Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-002807
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54642/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of March 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GIBBS

Between

HS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms. Blockley, Counsel, instructed by Mukhtar and Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms. Newton, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 25 February 2025

ANONYMITY ORDER

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. By the decision sent to the parties on 28 February 2024 First-tier Tribunal Judge Byrne (“the Judge”) refused the appellant’s protection and human rights appeal.

Anonymity

2. The Judge issued an anonymity order. Neither representative requested that the order be set aside and I have decided to maintain the anonymity order. This is because the underlying claim involves international protection issues and I consider that at the present time the appellants’ private life rights, protected by Article 8 ECHR, outweigh the public interest in open justice.

3. The anonymity order is detailed above.

Background
4. The appellant is a citizen of Egypt. It is not disputed that he was a member of Jameyah Talaae Zaid Lil Tanmiyah Almustadamah Committee (“JTZ”) in Egypt which is critical of the Egyptian government. The appellant’s account is that as a result of this membership he has been targeted by the Egyptian authorities.

5. The appellant also claims that he has been politically active in the United Kingdom and that these activities would place him on risk on return to Egypt. He also has an active Facebook account.

Grounds of Appeal

6. The appellant appeals on three grounds:

i) The Judge failed to give anxious scrutiny when considering the appellant’s answers in his substantive asylum interview ;

ii) The Judge failed to give adequate weight to the country expert report. Further, the Judge relies on a footnote in the reasons for refusal letter but the footnote does not support the Judge’s findings;

iii) The Judge erred by taking into account their negative credibility findings regarding events in Egypt when assessing the risk that the appellant would face on return to Egypt because of his political activities in the UK.

7. Upper Tribunal Judge Gill granted permission to appeal by a decision sent to the parties on 8 July 2024. UT Judge Gill found ground i) to be less persuasive but did not limit the grant of permission. She found that grounds ii) and iii) disclosed arguable errors of law.

Discussion and Reasons

8. I remind myself of the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, particularly where the fact-finding Judge has considered evidence from a variety of sources and has undertaken an evaluation of it, set in the applicable legal framework. I also remind myself that no decision will be perfect, that such decisions must be read holistically and sensibly, and that there is no requirement to give reasons for reasons.

9. At the start of the hearing I informed the parties that I had been unable to open the link referred to in the reasons for refusal letter. Both Ms. Blockley and Ms. Newton had also been unable to access the link. Consequently Ms. Blockley conceded that she could not rely on this aspect of the grounds of appeal.

10. The criticism made of the Judge’s findings in ground ii) is twofold. Firstly that they have introduced an arbitrary threshold without reference to the correct burden and standard of proof. This is at paragraph [21] of the decision:

“21…The Tribunal accepts the respondent’s submission that Dr. Faruqi comments here go no further than stating that the appellant’s account is very broadly plausible, rather than something that is a common occurrence.”

11. Given the lower standard of proof that is applicable in protection appeals I find that the Judge’s reference to the need for something to be a “common occurrence” appears to be an imposition of a threshold outside of the appropriate standard. However, although I find that this is an error of law I am not persuaded that it is material. This is because the judge does not reject the appellant’s claim to have bribed a Major General because they did not accept that bribery is a “common occurrence” in Egypt. I find that the Judge [22] accepts that “bribery is a phenomenon” but rejects, on the facts of this appeal, that the appellant’s claim is credible because the Judge is not satisfied that a Major General would take the risk of helping someone such as the appellant for the sum of £8000. The Judge does not find that bribery is not reasonably likely to occur in Egypt, only that on the facts of this appeal it did not.

12. Further, I am not satisfied that there is evidence before me that the Judge failed to take the expert report into account in its entirety. I find that the Judge refers to the fact that the report does not address the issue of the risk allegedly taken by the Major General, and refers to a lack of evidence that assisting a low profile person would place someone at less risk if caught. I am not therefore satisfied that a material error of law is identified in ground ii).

13. On ground iii) Ms. Blockley submits that the appellant’s credibility is not relevant when the Judge considers the risk that he would face on return to Egypt because of his sur place activities; it is a fact that the appellant has attended demonstrations. The fact of the attendance is, however, I find, accepted by the Judge [31]. What they do not accept is that this attendance, as nothing “more than an attendee” would place the appellant at risk on return and the decision has not been challenged on the basis that the assessment of the country background information in this regard is wrong.

14. The appellant claims that whilst at one of the demonstrations he was filmed and threatened, and he brought a witness to the appeal hearing to corroborate his account. This evidence was rejected by the Judge, and it is with regards to this assessment that the Judge relied on their previous credibility findings, which I find they were entitled to do. I am not persuaded that this approach was wrong or represents an error of law.

15. Ground iii) also disputes the way in which the Judge dealt with the evidence of the appellant’s witness; a lack of reasons as to why they were treated with caution. Ms. Blockley did not seek to develop this point in her submissions. Having considered [31] I am satisfied that the Judge has clearly explained their reasons, and that there is no error of law in this regard.

16. Although it was not in the grounds of appeal Ms. Blockley sought to raise the issue of the way in which the Judge had dealt with the appellant’s Facebook account. Ms. Newton did not object. I find however that the Judge correctly referred to XX(PJAK-sur place activities -Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC). I am satisfied that the Judge was entitled to find that limited weight could be placed on the Facebook posts because there had not been full disclosure of the account in electronic format. On this issue I find that Ms. Blockley was advancing no more than a disagreement with the judge’s findings.

17. Ground i) asserts that the Judge failed to give anxious scrutiny to the appellant’s answers in his substantive asylum interview (AIR). The Judge has concluded that in his AIR the appellant did not mention two groups of people raiding his home whereas this is what he says in his witness statement. The Judge therefore concludes that the appellant has developed his claim and that this undermines his credibility. I am however satisfied that the Judge is factually correct in their recounting of the evidence and that this is a matter on which the Judge was entitled to reach their own conclusions. I am further satisfied that the Judge has provided adequate and clear reasons for their findings. I am not therefore persuaded that an error of law is identified in ground i).

Notice of Decision

18. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The appellant’s appeal is accordingly dismissed.

L K Gibbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
28 February 2025