Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-002856

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01274/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

24th October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST

Between

Bolaji Ibrahim
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Ume-Ezeoke of counsel, instructed by direct access
For the Respondent: Ms Kerr, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a national of Nigeria. He appeals from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 23 April 2024 dismissing his appeal on human rights grounds. Permission to appeal was granted by the Upper Tribunal on 7 July 2025.
2. For the reasons set out below, I have decided that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve a material error of law and I therefore dismiss the Appellant’s appeal.
Background
3. I set out the Appellant’s history in some detail as his identity and citizenship are core issues in the appeal. The Appellant is a Nigerian national. He claims to have been born in London as Shanusideen Babajide Abayomi Ayo-ola Braimoh on 5 June 1974. In 1977 he claims to have travelled with his parents to Nigeria, where he completed his schooling before returning to the UK in 1993. In May 1993 the Appellant was issued a British passport (number 00905181) in the name of Shanusideen Babajide Abayomi Ayo-ola Braimoh valid to May 2003.
4. On 30 June 2004 the Appellant applied to renew that passport. In 2005 he was arrested and charged with making an untrue statement to procure a passport. On 20 March 2007 the Crown Court directed a not guilty verdict upon the CPS offering no evidence. Following the acquittal the Appellant’s British and Nigerian passports were returned to him.
5. The Appellant did not apply again to renew his expired British passport, but on 12 September 2007 he applied for a certificate of entitlement to the right of abode (“certificate of entitlement”). The certificate of entitlement was granted on 25 September 2007 and endorsed in the Appellant’s Nigerian passport, which was valid to 16 August 2012.
6. On 18 June 2009 the Respondent revoked the certificate of entitlement.
7. On 15 September 2009 the Appellant was convicted of dishonestly claiming a wrongful credit and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. On 13 February 2010, the Appellant attempted to enter the UK from Nigeria using his Nigerian passport endorsed with the revoked certificate of entitlement to the right of abode. He was detained, refused leave to enter and returned to Nigeria. On 10 January 2011 the Appellant changed his name by deed poll to Bolaji Ibrahim, and on 20 April 2011 he returned to the UK using another individual’s passport.
8. On 3 October 2013 the Appellant issued judicial review proceedings challenging the 2009 decision to revoke the right of abode. Permission was refused both on the papers and at an oral hearing, materially because (i) the claim was out of time and (ii) the claim was in any event academic, as by the time of the judicial review the Appellant’s Nigerian passport had expired so that a new application for a certificate of entitlement would have been required in any event.
9. On 15 May 2015 the Appellant was convicted of making false representations and was sentenced to a community order.
10. On 5 March 2018 the Appellant applied to renew his expired British passport (009059181). On 6 April 2018 the Passport Office responded, stating that investigations had shown that the Appellant was not a British citizen and should not have been issued with the passport in 1993. The letter stated that checks with the General Registry Office had confirmed that there was no trace of a birth of Shanusideen Babajide Abayomi Ayo-Ola Braimoh on 5 June 1974 in Tooting, London, but there had been a birth of Shammsden Babajide Abayomi Braimoh born on that date and place and a death in the latter name on 9 March 1975. The letter confirmed that passport 009059181 had been revoked and retained by HM Passport Office.
11. On 6 December 2018 the Appellant was arrested on suspicion of fraud. On 12 March 2019 he was served with notice of intention to deport him and on 13 March 2022 the Respondent made a deportation decision. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal on the basis that he was a British citizen, and alternatively that his deportation would breach Article 8 ECHR. He relied on his relationship with his British partner, who was said to be pregnant with his child, and on his relationship with the son of his former partner.
12. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The judge found that the Appellant was not a British citizen and that his deportation would not be disproportionate.
13. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal but granted on 7 July 2025 by the Upper Tribunal. The Respondent filed a Rule 24 notice on 14 August 2025 contesting the appeal.
The grounds of appeal
14. The Appellant appealed on six grounds:
a. Ground 1: The judge erred by not considering whether the Appellant met the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1)(iii) and (iv) of the Immigration Rules. The Appellant’s addendum Ground 1 challenged the judge’s failure to consider that the Appellant had been resident in the UK since 1993;
b. Ground 2: The judge had failed to give proper consideration to the evidence of the Appellant’s parents’ marriage;
c. Ground 3: The judge had misdirected herself and/or reached irrational findings by failing to determine the issue of the Appellant’s British citizenship for herself;
d. Ground 4: The judge erred by failing properly to scrutinise the Appellant’s evidence in support of his claim to be a British citizen and/or to indicate what weight she placed on that evidence;
e. Ground 5: The judge had misdirected herself by rejecting the Appellant’s partner’s claim to be pregnant;
f. Ground 6: The judge had erred by concluding that deportation would not have unduly harsh consequences for the Appellant’s partner and his unborn child.
The parties’ submissions
15. In his oral submissions on behalf of the Appellant, Mr Ume-Ezeoke focused on the evidential significance of the 1966 marriage certificate, which he submitted the judge had failed to consider when making credibility findings. He submitted that the certificate was consistent with the evidence of the Appellant’s brother that their father had changed his name prior to the Appellant’s birth. He further submitted that the First-tier Tribunal had erred by treating the dismissal of the Appellant’s judicial review proceedings as determinative of the issue of his British citizenship. The judge had evidence relating to the Appellant’s identity and should have determined the issue for herself.
16. In relation to Article 8, Mr Ume-Ezeoke confirmed that he was not relying on Ground 1 of the grounds of appeal. However, he relied on the addendum Ground 1 and submitted that the judge had erred in considering proportionality because she had not understood that the Appellant had been resident in the UK since 1993 and not 2007: length of residence was relevant to the ‘broad evaluative judgment’ required.
17. For the Respondent, Ms Kerr relied on the Rule 24 notice. She submitted that the certificate of entitlement had been revoked in 2009 on the basis of fraud. The judge had not been aware that a British passport had been granted in 1993 to the Appellant, but the judge was entitled to rely on the 2014 review proceedings and she could not go behind the conclusion of the Upper Tribunal without further evidence. The judge’s findings were rational and sustainable on the evidence before her and she had given clear and sufficient reasons for rejecting that evidence. On Article 8, the judge had been entitled to question the Appellant’s relationship with his partner and her claimed pregnancy in the absence of supporting evidence. There was no credible evidence before the judge that the Appellant’s deportation would result in undue hardship to his partner or his stepchildren.
Discussion and decision
18. There were essentially two issues which the First-tier Tribunal was required to determine. First, the Tribunal was required to determine whether the Appellant was a British citizen (‘the British citizenship issue’); if so, then he was not liable to deportation and his appeal would succeed. Second, if the Appellant was not a British citizen, the First-tier Tribunal had to determine whether his deportation would breach Article 8 and in particular whether he met either of the exceptions in s117C Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘the Article 8 issue’). Grounds 2-4 of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal are directed towards the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on the British citizenship issue, and Grounds 1, 5 and 6 address the Article 8 issue. I address each issue in turn.
The British citizenship issue (Grounds 2-4)
19. British citizenship and the right of abode are distinct (albeit related) legal concepts. The right of abode, as defined in s1 Immigration Act 1971, is the right to be “free to live in, and to come and go into and from, the United Kingdom without let or hindrance”. Those without the right of abode may live, work and settle in the UK only with permission and are subject to immigration control, i.e. the regulation of their entry, exit and conditions of stay in the UK. By virtue of s2 of the 1971 Act, the right of abode is conferred both on British citizens and on certain Commonwealth citizens. A certificate of entitlement to the right of abode (‘certificate of entitlement’), which is endorsed in the holder’s passport, is the means by which an individual who is not a British citizen can evidence the right of abode.
20. The First-tier Tribunal’s findings as to the Appellant’s nationality are set out at §§11-17 of the decision. The First-tier Tribunal noted that the Appellant relied on the birth certificate dated 5 June 1974 in the name of Shanusideen Babajide Braimoh and that the name on the birth certificate, and other details such as the father’s name and home address, matched the name on a death certificate dated 9 March 1975. At §13 the First-tier Tribunal recorded that the Appellant had been granted a certificate of entitlement in September 2007, that the Respondent had revoked the certificate of entitlement on 18 June 2009 and that the Appellant’s judicial review proceedings challenging the 2009 revocation had been refused permission.
21. At §15 of the decision, the judge referred to the evidence before her on which the Appellant relied in respect of his British citizenship. She noted that it primarily dated from 2006 or 2007; she considered the Appellant’s parents’ marriage certificate but noted that it did not prove the identity of the person possessing the certificate, and she rejected the photographs and other statements adduced by the Appellant as being of “very limited assistance”. She concluded,
“… The matter of the appellant’s nationality and the revocation of the Certificate of Entitlement has been already considered in the JR of 2014 – that was the appropriate process to use if he wished to challenge the revocation of the Certificate of Entitlement, and it is not for me to re-open that matter now in this appeal. As stated in that decision, it was open to the appellant to make an application for a new passport and Certificate of Entitlement if he wished to, and he would have had a right of appeal against a negative decision. He has chosen not to make such an application, and has made no further steps to pursue that claim until being served with the decision to deport him. The appellant has not provided any further credible evidence to support his claim that he is a British citizen, despite being given an additional six-month period prior to this hearing to allow him to do so.
16. For those reasons above, I find that the appellant is not a British citizen as he claims. I find that he is not Shausideen Babajide Braimoh date of birth 5th June 1974, because I find that Shanusideen Babjide Braimoh died on 9th March 1975. ”
22. As can be seen from that passage, although the judge did consider the Appellant’s evidence, she treated the revocation decision and the refusal of permission in the Appellant’s judicial review proceedings as determinative of the issue of whether or not he was a British citizen. That was an error, for two reasons. First, although the revocation decision was plainly relevant to the question which the judge was required to determine, which was whether the Appellant was at the time of the First-tier Tribunal hearing a British citizen, it did not provide a complete answer to that question. The revocation of his certificate of entitlement only demonstrated that the Appellant was not a Commonwealth citizen with the right of abode. Similarly, the refusal of permission in the judicial review proceedings did not address directly the issue of the Appellant’s British citizenship, but only whether his claim for judicial review demonstrated an arguable public law error in the revocation decision.
23. Second, the refusal of permission in judicial review proceedings does not normally involve a full judicial consideration or determination of the legal and factual issues in a claim. Permission was refused in the Appellant’s case principally because the claim was both significantly out of time and wholly academic. The Upper Tribunal did not substantively consider the underlying legal or factual issues.
24. The judge therefore erred by treating the question of the Appellant’s British citizenship as already having been determined by the revocation decision and the refusal of permission in the 2014 judicial review proceedings. However, having considered the evidence in detail, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal judge’s error was not material to the outcome of the appeal. If the judge had determined the issue for herself she would inevitably have come to the same conclusion, i.e. that the Appellant was not at the time of the hearing a British citizen, for the following reasons.
25. The Appellant’s claim to be a British citizen was materially based on two documents: (i) a birth certificate dated 5 June 1974, and (ii) a British passport issued in 1993. The birth certificate is not easy to read, but records the birth of an individual named Shanusideen or Shammsden Babajide Abayomi Ayo-Ola Braimoh in London. The Appellant’s case was that the first name on the birth certificate is Shanusideen, which was his birth name. The British passport was issued on 25 May 1993 in the name of Shanusideen Babajide Abayomi Ayo-Ola Braimoh. The Appellant’s case was that he was the individual named in the birth certificate and the rightful holder of the passport.
26. There were two significant pieces of evidence before the First-tier Tribunal which contradicted the Appellant’s claim. First, and most important, was the death certificate dated 9 March 1975, which recorded the death of an individual with details closely matching those claimed by the Appellant. The first name on the death certificate (Shanusideen) matched the name which the Appellant claims was his birth name on the birth certificate. Although the middle name appears to be spelt Babajidede on the death certificate and Babajide on the birth certificate, the surname and other details on the birth and death certificates matched exactly, as the First-tier Tribunal judge noted. The name of the Appellant’s father was recorded on both certificates as Rasheed Kolawole Braimoh. Rasheed Braimoh’s occupation was given on both certificates as ‘refrigeration engineer’, which matched that given in the witness statement of the Appellant’s brother, Delbert Braimoh. The addresses given on the birth and death certificates were also the same and matched that provided in Delbert Braimoh’s statement as the address where the family lived prior to moving to Nigeria. The signature of the informant (R Braimoh) on both certificates appeared to be the same. The name on the death certificate also matched the name on the 1993 British passport which the Appellant claimed was his. The death certificate, and the similarity of the details with the identity which the Appellant claimed, at the very least was evidence which required a cogent explanation from the Appellant.
27. The second evidential difficulty for the Appellant was the letter dated 6 April 2018 from the Passport Office refusing to renew the 1993 passport and revoking it. The basis for that decision was that the name on the passport did not match any registry entries, but that there were closely matching birth and death registry entries in the identity of Shammsden Babajide Abayomi Braimoh. The Passport Office concluded that the Appellant was not the individual he claimed to be and was not a British citizen entitled to the passport. Because the 1993 passport had been revoked, it did not therefore evidence the Appellant’s British citizenship; on the contrary, it indicated that his claim to citizenship had been rejected by the authority responsible for issuing passports after consideration of the evidence.
28. Both individually and together, the death certificate and the 2018 decision to revoke the 1993 passport provided strong evidence that the Appellant was not the individual he claimed to be and was not a British citizen.
29. That evidence was not addressed by the Appellant before the First-tier Tribunal, even though the death certificate and the issue of his identity were clearly at the heart of the Respondent’s deportation decision and the appeal. Ground 2 of the grounds of appeal asserted that the First-tier Tribunal judge had erred by failing to consider properly the evidence relevant to the citizenship issue. However, none of the other evidence before the First-tier Tribunal was capable, even taken as a whole, of addressing the death certificate and the passport revocation.
30. As the judge noted at paragraph 15 of the decision, the witness statements from the Appellant’s brother in the UK and from Nigerian family members all dated to 2006-7. The statements confirmed that the Appellant was the person in a family photo, and that Rasheed and Ganiyat Braimoh had had five children of whom Shanusideen was the fourth. None of the witness statements or other documents relied on by the Appellant addressed the death certificate or were capable of providing any explanation for it. The Appellant’s appeal skeleton argument for the First-tier Tribunal did not address it either. Nor was there any reference in the Appellant’s evidence or written case before the First-tier Tribunal to the revocation of the 1993 passport. The weight to be attached to the Appellant’s evidence was a matter for the judge; in the circumstances, it was entirely open to her to find that it was of “very limited assistance” in determining the citizenship issue.
31. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal and submissions in the error of law hearing also placed heavy reliance on the 1966 marriage certificate which was before the First-tier Tribunal. The certificate records the marriage on 9 July 1966 of Rasheed Kolawole Braimoh-Odufeso to Ganiyat Abike Braimoh-Odufeso. The Appellant’s case was that the marriage certificate proved that his father had changed his name (from Braimoh-Odufeso to Braimoh) before his birth, and that the documents before the First-tier Tribunal showed the same person (the Appellant) born in the UK, attending school in Nigeria and being granted a British passport in 1993.
32. I consider that the marriage certificate was of very limited relevance to the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. The Appellant has always claimed that Rasheed Kolawole Braimoh (the individual named on both the birth and death certificates) was his father and Ganiyat Abike Braimoh was his mother. The marriage certificate did not address or explain the existence of a death certificate in the Appellant’s claimed identity. The First-tier Tribunal judge did not err in failing to give greater weight to the marriage certificate when considering the citizenship issue.
33. Taking all of the above into account, I conclude that although the First-tier Tribunal judge erred in failing to determine the citizenship issue for herself, that error was not material to her decision. The burden was on the Appellant to demonstrate that he was a British citizen. If the judge had determined the citizenship issue, on the evidence before her she would inevitably have reached the same conclusion, i.e. that the Appellant was not who he claimed to be and was not a British citizen. Grounds 2-4 are not made out.
The Article 8 issue (Grounds 1, 5 and 6)
34. The Appellant’s addendum Ground 1 asserted that the judge had made a material error of fact by treating the Appellant as having returned to the UK from Nigeria in 2007, and that that error infected her consideration of the proportionality of removal.
35. The Appellant’s evidence in his witness statement was that he had been taken to Nigeria in 1977 and had returned in 1993 on the British passport issued in that year. The First-tier Tribunal judge referred to that evidence at paragraph 14, but did not make any finding as to the year when the Appellant returned to the UK from Nigeria. At paragraph 13, however, she found that the Appellant had applied for and been granted a British passport in 2007 on the basis of his certificate of entitlement, and at paragraph 19 found that he had used that passport to enter the UK. Both of those findings were, on the documents before me, erroneous. The Appellant’s certificate of entitlement was endorsed on his Nigerian passport, which he used for travel between 2007 and 2010, and he was not issued with a British passport in 2007.
36. However, any factual error as to the date of the Appellant’s arrival in the UK was not material to the judge’s consideration of the proportionality of his removal.
37. I start by noting that it is clear that the Appellant had not been continuously resident in the UK since 1993; on his own evidence he had been travelling to and from Nigeria and he was in Nigeria at least in February 2010, when he was refused entry to the UK, and in April 2011 when he returned to the UK using another individual’s passport.
38. As the Upper Tribunal noted in granting permission, the Appellant could not have met the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1) (iii) and (iv) of the Immigration Rules, because he did not meet the suitability requirements. The First-tier Tribunal therefore considered and applied the statutory framework under sections 117B and C Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. It appears to have been common ground, and the First-tier Tribunal found, that the Appellant had never been granted any period of leave to remain. Having found that the Appellant was not a British citizen, the First-tier Tribunal‘s inevitable conclusion (at paragraph 19) was therefore that the Appellant had not been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life. He therefore could not meet the requirements of Exception 1 in s117C(4). A longer period of unlawful residence could not have affected that conclusion.
39. The judge then considered the question of whether Exception 2 in s117C(5) applied, i.e. whether the Appellant had a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner or child and whether his deportation would have unduly harsh effects on them. The length of the Appellant’s residence in the UK, and whether he had arrived in 1993 or in 2007, was not material to the judge’s consideration of that question.
40. I therefore conclude that there was no material error in the judge proceeding on the basis that the Appellant had been resident in the UK since 2007 rather than 1993.
41. The Appellant’s Ground 5 asserted that the judge had misdirected herself by rejecting the Appellant’s partner’s claim to be pregnant at the time of the hearing. The judge considered the issue at paragraph 22 of the decision. She noted that the Appellant’s partner had claimed to have found out she was pregnant whilst in Nigeria in December 2023 (four months before the hearing) and that on her own evidence she had undergone medical tests relating to the pregnancy since returning to the UK in January 2024. The judge was entitled to consider that evidence which could have been supplied had not been, and to reject the pregnancy claim on that basis. In any event, the judge proceeded at paragraph 23 to consider in the alternative whether the Appellant’s deportation would have unduly harsh consequences if his partner were pregnant. There was no error in the judge’s approach.
42. Ground 6 asserted that the judge had erred by concluding that deportation would not have unduly harsh consequences for the Appellant’s partner and his unborn child. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal do not identify any relevant factors or evidence which the judge failed to consider, but instead emphasise the loving nature of the Appellant’s relationship with his partner. The judge considered the issue at paragraph 23. On the evidence before her, it was open to the judge to conclude that deportation would not be unduly harsh for the reasons given.
43. Considering the judgment as a whole, there was no error in the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning on the Article 8 issue and the conclusion that the Appellant’s deportation would not breach Article 8 was plainly one which was open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it. Grounds 1, 5 and 6 are not made out.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law.
The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

L Hirst

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 October 2025