Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003046

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58977/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of March 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

AHMED KAMEL SHAKER MAHMOUD NASSER
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Chaudhry, instructed by Latif Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Miss Z Young, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 31 January 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. In a determination promulgated on 2 December 2024 the Upper Tribunal found a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal had materially erred in law and set that decision aside, whilst also preserving the First-tier Tribunal’s factual findings and finding that any interference with the Appellant and his partner’s private life in the UK was proportionate. The scope of this hearing is limited to assessing whether the interference with the Appellant’s family life with his UK-based partner is proportionate only.
2. The basis of that finding was a concession by Miss Young that the First-tier Judge had erred in law for the reasons set out at [3] of the grant of permission to appeal which is in the following terms:

3. The Judge cites Agyarko at [49]. At [53] the Judge finds that the Appellant’s private life does not outweigh the economic interests of the UK. At [55] the Judge then finds that the decision interferes with the Appellant’s family and private life. At [59] the Judge finds that the interference with the Appellant’s private life is proportionate. There is no such finding in relation to family life, which was the main issue in the appeal. At [60], contradicting the finding at [55], the Judge finds that the decision does not interfere with the Article 8 rights of the Appellant or his partner. It is therefore arguable that the Judge failed to apply the guidance from the case of Agyarko and failed to carry out adequately the balancing exercise required when considering the proportionality of the interference with the Appellant and Sponsor’s right to family life.

3. The Appellant is a citizen of Egypt born on 7 July 1989 who states he is the partner of Samantha Jane Nelson, a British citizen (‘Samantha’).
4. The First-tier Tribunal Judge set out her findings from [17] of that decision from which a number are preserved. In her skeleton argument dated 28 January 2025 Ms Young set these out (which were not challenged before me) as being:

3. The factual findings and the finding that any interference with the Appellant or his partner’s private life in the UK is proportionate have been preserved (UT EOL decision [9]). The factual findings are as follow and referenced from the FTT decision:

a. Judge Herlihy in 2017 recorded that the Appellant lived in London for nine months before moving to the North East of England for a period of five years but that he returned to London about six months before the hearing on 4 August 2017. His application form for leave to remain as a partner of a British Citizen states that he began residing with his partner in February 2017, which would be about the same time he told Judge Herlihy that he had returned to live in London. I find this to be a major discrepancy and one that can damage his credibility in respect of the remainder of his claim [21].

b. Ms Kahm referred in her submissions to the language difficulty the Appellant may have faced at the previous hearing and that he was not represented. The determination in that appeal clearly records that the Appellant was represented and there is no mention of any problems the Appellant may have faced because of linguistic difficulties that were observed by the Judge [22].

c. The finding in 2017 was that he would not face persecution or serious harm in Egypt on his return and that his family and private life could continue there. There has been no additional evidence laid before me in respect of the situation he claims to face in Egypt because of his previous membership of the Muslim Brotherhood and I will be maintaining that finding [23].

d. The Appellant made no reference to a relationship he had formed in the North East of England at his previous hearing… there was no evidence before the FTT in 2017 that the Appellant has any current mental health issues [24].

e. There is little evidence of his cohabitation with his partner in the North East other than from his own testimony. Whilst it is accepted their relationship is currently genuine and subsisting, I am not satisfied that the Appellant has established his relationship with his partner has existed for as long as he claims [25].

f. However, as submitted by Ms. Khan, there is evidence that the Appellant’s partner has recently been awarded Personal Independent Payments from the United Kingdom Government. Her receipt of that would mean the financial requirements for someone joining their partner in the United Kingdom would be met. However, in my judgment, this is not relevant in this appeal as he can only meet the rules in terms of his Article 8 family rights under Appendix FM EX.1 because he entered the United Kingdom as a visitor and then became an overstayer [26].

g. Looking at the evidence in the round, given the disregard and lack of respect both the Appellant and the Sponsor have shown for the laws and authorities in the United Kingdom, I find I cannot rely on them as being witnesses of the truth. The discrepancies in the application form and between that and their oral evidence also causes me concern in respect of the evidence they have provided about what would happen in Egypt should they live there and what would happen if the Appellant returned to Egypt alone [27].

h. The first hurdle he claims he will have to overcome is his membership of the Muslim Brotherhood and the claimed jail sentence and find he was sentenced to in his absence in 2014. Findings on this were made by a previous judge and as I have insufficient cogent and reliable evidence to overturn that finding, I do not accept that he will face this difficulty on his return [30].

i. I do not accept, therefore, that if he did engage in political activity prior to leaving Egypt, this would result in adverse interest in him by the Egyptian Government and would not be an insurmountable obstacle to his reintegration to life in Egypt [31].

j. In respect of his family, the Appellant has demonstrated that he has been economical with the truth when speaking to them and his willingness to deceive them in respect of his true situation in the United Kingdom is evidence of his propensity to reveal only matters that are beneficial to him in his dealing with the world. He has deceived his family in respect of his relationship with his partner in the United Kingdom, which places a further shadow over his reliability as a witness of the truth. In my judgment, it also places a doubt over his true feelings in respect of his partner because if he is truly committed to her, it would be natural for him to tell his family about the happiness he finds with her [33].

k. There is no reason why the Appellant cannot return to Egypt and start his life there in much the same way as he started his life in the United Kingdom in 2010 [34].

l. Although claiming his mental health was suffering in 2017, there is no reference to any physical or mental health issues claimed by the Appellant in this appeal [35].

m. If the Appellant is to return alone, then I find there are no insurmountable obstacles to his reintegration as any hardships he may face initially can be overcome [36].

n. The Appellant has not provided sufficient reliable evidence to demonstrate that this is the true situation they would find themselves in on arriving in Egypt. The Appellant has not told his family of his relationship to date and, should he choose, they would not need to know anything should she return to Egypt with him. There are many larger cities in Egypt and there are many places he could reside with his partner that are cosmopolitan. Neither of them currently work, and it would not be unreasonable to expect him to find employment and provide accommodation for them both. He would be able to do this before his partner joins him if necessary. She would have him to guide her through the vagaries of life in Egypt as she come to terms with her new situation and any difficulties she may face. He also has the alternative of relying on his family initially. Either way, any difficulties they might face can be overcome should his partner decide to travel to live with him in Egypt [38].

o. The Appellant does not, therefore, meet the requirements of Appendix FM.EX1 and he does not meet the Immigration Rules [39].

p. There is no evidence before me that the court order in respect of the Appellant’s partner’s access to her children is reliant on her presence in the United Kingdom [41].

q. The information from both parties is that there is treatment for mental health available in Egypt and that anti-depressant drugs are available [45].
r. In my judgement, from reading the report by the psychologist, reading the medical records of his partner and their oral evidence, his partner’s mental health has not changed significantly over the years they have been together [47].

s. However, as that private life has been formed over a period of time when the Appellant had no legitimate expectation to remain in the United Kingdom, little weight can be attached to it. For the reasons given, I find it would be reasonable to expect him to leave the United Kingdom [48].

t. …the Appellant’s private life does not outweigh the interests of the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom [53].

u. I find that there will be an interference with the Appellant’s family and private life as he has been in the United Kingdom a sufficient length of time to establish a life here [55].

v. The Appellant has not established that he would suffer undue hardship should he be returned to Egypt. The Appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that his family members in Egypt could not assist him on his return [56].

w. The Appellant has demonstrated an ability to find ways and means to support himself is evidenced by his ability to remain in the United Kingdom for several years without access to employment or accommodation and there is no reason he could not continue in this way in Egypt [57].

x. I do not find that the Appellant has established that he would find himself destitute [58].

y. In these circumstances, I find that, on a balance of probabilities, the interference in the private life of the Appellant by the decision not to allow him leave to remain in the United Kingdom is proportionate when weighed against the legitimate aim of immigration control by the implementation of the Immigration Laws of the United Kingdom [59].

The Appellant has provided a further bundle of evidence for the purposes of this hearing in which he includes an updated witness statement dated 18 December 2024 in which he adopts the content of his earlier witness statement dated 24th July 2023

Discussion and analysis

The submissions

5. The parties were directed to file skeleton arguments although the only one received was that of Ms Young, through no fault of Ms Chaudhry.
6. Although the directions provided for the witness statements to stand as the evidence in chief of the maker, it was clear that that of Samantha had not been updated and so Ms Chaudhry was given leave to ask supplementary questions following which Samantha was cross examined by Ms Young, after which the parties made their submissions.
7. Samanta was asked about her medical condition and I was referred to the up-to-date medical evidence that has been provided. That includes a letter from her GP dated 5 November 2024 to the Mental Health Team which reads:

I would appreciate if you would be happy to review this 37-year-old lady who is currently on mirtazapine 30 mg for depression and anxiety.

She reports that she has been suffering from mood swings for some time now but noticed it to be worse over the 4-5 months. She describes episodes of high and low with each lasting 3 day up to 1 – 2 weeks. Pt reports would feel happy, overactive, mind being on overdrive, active/energetic followed by periods of being low, suicidal, anxious, and not wanting to leave the house.

There are no psychotic symptoms reported and she does not use any drugs or alcohol. Her symptoms do suggest possible bipolar, and I would appreciate if you would be happy to review for further assessment. I have not made any changes to her mirtazapine dose and she has details for the crisis team if it were required.

8. The reason for the referral is recorded in Samantha’s GP notes and the entry on 4 November 2024 of Generalised Anxiety Disorder, which is a condition where an individual worries constantly about everyday issues and situations and feels anxious about lots of different things.
9. The medication she has been prescribed is an antidepressant medication used to treat depression and anxiety.
10. Although Samanta, when asked whether the medication she is taking is available in Egypt claimed it was not, antidepressant medication clearly is according to the country information, with places such as the Al Mashfa Hospital providing effective treatment for bipolar affective disorder and depression treatment programs, together with other medical outlets in Egypt. It is not established that antidepressant medication or treatment for bipolar disorder or anxiety will not be available or accessible to either the Appellant or Samantha in Egypt, if required.
11. It was not disputed that the relationship between the Appellant and Samantha engages Article 8(1) ECHR. The advocate’s submissions focused upon the proportionality of any interference with their family life. It is settled law that if that is the issue the burden is upon the Secretary of State to establish that it is.
12. In her written submissions, set out in her skeleton argument, Miss Young writes:

SUBMISSIONS

(a) whether any interference with the Appellant’s family life with his UK-based partner is proportionate?

4. The Secretary of State submits that any interference with the Appellant’s family life with his partner Samantha Nelson is proportionate for the following reasons. The Appellant cannot meet the immigration rules as per paragraph 3 (o) above which is a weighty factor in favour of the Secretary of State in the balancing exercise. It is accepted that the relationship between the Appellant and Samantha Nelson is genuine and subsisting. The Appellant’s partner suffers from mental health issues but as set out at paragraph 3 (q) above, it was accepted that there is treatment and medication available to the Appellant’s partner in Egypt. There is no evidence in the Appellant’s UT bundle to suggest that position has changed. The Appellant states in his witness statement [Appellant’s UT bundle page 4, paragraph 2] that Samantha relies heavily on the Appellant for emotional support. It is respectfully submitted that if Samantha left the UK with the Appellant, then the Appellant would be able to continue to provide his partner with the emotional support, he says he continues to provide. The Appellant also states that Samantha’s mental health has deteriorated [Appellant’s UT bundle page 4, paragraph 3]. This statement made by the Appellant is at odds with what Judge Hands stated at [47] as set out at paragraph 3 (r) above. The letter from Hetton Group Practice dated 5 November 2024 [Appellant’s UT bundle page 13] states that Samantha has noticed her mood swings being worse over the last 4-5 months. The letter refers to Samantha’s symptoms may possible suggest they have Bipolar and have asked for Samantha to be reviewed for further assessment. The same position was noted in the report from Dr Ahmed dated 24 July 2023 [Appellant’s FTT bundle page 29] in relation to a referral to the psychiatrist for a possible diagnosis of Bipolar disorder. There are no further updates provided regarding the referral and any potential diagnosis of Bipolar. There is no updated evidence from the Appellant’s partner to confirm how they are feeling. Dr Ahmed also refers to Samantha having protective factors, one being her partner and the other her two children. Therefore, even if the Appellant was removed from the United Kingdom, Samantha would still have her two children as protective factors. On the other hand, if Samantha went to Egypt with the Appellant she would continue to have the Appellant as a protective factor.

5. It is a preserved finding that the interference with the Appellant’s private life is proportionate and that is a factor that needs weighing in the balance. The findings made in relation to this conclusion, demonstrate that the Appellant would be able to support himself and his partner on return to Egypt, would not be destitute and they both could arguably seek employment in Egypt.

6. The Appellant’s partner has two children here in the United Kingdom and are subject to a court order. As set out at a paragraph 3 (p) above, the Appellant’s partner’s access to her children is not reliant on the Appellant being present in the United Kingdom. In Samantha’s witness statement dated 24 July 2023 [Appellant’s FTT bundle page 22-23], paragraph 24 and 25, Samantha has no direct contact with her children. Samantha refers to making a further application for contact in the near future but there is no indication that application has been made. Therefore, indirect contact can arguably continue from outside of the United Kingdom if Samantha decided to leave the United Kingdom with the Appellant. Samantha has the support of her family in the United Kingdom.

7. It is a matter of choice for the Appellant’s partner as to whether she chooses to leave the United Kingdom with the Appellant or remain here without him. The Secretary of State submits that in either scenario when considering all of the factors relevant to the proportionality assessment do not create a disproportionate interference in order to conclude there is a breach of Article 8.

8. The Secretary of State invites the Upper Tribunal to dismiss the appeal.

13. On behalf of the Appellant Ms Chaudhry submitted Samantha only has indirect contact with the children and that if she leaves the UK to travel with the Appellant to Egypt, she will not be able to apply for face-to-face or further contact. Ms Chaudhry submitted that Samantha intends to apply to the Family Court for a relevant order which she has not done to date as a result of her anxiety due to her partner’s situation, as she does not feel able to deal with that and possible contested family proceedings together.
14. Ms Chaudhry also submitted that it was necessary to consider fear on removal which would cause stress and greater anxiety and the relevance of this to Samantha’s mental health and the impact of any deterioration. It was submitted that in November 2024 there is evidence she tried to hang herself and that although an explanation had been given, the medical issues require careful consideration.
15. It was submitted it was necessary to consider when looking at proportionality how Samantha would cope in a new environment in Egypt when anxiety levels in her home environment are as they are, where she is comfortable in her support. It was submitted there would not be such support in Egypt from her family although there is a preserved finding in relation to support albeit from the Appellant’s own family.
16. It was submitted Samantha has no knowledge of Egypt which would exasperate her mental state and that there had been no assessment of this aspect of the impact of taking her from her current source of medical support which meets her needs and having to grasp the services available in Egypt. It was submitted Samantha as a British national has a right to remain in the UK and access services.
17. Ms Chaudhry submitted the relevant questions the Tribunal needs to consider are, firstly what was the impact upon Samantha if the Appellant goes to Egypt alone and, secondly, what the impact will be upon her if they go together.
18. It was submitted it was not proportionate to expect the Appellant to leave the UK and to continue family life in Egypt, and it is case in which separation would not be proportionate and that the appeal should be allowed.

My findings

19. Whilst it is understandable that Samantha would want to be able to restore the role she previously had with her children, and to have direct contact with them, at the date of this hearing and decision her contact is limited by the Family Courts to indirect contact which can continue wherever she is living, be it the UK or Egypt. It was not made out, for understandable reasons, that any application has been made to the Family Courts which has realistic prospects of success, or at all, at this time.
20. It is not made out the indirect contact by way of letters and sending gifts to the children could not continue. As a result of the history with regard to the children their best interests are clearly to remain in the protective environment in which they currently live, although as they get older they will have a possibly greater say in relation to contact with their mother.
21. This case was not advanced as an Article 3 medical appeal on the basis of AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 48, but I accept that medical issues can be incorporated into consideration of the proportionality of an Article 8 appeal if relevant. That is part of a private live consideration, but it is a preserved finding that any interference in any private life is proportionate.
22. Reference is made to a report dated 24 July 2023 written by Dr Sonia Ahmed from Serene Psychology, but the report fails to set out the nature of Dr Ahmed’s qualifications, provides no details of any literature or material relied upon in making the report, fails to provide a statement setting out the substance of all facts and instructions which are material to the opinion expressed in the report, and fails to contain a declaration to the effect that the author has complied with, and will continue to comply with, the duty she owes to the court and tribunal to provide independent assistance by way of objectively unbiased opinion in relation to matters within their expertise, an acknowledgement that the witness will inform the parties of any change of opinion, and must contain a signed declaration of truth. That is relevant to the weight that can be given to this document.
23. The report indicates that Samantha self-referred herself to Dr Ahmed, was seen for an initial assessment on 12 July 2023, following which there was one further meeting on 21 July 2023. Under the heading “Risk” it is written:

During the initial assessment, conducted on 12/07/2023, Samantha reported having fleeting suicidal ideation with intent to act on those thoughts as being 8/10. Samantha reported that she did not have any specific plans in place and confirmed that she was able to keep herself safe at the present moment only because the support of her partner. Samantha reported that she had attempted suicide in the past, her last attempt was overdosed. She confirmed that the police were involved and that she was hospitalised and assessed by the mental health team.

Samantha confirmed that there is no current or historical risk relating to self-harm.

Samantha confirmed that she does not drink alcohol.

Samantha reported that she did used to have a drug addiction.

Protective factors:

Samantha identified her Partner & 2 children as her main protective factor.

Under the heading “presenting problems/issues: it is written:

Samantha reported that she is currently feeling depressed and anxious due to the
current situation with her partner of 7 years. Samantha’s partner is Egyptian will be
going to court on the 31st July to determine his immigration status. Samantha
reported that she is extremely distressed about this, as she reported her partner as
being her main support. Samantha stated that she is unable to move to Egypt with him
(as stated by court) due to her own ongoing mental health issues, as well as due to
having her children, here in the UK.

Samantha reported of having suffered from depression since 13 years ago after the
birth of her 2nd child. She believes she had undiagnosed PND. Samantha reported of
having anxiety since 2019, which she stated gotten worse since. Samantha reported
experiencing the following symptoms: physical fatigue and aches, binge eating,
tearful, unable to leave the house some days. Due to her anxiety Samantha stated that
she is barely able to leave the house unless absolutely necessary.

Samantha reported that this latest bout of depression has been on and off since
December 2022. Samantha has 2 children, who were taken away from her 7 years
ago. Samantha reported that this was because the Children’s father left and she
resorted to partying and drugs as a way to cope with this. Samantha reported that she
now has indirect contact with her children and is hopeful for direct contact next year.
Samantha has me aware that her GP has made a referral to the psychiatrist for a
possible diagnosis of Bipolar disorder.

24. There are a number of themes in this letter, which does not provide any opinion and is therefore not, strictly, an expert’s report, in relation to the issues being raised again before me.
25. Despite it being known for some time that these issues require discussion and consideration, no report has been provided specifically focusing upon an expert’s view of the answers to the questions posed by Ms Chaudhry. It is accepted however that some answers are present as indicated in the GP notes in the above report.
26. In terms of the first question posed by Ms Chaudhry in her submissions, namely what will be the impact upon Samanta if the Appellant is removed to Egypt and she remains in the UK, there will be no impact upon her contact with the children, her involvement with the GP and services within the UK will continue and can be increased if required, but clearly she will not have the day-to-day support provided by the Appellant which may have to become indirect. In terms of the loss of such support the evidence indicates that Samantha is likely to become more depressed, may become suicidal, and may require intervention from the mental health services to whom she is known and who can assist her through any such period. Although there is evidence indicating she has tried to commit suicide, the intervention and support she has received as a result has clearly ensured that she has not harmed herself to an extent where a real risk of the same arose. As referenced in the report, there are two protective factors available being the Appellant and her children and it does not differentiate between the two, meaning if one is lost the other will still be present.
27. There is insufficient evidence to show that if the Appellant is removed to Egypt the protective factor of Samantha’s children will not be sufficient to ensure she does not take her own life. I appreciate it will be very difficult for her and she may need intensive intervention by the GP and mental health services in the UK but they are very skilled and capable of dealing with such presentation. On this model there will be no interference with Samantha’s involvement with the medical profession in the UK.
28. If Samanta goes with the Appellant to Egypt, which will be her choice as per the submissions, then the fact it will be a voluntary decision by her is an important protective element of its own. There is insufficient evidence to warrant a finding that any medical treatment she may require will not be available and accessible in Egypt. Mental health problems are worldwide and Egypt has a health service which has not been shown to be incapable of dealing with Samantha’s needs.
29. I appreciate Ms Chaudhry’s point about the facts Samantha will be in a strange environment without the support of her immediate family, although it was not made out she would not be able to maintain contact with her own family based in the UK on the telephone or via video calls or other means. Samantha will not, however, be alone in Egypt. There is a preserved findings in relation to the Appellant’s family members in Egypt and the lack of credibility in his evidence in relation to what the exact situation will be if he is returned to Egypt. On the evidence it has not been made out that there will not be adequate family support available to them in Egypt.
30. I appreciate that the Appellant will have to seek employment, but it is a preserved findings that he will be able to find such employment. Whilst he is seeking employment or working he may not be available on a full-time basis as he currently may be, but Samantha will have other support that is available to assist her. It was not made out that any language or cultural difficulties will be problematic, as there is insufficient evidence to establish on the facts that this will be so.
31. Although the Tribunal has sympathy for the situation in which Samantha finds herself, in part based upon her past life and past experiences, it is necessary for me determine the merits of the appeal on the basis of the evidence that has been made available. I do not find in terms of Samanta’s positions that the material provided is sufficient to establish that the Appellant’s removal will be disproportionate based upon the effect upon Samantha on the basis of either of the options suggested by Ms Chaudhry.
32. In terms of the balancing exercise, section 117A Nationality, Immigration Asylum Act 2002 requires a court or tribunal in a case where it is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts will breach a person’s right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR and, as a result, will be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to have regard to the matters listed in section 117B.
33. In relation to those factors, I find as follows:

• 117B(1) - It is not disputed that the maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest. Immigration controls refer to a method or methods for regulating border laws on immigration which includes only allowing those to enter or remain in the UK individuals who have a lawful right to do so but removing those from the UK who have no such right. The Appellant has no right to remain.
• 117B(2) - it is not made out on the evidence that the Appellant will be a burden on the taxpayer. Samantha has sufficient income of her own and there are no language issues.
• 117B(3) - the Appellant is not financially independent but is not a burden on the taxpayer as sufficient household income is available. The Appellant’s case is that if he was allowed to remain, he would work.
• 117B(4) - the little weight provision to be given to an individual’s private life or relationship with a qualifying partner if it is established at the time the person is in the UK unlawfully, is noted, but I do not need to consider this in relation to private life as it is a preserved finding that interference in the same is proportionate. Samantha is a qualifying partner and the relationship has been formed during the time the Appellant has no right to remain in the United Kingdom. There is also the comments in the earlier determination about the fact that the Appellant was in London whilst also claiming at one point to have been in the north-east with Samantha, casting doubt upon some of the claims being made in relation to the relationship. The Appellant has had no right to remain in the UK and his presence has always been unlawful. Accordingly, it warrants little weight being attached to the relationship.
• 117B(5) - is not applicable as the Appellant’s immigration status is not precarious as he has not been granted any form of immigration status. He is an asylum seeker.
• 117B(6) - is not applicable is there are no qualifying children in relation to whom the Appellant has a genuine, subsisting, parental relationship.

34. The Appellant cannot succeed under the Immigration Rules, especially with reference to paragraphs 276ADE and paragraph EX.1 of Appendix FM. That is very relevant as Paragraph EX.1(b) of Appendix FM of the Rules required the Appellant to have a genuine subsisting relationship with a partner who is in the UK and is a British citizen, as Samantha is, and for there to be “insurmountable obstacles” to family life with that partner continuing outside the UK. The finding there are no such insurmountable obstacles and that the Appellant can return to Egypt and re-establish himself in his home country and carry on his family life with Samantha, carries considerable weight.
35. Article 8 ECHR does not allow a person to choose where they wish to live. The strongest aspects on the Appellant’s side of the balancing exercise relates to the impact on Samantha which is why the submissions that were made by Ms Chaudhry focused predominantly upon her situation rather than the Appellant’s.
36. When considering whether there are circumstances that warrant the appeal being allowed, even if Appellant cannot succeed under the Rules and having considered the statutory provisions and case law, I do not find it has been made out on the evidence that in this appeal such circumstance have been made out. It has not been shown the refusal of the Appellants application for leave to remain in the UK will result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for any individual, such that refusal of the application will not be proportionate.
37. Having sat back and considered the competing arguments I find the Secretary of State has established that any interference in the family life formed in the United Kingdom is proportionate, as the points relied upon by the Appellant are not sufficient to outweigh the strong public interest in his removal from the United Kingdom. A fair balance has been struck in the decision under challenge between the competing public and individual interests involved, when applying the proportionality test.
38. If Samantha chooses to remain in the United Kingdom the Appellant may be able to apply for leave to enter the United Kingdom lawfully if he can satisfy the relevant requirements to be permitted to do so, but that is a matter for them.

Notice of Decision

39. Appeal dismissed.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 February 2025