Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-002573
UI-2024-002830

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55913/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

29th May 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COTTON

Between

PK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Miss S Saifolahi, Counsel instructed by Sterling Lawyers Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, a national of Russia, appeals against the determination of First-tier Tribunal (FtT) Judge Latta (the Judge) dated 2 May 2024 in which the Judge refused the appellant’s appeal. The appellant had appealed against the decision of the respondent of 15 August 2023 to refuse an asylum claim.

2. The appellant’s case in the FtT was that he had worked in Russia as a bodyguard in the private security sector. He claimed that he had been unlawfully detained and tortured in Russia due to his connection with his employer and continued to face a threat on this basis. He further claimed that, were he removed to Russia, he would be subject to conscription and punished for ‘draft evasion’, bringing him within the protection of the Refugee Convention.

3. The appellant sought to appeal against the FtT determination on two grounds. The first ground was relating to credibility findings by the Judge, which the appellant contended were flawed. Permission to appeal was not granted on this ground by either the FtT or the Upper Tribunal (UT). The second ground is that the Judge failed to consider all of the relevant part of the respondent’s Country Policy Information Note (CPIN) Russian Federation Military Service was considered arguable by the FtT considering permission to appeal.

4. The appellant had filed additional evidence, said to be a summons to report for military duty, but agreed that this would only be relevant if there was a material error of law in the FtT judgment, when it might be used as additional evidence in the appellant’s case.

Analysis and decision

5. The appellant states that the Judge relied solely on 3.3.4 of the relevant CPIN to find that partial mobilisation was completed on 28 October 2022, but failed to consider the remaining part of the same paragraph, which refers to media reports that there is no presidential decree to that effect and that mobilisation remains in effect.

6. The appellant’s position is that the Judge relies on the fact that the appellant had completed his military service and combined this with a partial reading of the CPIN to conclude that the appellant is not at risk of mobilisation. In submissions before me the appellant took the approach that the Judge had looked at other parts of the CPIN but had considered 3.3.4 as the most relevant. The appellant is not freed from the risk presented by the partial mobilisation by reason of having undertaken previous military service, he submits.

7. The respondent submitted that there was no material error in the FtT determination and that the judge had clearly taken the relevant parts of the CPIN into consideration.

8. I agree that this issue was a live one in the FtT – the Judge identifies it as such at [8] and notes that the respondent had consented to the issue being raised. The relevant parts of the Judge’s analysis are at [58] to [61]. The Judge details that they were referred to the CPIN by both parties and that there was an unchallenged submission by the respondent that 12.2.1 of the CPIN was evidence that the appellant would not have to complete military service (as distinct from being mobilised) as he had already completed his military service.

9. The appellant points to the fact that the Juge quoted part of 3.3.4 of the CPIN that the partial mobilisation was said to have been completed on 28 October 2022, but does not balance this by referring to the media reports (referenced in the same paragraph of the CPIN) that the mobilisation remains in place.

10. The Judge states at [60] that they have given full consideration of paragraphs 3.3-3.6 of the CPIN. The Judge assesses that the risk of mobilisation ‘is not specific’. I agree that the Judge has highlighted the reference to partial mobilisation being completed in October 2022, but this does not indicate that the Judge has failed to consider the totality of the relevant evidence. In fact the Judge expressly states that they have considered the relevant parts of the CPIN. I consider that the Judge has sufficiently detailed the evidence they have considered in reaching their decision, this was a clearly defined issue for the Judge to determine, with evidence that does not need repeating any further than the Judge did in their determination. I do not accept the appellant’s submission that the Judge failed to consider and apply the remaining part of 3.3.4 of the CPIN. Properly read, the judgment indicates that the Judge did consider it but found that the evidence did not prove the case for the appellant. I find no error by the Judge.

11. I apologise to the parties for the length of time it has taken me to issue this determination.

Notice of Decision

1. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.

2. The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

3. The decision of Judge Latta dated 2 May 2024 stands.

4. There is an anonymity order in place in this case as detailed at the head of this decision.

D Cotton

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
26 May 2025