Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-002893
UI-2024-002988

First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/50505/2022
IA/00770/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 17th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

SONYA AZIZ HUSSEIN
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION LIFTED)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R. Ahmed, instructed by CJ Legal Ltd.
For the Respondent: Mr Lindsay, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

The anonymity direction previously in place in these appeals is lifted.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This decision is the remaking, under section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of a First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) decision dated 15 December 2023 but set aside by the Upper Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 12 February 2025.
2. The appellant was previously granted anonymity because she had made a claim for international protection. She is no longer pursuing that claim and now appeals only on the ground that her removal would be inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). At the outset of the hearing, I asked Mr Ahmed if there was any reason that the anonymity order should continue and he acknowledged that there was not. However, I do not consider that there is a public interest in identifying the minor children by name. I have therefore anonymised the names of the children in order to protect their privacy.
3. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq, born in Sulaymaniyah in 1984. She is of Kurdish ethnicity and a Sunni Muslim. She is married to Ali Kak Abdalla, who is also a Kurdish citizen of Iraq and was born in Sulaymaniyah in 1981. They have four children, A and B, who were born in Iraq in June 2010 and December 2015, respectively, and C and D, who were born in the UK in July 2021 and June 2025. At the date of the hearing, the children were 15, nine, four and 2.5 months old. The two eldest children have now lived in the UK for over eight years.
4. This appeal turns on the question of what the impact of leaving the UK would be on the children, and in particular on the two eldest children. This is because Parliament has stipulated at section 117B(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 that if a child has lived in the UK for at least seven years and it would not be reasonable to expect that child to leave the UK, then there is no public interest in removing their parents (unless a parent is liable to deportation). For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that it would not be unreasonable to expect the oldest children to leave the UK and that, taking into account the public interest in effective immigration control and the lack of evidence of a significant negative impact on the family as a whole, it would not be inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under article 8 to require the appellant to return to Iraq with her family.
Background
5. Mrs Hussein entered the UK on 11 November 2016, together with A and B. She claimed asylum, but after her husband arrived in the UK in February 2017, she withdrew her asylum claim and asked to be considered as a dependant on his claim. Mr Abdalla’s asylum claim was refused and his appeal against the refusal was dismissed by the FTT in a decision promulgated on 8 February 2018 (“the 2018 FTT decision”). Mrs Hussein then made an asylum claim in her own right, which was refused, and her appeal against that refusal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision dated 18 March 2020 (“the 2020 FTT decision”).
6. On 5 May 2021, Mrs Hussein made further protection and human rights submissions, on which her husband and two eldest children were dependants. The respondent recognised the submissions as a fresh claim but refused it in a decision dated 7 January 2022. This appeal is against that decision. On 31 October 2022 the FTT dismissed Mrs Hussein’s first appeal against the refusal decision (“the 2022 FTT decision”), but on 9 October 2023 the Upper Tribunal overturned the FTT decision in part and remitted the appeal to the FTT for rehearing. On 15 December 2023, a different judge of the FTT allowed Mrs Hussein’s appeal (“the 2023 FTT decision”), but in a decision promulgated on 12 February 2025, the Upper Tribunal set aside that decision and retained the appeal for remaking in the Upper Tribunal.
7. The remaking hearing was listed before me and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Clarke on 19 March 2025 but had to be adjourned due to the failure of the appellant’s then-solicitors to request an interpreter or instruct counsel. On 2 April 2025 the Tribunal issued directions governing the further progress of the appeal. The directions acknowledged that in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in CAO v SSHD [2024] UKSC 32 at [46]-[48], the Tribunal had a legal duty to ensure that it had sufficient information about the children’s circumstances to make an informed assessment of their best interests. These directions advised the appellant that the evidence about the children was entirely inadequate and that further evidence was needed:
26. In the light of what is said in CAO, we are concerned about the paucity of evidence before us relating to the children’s best interests. We note that whilst the Appellant uploaded a bundle onto Ce-File on 13 March 2025 in anticipation of the remaking hearing, this contained no evidence in relation to the children’s circumstances or best interests. […] The only evidence we could find relating to the children was contained in the FTT bundles uploaded onto Ce-File on 3 July 2024. This evidence appeared to be restricted to a few school documents from 2022.
27. In the light of the above, it appears to us that there is almost a complete absence of evidence relating to the best interests of the children. It appears from the Appellant’s bundle uploaded onto Ce-File on 13 March 2025, that the children appear to have been forgotten altogether, despite UTJ Rintoul’s direction that it would be necessary to make further findings in respect of the children, and despite Article 8 being a live issue.
28. We find in the light of this paucity of evidence and CAO that it is incumbent upon us to exercise our case management powers under [The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008] PR 5(3)(d) and direct that the Appellant’s representatives undertake a consideration of the children’s circumstances and best interests and make best efforts to provide the Tribunal with all relevant information and materials for examination, so as to allow the Tribunal to reach an informed decision.
8. Following a case management review hearing on 4 June 2025 and the issuance of further directions, the appeal came before me for hearing on 2 September 2025.
The hearing
9. In a skeleton argument filed on 18 August 2025, the appellant had clarified that she is no longer pursuing a protection claim under the Refugee Convention or article 3 ECHR. She appeals only on article 8 grounds, and in particular on the ground that the two eldest children are now “qualifying children” under section 117B(6) and it would not be reasonable for them to leave the UK. Nor would it be in the best interests of any of the children. Mr Lindsay confirmed at the outset of the hearing that the respondent consented to the consideration of the best interests of all four children in this appeal.
10. The parties therefore agreed that the issues before me were:
(i) What is in the best interests of the appellant’s four children;
(ii) Whether it would be reasonable for the two eldest children to leave the UK; and
(iii) Whether the family’s removal from the UK would be proportionate under article 8.
11. The following documents were before me:
(i) An appellant’s skeleton argument dated 18 August 2025;
(ii) The respondent’s skeleton argument dated 29 August 2025;
(iii) Child D’s birth certificate;
(iv) A supplementary bundle from the respondent, filed on 3 July 2025 (9 pages);
(v) An appellant’s addendum bundle, filed on 22 May 2025 (99 pages);
(vi) A document from the appellant entitled “Index to Bundle of Documents for Error of Law Hearing”, but in fact prepared on 13 March 2025 for the adjourned remaking hearing (175 pages); and
(vii) The respondent’s policy, Family life (as a partner or parent) and exceptional circumstances, Version 22.0 (16 July 2025).
12. I also had sight of all of the previous FTT and UT decisions, with the exception of the 2018 FTT decision in Mr Adbdalla’s appeal. Both parties agreed that they were content for the hearing to proceed without the 2018 FTT decision, as its findings were set out sufficiently in the other decisions. They also confirmed that the only independent evidence before me about country conditions in Iraq was concerned with redocumentation and the consequences of being undocumented. There was no country evidence about education and health care provision or the economic or security situation more generally.
13. I heard evidence from the appellant and her husband. They both gave evidence in Kurdish Sorani, and I was satisfied that they and the interpreter understood each other. Before the appellant gave her evidence, I asked her to let me know of any adjustments she might need due to having recently given birth or to the responsibilities of caring for an infant. She told me that she might need to take a break to feed the baby if she heard him crying, and that was in fact necessary early on in her evidence. It was also agreed that the appellant would leave the courtroom during her husband’s evidence so that she could take over looking after the children, which she did. No other accommodations were requested or appeared to me to be needed.
14. Both witnesses adopted the statements they had made in May 2025 and then were cross-examined. At several points during the appellant’s cross-examination, I attempted to clarify the question Mr Lindsay had asked, because it appeared to me that the appellant had not understood it. At the end of his cross-examination, I asked the appellant some further questions about circumstances in the family’s hometown, which I considered were necessary in order to obtain sufficient information to make a proper assessment of the best interests of the children. During her husband’s cross-examination, I once repeated and confirmed his evidence, when he had given his answer in English and I was not satisfied that I had understood him. Mr Ahmed raised no concern about any of these additional questions.
15. Because the appellant and her husband said so little about circumstances in Iraq in their witness statements, I consider it important to set out their oral evidence on this issues. In response to questions from Mr Lindsay, the appellant confirmed that she had an extended family in Iraq when she left, including parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, grandparents and cousins. Mr Lindsay had set out this list of potential relatives after several questions had failed to elicit a clear answer. The appellant then replied, “Yes, I had it”. Her husband had brothers, sisters and parents. They were both from the same area, which was a town called Darbandikhan. Mr Lindsay then asked, “That would be the place where your family would go back to live in Iraq if you go back to Iraq?” The appellant answered, “Yes, it’s that place. However, I don’t want to go back there.” He asked, “Do you mean you don’t want to return to Iraq at all, or is there some reason you can’t go back to Darbandikhan?” She answered, “Everywhere in Iraq.” She was asked if there was a school in the town, and she answered that her children had been too young to attend school when they left. The question was put to her again, and she said there was a school, but her children cannot speak, read or write Kurdish.
16. Under persistent cross-examination, the appellant insisted that her children do not speak Kurdish. She explained that although she was using an interpreter for the purposes of the appeal, she spoke reasonably good English and she always spoke to the children in English because they are enrolled in English schools, their neighbours speak English and they speak to each other in English.
17. The appellant said that she is not in contact with her family in Iraq because she “went through a bad experience with them”, and her husband is not in contact with his family either. He asked, “You’ve previously told a Tribunal that you had lost contact with your sister in Iraq, even though that wasn’t true.” She replied, “Yes, I know what you are talking about. I don’t have contact with her anymore. Would it be possible for you to continue with your question?”
18. She said the older children would derive no benefit from being fluent in English, because the first language spoken in their town is Kurdish and the second is Arabic. Her eldest son is beginning his studies for his GCSEs but could not continue his education in Iraq.
19. In response to my questions, the appellant clarified that her parents are still alive, and that she has one brother and four sisters. Her sisters are married but she does not know if her brother has married since she left. She does not remember how many children her sisters have, because it has been so many years since she left. Her husband has three sisters and two brothers. Before they left Iraq, she and her husband were living in their own house, near his family, although she used to travel back and forth to Egypt because she was a student. She did not know how to describe the size of the town, but there was a medical centre where they used to go if they were sick. If one needed an operation, it was necessary to go to Sulaymaniyah, which was one hour’s drive away. A lot of people in the town worked as shopkeepers, but some were farmers.
20. Mr Abdalla said in his evidence that Darbandikhan was a small town, smaller than Kalar or Sulaymaniyah. He did not know whether there were jobs and businesses there, because he had left ten years ago, although there had been jobs and businesses there when he left. He had worked as an engineer but would be unable to return to that profession because of the psychological impact and the loss of skills caused by the years they have spent in the UK being unable to work. He said that his children could not speak Kurdish. He had encouraged them to speak Kurdish and to listen to Kurdish music, but they had said they were tired and did not want to. He does not know if his wife agrees that the children should speak Kurdish. She is really tired and busy with the children and does not say anything at all. At the end of the cross-examination, he asked to say something further. He then expressed his anger and frustration about the way they had been treated by the Home Office and how long they had been waiting for status. He had been an engineer and his wife had been a solicitor, but now they felt disabled and powerless. He could no longer answer his children’s questions and that made him feel embarrassed and ill.
21. After the evidence, I heard submissions from both representatives. I will not rehearse them here, but I have taken them into account and will refer to them where relevant in the discussion below. During Mr Ahmed’s submissions about the best interests of the children, the appellant broke down in tears. She asked to say something, which I permitted without objection. She asked me to take into consideration that the children were doing very well in school, and that the schools had said that they were proud of them (the parents) for what they had helped their children achieve. I assured her that I would take into account all of the evidence before me concerning the children’s lives in the UK.
22. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision, which I now give with my reasons.
Legal framework
23. The appellant appeals on the ground that her removal from the UK would be inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under article 8. The legal framework for deciding her appeal is set out in Razgar, R (on the Application of) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27 and a long line of subsequent cases. The appeal turns on the fifth Razgar question: whether her removal would be a disproportionate interference with her or her family’s private lives in the UK. The appellant, her husband and her children obviously have a family life with each other, but the decision to refuse the appellant’s human rights claim would not interfere with that family life because the appellant’s husband and older children are dependants on her human rights claim and the respondent does not propose removing them without the younger children. However, the appellant, her husband and her two older children have all lived in the UK for more than eight years, and it is not in dispute that they have established private lives here or that removal would interfere with those private lives sufficiently for article 8 to be engaged. Nor is it in dispute that the decision is in accordance with the law, because the appellant and her dependants do not meet any of the immigration rules.
24. The sole question before me is therefore whether the family’s removal would be proportionate under article 8.
25. In answering this question, I must identify the children’s best interests and treat them as a primary, but not determinative, consideration.
26. I must also have regard to the considerations set out in the Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”). Because the two oldest children have lived in the UK for more than seven years, they are “qualifying children” as defined at section 117D of the 2002 Act and section 117B(6) applies:
“In the case of a person who is not liable to deportation, the public interest does not require the person's removal where—
(a) the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and
(b) it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the United Kingdom."
If section 117B(6) is met, Parliament has stipulated that the public interest does not require removal, and this determines the article 8 question in an appellant’s favour. Runa v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 514 at [32] (citing KO (Nigeria) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) [2018] UKSC 53 at [17]).
27. In considering whether it is reasonable for a child to leave the UK, the focus must be entirely on the child. See: KO (Nigeria) at [36]. There is no room for taking into account other factors, such as the parents’ conduct, the precarity of the family’s status while the children were putting down roots in the UK, or the parents’ ability to speak English or be economically self-sufficient. However, the parents’ immigration status is relevant as one of the real world facts that must be taken into account. This is because it will normally be reasonable for a child to live with their parents, and if both parents are expected to leave the UK, it would normally be reasonable to expect the child to go with them. KO (Nigeria) at [18].
28. If section 117B(6) is not met, it will be necessary to conduct a comprehensive article 8 balancing test, taking into account all relevant factors and having regard to all of the other considerations listed at section 117B of the 2002 Act.
Findings of fact
29. In accordance with the principles set out in Devaseelan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 702 and subsequent caselaw, I must take the findings of the 2020 and 2022 FTT decisions as my starting point. I consider that the relevant findings are:
(i) Mr Abdalla converted from Islam to Zoroastrianism in June 2016, but Mrs Hussein has not done so;
(ii) Both Mr Abdalla and Mrs Hussein have given accounts of suffering threats and physical harm from their families and others as a result of his conversion, but these accounts were not credible and the Iraqi documents adduced by Mrs Hussein were not reliable;
(iii) Neither of them would be at risk from the state, from their families or from the wider community because of his conversion;
(iv) Mr Abdalla claimed to have been involved in demonstrations in the UK against the authorities in the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) but his account of this political activity was not credible; although he may have posted material critical of the KRI authorities on Facebook, the evidence of this was very limited and he had not established that he would have come to the attention of the KRI authorities as a result;
(v) Both Mrs Hussein and Mr Abdalla either had, or have access to, Iraqi CSID cards; and
(vi) They could safely return to their home areas, where they would have family support and be able to find work.
30. As noted in the respondent’s skeleton argument, there has been no challenge to the findings at [39] and [40] of the 2022 FTT decision that “the best interests of the children lie in remaining with their parents” and that there was “no evidence” before the FTT “to suggest that the children would not be able to adapt to life in Iraq.” However, almost three years have passed since that hearing, which is a considerable period of time in the life of a young child. The issue before me is whether the children will be able to adapt to life in Iraq now.
31. I begin with findings about the children’s circumstances in the UK. A attends a grammar school and according to a letter from his school written in June 2025, he is more than halfway through his GCSE programme and is expected to gain “10 good passes”. He has an “exceptional attitude to his studies”, is “always willing to go the extra mile in all aspects of school life” (for which he has been recognised as a “Fiat Lux Scholar” several years in a row), has excellent attendance and is “popular with his peers, kind and supportive of others”.
32. B is enrolled in primary school. In his Year 4 school report he was assessed as at or above the expected standard in his behaviour and in most academic subjects and above that standard in reading and maths. He has received several academic awards and certificates and photographs show him participating in a range of school activities. B has been diagnosed with two ophthalmological conditions, bilateral blepharitis and lagophthalmos, but a letter from his treating Paediatric Ophthalmology clinic written in February 2025 recorded that he had not been using any medication in the past few months and his father reported “no concerns”. He also has asthma, which requires monitoring and management.
33. Various photographs show each of the older children socialising with a diverse group of peers in a range of settings.
34. None of this evidence has been challenged, and I accept it as genuine, as it either comes from third parties or consists of photographs that include a range of other people and give no indication of having been staged.
35. I conclude on the basis of this evidence that A and B are fully integrated into UK society. In spite of the challenges that they are likely to have faced due to their family’s lack of immigration status and their parents’ limited English, as well as A’s own lack of English when he arrived in the UK, they are successful academically, participate fully in their school communities and have formed friendships with a diverse group of peers.
36. The evidence regarding C is more limited, but he attends nursery in the UK. Most of the photographs show him socialising with his immediate family, as is to be expected at his young age.
37. I also accept the parents’ evidence that the older children do not read or write Kurdish or Arabic and that they speak English amongst themselves. Contrary to Mr Lindsay’s submission, I find it entirely plausible that the appellant has tried as far as possible to speak English with them in spite of her own limited English and the ever-present risk of return to Iraq. It is plausible that she felt that this would promote their integration, the forming of friendships in their wider community and their academic success for as long as they are living here. I also find it plausible that their father would nonetheless want them to maintain links with their language and culture, but that they would have little time or interest in doing so. However, I find that the children are likely to have at least some understanding of spoken Kurdish, given their father’s desire for them to have some knowledge of the language and the likelihood that the parents speak to each other in Kurdish, given their own more limited English.
38. I find that this is a close, loving and supportive family unit, based on the photographs, the parents’ impassioned statements about the children in their spontaneous evidence before me, and the independent evidence of the children’s resilience and achievement. However, I also find on the basis of the parents’ spontaneous oral evidence that the long years of immigration limbo and litigation are taking a toll on the family. The older children have begun asking questions of their father that he cannot answer, and this causes him distress and shame. The parents are tired, angry, frustrated and fearful for their children’s future.
39. The appellant’s case has not been assisted by the parents’ claim to know nothing about current circumstances in their hometown. The appellant has the burden of proof as to the facts she intends to rely on in the article 8 assessment and has put forward no independent evidence of any specific hardship that the children would encounter on return, in spite of the detailed directions of 2 April 2025 emphasising the need for evidence relevant to the assessment of the children’s best interests.
40. I find on the basis of the evidence before me that if the family were to return to Iraq, they could settle in the parents’ hometown. The appellant did not say otherwise: she clarified that her objection was to returning to Iraq, not to returning to her hometown specifically. I find that the appellant has not established that they would be without family support there. The parents’ account of being estranged from their families has been repeatedly rejected in previous determinations, and there was nothing in the evidence before me to justify reaching a different conclusion. Even allowing for an understandable impatience with being cross-examined about the same subjects for the fourth time, I found both witnesses to be evasive when asked simple questions, such as about how many relatives they have, how large their town is, and what the economic situation there is.
41. I further find that according to their own evidence, they were both in professional employment before they left Iraq and they owned their own home. There is a school in their town, and the only concern the appellant raised about the education there is that it would be in Kurdish and Arabic. I take into account that she and her husband were both born and raised in that town and were able to go on to obtain professional qualifications. There is a medical centre in the town that the appellant used to go to when she was ill, and hospitals an hour away in Sulaymaniyah.
42. I conclude that on return to Iraq, the children would have access to family support, adequate health care, and educational provision that is more than adequate (given the parents’ educational attainment). Their parents have not established that there would be a significant fall in their standard of living. I accept that it would be difficult for either parent to return to practicing their previous profession, given their long absence. However, there is no evidence before me that they would be unable to renew their qualifications or find other employment, or that they would be without family support in the meantime. To the extent that I must consider whether it is better for the children to remain in the UK or return to Iraq, I note that the parents do not say that they are likely to be able to exercise their professions in the UK.
43. I find that returning to Iraq would be likely to cause the older two children distress, as they would be leaving behind their friends and communities and would be faced with having to form new friendships with at best a limited understanding of spoken Kurdish. Continuing their education primarily in Kurdish and Arabic would be a significant challenge, but I reject the suggestion that returning to Iraq would somehow bring their education to an end or that A would have to start over in primary school. In the first place, some of what they have learned will be transferrable, such in mathematics. Secondly, there is no evidence before me that the local schools are incapable of integrating children returning from abroad. Third, although I recognise the irony of holding the family’s own success against them, the evidence before me shows that A and B are bright, hardworking and able to form positive relationships with teachers and peers. I find that these qualities will likely assist them in reintegrating in Iraq.
44. I take into account that A is halfway through his GCSEs, and that it will be disappointing to him to be unable to sit the exams that he has begun to prepare for. There is no evidence before me, however, that he will be unable to obtain equivalent educational qualifications in Iraq in the future, albeit with some delay.
45. I also consider it reasonable to assume that all of the children would derive some benefit from in-person contact with their grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins.
46. I conclude that it is in all of the children’s best interests to remain with their parents and siblings in a loving and supportive family unit. It is also in their best interests for their immigration limbo to come to an end. Return to Iraq would have an immediate negative impact on the eldest children’s wellbeing, while they adjusted to the loss of the friendships and other connections they have formed in the UK and confronted a very challenging educational environment. Although I must make my decision on the basis of the circumstances at the date of hearing, I consider that I can also take into account the reasonably foreseeable consequences of return. Taking into account the eldest children’s own capabilities and that they will have the support of their loving parents and the likely support of their extended family, I find that the evidence does not establish that there would be significant adverse consequences for the children after an initial period of readjustment.
47. I find that for the reasons set out above that it is in the older children’s best interests to remain in the UK in the short term, but that the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that it is in their best interests in the long term. Taking into account both the immediate and the reasonably foreseeable future consequences, it is in their best interests to remain in the UK, but not strongly so. The evidence is insufficient to support a finding that it is in the best interests of the younger two children to remain in the UK. There is no evidence of any significant ties outside their immediate family and, as noted above, no evidence that their standard of living would decline or that health and education services would be inadequate. They would, in addition, have the benefit of living close to a large, extended family.
48. Having identified where the children’s best interests lie, I turn to the question of whether it would be reasonable to expect the two eldest children to leave the UK. Mr Ahmed urged me to find that it would not be, primarily because of the length of time the oldest child has been in the UK and the stage he has reached in his education. He reminded me that it is generally accepted that children are likely to form stronger ties outside the family as they mature, such that a child who has spent seven years in the UK from the age of six, as A has, will have formed stronger ties than younger qualifying children. I consider that that principle does not take him very far. It is a useful predictive tool where there is limited evidence, but where there is detailed evidence of the private life that a particular child has developed, that evidence is what matters. On the evidence before me, I have found that both A and B have formed meaningful connections outside the family, and that they are well-integrated in the UK and achieving academically. They are likely to be distressed at leaving their friends and communities in the UK, and to suffer significant but temporary setbacks in their education. On the other hand, they will not suffer any additional adverse consequences from returning to the parents’ hometown, because they will have the support of a large, extended family, their parents are likely to be able to find work, and there is no indication that the health care or education they will have access to will be inadequate. On balance, it is not unreasonable to expect them to leave the UK.
49. Because section 117B(6) is not met, a wider article 8 assessment is required. I employ the balance sheet approach first recommended in Hesham Ali (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60 at [83].
50. It is in the best interests of the eldest two children to remain in the UK, but not strongly so. I also take into account that A is making a positive contribution to his school and that both A and B clearly have the potential to contribute positively to the UK in the future. This weighs in the family’s favour.
51. It is in the best interests of the younger children to remain with their parents and siblings, but the evidence does not support a finding that it would be better for them to remain in the UK than to return to Iraq as a family unit.
52. Although the appellant and her husband are far from fluent in English, based on the husband’s oral evidence and the evidence of how well integrated the children are into their schools and wider community, I conclude that the parents both speak sufficiently good English to integrate into their community in the UK. Section 117B(2) does not weigh against them. This is a neutral factor.
53. On the other hand, the public interest in effective immigration control weighs heavily against the appellant and her husband. They cannot meet the immigration rules, and in addition, they have been found to have put forward a series of protection claims that were disbelieved.
54. The evidence does not support a finding that the family would be financially independent in the short term. They have four children and there is no evidence of what support would be available to allow both parents to work. Mr Abdalla’s own evidence is that it will take him some time to recover from the professional and mental toll of the years in limbo. There is, however, no reason to find that the parents would not be able to work in future, especially as the children grow older. I therefore find that Section 117B(3) weighs against them, but not heavily.
55. The private lives that the appellant and her husband have developed over the years they have lived in the UK must be given little weight in accordance with section 117B(5), as their immigration status has at all times been precarious at best.
56. Although I recognise that this will be a great disappointment to the family and to A in particular, I conclude that the article 8 balance falls in favour of the family’s removal.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 September 2025