Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-002903

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00367/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22nd of April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JOSHI

Between

AA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Sepulveda, Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Simbi (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 7 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, we have continued the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. These written reasons reflect the decision which was given to the appellant and the respondent at the end of the hearing.
2. The appellant, with the permission of the First-tier Tribunal, appeals against the decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal, (“the Judge”), who, in a decision promulgated on the 22nd of April 2024, dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision dated the 28th of November 2023 refusing his asylum and human rights claims.
Anonymity Order
3. We have continued the anonymity order made by the First-Tier Tribunal. We have considered the public interest in open justice, but we consider it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations to those claiming international protection because of the need for confidentiality.
Background
4. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq born in 1997. He is Kurdish and is from Erbil in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). The Appellant fled Iraq because his father and uncle discovered that he had tattoos which they considered to be abnormal behaviour from the principles and teachings of Islam. The appellant’s father and uncle attacked the appellant and burnt his skin in an attempt to remove the tattoos. The appellant became aware from his mother that they intended to kill him. The Home Office’s decision maker accepted the appellant’s account but decided that he could either seek State protection or internally relocate.
5. The Judge found at §§15 to 18 of the decision that the appellant’s father and uncle were pictured with persons of influence in the PUK and they intended to find the appellant and take further action against him because of the dishonour brought on their family. The Judge found that the appellant was vulnerable to an attack by his father and uncle because it was unlikely that the authorities could prove the commission of a crime and take action against them. The Judge decided at §§19 to 20 however that the appellant had the option of internally relocating from his home area to avoid persecution. The Judge was not satisfied that his father and uncle were so connected to the authorities that they “are willing to invest substantial resources over time to try to locate the Appellant and then hand him over to his father and uncle to allow them to take retribution against him.”
6. The Judge further found at §§21 to 27 that the appellant with the assistance of his mother (or someone else in Iraq) could be reunited with his identity documents to allow his safe return.
The appellant’s appeal
7. The appellant sought permission to appeal, raising a broad challenge against the Judge’s decision that he had provided inadequate reasons in respect of two aspects of the appellant’s protection claim:
i. Firstly, in light of the Judge’s findings at §14 that the appellant’s father and uncle were pictured with persons of influence within the PUK and at §17 that his father and uncle intended to find him, it was argued that the Judge provided inadequate reasons for concluding at §20 that the appellant’s father and uncle did not have the reach and influence with the authorities to locate him within the IKR.
ii. Secondly, in finding at §§21 to 26 that the appellant could obtain his document(s) the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons for not accepting his explanation in his witness statement at §§8 to 13 that his INID and his old CSID were left with his father who had responsibility for looking after them and that it would not be safe for his mother to try and obtain them for him. In light of the Judge’s findings at §§11 to 17 it was argued that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons for not accepting his explanation.
8. The First-tier Judge granting permission did not limit the scope of his grant dated the 3rd of June 2024. The reasons for his decision are set out at §2 of his permission grant:
“It is arguable that the Judge gave inadequate reasons for finding that the Appellant’s mother could provide him with his CSID. The Judge makes a statement to that effect at para 22. However, the Judge gives no consideration to the Appellant’s evidence setting out why his mother cannot provide him with his ID documents. The reasoning on this issue, relevant to both the asylum (internal relocation) and humanitarian protection appeals, is arguably inadequate.”
The error of law hearing
9. The respondent had not provided a Rule 24 reply. On behalf of the respondent Ms Simbi accepted that the Judge’s decision did contain a material error of law in respect of the second limb of the appellant’s challenge that the Judge provided inadequate reasons for finding that the appellant could get assistance from his mother to obtain his identity document(s) given that his evidence was always that they were with his father. She agreed that the Judge failed to refer to the appellant’s evidence in his witness statement.
10. Ms Simbi submitted that in respect of the first challenge, the Judge had provided adequate reasons at §15 in finding that whilst the appellant’s father and uncle were pictured with persons of influence in the PUK and they were released without charge, it did not prove that the authorities were assisting them. She submitted that the Judge went further in stating that “there are many reasons why persons could be released without charge because of an insufficiency of evidence/corroboration to prove that a crime had been committed.” She submitted that this reasoning was adequate in making the findings at §§19 and 21.
11. Ms Sepulveda submitted that the Judge found at §15 that the appellant’s father and uncle were pictured with persons of influence in the PUK who are the party in government. They were also arrested and released by the authorities. She submitted that these two factors indicated that the appellant’s father and uncle had connections and influence over State actors and would be able to locate the appellant and harm him.
Discussion and conclusions on the error of law
12. In the circumstances we are satisfied that the Judge’s decision discloses no material error of law regarding the first limb of the challenge. We agree with the submission made by Ms Simbi, whilst the appellant’s father and uncle were pictured with persons of influence in the PUK and were released from detention, it was open for the Judge to find at §§19 and 20 that they are not so connected that the authorities are willing to “invest substantial resources over time to try to locate the Appellant and then hand him over to his father and uncle to allow them to take retribution against him by killing him because he had a tattoo.” We find that the Judge provided adequate reasons for concluding this in the decision at §15 and the challenge amounts to a disagreement rather than a material error of law.
13. We do agree with the representatives that there is a material error of law in respect of the Judge’s reasoning for finding that the appellant could get assistance from his mother to obtain his identity document(s).
14. Ms Simbi further submitted that the appellant may be able to re-document himself in the United Kingdom. She submitted that the CPIN on Iraq: Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns (Version 14.0, October 2023) does state at paragraph 6.7.9 that the process for renewing an INID can be commenced from the United Kingdom. After some discussion, it was agreed that on the evidence available this would make no material difference to the issue before us because the same paragraph recorded that the appellant would still require “a person acting as power of attorney, who would then send the INID to the United Kingdom or meet the returnee on arrival with the renewed INID.” We also brought to Ms Simbi’s attention that at paragraph 6.7.10 it stated that “the process to assign a power of attorney from the United Kingdom required the person to attend the Iraqi Embassy and to show some other form of ID.”
15. It was agreed that the remaking of the decision would be limited to the identity document(s) (either the appellant’s INID or his old CSID). There were two issues - firstly whether the appellant’s mother/brother could obtain one of these documents for him and either send it to him or give it to him on arrival in the IKR and secondly whether he could otherwise redocument and it was agreed he would need a power of attorney in Iraq to do so.
16. The appellant attended the hearing and the representatives confirmed that they were in a position to rehear this aspect of the appellant’s appeal.
Re-making the decision
17. In re-making the decision we have considered the documents contained in the 315 page appeal bundle, the appellant’s supplementary 13 page bundle, and an updated witness statement from the appellant dated the 24th of February 2025. We also considered the entirety of the oral evidence, a full record of which is to be found in the recorded record of proceedings.
18. In brief, the appellant gave evidence through a Kurdish Sorani interpreter. He adopted his witness statements and was cross examined. He stated in his evidence that his brother assisted him in making the arrangements for him to leave by plane on his own passport. He stated he is in contact with his mother and brother every few months. He does not speak to them often because they are afraid of his father. He stated they would not be able to bring his document(s) to the airport or send them to him because the documentation is with his father and they are afraid to talk to him about the appellant. He stated from what he knows, when he fled his brother was able to obtain his passport because it was not with the other documents. If it was, then he would have brought them as well.
19. We heard submissions from the representatives. Ms Simbi submitted that it is a matter for us to determine whether it is accepted that the appellant’s brother was able to obtain his passport and whether his mother or brother could now assist him. She submitted that it would be reasonable for him to contact them to determine whether they could assist. Ms Sepulveda submitted that the appellant explained in his witness statement at paragraphs 8 to 13 the difficulty that his family would have in obtaining his documents. She submitted that this evidence was not challenged in cross examination. She reminded us that the Home Office and the Judge had accepted most of the appellant’s account including the severity of the abuse from his father. She submitted that it was plausible in this context that his mother and brother would be frightened of his father who is the head of the household. She submitted that the appellant would need assistance from family members in order to obtain a power of attorney and it was clear from the accepted evidence that the appellant’s father had power over the family unit.
20. We make the following findings of fact.
21. In respect of the appellant’s identity document(s), we find the appellant’s oral and written evidence to be credible. In making this finding we note that the respondent and the Judge accepted the core aspects of the appellant’s claim including that he is at risk from his father in his home area. We find that it is plausible that his father, as the head of their household would have had control of the appellant’s documents including his INID (and his old CSID). We accept his explanation at §§8 to 13 of his statement that requesting, or taking, the document(s) from his father would place his mother and brother at risk. We find that his mother and brother would face the same risk if the appellant asked them to act under a power of attorney to obtain fresh documents for him.
22. We therefore find that the appellant would not have access to either an INID or CSID on return to Iraq. As confirmed in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC) it is necessary for an individual to have one of these two documents in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.
23. We further find that the appellant is a refugee. After a discussion with the representatives it was agreed that the appellant’s refugee claim is based on his risk of persecution that he would be the victim of an honour crime. The respondent accepted in their decision that his case does fall within the Refugee convention reason of particular social group (at page 257 of the appeal bundle). The Judge found that the appellant would be at risk in his home area for this reason at §17 given that the appellant’s father and uncle intended to harm him for dishonouring their family. The Judge found at §§18 to 20 that the appellant could internally relocate to avoid this risk.
24. When considering his claim under the Refugee convention, in light of our finding that the appellant would not be able to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR, we find that it would be both unduly harsh and unreasonable to expect him to relocate elsewhere in the IKR or indeed within Iraq. We therefore find that he is a refugee.
Notice of decision
There is a material error of law in the judge’s decision relating to the appellant’s identity document(s). We set aside the decision, preserving the judge’s findings at paragraphs 11 to 20 inclusive.
We remake the decision and allow the appeal on asylum and human rights grounds (Article 3 ECHR).

M D JOSHI

Judge M D Joshi
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

31 March 2025