an ‘addendum statement’, signed and dated 5 March 2023, the Appellant states that he continues to reside with this mother and brother and is fully reliant on his family for support as he is not permitted to work and has no income. He states that he has struggled to access the medical and mental health support he needs and has not recovered from the traumatic events that have happened to him. The Appellant has been doing courses in plumbing and EPC ratings for houses to expand his knowledge and possibly start a career in this field. The Appellant has no connection to Belgium or France.
14. In a written statement signed and dated 19 May 2025, the Appellant states that he is truly sorry and remorseful for his actions in the past that have led him to have these continued legal issues in his life. He states that he has had time to think about the severity of his actions and the circle of people he was involved in. The Appellant is doing a plumbing course that could lead to a career in engineering as some modules include health and safety in building services engineering. The Appellant wants to turn his life around and support his mother as she has supported him. The Appellant has been feeling the pressure and stress of his legal issues and his doctor has prescribed him anti-depressants and the option to self-refer for therapy if required.
15. The Appellant attended the hearing, adopted his written statements and gave oral evidence in English. He confirmed his current address which had not been updated with the Upper Tribunal. In addition to his written statements, he said that he had been taking anti-depressants for a month; he currently lives with his mother and siblings and is due to complete his plumbing course in three months time.
16. In cross-examination, the Appellant confirmed that he had not previously shown remorse for his offences and that his written statement did not touch on the aspects of the impact on his victims. In relation to the sexual assault, the Appellant said yes, but not really. He did take responsibility for the scenario, but what happened was completely different to the charges laid. The Appellant also expressly took responsibility for later offending, including assaults on other prisoners and staff whilst in prison. He stated that prison was a hostile place and whilst fighting may not be in your character, you have to improvise in the scenario you are put in, although he said that this did not make it right. Since his release, the Appellant states that his behaviour did change, just with a few hiccups along the way, by which he meant the later drugs possession offences. The Appellant stated that some of this may just have been him self-medicating.
17. The Appellant stated that he knew where he had gone wrong and had been able to reflect on this now, including where his actions had led him. His family in the UK had tried to help him along the way and by way of mitigation, he referred to living in deprived areas in a single parent household and things like that, including lacking stuff. The Appellant stated that he had lost contacts and relationships over time because of the lifestyle he was living. He has not attended any rehabilitation courses but hoped to do so.
18. In the United Kingdom, the Appellant had completed his primary and secondary education and was now enrolled in a plumbing course. He accepted in theory that he could use the skills from this training in France, but he had not yet finished the course and wanted to remain with family in the United Kingdom. He expected to finish the course in 6-12 weeks depending on his work rate.
19. The Appellant has been taking Mirtazapine since 2 May 2025, stating that he has been under a lot of stress, which is a regular thing. He does not know the system in France to know whether he could obtain the medication there. The Appellant had previously had CBT but not currently.
20. The Appellant stated that he can not speak some French and thought he only obtained an E grade in his GCSE. He accepted that in theory his family could visit him in France, but that it would not be ideal for them to support him there as they would not be able to provide emotional or financial support if he is no longer living in the same household.
21. In relation to drug use, the Appellant stated that he still uses drugs as sometimes he gets stressed out, the las occasion being about two weeks before the hearing, which was not a one-off use but used as an escape from stress and to get out of his mindset.
22. The Appellant had previously been employed in a warehouse when he was around age 17 or 18, but he has not had permission to work since.
23. At the moment, the Appellant spends his time going to the gym to keep fit and he is part of a running club. When asked what is different now compared to when he was previously offending, the Appellant stated that he has less friends and more productive friends, he focuses on his own mindset and self-care and what he has to do. He moved away from his previous area around two years ago.
The documentary evidence
24. Dr Olowookere prepared a psychiatric and scarring report dated 9 February 2024. The report sets out details of two specific scars found to be highly consistent with the Appellant’s account of being attacked with a machete in 2020 outside his house. In terms of mental health, Dr Olowookere’s opinion is that the Appellant is suffering from depressive disorder, with his (then) current episode being of a moderate to severe degree, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (“PTSD”). For the PTSD, the Appellant’s symptoms included remembering traumatic experiences, difficulty sleeping and moderate problems with concentration and the recommended treatment was a course of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy or Eye Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing for 8-12 weeks, or longer if needed. The prognosis is normally good with treatment and the Appellant can be supported by his mother and brother during sessions whilst gaining trust with the therapist.
25. The OASys report dated 1 April 2019 sets out the Appellant’s risk of further offending as at that date, with an OGRS 3 score of 31% risk of general offending within a year of sentence/discharge and a 48% risk within two years. The report includes detail of the Appellant’s numerous adjudications in detention and the additional days added to his sentence for them.
26. The factors considered to increase risk of reoffending were: a return to the area of offending, particularly if he associates with others involved in drug dealing and criminal activity; lack of stable accommodation; sustained periods of unemployment; gang activities; financial pressures; having no desire to gain lawful employment and still seeing drug dealing as a way to make his living. The factors likely to reduce risk of reoffending were: full-time employment; positive hobbies and pastimes; positive role models; family support; avoiding former peers involved in illegal or gang activities; stable accommodation; support from the Offender Manager; offending behaviour work; risk of recall.
27. There is an undated letter from the Appellant’s mother to the Respondent referring to the Appellant’s academic certificates, tenancy agreement, bank statement and utility bills (those documents being available in the bundle as well); also confirming there are no family members in France and a further undated letter referring to payslips (also included).
28. There is a handwritten, undated letter from the Appellant’s mother submitted shortly before the hearing. In it, she describes the Appellant as someone who “possesses a resilience and determination which is truly admirable” and “despite facing adversities and challenges, he has shown unwavering courage and strength of character”. The Appellant is referred to as having demonstrated his commitment to education and personal development, with references to the courses he has undertaken and is a talented athlete who has returned to the sporting world with vigor. The Appellant came in the top three in a sprint meet last season, showing “his determination and drive to excel”. Further, it is said that with the support of family and community, the Appellant’s mother is confident he will overcome the challenges that lie ahead and to thrive and succeed in his life.
29. There is a letter from Andrew Quadjovie, the Appellant’s younger brother, dated 9 April 2024 which states that he does not believe the Appellant has done anything wrong since coming out of prison and has since then been on a path to change his life, including doing a plumbing course; going to the gym and doing athletics. His view is that the Appellant has no intention of committing future crimes having learnt from his mistakes when he was younger.
30. There is an unsigned and undated letter said to be from the Appellant’s brother (although no name is included at all to identify the author) which states the Appellant is a talented athlete and football player. It refers to the family becoming hopeless, with feelings of sadness, loneliness and unworthiness which led to the Appellant finding what seemed like support from the wrong people, leading him to be away from home for weeks at a time and led to his conviction in 2017. The family were a single parent household and their mother used to be upset on a daily basis, so the Appellant felt he had no choice but to support her and fend for himself. Further, the Appellant had a life-threatening stabbing after he came out of prison which he still suffers from.
31. The bundle also includes a number of letters of support, including from:
• A PE teacher at John Roan school (undated but stamped as received on 13 May 2019) who taught the Appellant up to 2015.
• Christopher Hartley, dated 1 October 2020, written as a close friend of the Appellant from school involved in the music industry and refers to the Appellant spending the majority of his time in the studio learning about the music industry and being offered a job as co-manager with the author.
• Rev. Kwasi Amoani Okanta, dated 15 March 2021, knowing the Appellant since October 2019 as a church member and active participant in church activities, including the choir.
• Romario Schersmith-Adams of Romzy Music Ltd, unsigned and undated, who writes as a close friend of the Appellant having met in a recording studio and describes the Appellant as someone perfecting his musician character.
• Rebekah Ahmed, unsigned and undated, written as a character reference for the Appellant as a friend since May 2013.
32. In the latest documents submitted, there are a number of screenshots showing training units completed by the Appellant, as well as a course guide for the units in different sections. There is also a photo of Mirtazapine, 15mg tablets for the Appellant dated 2 May 2025.
33. There are a number of other documents in the bundle, including further immigration paperwork (including HMRC records), sentencing remarks, PNC, police statements and emails, school certificates (from 2010 and 2011, and exam result certificates from 2015), athletics results, NHS and benefit letters; none of which are necessary to refer to individually in this decision but have all been taken into account.
Closing submissions
34. On behalf of the Respondent, Mr Nappey relied on the reasons for refusal letter dated 27 October 2018 and the supplementary decision letter dated 9 November 2022; as well as the skeleton argument submitted.
35. In relation to the threat currently posed by the Appellant, Mr Nappey highlighted the sentencing remarks from the index offence, including the Appellant’s particular role in that; as well as his criminal history since 2011; starting with a sexual offence, the multiple drugs offences and a significant number of adjudications whilst serving his custodial sentence (set out in detail in the OASys report). The Appellant still refers to his conviction for sexual assault as an ‘incident’ and continues to downplay what happened without taking any responsibility for the actual offence he was found guilty of. This offence is still not directly addressed at all even in his most recent written statement and as per the previous First-tier Tribunal findings, the Appellant continues to blame others and wider societal factors for his offending. He has still failed to show any real insight in to his offending, or understanding of it. At its highest, the Appellant has now only made a short generic statement of remorse, without taking personal responsibility or addressing his individual offences in any way. Mr Nappey submitted that this was no more than a hollow statement for the purposes of this appeal to avoid deportation.
36. In relation to more recent offending, Mr Nappey submitted that these were not mere ‘hiccups’ as suggested by the Appellant, but showed that he has not changed his previous behaviours and drug use. The Appellant’s offending has and has continued to occur whilst he was within a close family unit. His family have not so far acted as a protective mechanism or barrier to his offending, which continued over a significant period of time. The OASys report assessed the Appellant to pose a high risk of reoffending and a medium risk of harm and whilst this is now some years old, there is nothing to suggest the Appellant has changed his ways since then. Mr Nappey submitted that overall, the Appellant still posed a high risk, although he had no convictions since 2022, that has to be considered in light of his long history of offending.
37. Mr Nappey relied on the fundamental interests of society set out in paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 to the EEA Regulations, in particular paragraph (g). Overall the Appellant has an appalling history of offending, he poses a high risk of reoffending, he has not taken responsibility for his offences, nor has he rehabilitated. His education through a plumbing course is not sufficient to show rehabilitation and family support has been similar throughout but did not prevent past offending, nor is it likely to have a more positive impact now.
38. In relation to proportionality, Mr Nappey referred to the factors in regulation 21(6) of the EEA Regulations. He submitted that the Appellant’s integration in to the United Kingdom was limited at best and that although he came here when he was relatively young, there was no evidence of employment or other education and little weight should be attached to integrative links formed around the time of criminal offending. Mr Nappey further relied on the Appellant’s membership of a gang as a factor against social integration and ties would have been broken during his time serving his custodial sentence as well. Further, it was notable that there had not been any updated evidence from friends or family and no other witnesses attended the hearing to give evidence in support of the Appellant’s appeal.
39. In relation to rehabilitation, despite the high risk of reoffending, the Appellant confirmed that no rehabilitation course had been undertaken and the limited evidence in relation to a plumbing course was not sufficient evidence to show actual rehabilitation.
40. In relation to family ties, Mr Nappey accepted that the Appellant has family in the United Kingdom but there is no reason that they would not be able to keep in touch and visit in France, even if that would be less than ideal for the Appellant. In any event, there is nothing exceptional in the family relationships and again noted that family did not prevent previous offending.
41. The Appellant is overall a healthy young man. He has recently been prescribed anti-depressant medication but has not provided any of his medical records or history; nor any up to date report as to his mental health. The previous psychiatric report did not have reference to any GP records and little weight should be attached to this. Further, there is nothing to indicate that the Appellant would not be able to obtain medication or other mental health treatment in France as required.
42. The Appellant can speak some French, as evidenced by his GCSE obtained in French and that would help him integrate on return to France; where he would be able to use the plumbing skills learnt in his course in the United Kingdom. There is little, if any, difference to the prospects of rehabilitation in France compared to the United Kingdom and he could still receive some support from family members in the Untied Kingdom.
43. Overall Mr Nappey submitted that the Appellant’s deportation would be proportionate.
44. On behalf of the Appellant, Ms Saifolahi relied on her skeleton argument and confirmed there was no dispute between the parties as to the applicable law and standard to be applied in this appeal. It was noted, without any formal ‘near miss’ argument being made, that the Appellant was at the date of decision only three months short of having been in the United Kingdom for 10 years and therefore achieving permanent residence here; a factor relevant to proportionality.
45. In relation to the Appellant’s criminal offending, the Respondent’s submission that this had escalated was disputed given that the two most recent convictions were only for possession which was not an escalation since the more serious possession with intent to supply conviction in 2017. It was also important to consider the Appellant’s pleas in proceedings and that at the time of the index offence he was only 18 years old. There was also significant delay between the Respondent’s decision in October 2018 and the hearing in the First-tier Tribunal some five years later. As at the date of hearing in the Upper Tribunal, the Appellant had not been convicted of any offence since 2022.
46. The Appellant’s evidence is that he has now had time to consider his past actions and has dissociated himself from previous associates. The time he has needed for this is a personal matter and what is needed differs between different people. The Appellant has also been open about his recent personal drug use to escape his current stressful circumstances, which was candid to accept recent criminal behaviour, albeit without a recent conviction.
47. The OASys report is now some years old and only shows risk factor predictions for upto two years after the report, which has not passed and there have been no further convictions since 2022.
48. The Appellant has current family support, shown in the psychiatric report to be relevant and significant to his mental health and lifestyle. Such support would not be available to the same level if the Appellant were in France.
49. Overall, it was submitted on behalf of the Appellant that the Respondent had not established that he posed a current, present and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society to the serious grounds level. However, if not accepted, in any event, the Appellant’s deportation would not be proportionate for the following reasons. First, the Appellant’s offending whilst serious, did not continue to escalate after 2017 and prior to that he had clearly integrated in the United Kingdom and been educated here since the age of 10. Secondly, the Appellant has no ties to France and has never resided there. He has some familiarity with the language, but his primary language is now English. The Appellant has engaged in courses within the scope of what he is permitted to do during the course of his appeal and he continues to have family support in the Untied Kingdom.
50. Ms Saifolahi’s primary submission was that the Appellant had rehabilitated already, but in the alternative, he would need to remain here to do so. The alternative submission was made in light of the Appellant’s admission of recent drug use, that for him to progress with rehabilitation, his prospects of doing so were better in the United Kingdom where he has family support, than in France.
Findings and reasons
51. The issues in this appeal are (i) whether the Appellant poses a present, genuine and sufficiently serious threat on serious grounds of public policy, public security or public health; and (ii) whether his deportation is proportionate.
Preserved findings of fact
52. There are extensive findings preserved from the First-tier Tribunal which are set out below as a starting point on these issues. These refer to the facts as found as at the date of that decision in April 2024, some of which will necessarily need updating further to the most recent evidence before me.
36. The respondent accepted, in the supplementary decision letter, dated 9th November 2022, that the Appellant had established permanent residence in the UK. The appellant did not seek to submit that he had established ten years’ residence for the purposes of the EEA Regulations. The appropriate test is therefore whether there are serious grounds of public policy or public security to justify deportation.
37. In making that assessment, I have had regard to the risk of harm and the risk of reoffending and to the types of convictions as well as taking account of the relevant factors set out in the EEA Regulations.
38. The appellant has convictions for exposure and sexual assault of a female under 13. The witness statement from Constable Paine records that it was alleged that the appellant grabbed the victim’s breast and vaginal area and exposed himself. The appellant does not address this conviction in his witness statements other than to say he was expelled from school as a result and that it had a major impact on his life. In the psychiatric report, the appellant is recorded as denying this offence and stating that it was a false allegation. He has not taken responsibility for the offences despite the convictions. There was no evidence to suggest that he appealed the convictions and no evidence, other than his own statement, to support the allegation that the victim was not being hones about the offence. This was a serious offence which would have had a long lasting impact on the victim. The appellant has not undertaken any sexual offences rehabilitation work but I also note that there have been no further similar convictions and the police intelligence set out in the witness statement of Constable Pain does not suggest that there have been any further arrests with no charges for similar offences.
39. The majority of the appellant’s convictions relate to drugs offences. The index offence was for conspiracy to supply Class A drugs. That is also a serious offence. Drugs offences have wide reaching consequences of drugs users, their families, the local community and wider society. Drug use can lead to further offences being committed to finance addition and to anti-social behaviour affecting communities and society.
40. The sentencing remarks set out the background to the offences and note that the appellant played a significant role in the offending. The sentencing remarks state:
‘You, I am sure, are 18 years of age but at the same time you knew exactly what you were doing. You carried out what I find is a significant role. You had the telephone, the means of supply. The time over which your actions were recorded indicate to me that you did indeed perform a number of acts within this conspiracy …’
41. The only OASys assessment before me is dated 1st April 2019. That gives an OGRS3 score of 31% in the first year and 48% in the second year. The appellant was considered to be at medium risk of harm to the public in the community and at medium risk of harm to staff, prisoners and known adults whilst in custody. The appellant was not considered to recognise the impact of his offending on the victim, community or wider society. The factors considered to increase risk were:
• Returning to the area of offending
• Lack of accommodation
• Sustained periods of unemployment
• Gang activities
• Financial pressures
• No incentive to find legal employment
42. The OASys assessment considers positive factors which would guard against reoffending. These included full time employment, positive hobbies, positive role models, family support, avoiding former peers, support from his Offender Manager, stable accommodation and offending behaviour work.
43. Following his entry into the prison sentence, the appellant was subject to significant number of adjudications ranging from disobeying lawful orders to fights on a number of occasions as well as an assault against an officer. The appellant had 51 days added to his sentence as a result of those adjudications. The appellant remained in custody until 2020 suggesting that his behaviour improved as the last adjudication was in June 2018.
44. The OASys sets out a number of rehabilitative programmes which it was considered would be beneficial to the appellant. This included work on thinking behaviour and risk management. It is unclear why this work was not undertaken; the appellant’s evidence was that it had not been undertaken. He states that it was because he had to request places on courses and that prisoners with longer sentences or more significant offending were prioritised. However, much of the work indicated as to be undertaken with the appellant’s Offender Manager and there is no real explanation as to why that was not undertaken. There was no updating OASys assessment, letter from Probation or independent risk assessment postdating 2019.
45. The respondent’s bundle contains communication from the Metropolitan Police which sets out their concerns regarding the appellant including intelligence to suggest that the appellant was involved with two gangs; the 1800 gang and the Dockyard gang. The witness statement from Constable Paine, dated 9th October 2018, states that the appellant was well known to the Metropolitan Police violent and organised crime unit. Constable Paine states that he had come into contact with the appellant ‘on a disproportionate number of occasions such was the involvement he had in gang activity and drug dealing’. Constable Paine describes the appellant as being a ‘hardened gang member who was clearly set on earning money through dealing drugs, he was offered diversion opportunities on a number of occasions but had no interest in this …’
46. The appellant alludes to this lifestyle, to some extent, in his first (unsigned and undated) witness statement. He states that after being expelled from school and moving between other educational establishments, he was placed at the Newhaven Centre which was like a youth club for troubled teenagers. The appellant states that it was here that his life became more troubled. The appellant does not at any stage state whether he accepts that he was involved with gangs. His brother, […], had a conclusive grounds NRM decision which found that he had been recruited by a gang but the appellant had not had this. The Metropolitan Police intelligence makes reference to the appellant being involved with gangs and the OASys assessment notes that gang related activities were a factor in possible reoffending. It is of some concern that the appellant does not really address this issue rather than generic statements about his peers and the area in which he lived. It is clear that when he first entered the prison system, he continued to fight against it given the number of adjudications he received in the first year of his custodial sentence. It is also clear, however, that this changed over time as the last adjudication was in June 2018 and the appellant remained in custody until 2020.
47. Upon release from custody, the appellant appears still to have been involved in a somewhat chaotic lifestyle. He received a conviction for possession of a Class A drug in November 2020 and another for possession of a Class B drug in May2022. There was also an attack on the appellant in November 2020 outside the appellant’s home. It is not known if this attack was gang related.
48. The appellant is silent, in his most recent witness statement, with regard to the drugs convictions in November 2020 and May 2022. The supplementary decision letter dated 9th November 2022, refers to the appellant being arrested on 9th October and being released pending further investigations. The PNC did not record any pending investigations or convictions post May 2022 so it seems that the investigation did not lead to further charges or convictions and that it has been concluded.
49. As part of the psychiatric assessment, the appellant stated that he no longer took drugs. The appellant was unable to really explain why the two convictions post custody occurred. He mentioned a lack of support as a result of having spent the majority of his licence time in immigration detention and as a result of the Covid pandemic but that would not apply for the 2022 conviction (by which stage the appellant’s licence would have concluded in any event). The appellant’s younger brother made reference to these convictions being mistakes by the appellant without giving any analysis as to why those mistakes occurred. The appellant’s older brother appeared to suggest that as far as he was aware, the appellant did not use drugs and had not used them which is directly contradictory to the appellant’s own evidence. It seemed that the appellant’s older brother was being somewhat evasive when asked when the appellant stopped using drugs stating that he had not seen the appellant using drugs. However, the appellant’s own evidence is that he has used drugs in the past and the appellant’s older brother was also involved in drugs. Either the appellant’s older brother does not know as much about the appellant as he suggested or he was reluctant to give information which suggests someone who is not being as open in his evidence as one would hope. The appellant’s older brother said that the appellant was private about the reasons for the drugs convictions but I would expect a family member who is assisting another family member in rehabilitation to push for a reason as to the reasons for any further reoffending if only to be able to help address those reasons. He suggested that this sense of privacy arose as a result of the attack in November 2020 but one of the drugs convictions was May 2022; some 18 months after the attack. The appellant himself seemed to have little insight into the later drugs convictions. The detail about the attack is also lacking. There is a brief description of what happened but no explanation as to why the appellant believed this had happened and no suggestion that the attack was reported to the police.
50. It is unfortunate that there is no updated risk assessment for the appellant. The risk assessment from 2019 shows a high risk of reoffending and a medium risk of serious harm. However, that was at a stage where the appellant was still rebelling against the prison system (which in itself may have been because of gang links as many of the incidents related to disobeying orders or fighting other prisons). The OASys assessment also mentioned the risk to the appellant as a result of his involvement with gangs and stated that he was subject to release planning although whether that occurred is unclear. The psychiatric report addresses the appellant’s mental health but does not consider any risk analysis.
51. An analysis of risk of harm/reoffending is made harder by the lack of up to date risk assessments. The OASys assessment was undertaken at a time shortly after the appellant’s last adjudications in prison. It seems that those then settled down. The appellant showed little insight into his offending behaviour and there was no real discussion regarding gang involvement within the OASys assessment. There is a witness statement from the Metropolitan Police outlining serious concerns with regard to gang membership although I note that many of those incidents related to as long ago as 2016 and 2017. The attack on the appellant after his release from prison is also of some concern given the fact that it could well relate to gang activity. Balanced against this is the fact that the appellant’s last conviction was in May 2022, that the 2 convictions post release relate to possession of drugs rather than supplying drugs, that the appellant informed Dr Olowookere that he had stopped using drugs which would be consistent with the lack of any further drugs convictions and that he has shown some insight into his offending. There was a tendency by the appellant to blame outside factors for his offending behaviour rather than accepting that he also had choices which he made but outside factors are also relevant in assessing risk. The appellant and his family members all spoke of the appellant now having a sense of purpose, being interested and committed to his studies and being engaged in athletics. I note in the appellant’s initial bundle there were letters talking of the appellant’s engagement in music activities dating from 2021. This was not mentioned at the hearing or in the updating evidence, the supporting letters from those individuals were not updated and they did not attend the hearing. It seems then that the appellant has not continued to commit to those activities.
52. The OASys assessment indicated high percentages regarding risk of reoffending and a medium risk of serious harm but this was at a time when the appellant was still in prison and was shortly after his involvement with adjudications. That settled down approximately 6 months before the OASys assessment. The only new convictions have been for possession of drugs and the last one was in May 2022, almost 2 years ago. In terms of the factors likely to increase or reduce the likelihood of reoffending, the appellant has moved areas, there is no updating evidence from the Metropolitan Police to suggest that he is still involved in gangs, he is engaging in education with a view to finding employment and has taken up athletics as a hobby. He has stable accommodation with his family. Those are all factors which were considered by the author of the OASys assessment to lead to a reduced likelihood of reoffending. The appellant has made significant changes to his lifestyle which his family have also recognised as being of a positive benefit to the appellant. […]
57. I accept that it is likely that the support of family and friends in the UK would be beneficial to the appellant. The appellant left Belgium when he was ten years old. It seems that he left the UK at some stage after that as his induction interview at prison made reference to his last entry to the UK being 2014. The appellant denied this in his evidence but there is no explanation as to why that date would have been recorded if the appellant did not give it. The induction interview asks whether the appellant has family in his country of origin to which the appellant responds ‘No’. he is asked for the date of his last visit to his country of origin and states ‘not returned’. The appellant states that he has never lived in France and that he has no contact with his father who is a French national. I accept that, having left Belgium at a young age, with no family in Belgium or France and having not returned for visits, the appellant’s connections with Belgium or France will be extremely limited. […]
58.The appellant states that he does not speak French so cannot return to France because of linguistic difficulties. I note from the GCSE certificates provided by the appellant that his grades in his GCSEs including English language were grades E, F and G. However, his grade for GCSE French was a C suggesting a level of capability given that the appellant did not obtain any passes in other subjects yet was able to obtain a grade C in French. I find that the appellant has deliberately attempted to downplay his ability in French. While he may not be fluent in French, I find that he will have some understanding of French and that this would quickly develop if he were living in France.
59. The appellant states that he has no ties to France. He was not challenged about that evidence. He states that, in any event, he has never lived in France and was born and brought up in Belgium. I accept that the appellant has few, if any ties, with France. He is a young man with very few qualifications in the UK and with no apparent employment experience. He would be in a vulnerable position if deported to France. There may be some support available to him from the State in the form of public funds but this is not certain given that he has never lived in France and it is unclear whether he would be expected to fulfil a period of residence prior to qualifying for assistance. The concern would be whether the appellant would slip back in to the same way of earning money which he did in the UK, i.e. drug dealing. The appellant had some support in the UK in the form of family support, potential access to education and public funds and access to housing assistance yet found himself involved with gangs and drug dealing. There is a real risk that this would occur again as a young man in France with few ties, no accommodation, no qualifications other than a GCSE in French and no employment experience on which to rely.
60. The appellant is also considered to require treatment and family support to assist him in addressing his PTSD. There was no evidence before me that he had started CBT but it was submitted on his behalf that he was intending to use the psychiatric report to seek a referral for treatment from his GP. The appellant has all of his immediate family members in the UK and has a close relationship with them. That support could continue via telephone calls and visits but it would not be the same level of support which he currently enjoys in the UK. The appellant did not provide any evidence to suggest that CBT would not be available to him in France.
61. There would also be an interference with the appellant’s education. At present, he is studying a plumbing course with a view to finding employment. There would be an interruption to this if he had to leave the UK although it is possible that he could continue his education in France. There was little evidence before me either way with regard to this.
53. I rely on the findings above in the assessments set out below and incorporate the same, without repeating them in full (although points of detail are referred to where relevant) and with updating as needed further to the situation as at the date of hearing.
Does the Appellant’s personal conduct represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious risk to one of the fundamental interests of society?
54. The Respondent can only deport the Appellant on serious grounds of public policy or public security in accordance with regulation 23 and 27 of the EEA Regulations. In accordance with the provisions set out above, I consider first the personal conduct of the Appellant and whether his personal conduct represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests in society. Although the Appellant’s convictions and criminal history does not itself justify a decision to deport, that is a convenient place to start.
55. The Appellant’s criminal history is set out in full above, which includes one sexual offence in 2011 when the Appellant was just 11 years old and the most serious being the index offences of two counts of conspiracy to supply class A drugs in 2017 when he was aged 18 (offences committed between May and July 2017), for which he received a sentence of 30 months’ in a young offenders institution (to which time was added for a significant number of adjudications). The nature and seriousness of the drugs offences is contained in the preserved findings of fact, including reference to the sentencing remarks.
56. Since then and following his release from detention, the Appellant has two convictions for drugs possession offences in November 2020 and May 2022 (for which sentencing information is unavailable, but there is nothing to suggest either resulted in a further custodial sentence). However, given the Appellant’s own admission that he still uses illegal drugs, most recently only two weeks before the hearing (albeit he stated in the course of his psychiatric assessment that he no longer took drugs, it is not possible to determine whether this was untruthful at the time or whether he resumed using after this point), his criminal activity has self-evidently continued or resumed, even without further convictions for it. The passage of time since the last conviction is therefore not a weighty factor to support the assertion that the Appellant no longer poses a genuine, present and sufficiently serious risk to the public; nor that he has rehabilitated.
57. In terms of the actual offences and the Appellant’s insight in to them, there is very little to suggest that he accepts responsibility for all of them or understands the wider impact of his offending. In relation to the first sexual offence, despite a very recent expression of remorse for all offending, the Appellant continues to dispute the circumstances of the offence and seeks to distance himself from what happened and fails to take responsibility for it. In particular, he still refers to it as an ‘incident’ or ‘scenario’ rather than an offence and only for something which he claims was very different to what he was convicted of. I take into account the more detailed existing findings as to the nature and seriousness of this offence and its long-lasting impact on the victim and that there have been no further convictions for sexual offences.
58. As to the other drugs offences, whilst the Appellant pleaded guilty to the most serious offences of conspiracy to supply showing some acceptance of responsibility, again, there is only a generic and very recent statement of remorse which fails to show any real understanding of the seriousness or impact of his offending. The Appellant continues to refer to difficult circumstances whilst growing up, with poor and unstable accommodation, being surrounded by drug use, poor exam grades and low employment prospects, lacking stuff, as well as being exploited by peers. The Appellant continues to rely on these external factors as an explanation for his choice in committing criminal offences; which his brothers also place reliance on in their support for the Appellant. Similarly, whilst he accepts that the assaults on other prisoners and staff whilst in custody were not right, the Appellant addresses these offences as being due to needing to improvise in the scenario he was in. All of this fails to show the Appellant having taken any personal responsibility for his offending at all.
59. There are a number of indications that the Appellant was involved in gangs, including an attack on himself after his release from prison by a group with a machete and being run over; which he now says was reported to the police but there is no indication that any action was taken in relation to an obviously serious offence, which would be surprising if it was reported. However, the Appellant has never engaged with any of this evidence, has never confirmed or denied gang involvement; in fact he has never addressed any of this at all in his evidence or during the OASys assessment. The Appellant’s involvement or otherwise in gangs and whether he has distanced from such associations or behaviour is difficult to assess given his failure to engage with any of this. However, the evidence does indicate past involvement at least.
60. Further, the fact that the Appellant has further convictions for possession which he describes as ‘hiccups’ and were either not known about, or not accepted as doing anything wrong by family members (detailed findings on this evidence are in the preserved findings above); shows that he continues to fail to understand the seriousness of drug use in society or the impact it can have on individuals. The reference to continued drug use as possibly just ‘self-medicating’ or as a release from stress, again fails to reflect the seriousness of such behaviour or reasons for it, particularly at a time when the Appellant has also been prescribed and was taking anti-depressants. I do however take into account that the Appellant’s more recent offending has not been as serious as the index offences, nor has there been any further escalation in seriousness from those.
61. As to the assessment of future risk, the OASys report is now some six years’ old and therefore less weight can be attached to this as there is no up to date assessment of the Appellant’s circumstances and risk factors. As per the preserved findings, it is also relevant that the OASys report was completed at a time when the Appellant had received numerous adjudications whilst serving his sentence, including for assault; but subsequent to which this settled down.
62. At the time of the OASys report in April 2019, the Appellant was assessed as having a risk of further offending within one year of sentence/discharge of 31% and within two years of 48%. The Appellant was considered to be at medium risk of harm to the public in the community and at medium risk of harm to staff, prisoners and adults whilst in custody. As above, in the preserved findings, there were a number of adjudications, including for assault during his period of custody and the Appellant did in fact reoffend in 2020 and 2022.
63. The OASys report remains helpful for identification of what factors may increase the risk of future offending and those which may decrease the risk of future offending. As to those which may increase risk, they were: a return to the area of offending, particularly if he associates with others involved in drug dealing and criminal activity; lack of stable accommodation; sustained periods of unemployment; gang activities; financial pressures; having no desire to gain lawful employment and still seeing drug dealing as a way to make his living.
64. As to these factors, the Appellant moved away from the area in which he previously lived around two years ago. The Appellant refers to now having fewer friends and more productive friends in his oral evidence as a factor which has changed since his offending; although he has not expressly stated that he has dissociated from former criminal associates, there is nothing to suggest ongoing contact from those he was previously involved in. However, given the Appellant’s ongoing and recent drug use in his now different home area, he will necessarily have some association now with drug dealers and criminal activity; suggesting at least some new connections of this sort have been made even if contact with past associates has ceased. The ongoing drug use and corresponding involvement with criminal activity and drug dealers (even if not himself dealing) is a significant risk factor to increase future offending given the Appellant’s history of drugs offences.
65. There is nothing to suggest that the Appellant’s current accommodation with his family is not stable, but he remains unemployed (due to his restrictions on work) and financially dependent on others. He has however undertaken various vocational plumbing and EPC courses with a view to lawful employment in those fields once permitted to do so if in the future. The availability of such employment and whether it would give the Appellant financial security to deter him from returning to drug dealing is unknown.
66. In relation to those factors which may decrease the risk of future offending, these were: full-time employment; positive hobbies and pastimes; positive role models; family support; avoiding former peers involved in illegal or gang activities; stable accommodation; support from the Offender Manager; offending behaviour work; and the risk of recall.
67. A number of these factors, such as stable accommodation are simply the other side of the coin to those which would otherwise increase risk. As above, there is nothing to suggest that the Appellant’s accommodation with his family is not stable and there is at least the potential for full-time employment in the future when permitted to do so and assuming the Appellant completes his current vocational plumbing course to lead him to employment in that field. However, that is not yet in place for the Appellant.
68. There are a number of letters of support for the Appellant in the bundle which refer to the Appellant engaging in positive activities, such as athletics, music and participating in the Church; however, all of these predate 2021 and none have been updated. There were no friends or acquaintances who made a formal witness statement to the Upper Tribunal and none attended to give evidence on the Appellant’s behalf. It is notable that the Appellant himself does not refer to continuing with the majority of these activities, stating only that he goes to the gym and is involved in athletics. The Appellant’s involvement in a number of activities and past-times has not been sustained; and that there is nothing to suggest any continuing support or involvement with many of those who had previously written letters of support and who may have been a positive influence for the Appellant. The constant remaining interest is in athletics, which has featured in the Appellant’s life since secondary school (from his time at John Roan school in particular) and he continues to engage in now; but the information on this is limited to short references to it. It is hard from this information to gauge the level of the Appellant’s involvement and not possible more generally to identify any positive role models for the Appellant, at least outside of family which I turn to next.
69. In terms of family support, the Appellant lives with family, who support him and he speaks to this being given to him from his mother in particular. There are letters from the Appellant’s mother and brothers, some of whom gave oral evidence in the First-tier Tribunal hearing; but none of whom attended the hearing in the Upper Tribunal to do so (his mother attended part of the hearing but did not give oral evidence). The letters themselves, particularly the most recent ones, speak to the Appellant’s resilience, strength of character and determination but offer very little detail in what support is actually given to the Appellant in a practical way and fail to address in any meaningful way his criminal offending (beyond reference to difficult external factors at the time) or risk of reoffending.
70. As above in the preserved findings and in the written evidence from one brother most recently submitted, the Appellant’s family appear to either be unaware of his convictions for possession of drugs since his release from custody; or fail to appreciate their significance or seriousness. There is nothing to suggest any family members are aware of the Appellant’s continuing drug use, or if they are, they have not engaged with this in their limited evidence or the risks that it continues to increase for the Appellant.
71. Although the Appellant describes difficult circumstances, particularly in his and his family’s living environment whilst growing up, he has lived with family throughout his time in the United Kingdom (save for his period serving his custodial sentence) and with their support. That is likely to assist now with stable accommodation and financial support, but did not prevent any of his previous offending and has not prevented his ongoing drug use. There is nothing of any substance from any family member now as to any differences in the nature of their support or generally that would suggest that the Appellant’s family would now have any greater success in reducing the risk of further offending.
72. The Appellant has not engaged in any offending behaviour work (as set out in the preserved findings) and it is not expected that following completion of his sentence and licence period that he would still have an Offender Manager or any potential involvement with one. Nor is there any remaining risk of recall. Some of these factors to reduce the risk of further offending are therefore no longer directly relevant given the passage of time, although I would consider the risk of deportation as a potential factor in a similar way to the risk of recall; albeit not a positive one as yet given the Appellant’s further offending and continued drug use even up to shortly before his latest appeal hearing.
73. The last factor as a positive to reduce the risk of reoffending was for the Appellant to avoid former peers involved in illegal or gang activities. I take into account what is already set out above in relation to the Appellant moving away from his former home area and with nothing to suggest that he remains in touch with previous associates involved in illegal activity; but that the Appellant has continued to fail to engage with the evidence pointing towards gang involvement and inevitably now has new criminal associates from continuing drug use.
74. Overall, whilst there are some positive factors which, by reference to those identified in the OASys report, would reduce the risk of further offending, in particular stable accommodation with family support, in a different geographical area and education with a view to legal employment; I find that the factors likely to increase the risk of further offending outweigh these. In particular, the evidence of family support is limited and has not prevented offending in the past; his family seem unaware of or not engaged with all of the Appellant’s current lifestyle and circumstances including drug use; the Appellant remains financially dependent on others; if anything his hobbies and pastimes have reduced compared to what they were said to be a few years ago and most importantly, he has already committed further offences, with convictions for possession and continues to use drugs now. Whilst these offences are not as serious as the index offences, the nature of drug use is one which creates risk of further offending not just in terms of possession, but also an escalation to dealing (which is the path followed by the Appellant previously) and the risk of other offending to pay for the drugs where the Appellant has no independent financial means and is not in employment.
75. Finally, I have taken into account the factors set out in the legal framework section above from Schedule 1 to the EEA Regulations. This includes in paragraph 3 that where the EEA national has received a custodial sentence, the longer the sentence or more numerous the convictions, the greater the likelihood that the individual’s presence in the United Kingdom presents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting the fundamental interests of society. The Appellant’s index offences for which he received a custodial sentence of 30 months’ were serious (although not at the highest end of sentencing) and he has six convictions for seven offences overall. Further, in paragraph 7 of Schedule 1, all of the fundamental interests of society as set out in the legal framework section above are relevant to the present appeal given the nature and risk of reoffending in relation to this Appellant.
76. Overall, I am satisfied that the Appellant’s personal conduct, in particular his continued drug use and continued risk of reoffending, represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to more than one of the fundamental interests in society, including, but not limited to maintaining public order; preventing social harm and protecting the public. I find this to be to the elevated serious grounds threshold because of the nature of the risks posed by drug use and wider offending related to it, with a high likely risk of further offending and causing a medium risk of harm (the nature of the risk not having changed since the OASys report despite the passage of time). I have taken into account the adverse impact of drug use on wider society which is well known and does not need to be repeated here in any detail.
Is the Appellant’s deportation proportionate in accordance with Regulation 27 of the EEA Regulations?
77. Regulation 27 of the EEA Regulations sets out specific factors to be taken into account when considering whether the Appellant’s deportation would be proportionate. I take these into account as follows.
78. The Appellant is now 26 years old and is in good physical health. In terms of his mental health, he was previously assessed in early 2024 as suffering from depressive disorder and post-traumatic experiences (only the latter of which was accepted in the preserved findings of fact by the First-tier Tribunal). Family support was identified as being beneficial at that time, particularly to assist in a period where a relationship was established with a professional for CBT, but at the most recent hearing, the Appellant stated that he had previously completed a course of CBT. The Appellant had been prescribed a course of anti-depressant medication earlier in the month, with the option to self-refer for therapy if required (not yet taken up). There are no other up to date mental health assessments or medical records available and no indication of any current or needed family support in relation to mental health; albeit it is usually the case that this would be beneficial to a person. The Appellant referred to having consulted his doctor recently because he has been feeling the pressure and stress of his legal issues rather than any ongoing trauma from the attack on him that he had previously referred to or any ongoing depressive symptoms.
79. The Appellant currently lives with his mother and brothers in the United Kingdom. He is not currently permitted to work, so has no personal income and is financially supported by family members (although their economic situation is unknown). The Appellant has some limited employment experience in the United Kingdom having worked in a warehouse, albeit this was many years ago, before serving his custodial sentence when he was 17 or 18 years old. He is currently undertaking vocational courses in plumbing which he hopes to utilise for employment in the future.
80. The Appellants claims to have arrived in the United Kingdom in 2009 with his mother and brothers and to have resided here ever since. There is some suggestion that he left and re-entered the United Kingdom in 2014 (as per the Appellant’s own statement to the authorities many years ago) but there is nothing to suggest absence for any lengthy period of time and the Respondent accepts in any event that the Appellant had achieved permanent residence in the United Kingdom. I find that the Appellant is likely have around to sixteen years’ residence in the United Kingdom, including some period of absence up to 2014 and his period of imprisonment from 2017 (which broke his continuity of residence for the purposes of the EEA Regulations).
81. During the Appellant’s residence, he completed his primary and secondary education. There is a brief reference to an earlier period in college prior to conviction for the index offences; but no detail of whether this was for any significant period and it was not completed/did not result in any further qualifications beyond GCSE level. More recently, the Appellant has pursued vocational plumbing and EPC courses. It can be inferred that during his residence and education in the United Kingdom, with family and friends, brief employment, at least past involvement in the Church and more regular involvement in athletics, the Appellant has some degree of social and cultural integration here. However, in accordance with paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the EEA Regulations, little weight should be attached to integration if formed at or around the same time as the commission of a criminal offence. Given the Appellant’s offending history from 2011 to 2022, this covers most of his period in the United Kingdom, which also includes his time serving his custodial sentence which is likely to have broken some of his integrative links here.
82. There is no real dispute that the Appellant has no meaningful ties, if at all, with his county of nationality, France. The Appellant’s nationality derives from his father, with whom he does not have a relationship and he spent his early years in Belgium (not France) before coming to the United Kingdom. He has never lived in France and has no direct experience of life there. He does however speak at least some French (having achieved a Grade C at GCSE in French, as set out in the preserved findings) and this would give him some connection and ability to establish himself there.
83. The Appellant’s recent vocational courses would also provide transferable skills that he could use to seek employment in France (assuming he completes the course in the coming weeks as expected or would be able to complete it in France), which is an improvement from the position considered above by the First-tier Tribunal and there is now at least some evidence of past employment. As a French national, there is no reason to think that the Appellant would not be entitled to support and opportunities on return there; including mental health medication and treatment if required – there being no evidential basis relied upon by the Appellant for the concern in the preserved findings that he may have to fulfil a period of residence prior to qualifying for assistance and nothing to suggest a lack of family support, as they do now, in the interim if needed.
84. I give separate consideration to the issue of rehabilitation of the Appellant or prospects for the same either in the United Kingdom or in France. As above, I do not find that the Appellant can be considered to have rehabilitated fully from his criminal offences in circumstances where he has continued to offend (even if there have been no further convictions since 2022, he is currently using drugs which shows offending behaviour); where he has not shown any meaningful remorse or insight in to his offending and where he has not undertaken any work to directly address his offending (beyond the more indirect pursuit of education).
85. The preserved findings of fact contain an assessment of the relevant factors for rehabilitation in the United Kingdom and in France (albeit not framed expressly as a consideration of rehabilitation) and refer to matters such as the Appellant’s relative level of support and prospects in both countries. Although there has been some further education and improvement in mental health (with previous CBT and only recent self-referral for anti-depressant medication), the situation is broadly the same for the Appellant. He would have more direct and continuing family support in the United Kingdom through living with them in the same household, than he would in France where contact would be more indirect and limited on a face-to-face basis. There is however nothing to suggest that the Appellant’s family would not keep in touch or continue to support him in France, nor that they would be unable to visit or provide any continuing financial support as they do now. The Appellant would still be returning to a country where he has no meaningful ties and would need to establish himself with accommodation and employment, with relatively few qualifications and experience; he now has more than he did when his appeal was before the First-tier Tribunal. Overall, the Appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation are better in the United Kingdom compared to in France; but not to any significant extent given that even with ongoing support in the United Kingdom, the Appellant has not yet rehabilitated over many years since his release from custody and still poses a risk of further offending in the United Kingdom. This is a matter to which I attach weight, but it is not in any way determinative or a trump card.
86. In all of these circumstances, balancing the risk posed by the Appellant to the fundamental interests of society and all of the factors above, I find the Appellant’s deportation to be proportionate and in accordance with regulation 27 of the EEA Regulations. Whilst he has far greater ties to the United Kingdom than he does to France, those are transferable to another relatively similar European country where he has at least basic understanding of the language (which would quickly develop on return) and no worse prospects of future employment than he does in the United Kingdom, utilising more recent qualifications and experience. The Appellant would be able to maintain family relationships from France and continue to receive support from family members there (albeit in a reduced way without the same face-to-face contact), as well as access appropriate health care as needed. In the round, the Appellant’s ties to the United Kingdom and prospects here do not outweigh the risk posed to the fundamental interests of society, which has persisted for many years after the index offences with further offending and drug use, even if currently at a lower level of seriousness than the index offences.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law, such that it was necessary to set aside the decision.
The appeal is remade as follows:
The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.
G Jackson
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
30th June 2026
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-002325
First-tier Tribunal No: DA/00382/2019
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
…………………………………
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON
Between
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and
CHRISTIAN LOUIS QUADJOVIE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms SA Nwachuku, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms J Fletcher of Counsel, instructed by Kalsi Solicitors
Heard at Field House on 8 October 2024
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Beach promulgated on 24 April 2024, in which Mr Quadjovie’s appeal against the decision to deport him under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (the “EEA Regulations”) dated 17 October 2018 was allowed. For ease I continue to refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal, with Mr Quadjovie as the Appellant and the Secretary of State as the Respondent.
2. The Appellant is a national of France, born on 4 February 1999, who claims to have first entered the Kingdom in 2009 (although the Respondent claims he left at some point and re-entered in 2014). The Appellant has a number of criminal convictions in the United Kingdom as follows. First, on 25 October 2011, he was convicted of exposure and sexual assault on a female under the age of 13; for which he was sentenced to a supervision and rehabilitation order. Secondly, on 28 October 2016, he was convicted of possession of a knife; for which he was sentenced to a nine month referral order, a costs order and payment of a victim surcharge. Thirdly, on 6 December 2016, the Appellant was convicted of possession of a class B drug, for which he received a three month referral order and a costs order. Fourthly, on 23 August 2017, the Appellant was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to supply class A drugs, for which he was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment in a young offenders institution.
3. The Respondent made a decision to deport the Appellant under the EEA Regulations on the basis that there was insufficient evidence that the Appellant had permanent residence in the United Kingdom (due to a lack of evidence as to the period between 2009 and 2014, that the Appellant had left education in 2015 with insufficient evidence of genuine and effective employment up to 2017 and no evidence of comprehensive sickness for the relevant period; further continuity of residence was broken by the Appellant’s incarceration from late 2017); that he posed a genuine, present and a sufficiently serious threat to the public and his deportation would not be disproportionate.
4. In particular, the Respondent referred to the Appellant’s criminal offences, which involved gangs and drugs; as well as a history of adjudications whilst in detention for which he had an additional 51 days added to his sentence. The Appellant was considered to be a high harm offender, with offences involving a knife and violence. The OASys assessment was relied upon, in which the Appellant was assessed as posing a medium risk of harm and a high risk of reoffending. It was noted that there had been an escalation in the seriousness of the Appellant’s offending, which continued and despite the initial community rehabilitation sentences given, and that he had failed to engage with offending courses in detention. It was considered that the Appellant had a propensity to reoffend and taking all of this into account, he posed a continuing danger.
5. In relation to proportionality, the Respondent decided that there was no social cultural integration into the United Kingdom, the Appellant could keep in touch with family from France, where he is a national and where he has knowledge of the country and the language, such that he would be able to rehabilitate there. The Appellant’s deportation was therefore considered to be proportionate.
6. Finally, the Respondent considered Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but found that none of the exceptions to deportation applied in this case. The Appellant did not have a partner or child in the United Kingdom, he did not meet any of the three conditions for the private life exception and in any event, there were no compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in his deportation.
7. Judge Beach allowed the appeal in a decision promulgated on 24 April 2024 under the EEA Regulations. As at the date of hearing, the Respondent had accepted that the Appellant had permanent residence in the United Kingdom and there was evidence that the Appellant had committed further offences, namely possession of a class a drug in November 2020 and possession of a class B drug in May 2022.
8. In relation to the assessment of whether the Appellant posed a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the public; the First-tier Tribunal decision refers to the OASys report from 2019 not being up to date and that although there were adjudications within detention, the Appellant’s behaviour had improved towards the end of his sentence. There was reference to a lack of insight from the Appellant into even his recent offending, together with a possible gang-related attack on him in 2022. Following his release from detention, the Applicant had moved areas, he was in education, he was involved in athletics and had stable family accommodation. These are factors that the Judge considered were all likely to reduce his risk of reoffending. Overall, it was concluded that the Appellant did not pose the necessary risk as at the date of hearing.
9. In relation to proportionality, the First-tier Tribunal considered the Appellant’s claim to have mental health problems, but noted the lack of medical records to support the claim and a number of concerns about the expert report relied upon. It was however accepted that family support would be beneficial for the Appellant’s mental health. It was noted that the Appellant had never lived in France, had no contact with his French father and had left Belgium at the age of 10, with no relatives either in Belgium or France and had little connection with either country. The Appellant has some understanding of French, which he had downplayed, but it was unclear what support he would have available in France. The Judge considers the proportionality exercise to be finely balanced, but overall concluded that deportation would be disproportionate given the Appellant’s lack of ties to France or Belgium, which would leave him vulnerable to gangs and criminal ways, as well as rehabilitation being harder for him in France.
The appeal
10. The Respondent appeals on three grounds as follows. First, that the First-tier Tribunal misdirected itself as to the assessment of risk posed by the Appellant and failed to give adequate reasons for its conclusion. In particular, that there need not be an imminent risk of reoffending and that there was sufficient evidence overall to show that the Appellant posed the necessary threat. Secondly, that the First-to Tribunal failed to consider the guidance in HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC) when considering weight to be attached to the psychiatric report, given that in the present case, there was a lack of medical records and any evidence of treatment in the past. Thirdly, that the First-tier Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for its conclusion that the Appellant’s deportation would not be proportionate. In particular, that there was a lack of evidence before the First-tier Tribunal of any permanent change in the Appellant’s circumstances to support a finding that there was a sufficient reduction in risk. Further, there was a lack of express reference to the factors set out in a Schedule 1 to the EEA Regulations.
11. At the oral hearing, on behalf of the Respondent, Ms Nwachuku relied on the written grounds of appeal and made oral submissions in support of the same. In relation to the first ground of appeal, attention was drawn to (i) the OASys report which referred to a high risk of reoffending and a medium risk of causing serious harm to the public (with percentile scores of 31% and 48% in the first and second year) and with no evidence of any rehabilitation or action to address offending behaviour directly, as well as further offences after release from prison (which the Appellant himself was not forthcoming about); (ii) the Appellant’s involvement in gang related crime and drugs offences with ‘little insight’ into his offending behaviour and the evidence that his further offending was ‘just mistakes’; (iii) that the Appellant had stated in his response to notification of liability to deportation on 26 July 2019 that he would not reoffend, but went on to do so even with the knowledge that he was liable to deportation; (iv) the Appellant not being in employment and being financially motivated to offend; (v) the evidence of the Appellant’s brother being contradictory about the Appellant’s drug use and the lack of family support previously preventing offending; (vi) the Appellant’s adjudications in detention, which show that even incarceration was not a deterrent. It was submitted that a number of these factors, were not properly taken into account and there were inadequate reasons, for example, for concluding that there had been changes in the Appellant’s circumstances which would mitigate risk when matters such as family support had not changed and was not sufficient previously to prevent offending. Ms Nwachuku’s submissions evolved somewhat from the grounds to amount, in essence to a rationality challenge; that on the evidence it was not actually open to the First-tier Tribunal to find that the Appellant did not pose the necessary risk.
12. In relation to the second ground of appeal, the Respondent’s case was that the First-tier Tribunal failed to follow the guidelines in HA and therefore attached too much weight to the psychiatric report in circumstances where there was no record of any previous mental health issues and the attack relied upon as the cause of PTSD and depression was not evidenced or ever reported to the police. Further, that the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal was that the Appellant had not engaged in any of the treatment recommendations.
13. In relation to the final ground of appeal, the Respondent’s case is essentially that the proportionality assessment is fatally undermined if she is successful on either of the first two grounds of appeal and in any event, inadequate reasons were given and there was no consideration of the factors in Schedule 1 to the EEA Regulations, particularly the need to maintain social order; preventing social harm; tackling offences likely to cause harm to society and protecting the public. Overall, the Respondent maintains that there was sufficient evidence before the First-tier Tribunal to establish that the Appellant’s deportation would be proportionate to the fundamental interests of society.
14. On behalf of the Appellant, Ms Fletcher identified that the grounds of appeal were in essence a rationality challenge to the decision of the First-tier Tribunal but do not meet the high threshold for such a challenge. It was not sufficient that a different decision may have been reached to find an error of law. This was a case in which the Respondent simply disagreed with the adequate reasons which were given for the decision.
15. In relation to the particular matters raised, Ms Fletcher submitted that (i) the Appellant’s behaviour had improved since the beginning of his incarceration and he had been unable to do rehabilitative work there, nor was he able to spend time on licence because he was immediately held in immigration detention; (ii) the Appellant’s later convictions were far less serious, as shown by the sentence passed being only a fine; (iii) the First-tier Tribunal in fact attached relatively low weight to the psychiatric report in any event, with concerns expressed about it, which was not contrary to HA; and (iv) the First-tier Tribunal expressly considered the Appellant’s risk factors and gave sufficient reasons as to why these had been mitigated through a move, education and involvement in sport. It was submitted that overall, it was open to the First-tier Tribunal to find that the Appellant did not pose a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest.
Findings and reasons
16. The first ground of appeal concerns the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of future risk and the conclusion that the Appellant was not a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or public security. The factors taken into account, including the Appellant’s criminal history, time in incarceration, further offending, family support, rehabilitation (or lack thereof), lifestyle, health, education and hobbies are set out within a discussion of the evidence between paragraphs 38 and 51 of the decision. I do not set that out in full here, but note the evidence and factors considered, which include included:
(i) the Appellant not taking responsibility for his first, sexual offence and not having undertaken any sexual offences rehabilitation (albeit there have been no further such offences) [paragraph 38];
(ii) the seriousness of the drugs offences and the Appellant’s significant role in the conspiracy [paragraphs 39 and 40];
(iii) the significant number of adjudications and time added to sentence, albeit improved towards the end of the period [paragraph 43];
(iv) the Appellant’s failure to undertake the rehabilitative programmes considered to be beneficial for him, without explanation [paragraph 44];
(v) the Appellant’s history as a “hardened gang member who was clearly set on earning money through dealing drugs …”, albeit from a police statement in 2018 [paragraph 45];
(vi) the Appellant’s failure to address the issue of gang involvement, or even state whether he accepts such involvement at all [paragraph 46];
(vii) the Appellant’s somewhat chaotic lifestyle after release from prison with further offences and an attack on the Appellant which may have been gang related [paragraphs 47, 49 and 51];
(viii) the Appellant’s silence as to his further drugs offences [paragraphs 48 and 49] and contradictory or evasive evidence from his brothers on this [paragraph 49]; and
(ix) the Appellant’s tendency to blame others for his offending behaviour rather than accepting his own role [paragraph 51].
17. The only factors which appear to have been considered in the Appellant’s favour appear in the second half of paragraph 51, which included that the last conviction was in May 2022; and the two further convictions were for possession of drugs rather than supply. Further, that the Appellant had told the psychiatrist he had stopped using drugs (with no further convictions for drugs offences). The decision also states: “The appellant and his family members all spoke of the appellant now having a sense of purpose, being interested and committed to his studies and being engaged in athletics.”, albeit it was noted the Appellant had not pursued a previous hobby in music and none of those who referred to this in earlier supporting letters updated their evidence or attended the hearing.
18. The First-tier Tribunal expressly referred in paragraph 41 to the factors in the OASys report considered to increase risk of reoffending/harm as:
• Returning to the area of offending
• Lack of accommodation
• Sustained periods of unemployment
• Gang activities
• Financial pressures
• No incentive to find legal employment.
19. The positive factors which would guard against reoffending were set out in paragraph 42 as including; “full-time employment, positive hobbies, positive role models, family support, avoiding former peers, support from his Offender Manager, stable accommodation and offending behaviour work.”
20. The ultimate conclusion is set out in paragraph 52, which includes a reference back to the factors set out in the OASys report, was as follows:
“52. The OASys assessment indicated high percentages regarding risk of reoffending and a medium risk of serious harm but this was at a time when the appellant was still in prison and was shortly after his involvement with adjudications. That settled down approximately 6 months before the OASys assessment. The only new convictions have been for possession of drugs and the last one was in May 2022, almost 2 years ago. In terms of the factors likely to increase or reduce the likelihood of reoffending, the appellant has moved areas, there is no updating evidence from the Metropolitan Police to suggest that he is still involved in gangs, he is engaging in education with a view to finding employment and has taken up athletics as a hobby. He also has stable accommodation with his family. Those are all factors considered by the author of the OASys assessment to lead to a reduced likelihood of reoffending. The appellant has made significant changes to his lifestyle which his family have also recognised as being of a positive benefit to the appellant. Despite the OASys assessment (which is now some 5 years old), I find that there is sufficient evidence before me to show that the appellant has made changes to his life and has moved away from the chaotic lifestyle which contributed to his offending behaviour. Taking account all of the evidence, I find that the evidence does not show that the appellant is a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or public security.”
21. When reading the decision as a whole, the final conclusion which appears in paragraph 52 reads against the tone of the preceding paragraphs, in which, as set out above, there is only a brief reference to a small number of factors in the Appellant’s favour in half of one paragraph, as against a much longer list of factors adverse to him and which would support a finding that he continued to pose a risk.
22. The submissions of the parties were both essentially not as to the adequacy of reasons for the ultimate conclusion (although this was addressed) but as to whether this was a rational conclusion on the basis of all of the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal. However, there is in my view a valid point raised as to the adequacy of reasons as it is very hard to understand why the limited factors referred to in paragraphs 51 and 52 in the Appellant’s favour, which address only some of the factors which would increase or decrease the risk of reoffending, sufficiently outweigh the much longer list of factors relevant to an increased risk of reoffending, particularly, for example, the Appellant’s lack of insight in to his offending and his lack of rehabilitation work. That is particularly so in circumstances where many of the points in favour of the Appellant included caveats within the findings, such as it being unknown as to the Appellant’s gang involvement and that the evidence of his brothers was less reliable as they either did not know about further drugs offences/drug taking or were not being truthful or as forthcoming as they should be in their evidence about it.
23. There is also a lack of reasoning or explanation as to how some of the factors considered in the Appellant’s favour were a long-term or permanent change, given, for example, evidence that he was previously living with his family (albeit at times in unstable accommodation) who were unable to deter him from a number of drugs offences (and seemingly involvement with gangs, although no firm findings were made on this); previously being in full-time education and previously being involved in athletics in school. I accept that factors such as moving out of the area in which his earlier offending took place is an unequivocally positive factor to reduce risk, but this appears to be the only point with no concerns or similarity to the Appellant’s past which identifies a specific change.
24. For these reasons, I do find that the First-tier Tribunal has not given adequate reasons for the ultimate conclusion that the Appellant does not pose a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or public security. It is entirely unclear and unreasoned as to how, on balance, the factors in the Appellant’s favour to reduce risk have outweighed the factors increasing risk to lead to the overall conclusion; which is against the tone of the findings throughout the decision when read as a whole. It is not possible in this case for the losing party to understand the reasons for the finding made.
25. The same reasons could also support a finding that the conclusion reached by the First-tier Tribunal was not rationally open to it on this issue and a finding that it was made against the weight of evidence. There is however a higher threshold for a finding of irrationality and whilst there is force in the Respondent’s submission to this effect, it is not necessary to go this far in my decision. The inadequacy of the reasons to understand the decision reached is sufficient in itself to find an error of law on the first ground of appeal and to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
26. The second ground of appeal concerns the assessment of the psychiatric report and whether the guidance in HA has been followed given the lack of other medical reports. This evidence was considered by the First-tier Tribunal in the context of the proportionality assessment and discussed in paragraphs 54 to 56. There is express reference to the lack of any medical records prior to the psychiatric report which identify any mental health concerns, as well as to the Appellant having not pursued any assistance or the recommended treatment following the report either. Whilst the First-tier Tribunal has not expressly linked this lack of evidence to the weight to be attached to the psychiatric report itself; it has clearly been linked to the weight given to the Appellant’s claimed poor mental health and there are a number of separate concerns raised as to the contents of the psychiatric report, not all of which was accepted. In any event, it is difficult to see how this ground of appeal would be material to the outcome on proportionality or otherwise within the decision given that overall, the Appellant’s mental health was at its highest a small factor weighed in the balance, particularly given the findings that he would continue to receive support from his family (albeit at a different level to that they could offer within the United Kingdom) and there was nothing to suggest he would not be able to access appropriate treatment for any condition in France. The failure to refer expressly to HA or link the lack of wider medical records would not in these circumstances amount to a material error of law in itself to necessitate setting aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
27. The final ground of appeal concerns the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of proportionality. As above, where an error of law has been found in the assessment of risk, this fundamentally undermines the lawfulness of the proportionality balancing exercise which was based on the Appellant not posing a genuine, present and sufficiently serious risk. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal must therefore be set aside in respect of that conclusion as well for this reason alone. It is not therefore necessary to consider further in any detail the Respondent’s wider ground as to adequacy of reasons in respect of this issue; albeit I note there is force in the failure to expressly refer to the provisions of Schedule 1 of the EEA Regulations. This is a matter which can be addressed by the parties and in the decision re-making this appeal.
28. For the purposes of re-making, this appeal is suitable to be retained in the Upper Tribunal given that there is little in the way of further facts that need to be found, save for potentially some updating of the Appellant’s circumstances since the last hearing in April 2024. Given the nature of the errors of law found, my preliminary view is that the findings of fact in paragraphs 26 to 51, 52 (so far as this contains findings of fact as opposed to the conclusions stated therein), 57 to 62 can all be preserved. Any disagreement with this indication as to the appropriate findings to be preserved can be raised at the next hearing.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is necessary to set aside the decision.
I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
Listing Directions
1. The appeal to be re-listed for a face to face hearing on the first available date before UTJ Jackson with a time estimate of 2.5 hours.
2. The Appellant may file and serve any further evidence upon which he wishes to rely no later than 14 days before the re-listed hearing. Any person who intends to give oral evidence at the hearing must file and serve a written statement (or updated written statement), signed, dated and accompanied by a statement of truth; to stand as their evidence in chief. This may be in the form of a supplementary bundle.
3. The Respondent may file and serve any further evidence upon which he wishes to rely no later than 7 days before the re-listed hearing.
G Jackson
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
22nd November 2024