Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-002704

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54211/2023
LP/03201/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Re-making Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 19th November 2025

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
ED
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Ms Jegarajah, Counsel, instructed by Wimbledon Solicitors
For the respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

RE-MAKING DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. It follows the decision of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Welsh, sealed on 24 December 2024, setting aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which in turn had dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds.

2. In brief summary, the appellant, an Albanian national born in 2004, claims be at risk on return due to an outstanding debt incurred by his father in 2005. The moneylenders had threatened and attacked the appellant and would be able to find him on return and do him harm.

The error of law decision
3. Judge Welsh found that the First-tier Tribunal had materially erred in a number of respects. First, no adequate reasons were provided for concluding that the moneylenders had an intention to carry out their previous threats. Second, there was no consideration of the ability of the moneylenders to trace the appellant if he returned. Third, there was no finding on the issue of whether the appellant had remained in contact with his family since being in the United Kingdom. Fourth, the judge’s reasoning on the issue of state protection was inadequate. Fifth, the judge erred in concluding that the appellant was a member of a particular social group (PSG) as a child and the reasoning on the family as a PSG was inadequate.

4. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision was set aside with no preserved findings. Judge Welsh concluded that the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal and the decision re-made.

Procedural history
5. This appeal has an unfortunate procedural history following Judge Welsh’s error of law decision. Despite case management directions and a case management hearing, the appeal had to be adjourned on two occasions which in turn led to significant delays. At one stage the conduct of the appellant’s solicitors resulted in the Partner of the firm being required to attend in person to explain what had occurred.

6. There were procedural deficiencies even at the final stages. The appellant’s consolidated bundle, which should have been filed and served by mid-September 2025 (in compliance with the directions sealed on 4 September 2025), was not in fact provided until 3 November 2025, without explanation or an application for extension of time. The solicitors were under the impression that directions issued back in April 2025 still applied, when that was clearly not the case.

7. I take a final opportunity to urge Wimbledon Solicitors to adopt a more rigorous approach to the organisation and preparation of their caseload.

The legal issues
8. In light of all the materials before me and following a discussion at the outset of the resumed hearing, the following legal issues require consideration and determination.

Refugee Convention
(a) Does the appellant fall within a particular social group, specifically a potential victim of trafficking/exploitation or membership of his family?

(b) If he does, is he at risk of persecution by the moneylenders in his home area?

(c) If he is at risk in the home area, could he obtain sufficient state protection there?

(d) If he could not, would he be at risk of trafficking/exploitation throughout Albania?

(e) If so, he will succeed under the Convention

(f) If not, would it be unreasonable/unduly harsh for him to internally relocate?

Article 3 ECHR
(a) Is the appellant at risk of Article 3 ill-treatment by the moneylenders in his home area?

(b) If so, could he obtain sufficient state protection there?

(c) If not, would he be at risk of trafficking/exploitation throughout Albania?

(d) If he would, he will succeed on Article 3 grounds;

(e) if not, would it be unreasonable/unduly harsh for him to internally relocate?

9. During the course of her submissions, Ms Jegarajah expressly confirmed that she accepted that any risk from the moneylenders was confined to the appellant’s home area and did not extend elsewhere in Albania. This ‘refining’ of the appellant’s case had not been set out in her skeleton argument.

10. The issue of trafficking/exploitation requires a word of explanation. It is unclear to me to what extent, if any, this particular issue has ever been relied on previously. The appellant himself has, as far as I can see, only ever alluded to a fear of the specific moneylenders. In my preparation for the resumed hearing, I had assumed that the production claim was being put forward on this narrow basis. Ms Clewley confirmed that that had been her understanding.

11. Following discussions at the hearing and having looked again at skeleton arguments prepared for the resumed hearing and the First-tier Tribunal hearing, it is right to say that trafficking/exploitation had been put in writing, albeit very briefly and without any detailed references to supporting materials.

12. Ultimately, I concluded that the appellant was entitled to argue that there could be a risk of trafficking/exploitation. The way in which I ensured that Ms Clewley was not prejudiced by the shift in the appellant’s case on the moneylenders and the elaboration of the trafficking/exploitation point is set out in due course.

13. Ms Jegarajah expressly confirmed that the hearing that there was no Article 3 or Article 8 medical claim before me. She also expressly confirmed that Article 8 was not being pursued in any form.

The documentary evidence
14. The appellant’s consolidated bundle is indexed and paginated 1-848. This includes a psychological report by Dr Ana Reis, dated 4 July 2025. In addition, I admitted the following materials in evidence without objection by Ms Clewley (she confirmed that she had the opportunity to consider all of the materials):

(a) A supplementary witness statement from the appellant, signed and dated 12 November 2025;

(b) An online article from “telegrafi”, dated 11 November 2025 and entitled “Assassination in Rinas” (ultimately, this proved to be of no relevance to the appellant’s case);

(c) Online articles to which hyperlinks are set out in Ms Jegarajah’s skeleton argument.

15. From the respondent, there are relevant CPINs on Albania including that on human trafficking from July 2024 and mental health provision, dated January 2025.

The oral evidence
16. This is a matter of record, but I confirm that I also took a full note.

17. The appellant confirmed at the outset that he wished to give his evidence in English. I was satisfied that his level of English was sufficiently good to do this without the assistance of an interpreter. I made it clear that I would keep this under review during the hearing. I was satisfied that the appellant understood all of the questions and that I understood all of his answers.

18. I treated the appellant as a vulnerable witness in light of the psychological report of Dr Reis. I carefully explained to the appellant that he should indicate if he was not sure about the meaning of the question, or if he needed a break. In the event, there were no apparent problems with communication or understanding during the hearing. I was satisfied that the appellant had understood what was being asked of him and had been able to fully participate in proceedings. At no stage did the appellant become noticeably upset in any way. He was articulate, if softly spoken.

19. I record here the fact that during the course of her submissions, Ms Jegarajah requested that the appellant be able to wait outside of the hearing room. I assumed that this was because she felt he might become upset by what was being said on his behalf, or what might be said against him by the respondent. I asked the appellant whether he in fact did want to leave the hearing room, given that this was his appeal and he was fully entitled to remain in the room. He confirmed to me that he did want to leave and I confirmed that he could do so.

The parties’ submissions
20. As with the oral evidence, the submissions are a matter of record, but once again I took a full written note. I will only summarise what the representatives said.

21. Ms Clewley relied on the reasons for refusal letter, the respondent’s review, and the skeleton argument provided by a colleague, Mr Wain. She submitted that there was no Convention reason in this case. The appellant was not in fact a victim of trafficking or exploitation. There would be sufficient state protection in the home area and elsewhere. In this regard, I was referred to 2.14 and 7.1-7.3.7 of the relevant CPIN and the case of AD v Sweden [2024] ECHR 402. The moneylenders did not represent a significant crime group with any real influence with the authorities. There was no nationwide threat from them. The appellant could internally relocate. He was now 21 years old, he was not a victim of trafficking, he was male, he was educated and could work. Relevant mental health treatment would be available. He had rejected talking therapy in United Kingdom. He was not in a position of crisis. He was now living independently and taking care of himself.

22. It was submitted that the appellant’s evidence on the lack of family contact was unreliable. He was either still in contact or could re-establish contact if he wished.

23. Ms Jegarajah relied on her skeleton argument. The Convention reason was either a potential victim of trafficking/exploitation or membership of a family. As mentioned earlier, she confirmed that she was not pursuing a claim risk from the moneylenders away from the home area. Significant reliance was placed on the psychological report. The report was consistent with the appellant’s claim not to be in contact with his parents. If he returned to Albania he would be homeless, not independent, not able to take up any therapy, and would be vulnerable to trafficking/exploitation. He would have no family support. He suffered from thought disorder and other difficulties.

24. I was specifically referred to the following paragraphs of the psychological report: 2.5, 2.6.3, 5.2, 6.1, 6.6, 6.9, 6.10-6.13, 6.16-6.18, 6.20, 6.22, 6.27-6.28, 7.19-7.20, 7.23-7.25, 7.27-7.29, 7.42-7.45, 7.50-7.55, and 7.74. Ms Jegarajah asked me to disregard those passages in the report which referred to the situation in Albania as regards medical facilities and societal structures. She confirmed that there were no GP records confirming any appointments since January 2024 (although I note that Dr Reis’ report states that there was an appointment in 2023).

25. The report was also relied on in respect of the appellant’s situation if he returned to Albania, particularly in relation to his vulnerability to trafficking/exploitation and his ability to internally relocate.

26. Ms Jegarajah accepted that appropriate medical services were available in Albania, but she submitted that the appellant would not access such treatment due to his mental health problems.

27. As flagged earlier in this decision, the way in which the appellant’s case was now been put differed somewhat from how it had been initially (in respect of the risk from moneylenders) and had expanded on the trafficking/exploitation issue. To ensure fairness to the respondent, I gave Ms Clewley an opportunity to make additional submissions on the trafficking/exploitation issue. She did so, submitting that the appellant’s case was distinguishable from TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC) because the appellant was male and was not a victim of trafficking. Further, the appellant was living independently, was educated, was able to work, and had established friends whilst in the United Kingdom. The medical evidence did not indicate that the appellant was unfit to work or to care for himself. There was no evidence of self-harming. The Asylos report could be distinguished. She sought to make a point about the single interview which led to the preparation of the psychological report.

28. In reply, Ms Jegarajah reiterated her submission that a potential victim of trafficking could be a particular social group. The respondent’s submission that the appellant was living independently and would be able to work was wrong in light of the psychological report.

29. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.

Findings of primary facts
30. In making the relevant findings of fact, I have considered the evidence as a whole , not simply that which I have been specifically referred, and asked myself the question of whether it is reasonably likely that the material events relied on by the appellant occurred.

Credibility in general
31. As mentioned earlier, there has been no substantive challenge to the appellant’s overall credibility. The reasons for refusal letter expressly accepted the core of the appellant’s account of past events. The First-tier Tribunal found his evidence to be credible, although of course I acknowledge that the decision and findings have all been set aside. The respondent’s skeleton argument states at [6] that, “… it is accepted that the appellant’s father borrowed money from a criminal gang which resulted in them targeting the appellant…”. There was no challenge to the appellant’s credibility at the hearing before me.

32. In general, I found the appellant to be a straightforward witness. I have taken account of the fact that claimed events took place when he was still a child and, that he is a vulnerable witness with supportive medical evidence. He has essentially been consistent in his account. Some aspects of his stated fear are speculative, but that does not materially undermine the truthfulness of what he has said; rather, that goes to the well-foundedness of a fear of return.

33. I will address the issue of family contact in due course, as this does raise certain concerns.

Vulnerability
34. I am satisfied that the appellant’s vulnerability by virtue of his mental health conditions did not prevent him from putting forward his evidence at the hearing. It did not prevent him from understanding what was being asked. It did not result in confusion or an inability to relate a coherent narrative.

The appellant’s home area and family background
35. in light of the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied that the appellant’s home area is Fushe-Kruje, which lies in the region of Durres, north-west of Tirana. I find that the appellant is an only child. I find that he attended school until he was almost 17 years old, completing secondary education.

The debt issue
36. I find that the appellant’s father did in fact borrow money from moneylenders following a construction accident in 2005 which resulted in him becoming disabled. I accept that money was approximately €30,000. I find that the money was borrowed to pay for private medical treatment in Turkey. It is plausible that the money was borrowed from an unofficial source, i.e. the moneylenders.

37. I accept that the appellant’s father was unable to repay the debt because he simply did not have the resources to do so and was unable to work due to his injury. It is reasonably likely that the moneylenders made demands for the money and when repayments were not forthcoming, they made threats to the father over the course of time and eventually a threat to abduct the appellant for the purposes of trafficking/exploitation. I accept that the appellant himself was physically attacked when he was 16 years old. I find that the physical attack was accompanied by a threat to the appellant’s future safety. That threat included the assertion that if he approached the police they would get to know of this.

38. Bringing matters up to date, I conclude on the lower standard that the debt owed by the father has not in fact been repaid. In so finding, I take account of the fact that the father was disabled by the injury in 2005 and it is reasonably likely that he has been unable to work very much, or at all, since. I take into account the fact that interest had been charged in the debt and that would have accumulated over time. There is no positive evidence to indicate that the debt has been repaid during the period 2021 to date. I have also taken into account my findings on the family contact issue, below.

The appellant’s departure from Albania
39. In light of what I have already accepted, it is reasonably likely that the attack on the appellant prompted his family to make arrangements for his departure from Albania. The precise details as to what was arranged and how it might have been funded are unclear. However, given the appellant’s age at the time of these events, the passage of time, and his vulnerability, I do not regard the vagueness as undermining his credibility.

40. I find that the appellant’s father utilised a friend to facilitate the appellant’s departure from Albania in August 2021. I cannot know whether the father found additional money to fund the journey, or whether the exercise was carried out as a favour.

Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004
41. The appellant did pass through a number of European countries before coming to the United Kingdom. However, his age has never been disputed and he was a minor at the time he left Albania and at all times during his journey to this country. I accept his evidence that his father made the arrangements and identified United Kingdom as the safe final destination. Whether that view was appropriate is not something the appellant himself can be held accountable for. In all the circumstances, I conclude that the appellant did not in fact have a reasonable opportunity of claiming asylum in other safe countries on route to the United Kingdom. Even if he did, any damage to his overall credibility would in my judgment be minimal.

Events since the appellant’s departure and contact with the family and/or the friend Andi
42. On the evidence before me, I find that the appellant remained in contact with his parents from his arrival in this country in January 2022 until May 2022. Frankly, it would be wholly implausible if he had not. He was a minor who had been sent away from Albania by his father with the specific intention to seek safety elsewhere. The appellant had his father’s contact information and would clearly have wished to inform his parents that he had arrived in United Kingdom and was safe there. The appellant would have had every desire to find out whether his parents were also safe.

43. For the reasons set out below, which must be read cumulatively, I accept that it is reasonably likely that the appellant made a decision to cease contact with his parents since May 2022.

44. First, I take into account the fact that I found the appellant to be generally credible. That is a positive indicator of credibility in respect of the family contact issue. However, it is not determinative. Just as the fact that a person gives unreliable evidence about one matter does not necessarily mean they have been unreliable about others, the converse is true: a person who has been reliable about a number of matters may also give unreliable evidence about a particular issue.

45. Second, and following from the above, the appellant has been consistent in his assertion that he ceased contact in May 2022. The consistency can be found in his own evidence and, for example, what he told Dr Reis. I take full account of that.

46. Third, there is the psychological report of Dr Reis. This is important evidence and its substance has not been the subject of any meaningful challenge by the respondent. Having regard to the particular passages to which I have been referred and the report as a whole, I accept that the appellant has been diagnosed with PTSD, a Major Depressive Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder. Beyond that, I have had particular regard to the following particular aspects of the report:

(a) The appellant’s overall psychological profile resulting from past trauma;

(b) His fear of returning to Albania and his sense of safety in this country;

(c) His “suspended psychological state”;

(d) His rigid thinking;

(e) A display of avoidant coping strategies; and

(f) A fear of losing the security that he now has.

47. This evidence is supportive of the appellant’s claim to have ceased contact with his family and, potentially, Andi. It provides a basis for why he may have made that decision, notwithstanding what one might describe as a natural and reasonable desire to maintain contact.

48. I place the report in the context of the appellant’s age when he arrived in this country and his minority until 2022. I also take into account the fact that the appellant has not undergone any relevant therapy in this country which might potentially have addressed some of the issues.

49. I note that paragraph 6.20 of the report states that the appellant “has” maintained contact with his parents through Andi. That suggests ongoing contact. However, the point was not canvassed at the hearing and therefore the appellant was not given an opportunity to address it. For present purposes, I place no weight on it.

50. Fourth, the appellant’s oral evidence involved a high degree of speculation which gives rise to concerns as to its reliability, even on the lower standard. When asked in cross-examination what had changed in May 2022 to make him stop contacting his parents, he stated that he thought that the gang had gone looking for him after he left Albania, although his parents never in fact told him this. He subsequently appeared to suggest that they had told him directly. The picture was not entirely clear. He later said that he had changed his number and had not kept his father’s number because he did not feel safe. I do not accept that particular aspect of his evidence: he may not have wished to contact his parents, but it is not reasonably likely that he would simply have tried to ensure that he had no means of contacting them, even in an emergency. In re-examination, the appellant said that he believed it was not hard to tap a telephone and that the moneylenders had contacts everywhere. I appreciate his subjective fear of the moneylenders and his fear of returning to Albania (I will address the psychological report, below), but I just do not accept that he genuinely believed, or still believes, that those individuals would be able to in some way trace any telephone call that he might make to his parents, or them to him. There is no suggestion that the moneylenders managed to tap any telephone calls between January 2022 and May 2022. I have not been referred to any evidence in which the appellant asserted that he blamed his parents for his own problems and ceased contact out of anger and/or resentment.

51. Fifth, the appellant told me that he had ceased contact with his friend Andi out of fear. Yet even if the appellant had not wanted to contact his parents directly, it is improbable that he would not have wished to use his friend as a conduit through which to make contact with his parents. He has not suggested that his friend had been put at risk. The appellant would have known that he could have asked his friend to obtain information about his parents without he (the appellant) having to speak to his parents directly. Overall, I accept that the appellant has not in fact used Andi as a conduit for contact since May 2022, but I do not accept that he has failed to keep Andi’s number or other contact details.

52. Sixth, the appellant had good reason to wish to continue contacting his parents, even on an intermittent basis. He would have been able to tell them that he was safe in United Kingdom and to have found out whether the moneylenders were still applying pressure to them and/or making threats against the appellant himself.

53. Seventh, I acknowledge Ms Jegarajah’s submission that Ms Clewley had not specifically put to the appellant the contention that he was lying about the absence of family contact. However, the respondent’s review clearly put the claimed lack of family contact in issue. Judge Welsh’s error of law decision found that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law by failing to make a finding on that disputed issue: [19] of her decision. Relevant questions on the issue had been put in cross-examination and the appellant was given a fair opportunity to respond. In my judgment, the reliability of the appellant’s evidence on family contact was a live issue at the hearing before me, the appellant was on notice of that, and the fact that he was not specifically accused of lying does not preclude me from considering the issue.

54. Eighth, it would have been open to the appellant to simply say that he had been in contact with his parents and that they had told him directly that the moneylenders were still threatening him. That would have added to his claim and neither the respondent nor I may well have been any the wiser even if this assertion was untrue. He has not taken that course of action.

55. It is apparent from the above that there are concerns over reliability and my finding that the appellant has in fact ceased contact with his parents is finely balanced. Ultimately, it is based on three main considerations: his age when past events took place; the psychological report and the symptoms and consequences set out therein; the appellant’s clearly expressed strong feelings of safety in this country and the wish to disassociate himself from what has happened in the past. I do not regard his decision to cease contact as reasonable or plausible from the perspective of what might be described as an informed bystander. However, that is beside the point. I am applying the lower standard and I must of course exercise real caution before making adverse findings based on what I or many other people might describe as reasonable or plausible.

56. I make the following further findings on the family contact issue. It is not reasonably likely that the appellant would be unable to re-establish contact with his parents prior to or after return to Albania. Whilst I have accepted that he took the decision to cease contact, it is not reasonably likely that he has discarded his parents’ telephone number and the same is true of Andi’s number. I find that to be the case even if he has changed his own number. I simply do not accept on the lower standard of proof that he would have ensured that he had no means of making contact even if, for example, an emergency arose in the United Kingdom or suchlike. Even if he had not kept the telephone numbers as a written or digital record, it is not reasonably likely that he would have forgotten these that of his parents. I do not accept that his decision to cease contact involved a fixed and permanent state of affairs.

57. Even if he had in fact discarded his parents telephone number and could not for some reason recall it from memory, it is not reasonably likely that he would be unable to (a) locate his friend Andi through social media or some other means; (b) contact his parents through the postal system in order to get a telephone number; or (c) utilise organisations in this country and/or Albania to make contact. It is not reasonably likely that the moneylenders would be able to find out that he had made telephone contact if he chose to do so.

The appellant’s mental health and the report of Dr Reis
58. I have already alluded to the report. I accept the diagnoses made. There is no substance to Ms Clewley’s point about the report having been prepared after a single interview. It is the common experience in this Tribunal that specific medico-legal reports are prepared following a single extended meeting. In the present case, Dr Reis confirmed that there had been a two-hour meeting (paragraph 5.1) and that was “a typical timeframe for comprehensive psychological evaluation in a legal context (paragraph 7.1). There is no proper basis for me to go behind that particular statement.

59. Aside from one aspect of the report, I place considerable weight on the opinions of Dr Reis as they relate to the assessment, evaluation, and opinion stated in the passages to which I was referred by Ms Jegarajah and more generally. The evidence paints a picture of the appellant as a vulnerable young man with significant mental health symptoms which have and continue to cause him real difficulties.

60. The aspect of the report which I have disregarded relates to Dr Reis’ inappropriate analysis of the medical facilities available in Albania and the social structures in that country. It is not entirely clear to me why she addressed these issues when they clearly fell outside her expertise. Nonetheless, this shortcoming does not undermine all other aspects of the report.

The Refugee Convention: particular social group
61. I do not accept that being a potential victim of trafficking/exploitation constitutes a particular social group. There is no innate characteristic or common background that cannot be changed. The group proposed by Ms Jegarajah would be defined by the risk of persecution alone and that is insufficient. The situation is different for those who are in fact victims of trafficking/exploitation: they would share an innate characteristic or at least a common background (i.e. they had been trafficked/exploited). Potential victims of trafficking/exploitation could in principle include anyone and everyone unless one then proceeded to try and narrow it down by reference to a variety of particular considerations. That would be unworkable and contrary to any authority I am aware of. Ms Jegarajah did not direct me to any authority in support of her contention.

62. Further, being a potential victim of trafficking/exploitation cannot be categorised as a characteristic or belief so fundamental to an individual’s identity that they should not be forced to announce it.

63. Yet further, there is no evidential basis on which I could conclude that men in Albania who might be at risk of being trafficked/exploited have a distinct identity within that country’s society. In general, I agree with the points made by the respondent at [8]-[11] of the respondent’s skeleton argument.

64. The second particular social group relied on by Ms Jegarajah is that of membership of a family. That contention was not expanded on either in the skeleton argument or oral submissions.

65. I accept that membership of a family can in principle constitute a particular social group. That much is clear from decided cases: for example, Fornah v SSHD [2006] UKHL 46. Such membership is an innate characteristic. On the basis of Fornah, I am satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated a Convention reason, namely membership of the particular social group of his family. My reasons are as follows. First, it is unnecessary for the appellant to show that his father was persecuted for a Convention reason. Clearly, he was not: he was targeted simply because of an unpaid debt. Second, the appellant need not show that all members of the family were at risk of being persecuted. Third, I am satisfied that the appellant himself was targeted by the moneylenders simply because he was a member of the family. As a child at the time, I satisfied that the moneylenders did not have any other interest in the appellant other than that he was the son of the debtor father: that is sufficient for the Convention to be engaged.

Risk in the home area
66. The appellant has been persecuted in the past: he was threatened and then physically attacked and threatened again. That operates as an indicator as to future risk.

67. The respondent contends that the moneylenders been unable or unwilling to enforce the debt over a considerable period of time and this is indicative of a lack of ongoing interest in the appellant.

68. I have already found, on the lower standard, that the debt has not been repaid.

69. It may seem obvious, but if the appellant returns to the home area he would of course remain his father’s son. He was deemed to be a legitimate target in the past and I would be cautious in concluding that that interested had dissipated. Even if it had, I must assess risk on the basis that the appellant has in fact returned to the home area and his presence is reasonably likely to become known sooner rather than later. The appellant cannot be expected to live in hiding within the family home.

70. I take account of the fact that Fushe-Kruje is a “city” of only approximately 18,000 people. I take account of country information which indicates that the nature of Albanian society is that newcomers to an area will stand out or have questions asked about them. In this case, the appellant would be newly arrived after an absence of some four years.

71. The media articles referred to in the appellant’s skeleton argument indicate that the home area is known for criminal activities, including corruption, murder, and weapons trafficking.

72. The appellant has never stated a particular name of the moneylenders, either as individuals or a gang. He has however directly encountered the group when they harmed and threatened him. They told him they would find out if he made contact with the police. In oral evidence he stated that he had seen the group shooting at police. As a whole, the evidence indicates that the group operates in an organised form and has the ability to obtain information from the local police. On the other hand, it would appear to suggest that there was conflict between the group and the authorities. They may appear to be a tension here, but the two states of affairs are not necessarily mutually exclusive: individual police officers could be bound up in corruption whilst the local force as a whole may be engaged in combating a particular group.

73. Were the appellant to return to his home area it is reasonably likely that the moneylenders would become aware of his presence. If their previous interest has dissipated over time, it is reasonably likely that this would be ignited once again, whether alongside an interest in the father or separately. The fact that the appellant is not the debtor did not prevent past problems and would not in my judgment prevent future adverse interest.

74. Overall, I conclude that there is a risk of persecution in the home area. That risk is for the Convention reason of membership of a particular social group, namely the appellant’s family.

75. The next question is whether the appellant could obtain sufficient state protection. Having regard to the country information as a whole (specifically that contained within the respondent’s current CPIN), country guidance cases, and the judgment of the First Section of the ECtHR in AD v Sweden (specifically [70]-[71]), I conclude that there is in general a sufficiency of protection for individuals in Albania.

76. The appellant has never approached the Albanian authorities for protection. Given his age when he was last in Albania, that adds little to my overall assessment. He would be returning as an adult and that may suggest that he could now approach the authorities. He is not in fact a victim of trafficking/exploitation. All other things being equal, I would be minded to conclude that he could seek state protection in his home area and that it would be of a sufficient standard.

77. However, on the facts of this case, all other things are not equal. The appellant’s family, and the appellant in particular, have been previously targeted by the moneylenders. The group clearly know where the appellant’s family home is. If the appellant were to return, I have found that the moneylenders would become aware of his presence.

78. These specific considerations are to be viewed in the context of other aspects of the country evidence contained in the respondent’s CPIN. At paragraph 5.3.1 a 2024 report noted that “in 2023, several cases demonstrated how organised crime networks infiltrated law enforcement…, and how those criminal outfits operated freely outside the law.” At paragraph 5.4.1, there is reference to police corruption being a problem and “most prevalent among front-line police.” At 5.4.2 there is reference to “law enforcement agencies are still unable to function independently, and are under the influence of politicians and organised crime networks, as observed in multiple cases during 2023.” At paragraph 5.4.6 an OASC from 2024 is quoted as saying that, “corruption and lack of resources within the police present continual challenges.”

79. On the particular facts of this case and having regard to all other relevant materials, I conclude that it is not reasonably likely that the appellant would be able to obtain state protection which would be sufficient to avoid or reduce the risk of him being targeted and harmed by the moneylenders. The country information on possible redress after the event paints a somewhat better picture, although even if it was available and effective, it would be of little use to the appellant if he had already been seriously harmed and/or taken by the moneylenders for their own purposes.

Risk elsewhere in Albania
80. Ms Jegarajah has conceded that the moneylenders would not present a risk to the appellant elsewhere in the country. I would have come to the same conclusion even if that concession had not been made. There is no reliable evidence that the group had any reach beyond the appellant’s locality. It is his belief that they have “connections everywhere”, but that is, with respect, pure speculation on his part. It is not reasonably likely that the group would have the desire and/or ability to locate the appellant in a place of relocation. There is no reliable basis on which to conclude that they would even be aware of his re-entry to Albania if he went straight to another area such as Tirana, Durres, or somewhere in the south of the country.

81. I turn to the question of whether the appellant would be at risk of trafficking/exploitation by other unknown groups elsewhere in Albania. For the following reasons, I conclude that he would not.

82. First, he is not in fact a victim of past trafficking/exploitation.

83. Second, he is an adult male. Whilst that is not determinative of risk, it is a relevant consideration. The existing country guidance cases and a fair amount of the country evidence indicates that it is young women who are most at risk. In particular, the guidance set out in TD and AD relates to women.

84. Third, even if one were to apply the potential risk factors discussed in TD and AD to the appellant, the indicators are largely against the existence of a risk:

(a) The appellant is relatively well-educated;

(b) He is now 21 years old;

(c) He is in principle able to work and it is reasonably likely that he would wish to do so. In oral evidence, he confirmed that he could work in construction. Dr Reis’ report does not go so far as to conclude that he is simply unable to work;

(d) The country guidance cases and country evidence does not indicate that he would not be seen as distinct within Albanian society, unlike a young woman living apart from her family;

(e) Nor would he be seen as distinct in the way in which female victims of trafficking are;

(f) Whilst he would not be living with his family and may not be able to obtain financial assistance from them, he would be able to re-establish contact and would at least be able to obtain emotional support;

(g) I have not been referred to evidence which indicates that he is from an area of the country particularly associated with trafficking/exploitation (as opposed to other forms of criminal activity).

85. In short, the cumulative effect of the country guidance cases and the country evidence does not demonstrate that such a person is in general reasonably likely to be trafficked/exploited.

86. Fourth, I take full account of the appellant’s mental health. This does present a vulnerability which is relevant to the issue of risk of trafficking/exploitation. This would undoubtedly make it more difficult for him to reintegrate into his new environment. It would present difficulties with establishing relationships and interacting with the authorities.

87. Having said that, appropriate mental health treatment is available in Albania, specifically in Tirana. Such treatment is state-funded. The facilities may not be at the same standard as in the United Kingdom, but that is not the appropriate basis for consideration. The appellant would be able to obtain appropriate medication and is not currently receiving any other form of treatment in this country. In fact, he rejected the possibility of what is now called talking therapy. Whilst at points Dr Reis’ report appears to suggest that the appellant could not or would not engage in any treatment in Albania, other evidence indicates the contrary. The appellant is living independently in this country, is taking care of himself, has made some friends with whom plays football, and has only had, at most, two interactions with his GP since the beginning of 2022. His position here is one of subjective and objective safety, and I acknowledge that a return to Albania (albeit away from the home area and place of past problems) is likely to cause increased anxiety. However, on the evidence as a whole I conclude that it is not reasonably likely that he would refuse to, or simply be unable to, engage with appropriate treatment. That treatment could, I find, be escalated if necessary. All-told, I conclude that the appellant’s mental health problems would not of themselves, or cumulatively with other considerations, create a risk of him being targeted by traffickers/exploiters.

88. Fifth, I have not overlooked the fact that the appellant left Albania at the age of 17 and has now been away from the country for four years. That would not in my judgment stand him out as a target for trafficking/exploitation, nor would it be of such significance as to prevent him from accessing appropriate mental health treatment. On a general level, Albanian society must be well-used to its citizens travelling abroad for some time and then returning for one reason or another. Even putting that to one side, it cannot be ignored that the appellant has shown resilience and fortitude in making the long journey from Albania to this country as a minor and then having been able to look after himself here without significant medical intervention or other ongoing care assistance.

Internal relocation
89. The final issue to be addressed is whether it would be unreasonable for the appellant to internally relocate away from Fushe-Kruje.

90. This issue is not specifically dealt with in the appellant’s skeleton argument. It is only briefly addressed in the appellant’s written evidence

91. I have taken all of the appellant’s personal characteristics into account before reaching my conclusion. It is a holistic approach involving a “fair assessment of the relevant facts”: Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5, at [21]. The stringency of the reasonableness test must not be underestimated - the question is whether it would be unduly harsh for the appellant to internally relocate: Januzi at [21], [24], and [47].

92. For the following reasons, I conclude that it would not be unreasonable/unduly harsh for the appellant to internally relocate.

93. First, I refer back to and rely on all that I have said at [82]-[88], above.

94. Second, I reiterate that I have carefully considered the entirety of Dr Reis’ report. I do not underestimate the mental health challenges which will have to be faced by the appellant. Specifically, I have taken full account of what Dr Reis says at 7.50-7.54 and 7.72-7.76 concerning the possible consequences of return to Albania.

95. There are, however, particular mitigating factors which must be fed into the consideration of Dr Reis’ evidence. A number have already been discussed previously. I reiterate those and add the following considerations. There is the undisputed availability of appropriate mental health treatment in Albania. I have disregarded Dr Reis’ inappropriate consideration of that issue in her report and her opinions as to the potentially serious consequences of return on the appellant’s mental health cannot be seen in isolation and/or the basis that there would not be appropriate treatment. I have previously explained why I conclude that the appellant would be able to in fact access such treatment. The fact that he has not accessed certain treatment in the United Kingdom has been out of choice. The absence of treatment here has not prevented him from living independently and caring for himself without the need for intervention from external agencies.

96. I do not underestimate the appellant’s subjective fear of returning and he is clear wish to remain in this country. Having said that, he is clearly intelligent and in many ways a capable young man. If my re-making decision is explained carefully to him, it will be apparent that he is not being expected to return to his home area and that appropriate medical treatment would be available. My decision would (subject to any onward challenge) provide finality in terms of the legal process in this country, a process which has been described by Dr Reis as contributing to the appellant’s anxiety.

97. On the materials before me, I see no basis on which the appellant’s current medication, or an equivalent, could not be obtained immediately on or soon after arrival in a place of relocation, in particular Tirana. If it was deemed appropriate for him to receive treatment additional to the prescribing of medication, there is nothing to suggest that that could not be put in place either in advance of return or soon thereafter. I remind myself that there is no expert medical evidence from Albania.

98. I take into account, at least to an extent, the possibility of the appellant applying through the Assisted Voluntary Returns scheme for help and funds. However, that would be a matter for him: he cannot be forced to do that and I do not regard this as a significant consideration in my overall assessment.

99. It is reasonably likely that the appellant would be able to obtain some form of support from Andi, even if that was only on an emotional level. I have found that he either retains Andi’s number or could re-establish contact in some other way. There is nothing to suggest that this friend would do nothing to help.

100. On the face of it, I also see no reason why the father’s friend who facilitated the appellant’s departure would not be able to help in some way on return. I accept that this is somewhat speculative and I do not place significant weight on this possibility, but I am entitled to draw certain inferences from the primary facts. The father’s friend was of significant assistance in the past. As the appellant would be able to re-establish contact with his parents prior to or after return, I see no reason why the friend could not then be contacted for help.

101. In summary, internal relocation would be difficult and involve significant challenges, both practical and in relation to the appellant’s mental health. However, on a holistic and fair assessment of all relevant circumstances, relocation would not be unduly harsh.

Article 3: the protection claim
102. The appellant’s Article 3 protection claim effectively runs in parallel to that under the Refugee Convention. For the same reasons set out in respect of the latter, the former must also fail.

Articles 3 and 8: medical and generally
103. It will be recalled that Ms Jegarajah confirmed that no Article 3 and/or 8 medical claim was being pursued. The same is true in respect of Article 8 more generally (i.e. a private life claim). I formally record here that those claims must fail.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law and that decision has been set aside.

The decision in this appeal is re-made and the appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 19 November 2025