Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-002949

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59255/2024
LP/01904/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PHILLIPS

Between

XX
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Islam of Counsel, instructed by Inayat Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Ms Rushforth, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Interpreter: Kurdish Sorani.

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 15 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant and any member of his family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. This order is made on account of the fact that the appellant’s claim is for international protection.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The issue before the Upper Tribunal in this case is whether the Appellant would be at risk of persecution on account of either activities in Iran or his “sur place” activities. For the reasons which follow, we conclude that he would be at risk of persecution and allow his appeal under the Refugee Convention.
Introduction
2. The Appellant appeals against the Respondent’s decision dated 13 October 2023 refusing his claim for asylum made on 23 September 2021.
3. In an error of law decision dated 10 March 2025 (annexed to this decision at Annex A), the Upper Tribunal set aside the decision of First-tier Tribunal dated 14 May 2024, dismissing the Appellant’s appeal because the First-tier Tribunal erred by failing to correctly apply HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC).
4. The Appellant’s appeal now comes before us to be remade pursuant to s.12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
Issues in the appeal
5. The issues in this appeal are whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason in Iran or whether he is entitled to humanitarian protection. The standard of proof is whether there is a real risk or a reasonable likelihood of the Appellant being subject to serious harm.
Documentary evidence
6. The appellant provided a 222 page bundle. On the day of the hearing the Appellant submitted a further bundle of 256 pages containing a new witness statement and photographs. The Respondent did not object to this evidence being admitted and we were satisfied that it was fair and in the interests of justice to admit this evidence because it is relevant to the issue of risk on return. The Appellant also submitted a skeleton argument.
Oral evidence
7. We heard oral evidence from the Appellant who gave his evidence in Kurdish Sorani through a court appointed interpreter. He confirmed that he understood the interpreter and adopted his witness statements. He was cross examined by Ms Rushforth. His evidence is recorded in the record of proceedings and we will refer to it when making our findings below. A witness, the Appellant’s friend also attended to give evidence. He confirmed that he is the friend who posts material on the Appellant’s Facebook account.
Submissions
8. Miss Rushforth relied on the reasons for refusal letter and review. Her initial submissions focused on the Appellant’s alleged activities in his own country which she submitted were not credible.
9. She the submitted that the Appellant’s “sur place” claim should be viewed through that lens. His postings increased after his asylum claim was refused in 2023 which strongly suggests and supports her submission that he has posted material to bolster his asylum claim and that his political beliefs are not genuinely held. She submitted that he has ramped up his activities in support of the appeal. There is no reasonable evidence to conclude that the authorities are aware of his attendance at demonstrations. XX(PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) (CG)[2022] UKUT 00023 is authority for the proposition that someone who is not genuinely motivated could be expected to delete their account before returning to Iran. The Appellant could be expected to delete his account. She submitted that applying the factors in HB, the Appellant is not at risk on return.
10. Mr Islam submitted that the Appellant’s account of what happened in Iran was credible and that the Appellant’s account was consistent and plausible with background information. In any event the Appellant is accepted to be a low-level protester. He has attended anti-regime protests and has posted photos of his attendance. He invited us to find that the Appellant is genuinely politically motivated. He submitted that given the number of demonstrations he has attended and the risk factors outlined in HB the Appellant is at risk on return.
Issue regarding preserved findings
11. When setting aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal the Upper Tribunal did not preserve any findings of fact made by the First-tier Tribunal save that the Appellant was a “low level protester”.
12. At the hearing before us Ms Rushforth for the Respondent did not take issue with the fact that the Upper Tribunal had set aside all of the remainder of the findings. After the hearing and before this decision was drafted, we received further representations from the Respondent arguing that because the findings of the First-tier Tribunal had not been challenged in the grounds to the Upper Tribunal that the First-tier Tribunal findings should have been preserved in their entirety. We find that these arguments should have been made either at the error of law hearing or at the outset of the re-making hearing. Nevertheless we adopt the following approach:
13. The First-tier Tribunal found the following:
a) It was not credible that the Appellant lost his fingers when he was injured by an IED on the Iraqi border in 2018.
b) The Appellant did not distribute leaflets in Iran. His home was not raided by Ettila’at. The Appellant did not come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities in Iran. He did not have a Facebook account in Iran. His Facebook account was opened after he arrived in the UK and has been active since 2023 after his claim for asylum was refused. The posts were made to bolster his claim of carrying out “sur place” activity.
c) In respect of his attendance at demonstrations, by 24 May 2024 he had attended three demonstrations where there were 200 people. He does not stand out. He has his back to the Embassy building and in some he is concealed behind a van. He is a low level protester. His attendance at demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy will not have brought him to the attention of the Iranian authorities as having a political profile sufficient to make him a person of adverse interest as on 24 May 2024.
14. Having heard the Appellant’s oral evidence and the legal submissions in this appeal, we are also in agreement that the Appellant’s evidence in relation to leafleting in Iran was incoherent and inconsistent. For instance the Appellant’s evidence about the name of the person who gave him the leaflets was entirely contradictory and the account lacked detail. On this basis we do not depart from the First Tier Tribunal’s finding that the Appellant had not come to the attention of the Iranian authorities prior to leaving Iran.
15. We do not understand why the First-tier Tribunal found the Appellant’s claim to have been injured in an IED implausible but that finding is immaterial to the outcome of this appeal and we make no further finding on this issue.
16. In respect of the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations, we find that as at the date of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal the Appellant had attended three demonstrations in which he had no particular role; that he had posted some images of himself attending demonstrations and some material critical of the Iranian authorities on Facebook and that he had become more active on Facebook since 2023. He would be known to the Iranian authorities as a “low level supporter”.
17. Thus far our findings do not depart from those of the First-tier Tribunal in any event and on that basis it is immaterial that the Upper Tribunal did not explicitly preserve the findings of the First-tier Tribunal.
18. The First-tier Tribunal erred in the assessment of risk in the decision and it falls to us to make a new risk assessment as at the date of this hearing. A year has passed since the previous findings were made in May 2024 and it falls to us to make factual findings in respect of any “sur place” activities which have taken place in the intervening period and assess the risk holistically on the basis of both the previous and new factual findings.
New factual findings
19. We find that since the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal the Appellant has attended further demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy in London on 29 March 2024, 21 April 2024, 26 May 2024, 25 August 2024, 7 February 2025, 16 March 2025 and on 6 April 2025 because the Appellant has provided photographic evidence of his attendance and it was not put to the Appellant by the Respondent that he had not attended the demonstrations.
20. We also find that the Appellant has continued to post material critical of the Iranian regime and supportive of Kurdish groups on Facebook with the assistance of his friend. We find that his Facebook profile status is open because this was conceded by Mr Rushforth.
Assessment of risk
21. We have had regard to AB and Others (internet activity – state of evidence) Iran [2015] UKUT 0257 (IAC), HB(Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC), BA (demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) and XX, and when making our decision we also had before us the latest CPINs on Iran including Kurds and Kurdish political groups, Iran, May 2022 and Social media, Surveillance and Sur Place activities, Iran April 2025.
22. We consider firstly the Appellant’s “social graph” in accordance XX in order to decide whether the Appellant will have already have come to the attention of the authorities as a result of his Facebook posts and attendance at demonstrations to date.
23. The Appellant has now attended a total of ten demonstrations, all of which are outside the Iranian Embassy. Some of these demonstrations have taken place on the anniversary of Kurdish Martyrs and the demonstrations involve protests against the Iranian government’s treatment and human rights violations against Kurdish people in Iran including executions and imprisonment.
24. At this juncture although we note that the Appellant has been found to have carried out political activities in bad faith, we do take into account the background evidence that the majority of Kurds in Iran are supportive of pro-Kurdish parties and against the government for a range of reasons including the suppression of Kurdish culture, widespread discrimination, the poor treatment of political opponents and the limited economic prospects of those of Kurdish ethnicity. We find that the Appellant’s assertion that he is against the Iranian government to be consistent with this.
25. We turn to whether the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations has been subject to surveillance. We find in accordance with WAS (Pakistan) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 894 and MH (Bangladesh) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 688 that it is likely that an authoritarian regime such as Iran will monitor protestors and carry out surveillance abroad. This is supported throughout the CPIN on surveillance (see 10.1 to 10.4) which refers repeatedly to high profile dissidents as well as ordinary individuals critical of the regime being monitored and plots being foiled to kill UK based individuals. The current CPIN refers to the authority of BA which was heard in 2010 and promulgated in 2011. This is 14 years ago and we find that the technology is likely to have moved on since then in terms of facial recognition. We also find that It is likely that anti regime pro-Kurdish protests are monitored particularly given the Iranian authorities hair-trigger approach to Kurdish issues. This is consistent with the Appellant’s evidence that he could see cameras at the Iranian Embassy filming protests he has attended.
26. We also note at 3.2.4 of the CPIN on surveillance that decision makers should also take into account that the Iranian authorities are likely to intensify their monitoring efforts abroad during periods of heightened political tension in Iran. We find that there is currently heightened political tension.
27. Whether the Appellant will have been subject to surveillance will however in accordance with BA depend on his profile.
28. We have found that the situation has moved on since the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal in 2024 because of the passage of time. The Appellant has now attended ten demonstrations over a period of eighteen months. His attendance is regular and frequent. He is clearly visible in the photos. The protests tend to involve a few hundred protestors or less. They do not involve thousands of participants. This, we find, makes it easier for the authorities to identify participants. Although he is not a leader or organiser, the Appellant has held up photographs obviously critical of Khomeini, stood next to individuals holding the Kurdish flag and held the Kurdish flag himself. There are also photographs of him chanting. We find on this basis that he has been an active participant. We do not find that his back is to the Embassy save for the purpose of having his photograph taken from an angle where he can be seen in front of the Iranian Embassy. He has faced the Embassy and stood directly opposite the Embassy. The demonstrations are in support of pro-Kurdish causes which are seen by the authorities in Iran be to separatist. The Appellant’s evidence is that he has witnessed the authorities recording demonstrations from the Embassy and we find that this is consistent with the background evidence as above.
29. Pictures of him attending demonstrations have been posted on his Facebook account which is open and has several followers. We accepted the unchallenged evidence of his friend that he posts material critical of the Iranian government for the Appellant on-line on his Facebook account. The Appellant also likes and re-posts other posts. We accept his evidence that even if he is illiterate, it is possible for him to discern the context of the posts from the accompanying pictures such as of Khomeini with a black cross over his face or of young men being executed by hanging. He has provided the Facebook download in accordance with XX and we accept that the Facebook evidence has not been tampered with.
30. Having had regard to the lower standard of proof, we find that the Appellant’s profile is strong enough that there is a real risk that he has already been subject of targeted surveillance by the Iranian state. His social graph is sufficient to establish a risk that he has been subject to surveillance that would have resulted in downloading and storing material held in his name. We find that he has drawn enough attention to himself by the extent of his real world activities to have become the subject of targeted social media surveillance.
31. We also find that even if the Appellant’s activities have been undertaken in bad faith, he will be perceived by the Iranian authorities as a separatist activist committed to the Kurdish cause.
32. We find from the authorities that the Appellant, as a returning Kurd with no passport will have to apply for an Emergency Travel Document which will be the first “pinch point” referred to in AB and Others.
33. We find that because of the Appellant’s existing profile, it is irrelevant whether he deletes his Facebook profile because the Iranian authorities will already know of him. Regardless of whether the appellant genuinely holds his political views, he will be regarded as such by the Iranian state.
34. We refer to the headnote in HB which we find does not displace AB and Others and which is not displaced by the subsequent guidance in XX. We also find that HB is consistent with the current background material which is that those perceived to be opponents of the Iranian regime of Kurdish ethnicity continue to be subject to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
(5) Kurdish ethnicity is nevertheless a risk factor which, when combined with other factors, may create a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. Being a risk factor it means that Kurdish ethnicity is a factor of particular significance when assessing risk. Those “other factors” will include the matters identified in paragraphs (6)-(9) below.
(7) Kurds involved in Kurdish political groups or activity are at risk of arrest, prolonged detention and physical abuse by the Iranian authorities. Even Kurds expressing peaceful dissent or who speak out about Kurdish rights also face a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.
(8) Activities that can be perceived to be political by the Iranian authorities include social welfare and charitable activities on behalf of Kurds. Indeed, involvement with any organised activity on behalf of or in support of Kurds can be perceived as political and thus involve a risk of adverse attention by the Iranian authorities with the consequent risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.
(9) Even ‘low-level’ political activity, or activity that is perceived to be political, such as, by way of example only, mere possession of leaflets espousing or supporting Kurdish rights, if discovered, involves the same risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. Each case however, depends on its own facts and an assessment will need to be made as to the nature of the material possessed and how it would be likely to be viewed by the Iranian authorities in the context of the foregoing guidance.
(10) The Iranian authorities demonstrate what could be described as a ‘hair-trigger’ approach to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights. By ‘hair-trigger’ it means that the threshold for suspicion is low and the reaction of the authorities is reasonably likely to be extreme.
35. We find in accordance with this headnote, that as a Kurd who is returning on an ETD who is already known to and perceived by the authorities to be involved in pro-Kurdish activity, there is a real risk he will be picked up at the airport and interrogated. We find that as a result of his perceived political opinion including attending pro-Kurdish demonstrations that he will be at risk of arrest, prolonged detention and physical abuse involving treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
Conclusion
36. For the reasons above we find that removal of the Appellant would breach the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal is allowed on Refugee Convention grounds and pursuant to Article 3 ECHR.

R J Owens

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 July 2025

Annex A

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2004-002949

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59255/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OBI

Between

X
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Mohammed Mohzam, counsel, instructed by Quality Legal Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Amrika Nolan, Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 February 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant, a citizen of Iran, appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Trevaskis (‘the Judge’), promulgated on 14 May 2024 following a hearing on 2 May 2024. By that decision, the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s protection and humanitarian claims.

Background
2. The Appellant left Iran illegally. He is of Kurdish ethnicity and in the UK has attended demonstrations against the Iranian regime and/or in support of Kurdish rights. Photographs of the Appellant at these demonstrations have been posted on Facebook.
3. The Appellant states that he would be at risk on return to Iran because of his political activities in support of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iran (where he distributed leaflets) and the UK.

Decision of the First Tier Tribunal
4. The Appellant gave oral evidence. At [11] of the reserved decision the Judge summarised the Appellant’s evidence, regarding his activities in Iran and the consequences, as follows:
“He told me that he had been working as a Kolbar, or smuggler, in Iran since he was 18 and continuing until he was caught leafleting for KDF. While doing this he was injured by an IED on the Iraqi border in 2018, losing fingers; he has not mentioned this before. He has produced a letter from his GP in UK, repeating his account of how he was injured. There is no medical opinion evidence as to the causation of the injuries and the Appellant has not given any detailed account of the causation. I do not find this claim credible.
5. The Judge went on to make other adverse credibility findings:
i. The Appellant stated that he started leafleting in 2020, a month before he left Iran (see [12]). He was introduced to this by a friend whose name he did not know. During cross examination, when it was put to the Appellant that he had provided a name during his asylum interview, he initially denied this but then said it had been a mistake. When re-examined, he said he had made up the name because he was stressed. The Judge found no plausible explanation for this inconsistency and concluded that this damaged the overall credibility of the Appellant’s claim.
ii. The Appellant said he was given leaflets by an unnamed person which he distributed twice a week at night (see [13]). He is illiterate so he did not read the leaflets but was told the materials were pro-Kurds. When asked to describe the leaflets the Appellant said they were on normal paper. The Judge found that it would be reasonable to expect Appellant to give more detail of the appearance of the leaflets, and his failure to do so damaged his credibility.
iii. The Appellant said that he had had no contact with the authorities before he began leafleting, despite having worked as a Kolbar for 5 years (see [14]). He found out they were looking for him because they raided his parents’ home. He could not recall when the raid took place, but he was working as a Kolbar at the time. The Judge found this implausible.
iv. The Appellant stated that he left Iran between 1-10 June 2020. arrived in the UK in September 2020 (see [15]). When it was put to him that he arrived in the UK in September 2021, he stated that he had been referring to the Iranian calendar. During re-examination he confirmed that he had arrived in the UK in September 2020. At first he denied having said that he left Iran in June 2020, then said it was a mistake. When the Judge asked the Appellant for the date he left Iran on the Iranian calendar he was unable to do so. The Judge found that the Appellant’s inconsistency further damaged his credibility.
v. The Appellant stated that he first created a Facebook account when he was 10 but the earliest post he could show was dated 9 July 2022 (see [16]). The explanation he provided was that he had re-opened the same account after he lost the password and had not made any posts in Iran. His friends write the posts 2-3 times a week because he is illiterate. He stated that Facebook had deleted posts between 14 December 2022 and 19 October 2023, but later said he had deleted them by mistake. The Judge found this entire account lacked credibility and took judicial notice that deletion of posts from Facebook without the co-operation of Facebook would not be possible. The absence of at least a letter from someone who had been posting on the Appellant’s behalf also damaged his credibility.
6. At [16] the Judge found that there was no evidence to support the Appellant’s claim that his Facebook account existed before he left Iran. Furthermore, if he had no political profile before 2020 and it was illegal to post on Facebook in Iran, it is not credible that a 10 year old boy would ask a family member to create an account. The Judge found that the Facebook account has only been opened since the Appellant came to UK and has only been “really active” since October 2023, when his application was refused. The Judge found that the posts had been made to bolster his claim of sur place political activity.
7. At [17], the Judge stated that he found nothing to suggest the Appellant had a leading or prominent role in any of the demonstrations he attended. The Judge found it unlikely that the Appellant would be identified by the Iranian authorities as anything other than a “low-level protester”.
8. The Judge, having rejected the Appellant’s account, did not accept that he has a subjective fear of persecution or serious harm and dismissed his appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds.
9. The Judge went on to consider whether the Appellant can show he will be at risk on return in the event that the credibility findings are wrong. The Judge considered the transparency reports produced by Facebook showing the number of government requests for user data. The Judge also considered the Country Guidance case of BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) where it was held that it is important to consider the level of political involvement and “There is not a real risk of persecution for those who have exited Iran illegally or are merely returning from Britain.” The Judge found that the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy will not have brought him to the attention of the Iranian authorities as having a political profile sufficient to make him a person of adverse interest (see [26]).
10. At [27] the Judge stated:
“As a returning failed asylum seeker, he will be of minimal interest to the authorities on return and will be allowed to return to his home area. His Facebook activity, such as it is, is not likely to have come to the attention of the authorities in Iran. He has no genuine political profile which he would have to conceal due to fear of persecution.”

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal by First-tier Tribunal Judge Dainty on 25 June 2024. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:
i. Ground 1 – Failure to consider current country guidance case law
The leading country guidance case law in relation to risk on return as an Iranian Kurd is HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC). The Judge’s failure to consider this guidance undermines his determination.
ii. Ground 2 – Failure to consider a material factor
The Judge failed to deal with risk on return arising from his finding that the Appellant is a low level political activist due to his sur place activity. In HB the Upper Tribunal recognised the ‘hair-trigger’ approach to those “suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish activities or support for Kurdish rights”. The threshold of suspicion was stated to be “low” and even “low-level” political activity or such activity that is “perceived to be political”, creates a risk of persecution or ill-treatment contrary to Art 3 of the ECHR.
In the case of FA (Iran) [2024] EWCA Civ 149, Court of Appeal held that the assessment required in light of HB “is not an evaluation of the level of the material, but an evaluation of whether it was political, and, if so, of how it would be seen by the regime.” The Judge failed to consider perceived risk on return as set out in HB and FA.
12. First Tier Tribunal Judge Dainty stated that it is arguable that there is an error of law in failing to consider how the hair trigger approach would impact the Appellant following the “low level protester” finding.

Rule 24
13. The respondent did not provide a rule 24 response.

The Hearing
14. Mr Mohzam solely relied on Ground 2 in his oral submissions. He submitted that the Judge made a clear factual finding that the Appellant is a “low level protester” but failed to apply HB (which was cited in the skeleton argument) and consider the risk that this posed for the Appellant on return to Iran. He further submitted that the application of the correct case law was likely to result in a different outcome given that the “hair trigger” approach includes perceived political activity. Mr Mohhzam was neutral as to whether the appeal should be remade by the Upper Tribunal or remitted to the First Tier Tribunal.
15. Ms Nolan submitted that it was important to note that none of the credibility findings had been challenged. She submitted that the “low level protester” finding should not be considered in isolation but in the context of the decision as a whole. Based on the Judge’s findings there was no need for HB to be considered as the Appellant was not likely to have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. Ms Nolan further submitted that even if HB should have been considered it would not have changed the outcome given the unchallenged credibility findings. She invited me to retain the appeal in the Upper Tribunal if I determine that there has been a material error of law and submitted that the re-making decision can be determined on the papers.

Error of Law Reasons
16. In HB the Upper Tribunal provided detailed Guidance. Of particular relevance to this case are [7] to [10] of the Head Note which states:
“(7)   Kurds involved in Kurdish political groups or activity are at risk of arrest, prolonged detention and physical abuse by the Iranian authorities. Even Kurds expressing peaceful dissent or who speak out about Kurdish rights also face a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.
(8)   Activities that can be perceived to be political by the Iranian authorities include social welfare and charitable activities on behalf of Kurds. Indeed, involvement with any organised activity on behalf of or in support of Kurds can be perceived as political and thus involve a risk of adverse attention by the Iranian authorities with the consequent risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.
(9)   Even ‘low-level’ political activity, or activity that is perceived to be political, such as, by way of example only, mere possession of leaflets espousing or supporting Kurdish rights, if discovered, involves the same risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. Each case however, depends on its own facts and an assessment will need to be made as to the nature of the material possessed and how it would be likely to be viewed by the Iranian authorities in the context of the foregoing guidance.
(10)   The Iranian authorities demonstrate what could be described as a ‘hair-trigger’ approach to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights. By ‘hair-trigger’ it means that the threshold for suspicion is low and the reaction of the authorities is reasonably likely to be extreme.”
17. The Judge failed to analyse the evidence by reference to the Country Guidance in HB and, in particular, has not examined the risk of return due to the “hair-trigger” approach of the Iranian authorities. Arguably the Judge conflated the issue of risk in Iran when leaving (or returning) with the lack of credibility in relation to the sur place activities.
18. As a result of the failure to consider and analyse the Country Guidance I find there is a material error of law and set aside the judgment.

Disposal
19. Having considered whether this appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal or remitted to the First-tier Tribunal, I concluded that it should be retained and listed for a resumed hearing in due course. The error of law did not involve procedural unfairness. The issues to be determined are legally straightforward (risk on return) and the extent of relevant fact-finding will be relatively limited given that this is a one witness case.
20. I considered whether certain findings should be preserved. It is a difficult balance to strike. Having regard to that balance, I concluded that these appeals should be reconsidered afresh and without any preserved findings, save for the finding at [17] that the Appellant is a “low level protester”. The Appellant may count himself fortunate in this regard, but there is a danger that preserving the adverse credibility findings may result in an artificial exercise on remittal.

Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal erred in law and its decision is set aside in accordance with section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
The appeal is retained in the Upper Tribunal and the decision will be re-made in due course.
Directions to the parties
(1) No later than 35 days after this error of law decision is sent out, the appellant shall file and serve a consolidated bundle of all evidence relied on for the purposes of re-making the decision in this appeal. The appellant must note that the contents of the bundle must be relevant to the scope of the resumed hearing, as identified in this error of law decision;
(2) If the appellant is to give oral evidence and requires an interpreter for doing so, this must be communicated to the Upper Tribunal’s administrative staff promptly and no later than 35 days after this error of law decision is sent out;
(3) No later than 42 days after this error of law decision is sent out, the respondent may, if so advised, file and serve any additional evidence relied on;
(4) No later than 10 days before the resumed hearing, the appellant shall file and serve a skeleton argument;
(5) No later than 3 days before the resumed hearing, the respondent shall file and serve a skeleton argument;
(6) The parties may apply to vary these directions, promptly and copying in the other side.

Margaret Obi

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 March 2025