Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-002505

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56624/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 22nd of April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WEBB

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

MA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Rushforth, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.
For the Respondent: Mr McGarvey, instructed by Crowley & Company.

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 20 December 2024

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the above respondent is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the above respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the above respondent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Secretary of State appeals with permission a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Boyes (‘the Judge’), promulgated following a hearing at Columbus House, Newport, on 19 April 2024, in which he allowed the appeal on international protection grounds on the basis (i) it was said there is a reasonable likelihood that he will be persecuted on account of his involvement in a blood feud, (ii) that because he had not suffered attempts made on his life it was not a reliable indicator of future safety, and, (iii) that the appellant was in grave danger given the cultural indicators in circumstances which prevail in this case.
2. The Secretary of State sought permission to appeal on the basis the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons for why the appellant was found to be credible in relation to his claim to be of interest to the Iranian authorities, providing only about a statement relating to the credibility not an evidence-based reasoning to support the findings made. The Grounds argue the Judge failed to address inconsistencies contained in the refusal letter, the Respondent’s Review and submissions made by the Presenting Officer at the hearing.
3. Permission to appeal was granted by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 24 May 2024, the operative part of the grant being in the following terms:
2. The grounds asserts that the Judge erred in failing to give adequate reasons for findings on material matters.
3. The grounds refer to paragraph 15 and 16 by way of example. IJ Boyes sets out a list of facts that are found in the determination that fails to explain how or why these findings were made save for the broad statement in paragraphs cited above.
4. IJ Boyes does also failed to address any specific inconsistencies raised by the Respondent and the decision letter and any oral submissions made. The Respondent relies on the case of MK (due to give reasons) [2013] Pakistan UKUT 00641 (IAC) and Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC).
5. The grounds to identify and arguable error of law.
4. The application is opposed by the above respondent in a Rule 24 response filed by Mr McGarvey dated 19 July 2024, the operative part of which is in the following terms:
1. It is submitted that the learned Judge made no material error of law within the determination.
2. The grounds of appeal state that the Judge erred in law “by failing to provide adequate reasons for why the Appellant is found to be credible in relation to his claim to be of interest to the Iranian authorities. For example, at [15] and [16] of the determination.”
3. It is submitted that it was never part of the Appellant’s claim that he was at risk from the Iranian authorities because of the events which took place in Iran.
4. The Respondent within their refusal did not accept the Appellant, while in Iran, had been in a relationship with a girl named Kani and as a result had suffered physical abuse and mistreatment.
5. The Judge found to the contrary.
6. The Respondent cross examined the Appellant at the hearing asking 67 questions in relation to his account.
7. It is submitted that the Judge’s findings at paragraphs 15 and 16 of the determination are rational and sustainable, they are based upon the oral and documentary evidence before the court.
8. At paragraph 15 and 16 of the determination the Judge states: “I had the benefit of seeing and hearing the appellant give evidence and be tested under cross examination. I have considered his oral evidence against his SEF and Asylum interview and reach the conclusion that the appellant is a reliable, accurate and credible witness as to the facts. His account is measured, plausible and contains little if any, deviation across the number of occasions he has been asked to provide the account. I found his account not only to be plausible but entirely credible. The criticisms made of the appellant and his account are in my view unfounded. The claimed inconsistencies are in my view not significant and do not cause one to doubt the veracity of the appellant’s account”
9. It is submitted that the Respondent’s decision was unsustainable. Although the Respondent vigorously cross examined the Appellant his credibility remained intact. It is submitted that the Respondent’s grounds of appeal are merely a disagreement with the Judge’s findings that the Appellant was credible as this is at odds with their decision to refuse the Appellant asylum.
10. The grounds of appeal argue that the Judge failed to address the inconsistencies contained within the RFRL, the Respondent’s review and the submissions of the Presenting Officer made at the hearing.
11. Further the Judge failed to provide evidence based reasons for finding the Appellant to be a credible witness.
12. The RFRL deals with the Appellant’s credibility at paragraph 5 (Page 11 Respondent’s bundle).
13. The Review relies upon the RFRL.
14. The Submissions made at the hearing by the Presenting Officer were all contained within the RFRL.
15. It is submitted that the Respondent is attempting to reargue the case because they disagree with the findings of the court.
16. It is submitted that the alleged inconsistencies within the RFRL which were repeated in the Review and the oral submissions of the Presenting Officer are insignificant as stated by the Judge at paragraph 16 of the determination. “The claimed inconsistencies are in my view not significant and do not cause one to doubt the veracity of the appellant’s account”
17. It is submitted that Judge adequately dealt with the alleged inconsistencies raised by the Respondent within the determination and there is no material error of law.
18. It is submitted that the Judge is not obliged to rehearse every point made within the Respondent’s decision, Review or submissions. As already stated, these were repeated from the RFRL. The Judge stated at paragraph 13 of the determination “I have also taken into account the matters relied upon by the Respondent.”
19. It is submitted that the Judge did not materially err in law.
20. It is submitted that the determination does not disclose any material error of law and should stand.
Decision and reasons
5. When considering a decision of the judge below on appeal it is important to have regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at [2], Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26] and Hamilton v Barrow and Others [2024] EWCA Civ 888 at [30 – 31].
6. Ms Rushforth did not challenge our preliminary view that the Judge had made adequate findings in relation to the credibility of the appeal, but submitted the Judge had erred in relation to his findings concerning sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.
7. Judge Webb raised the issue of whether these were matters in relation to which permission to appeal had been sort in the original grounds seeking permission to appeal, which Ms Rushforth accepted were not.
8. Procedural rigour requires the focus to be on matters for which permission to appeal has been sought and granted. If a matter is not raised that a party wishes to pursue, they have to make a proper application for permission to amend the grounds on which they seek permission to appeal. A formal application will need to be made supported by adequate reasons. It will then be for the Tribunal to decide whether to grant permission to appeal when considering all the facts. If permission is granted enquiries will have to be made to ascertain whether that creates a problem for the opposing party who may not have had notice that this was a live issue which, if they are unable to proceed, may result in the proceedings being adjourned. In such circumstances the question of wasted costs may arise.
9. As the issue of sufficiency protection and internal relocation issues were not raised and there was no application to amend the pleadings, this is not a matter on which we permitted further submissions.
10. In Volpi at [2 vi] it is written: vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
11. In terms of decision writing, it is an essential requirement that the terms of the judgement should enable the parties and any appellate Tribunal readily to analyse the reasoning it was essential to the judge’s decision – see English v Emery Reimbold and Strick Ltd (practice note) (2002) 1 W.L.R 2409, per Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR, who in giving the judgement of the court stated:
‘A judge cannot be said to have done his (or her) duty if it is only after permission to appeal has been given and the appeal has run its course that the court is able to conclude that the Reasons for the decision are sufficiently apparent to enable the appeal court to uphold the judgment. An appeal is an expensive step in the judicial process and one that makes an exacting claim on judicial resources. For these reasons permission to appeal is now a nearly universal prerequisite to bringing an appeal. Permission to appeal will not normally be given unless the applicant can make out an arguable case that the judge was wrong. If the judgment does not make it clear why the judge has reached his (or her) decision, it may well be impossible within the summary procedure of an application for permission to appeal to form any view as to whether the judge was right or wrong. In that event permission to appeal may be given simply because justice requires that the decision be subjected to the full scrutiny of an appeal.’
12. The Judge’s findings commence at [13] of the decision under challenge. At [14] the Judge states that having considered all the information the appeal is allowed for the reasons set out at [15 – 24] of the decision under challenge, which are in the following terms:
15. I had the benefit of seeing and hearing the appellant gave evidence and be tested under cross examination. I have considered his oral evidence against his SEF and Asylum interview and reach the conclusion that the appellant is a reliable, accurate and credible witness as to the facts.
16. His account is measured, plausible and contains little, if any, deviation across the number of occasions he has been asked to provide the account. I found his account not only to be plausible but entirely credible. The criticisms made of the appellant and his account are in my view unfounded. The claimed inconsistencies are in my view not significant and do not cause one to doubt the veracity of the appellant’s account.
17. I accept that he met and courted a young lady. I accept that there was feud between their families of which the appellant was not aware. I doubt very much he would have engaged with the young lady if he did know. I accept the appellant’s account about the development of the courtship and the meetings between them. Given the restrictive and controlling society in which the (sic) both lived I do not doubt that there was an element of enforced secrecy and to some extent fear.
18. I accept the appellant’s account that the courtship was discovered by [K’s] Brother’s and the appellant was assaulted. I accept that the appellant was assaulted by his own Father. Why would the appellant make up having his cousin help him escape if it were not true. His Father was not able to help him, quite the contrary.
19. The appellant suffered both at the hands of [K’s] family and his own family. This is not something which is miraculously going to go away. Blood feuds develop, they fester and stew and result in dangerous and often harm filled or fatal consequences for those involved. The appellant has, I am satisfied, wronged egregiously in the eyes of his own family and in the eyes of [K’s] family. This has serious consequences for the appellant.
20. I accept that the appellant is in danger and that if returned he would be harmed and/or killed. There is no protection, the appellant has already tried to secure assistance without success. The Police will view this is a family matter and will not intervene.
21. The appellant’s account was, on the whole, the product of recollection of events which had happened rather than manufacture. He was clear in answering the questions and did not seek to embellish his account or provide more information where it was not required.
22. The appellant cannot internally relocate as it is unreasonable in all the circumstances. I accept that his family will find him and/or [K’s] family will seek him out. The appellant is a young man, illiterate and without a trade or profession. He would have nowhere to go but to his home address. If you did so, he would be harmed.
23. The Facebook material is superfluous in light of the above. The appellant is not a political being and has not displayed or shown any genuine interest in Kurdish affairs or Kurdish rights organisations. I accept that he has opened this account as that is what is expected he does. He does not know that which is posting as he is illiterate. He is simply copying and pasting from others. I do not accept that the appellant’s genuine activist and is simply seeking to provide himself with another Avenue and head of claim. The appellant can properly and safely delete your account however in light of the above this is unlikely to be necessary.
24. The appeal is thus allowed. I accept that there is a reasonable of likelihood that he will be persecuted on return of his involvement in a blood feud and that just because he has not suffered attempts made on his life is not a reliable indicator of future safety. I find that he is in grave danger given the cultural indicators circumstances which prevail in this case.
13. It matters not that another judge may not have come to these conclusions or that the author of the grounds seeking permission to appeal disagrees with them. The question is whether the findings are within the range of those reasonably open to the Judge and that they are supported by adequate reasons. Reasons only need to be adequate not perfect.
14. It is not acceptable to allege legal error on the basis of what is, in effect, an attempt to seek reasons for reasons.
15. The reason the Judge allowed the appeal is that he accepted the appellant was telling the truth about events in his home state, and that as a result of those events he will face a real risk of harm on return. A reader of the determination is clearly able to understand the Judge’s core findings and the reason why he came to those conclusions.
16. The Grounds establish no basis for challenging that finding. As the Judge accepted that the appellant was telling the truth about his experiences in Iran the Judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant will face a real risk on return sufficient to warrant the appeal being allowed.
17. We conclude that the Secretary of State has failed to establish legal error material to the decision to allow the appeal.
Notice of Decision
18. The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have materially erred in law. The determination shall stand.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 December 2024