Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-002901

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52871/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 09 April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RAE-REEVES

Between

VH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Richardson – Counsel instructed by Malik and Malik Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Cunha – Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS

Anonymity Direction
1. We have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice because of the potential risk to the appellant. The appellant is accepted by the respondent to have been exploited previously and is the victim of modern slavery.
Introduction
2. The appellant failed in his appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against the decision of the respondent to refuse his claims based on international protection and human rights grounds. The determination by Judge S George (“the Judge”) was promulgated on 22 April 2024. By a decision dated 25 September 2024, this Tribunal found that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law such that its decision fell to be set aside, subject to the preserved findings referred to below. Having set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, the matter was retained in the Upper Tribunal for a new decision to be made on the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of protection claim.
3. The appeal was listed to be remade on 18 November 2024 but due to the appellant’s solicitor’s failure to comply with directions and properly instruct counsel it was adjourned. Specifically, a new matter had been raised that was not previously considered by the respondent as identified in s85(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, namely the possibility of a new threat to the appellant due to a blood feud.
4. The appellant has served a further bundle of evidence in support of his appeal referred to as the appellant’s bundle amounting to 363 pages (‘AB’). This bundle takes into account the agreement of the respondent to deal with the new matter, made on 10 March 2025. We have also been referred to an earlier composite bundle of 489 pages (‘CB’).
5. We heard evidence from the appellant and submissions were made by Ms Cunha and Mr Richardson who also relies on an appellant’s skeleton argument (‘ASA’). At the beginning of the hearing Ms Cunha advised us that she had put Mr Richardson on notice that she now challenged Judge George’s findings and the original basis of the refusal letter due to evidence in the court documents that the appellant’s father was present at the appellant’s younger brother’s court hearing. Mr Richardson confirmed that he did not seek an adjournment in these circumstances and wished to proceed. He acknowledged that Ms Cunha could ask questions about the new evidence.
6. This is our decision in respect of the remaking of the decision relating to the Appellant’s protection claim. We take into account the Appellant’s vulnerability as referred to below and we note the Appellant’s very young age as a child when he first arrived in the United Kingdom.
Background
7. The appellant is a national of Albania who came to the UK when he was aged 15. The following matters set out by Judge George (“the Judge”) were not challenged by Ms Cunha today;
i. The appellant’s identity and date of birth;
ii. The appellant was born and lived in Ceren in Diber in the north-east of Albania. The appellant is a member of a particular social group, namely someone would be persecuted by the criminal gang who are the Albanian moneylenders and as a male victim of trafficking;
iv. The appellant came to the attention of money lenders (C and E) who his father owed money to. C and E were involved in gambling and organised crime;
v. the appellant was trafficked and forced to work in Belgium by an Albanian man called K;
vi. the appellant was unable to claim asylum in Belgium because he was under the control of traffickers and therefore, his credibility is not damaged by not making a claim in Belgium.
8. What is not accepted by the respondent today is that the appellant’s father went missing and there has been no contact with him since.
9. At the error of law hearing, the Upper Tribunal determined that the Judge’s findings would still stand except for paragraphs 31 and 32 of the FtT decision which dealt with sufficiency of protection and the availability of relocation.
10. In the determination dated 22 April 2024, the Judge found that the appellant had to leave his family home at the age of 11 due to difficulties with the money lenders and suffered from domestic abuse by his father [26].
11. At paragraph 21 the Judge found that it was likely that the parties referred to at paragraph 4 (v) above; C, E and K are linked as part of a greater criminal enterprise and that the criminal gangs would still be of the view that the appellant owes this debt. He found that the appellant would not be able to return to his mother’s house as he would be an easy target for re-trafficking [29].
12. At paragraph 22 he lists the factors that “increase the risk of the appellant being re-trafficked or is at risk from the money lenders” although he also found him to exhibit resourcefulness which would assist him on return. He concludes that there is a real risk that the appellant will be trafficked again and the risk factors he identifies mirror those in the CPIN [27, 28].
13. Since the error of law decision was made, the appellant has provided a witness statement dated 07/11/2024 together with documents upon which he relies to demonstrate that he is now under threat due a blood feud. The respondent consents to this new matter being dealt with today pursuant to Section 85(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The documents relate to a court hearing involving the appellant’s younger brother being remanded or indicted for the murder of another youth whilst in a group of young men. No evidence is provided in relation to the current status or conclusion of the court proceedings. A number of media reports of the hearing are also relied upon. Ms Cunha does not challenge the authenticity of the documents but does rely on the reference to the appellant’s father being present in court to demonstrate that the previous findings cannot be relied upon
The issues in this appeal
14. The parties agree that the issues to be resolved are;
(a) Whether the appellant is at risk from the original traffickers in his home area or a new area?
(b) Is the appellant at risk from a blood feud involving the Dervishi family?
(c) Is there sufficiency of protection available to the appellant?
(d) Is internal relocation a viable option?
15. Ms Cunha confirmed that she accepted that the appellant had been exploited in Belgium and is the victim of modern slavery.
Submissions
16. Ms Cunha questions the plausibility of the appellant’s account and made the following submissions;
(a) The appellant is not at risk from K because he has not informed his mother of his treatment which was the reason given for fearing K.
(b) The appellant's case is that he was trafficked by K because K had paid off C and E’s debts; if so there is no threat from C and E as their debts had been settled.
(c) The appellant's father is present as he attended the recent court hearing; as such he would be the target of any debtors.
(d) She submits that there is no evidence of an unpaid debt as the father has been present.
(e) In respect of the blood feud there is no evidence of what has happened to the defendants and the court evidence is that it was in self-defence.
(f) There is no evidence from his mother.
(g) As his father was at court, he would be the one at risk if there was a feud.
(h) He could live with his mother or relocate to Tirana and there is no evidence that he could return to live with his uncle.
17. Mr Richards relies on the ASA for his full submissions. He also submits;
(a) Whilst the Upper Tribunal can disturb the findings of the FtT, there is no reason for doing so.
(b) He submits that there is no reason to disturb the finding that the debt was still owed and there is a risk of trafficking and that he suffered from domestic abuse and is vulnerable.
(c) He highlights two reasons for disturbing previous findings. Firstly because of his father possibly being present at the hearing which he submits changes nothing because nothing is known of his situation, and he may not be resident.
(d) Secondly, because of reference to K being his mother’s cousin which accords with the CPIN on Trafficking.
(e) In relation to the blood feud, he submits that doesn't matter what the circumstances are. Blood feuds are still a phenomenon, according to the CPIN (9.1.5) especially in his home area. His evidence on attempted reconciliation is consistent.
(f) He submits that the test is reasonableness of relocation per Januzi v SSHD & Ors [2006] UKHL 5 [2006] 2 WLR 397and is subjective bearing in mind that the appellant has been trafficked and his family background. Even if the Dervishi family will not harm him, he will still be in fear of them. He cannot expect his uncle to help and has no contact with him
(g) He relies on the factors articulated in TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092.
(h) He is at risk from K whose motivation is the fact of the appellant’s escape.
(i) He will not be able to obtain protection from a blood feud as identified in CPIN Blood feud 10.2.5 and 10.2.9.
Evidence
18. We heard evidence from the appellant through an interpreter. He adopted his three witness statements (‘WS’) dated 07/11/2023, 07/02/2024 and 07/11/2024 (AB 140, 26, 114). He did not adopt his statement dated 27/06/2019 as Mr Richardson had no instructions about it. In oral evidence, he confirmed that he had not had contact with his father for nine years, although acknowledged that he appeared to have attended his brother's trial. He said that he didn't know if his father had been present or why, although said that his mother had mental health problems, and she could not attend. He maintained his explanation that he was forced to work to cover his father's debts, and this was because they could not find his father.
19. When pressed, he confirmed that he had fled from his trafficker K who is his mother’s cousin as he had been made to do “dirty work”. He stated that his mother spoke to K in order for him to join him in Belgium and he met him there. He had been promised work but then left him on the street to “beg as a slave”. He confirmed that he had not told his mother about K. He was asked whether it was correct that K held him because he had paid off the debt to C and E. He confirmed that this is what he said but didn't know if the debt had been paid or not because if it had been paid, his mother would have told him it would be OK to return.
20. He insisted that following Kanun custom it would be normal for him to be targeted in a blood feud due to his brother's actions, but he could not give any evidence of the feud. He said that he understands the family of the person died so the other families will have problems, but could not produce any evidence, although he'd got this information through the Internet. He confirmed the blood feud was unrelated to K or his father's debt. He said that his mother had moved now to a place called Malsi. He does not know if his uncle is still in Tirana as he is not in touch.
21. In cross examination, he was asked whether his father could provide him with any form of protection, and he said that he did not think so because his father was gambling, drinking and doing bad things such as borrowing money. He was responsible for beating his wife and children and therefore could offer no protection. He did not know the outcome of his brother's court case.
22. He confirmed that his mother had gone to the Dervishi family, but they had refused to reconcile, which resulted automatically in a feud.
Legal Framework
23. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds an appellant must show a real risk of serious harm at the date of the hearing. The burden of proof rests on an appellant. The standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood, which can also be expressed as a reasonable chance or a serious possibility.
Findings of Fact
24. Before we deal with the issues identified above, we first comment on the Judge George’s preserved facts. Mr Richardson submits that there is no reason to reopen all of the issues, whereas Ms Cunha submits that we must do so because of the evidence about the presence of the appellant's father. In the interests of justice, we consider it prudent to re-examine all of the issues and make our own findings.
Risk from Traffickers
25. We deal first with the presence of the appellant’s father. We find that he was present at the brother’s hearing as it stated clearly on the face of the court document upon which the appellant relies. As such he was present in Albania in 2024 and willing (or possibly summoned by the court) to act as his son's responsible adult. We find that this was high profile hearing because the appellant relies on substantial press reports of it.
26. In the refusal letter dated 21/04/2023 the respondent accepts that the appellant has come to the attention of money lenders and that he was trafficked (CB 378). In submissions today Ms Cunha says that the appellant said that K had paid the debt so there would be no reason for C and E to pursue him. The appellant’s evidence on this point is confusing because when it was put to him, he indicated that it was correct, but he wasn't told previously because he did not know he had money problems. The meaning of this answer was unclear to us. The appellant's written evidence on this point is that his father owed K money, and this is why he was trafficked (WS dated 07/11/2023 paragraph 21 AB143, WS dated 27/06/2019 paragraphs 16, 25 CB395).
27. Despite the reference today to K paying off the debts, the appellant’s evidence has been consistent that his father owed money to all three individuals which places him at risk. He stated this in his first statement in 2019 provided as part of the asylum process and in his statement in 2013. This evidence is also reflected in his asylum interview in the response to question 56; “he told me that my father borrowed money from him”. Based on the consistency of the appellant's evidence and as reflected in the refusal letter, we accept that the family are indebted to K, C and E. We note in passing that the representatives thought the reference in oral evidence to K being his mother's cousin was new evidence. This is not the case as it is consistent with his AIR, question 53 (on our reading of that exchange) and his witness statement dated 07/11/2023 (paragraph 16). We find that because it is accepted that his mother's cousin trafficked the appellant the fact of a familial relationship does not reduce any risk.
28. Given the hearing’s prominence we find it likely that anyone seeking to enforce an outstanding debt would have known or be able to ascertain that the appellant’s father, the debtor was present. This may reduce the risk of the debt being enforced against the appellant, but it does not extinguish the risk. We address the existence of the debt below.
29. Assuming it to be outstanding, the presence of his father in 2024 would not necessarily extinguish risk on the appellant. He has been trafficked and re-trafficking a young person could be plausibly construed as a more effective means of repaying a debt than enforcement against his father, even if his whereabouts are known. His father could have been working abroad, as is very common, and simply returned for the court hearing in the absence of his mother due to mental health issues. His father may be incapable of repaying the debt, particularly if he is still drinking, gambling or behaving irresponsibly. In such circumstances, debtors could still pursue the appellant as being the only means of repaying the debt through work. The presence of the appellant's father at the hearing therefore does not obviate the need to carry out an assessment of the risk of being re-trafficked.
30. Mr Richardson highlights the risk of trafficking and submits that we apply the criteria in TD and AD. We observe that female victims were central to that case which specifically examined their place in an honour-based society which would impact on their reintegration. Nevertheless, we agree that the criteria it lists are also relevant to our analysis.
31. Before we conduct that analysis, we record that we have considered the Country Policy and Information Note Albania: Human trafficking Version 16.0 dated July 2024. Section 3.3 deals with male victims and it states that in general, male victims of trafficking are not at real risk of serious harm, but the onus is on the individual to show otherwise. Vulnerability factors include lower economic backgrounds, low level of education or lack of employment opportunities, physical or mental disabilities, experience of domestic abuse or family breakdown and living in remote areas (3.3.2). It concludes that male trafficking victims would not be at risk for that reason alone and that risk will depend on similar criteria to those in TD and AD. For those that have been trafficked, risk factors of harm include age, education, skills and employability, area of origin, health or disability, availability of a support network and the “intent and reach of their traffickers” (3.3.4).
32. We have considered the appellant's limited education, that he is from a rural area and that he has been the victim of abuse by his father. He is from a broken family unit. He has health problems, albeit not life threatening which include knee problems, eye problems and anxiety. He is still a young man and was trafficked as a child. In terms of support network, we accept the appellant’s evidence that he has nothing to do with his father as this has been consistent throughout his evidence over the last 6 years. However, he would have the support of his mother and possibly his uncle with whom he lived although he says he is not in touch with him and his first witness statement suggested that he had moved to Greece. Despite the possible support of his mother and uncle in disparate parts of the country, we conclude that the appellant has vulnerabilities that would raise the risk of being re-trafficked. This is based on the CPIN (Human Trafficking) which states that such factors make it more likely for an individual to be re-trafficked.
33. As well as these personal characteristics, the key vulnerability in our view is the “intent and reach of the traffickers”. The appellant's evidence is that C and E are very powerful men and that they run a lot of businesses including betting and gambling shops and are well known as being dangerous to debtors. Judge George found them to be linked to organised crime. The appellant states that they have links to police who patrol the areas where they have businesses (WS 07/11/2023, paragraph 39 AB145). This is consistent with the evidence he gave at interview in response to question 79 (CB485). His evidence is not challenged in the refusal letter or in submissions today. On this point, Ms Cunha submitted that if C and E had links to government and police, it was implausible they would not track his father. Based on the consistency of the appellant’s evidence and because it is unchallenged, we accept that C and E do have power and influence, are linked to organised crime and this must be reflected in the risk of the appellant being re-trafficked.
34. Based on all of these factors, we conclude that there is still a risk to the appellant of being re-trafficked. This risk is higher in his home area but would also apply to relocation such as Tirana due to the reach of the criminals involved.
Risk from a blood feud
35. We direct ourselves that the country guidance in EH (blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 00348 (IAC) is still effective. At headnote 7 it states;
In order to establish that there is an active blood feud affecting him personally, an appellant must produce satisfactory individual evidence of its existence in relation to him. In particular, the appellant must establish:
(i)his profile as a potential target of the feud identified and which family carried out the most recent killing; and
(ii) whether the appellant has been, or other members of his family have been, or are currently, in self-confinement within Albania
36. In the ASA, Mr Richardson relies on the following passage from EH;
In determining whether an active blood feud exists, the fact-finding Tribunal should consider:
(i) the history of the alleged feud, including the notoriety of the original killings, the numbers killed, and the degree of commitment by the aggressor clan toward the prosecution of the feud;
(ii) the length of time since the last death and the relationship of the last person killed to the appellant;
(iii) the ability of members of the aggressor clan to locate the appellant if returned to another part of Albania; and
(iv) the past and likely future attitude of the police and other authorities towards the feud and the protection of the family of the person claiming to be at risk, including any past attempts to seek prosecution of members of the aggressor clan, or to seek protection from the Albanian authorities.[6]
37. The appellant has provided court documents relating to a hearing concerning his brother’s alleged murder of an individual from the Dervishi family. The hearing was not a final sentence hearing or conviction but appears to involve a challenge to the validity of arrest and agreeing to place the defendant on remand. Neither the appellant nor the representatives knew the conclusion of the court case. Ms Cunha does not question the authenticity of the court documents or the numerous press articles reporting on the hearing.
38. We accept the court record as genuine and that it reflects the charges against the appellant’s brother of “murder committed in cooperation.” (AB30). It states that the defendant was with three friends outside a pastry shop near the maternity hospital in Tirana. Five individuals drew up in an Audi which was chased after an exchange of words and gestures, The papers include the account from those in the defendant's group who state that the deceased tried to hit the defendant with a tyre iron and was stabbed as a result. Another account suggested there was a disagreement over a young woman.
39. The appellant’s evidence is that, subject to Kanun custom, if someone is killed, the family can take revenge. He says that his mother visited them to effect a reconciliation, but they wouldn't accept it. We accept Mr Richardson’s submission that blood feuds are still a phenomenon, and this is borne out by the CPIN. However, this is balanced with the findings in EH that blood feuds are few and declining. In the present case, we do not find that the appellant has discharged the burden of proof, even at the lower level, that he is personally at risk from a blood feud.
40. We find there to be a clear lack of evidence about the existence of the feud. We take into account the notoriety of the hearing based on the press reports, but this is of limited value when the outcome of the court case is entirely unknown. We accept that the appellant was originally from an area of Albania where there had been a historic custom of Kanun which involves blood feuds. However, this on its own does not discharge the burden. We specifically note that the killing took place in Tirana, not in the appellant’s original area in the north of Albania.
41. We have not been provided with any evidence about the Dervishi family or specific evidence of threats that they have made. In his latest witness statement dated 7/11/2024, the appellant states that his mother sent a family member to speak to the family to ask for forgiveness, but this was refused. We accept that this is consistent with his overall evidence today (and the CPIN). We have no evidence from his mother or anyone else about the feud.
42. Based on the guidance in EH, we do not accept that the appellant is at risk from a blood feud.
Sufficiency of protection/relocation
43. In the skeleton argument, Mr Richardson had relied on the CPIN dated December 2022. When we pointed it out to him, he acknowledged that there is a more recent CPIN dated February 2025 which we have regard to.
44. We first deal with the possibility of relocation. We do not consider it to be viable for him to relocate for two reasons. Firstly because of the potential lack of protection which we deal with below. Secondly, because of his specific characteristics and circumstances. We have found that the appellant is at risk of being re-trafficked and he could still be a target of K, C and E. We have identified a number of vulnerabilities [31, 32]. These have a material bearing on his ability to relocate because, as we have found, he would be at risk of being re-trafficked and this would militate against the exercise of safe relocation. We do not consider that relocation is viable if it puts the individual at risk of being re-trafficked. Furthermore, we find that the same vulnerabilities would also make relocation difficult if not impossible. These include his lack of network or family. We have accepted that he does not know where his uncle is and has no contact with his father. Support in his mother’s locality would result in an unacceptable risk from K, C and E. As a young person the lack of support would be material.
45. He also exhibits other vulnerabilities such as lack of education, lack of work experience and minor medical problems as well as being a victim of abuse by his father and from a broken home. Not only do these factors increase the risk of trafficking and abuse but they also much reduce the chances of employment and being able to support himself. We find that all of these factors would mean it is not viable to relocate even if protection was available. We also take into account that the Appellant had arrived in the United Kingdom as a child and that he is still relatively young.
46. We now consider whether there is sufficiency of protection. Based on our finding that C and E are influential, we do not consider that there would be adequacy of protection in the appellant's home area. This is because whatever influence they have, it would be magnified in the local area where they may have more influence over the police or could find and harm him.
47. We therefore consider whether it is realistic and plausible for the appellant to move elsewhere, such as Tirana and whether there would be protection there.
48. We note that in TD and AD the court found;
“There is in general a Horvath-standard sufficiency of protection, but it will not be effective in every case. When considering whether or not there is a sufficiency of protection for a victim of trafficking her particular circumstances must be considered”. [headnote d]
49. We have considered the very recent Country Policy and Information Note Albania: Actors of Protection dated February 2025 (“the CPIN”). It states;
In general, Albania takes reasonable steps to prevent the persecution by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution and a person is generally able to access the protection. (2.1.1)
Whilst instances of corruption, misconduct and inefficiency have been reported, the scale and extent of these issues do not, in general, indicate a police system that is unwilling or unable to offer effective protection. The government has demonstrated, and continues to demonstrate, a commitment to reforming the police force (2.1.8)
50. We accept Mr Richardson’s submission when quoting from the older CPIN that decision makers need to consider each case on its facts as this accords with the guidance in TD and AD.
51. The CPIN cites the recent views of the European Court of Human Rights in AD and Others v Sweden - 22283/21 (No Article 3 - Prohibition of torture: First Section) [2024] ECHR 402 (07 May 2024) which we have considered in full. It quotes that judgment as expressing concern that Albanian criminal gangs are the strongest in Europe and that there has been widespread corruption. The court concludes;
“In the light of these recent reports, which postdate the decisions in the domestic proceedings, the Court considers that the Albanian authorities' capacity to protect their people cannot be regarded as insufficient for the general public in Albania. Nor can it be regarded as generally insufficient for all persons who are targeted by criminal organisations”.[71]
52. It comments that a report in 2023 found several cases that demonstrate that organised crime networks have infiltrated law enforcement and as a result operate freely outside the law. However, a security report in April 2024 states that police now have a visible presence throughout Tirana [5.3.1]. Recent reports suggest crack downs on police misconduct with arrests of officers, detentions and disciplinary proceedings (7.4.1, 7.4.2).
53. Set within the context of this information we assess the risk to the appellant from K, C and E. We have found that they are influential and are linked to organised crime. The question is whether the appellant has demonstrated that their power is such that he cannot avail himself of state protection. Our starting point is that there is a Horvath level of protection as set out in TD and AD. The indication in the CPIN and in AD Sweden is that the position has improved since that time, which would give an indication that there are even better levels of protection available.
54. We remind ourselves of the lower standard of proof which applies. We must apply that standard. We conclude that C and E particularly have power and influence and despite the general consensus that there is a Horvath level of protection, we are concerned that the most recent case law in the ECHR suggested the Albanian criminal gangs are the strongest in Europe and corruption is still widespread. The CPIN also refers to some gangs being outside of the law even despite the recent improvements.
55. Given such improvements, this is a marginal cases as to whether or not the appellant could seek protection. However, bearing in mind the lower standard of proof, we conclude that given his vulnerabilities and age and with the power of those he is at risk from he would not be able to avail himself of state protection and relocation is not a viable option. We have taken into account that he has not yet been to the police. This no doubt reflects the age he was when he left Albania.
Conclusions
56. We find that the appellant is at risk of being re-trafficked and that he would not be able to avail himself of state protection. For this reason, his claim for international protection succeeds
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law and was previously set aside.
We remake the decision, and we allow the appellant’s appeal on protection grounds.

V Rae-Reeves

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

03/04/2025