Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-003075
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00129/2024
PA/60381/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILLIAMS

Between

BMP
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Read of Counsel, instructed by CJ Legal Limited
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 7 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is our decision in respect of the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the respondent to refuse his protection claim. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside by Upper Tribunal Judge McWilliam following a hearing before her on 3 October 2024. The written decision was sent to the parties on 27 July 2026. It is the remaking of the decision in the appeal that we are to decide.
Background

2. The appellant, a national of Iraq, entered the United Kingdom on 15 May 2021. His protection claim was made to the respondent on 15th May 2021. The claim was advanced on two bases, first that the appellant was at risk because of a relationship with a young woman which was subsequently discovered by her father, an influential member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and secondly on account of his sur place political activity. The claim was refused on 27 October 2023. The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal was heard by Judge Ficklin and dismissed by a decision sent to the parties on 17 May 2024.

3. The appellant sought, and was granted permission to appeal on two grounds, that the Judge had inadequately reasoned his findings on credibility, and that he had failed to give any reasons for his finding that the appellant’s sur place activity would not place the appellant at risk upon return.

4. The decision of Judge Ficklin was set aside by Upper Tribunal Judge McWilliam in a decision sent to the parties on 27 July 2026. She found that the first ground did not identify an error of law but was a disagreement with the findings. The second ground, however, did disclose a material error of law. It was agreed at the error of law hearing that the issue was a ‘narrow one’, and whilst Mr Read initially sought to persuade us the decision in its entirety had been set aside, and that we could revisit the issue of the appellant’s clandestine relationship, the issue had been conceded in the skeleton argument prepared by the solicitors, which said

‘Ground one failed. The findings of the First-tier Tribunal on the Appellant’s account of events in Iraq were not disturbed and are not reopened. The findings on documentation are likewise undisturbed and are not pursued’.

5. We further noted that Judge Ficklin, at [16] of his decision, recorded that the appellant ‘has attended demonstrations and posted recordings of these as well as anti-regime materials on his social media. He is also associated with the Dakok Support Centre, a Kurdish charity in the UK that arranges demonstrations and opposes corruption in the KRI. Dakok provided a letter dated 6 May 2024 stating that he took part in their activities. I accept that he does’.

6. The appellant’s activities are accepted; it falls to us to determine whether those activities are an expression of genuinely held belief, and what risk, if any, would emanate from the appellant’s engagement in those activities.

The Law

7. To succeed in his appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, i.e. race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The burden of proof is upon the appellant. Per the decision in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449, the standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. We must determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

a. Taking the claim at its highest, there is a Convention reason;
b. Considering the credibility of the account, the appellant fears persecution for that Convention reason;
c. The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
d. There would not be sufficient protection available; and
e. The appellant could not internally relocate

The Hearing

8. The appellant was assisted by a Kurdish Sorani interpreter, Mr Jansepar. At no time during the hearing did we observe any difficulties in communication between the appellant and the interpreter, nor were any issues raised by the parties. At the outset of the hearing, we heard an application by Mr Read for the remote attendance of a witness, SA. We were told SA was suffering with ‘flu like symptoms’, and that he could not attend the hearing centre, although he could attend via Cloud Video Platform.

9. Mr Tan indicated he sought to cross-examine SA, and that whilst there was no medical evidence, he did not oppose the application for him to attend the hearing remotely. On the basis that SA’s evidence was of importance to the appellant’s appeal, and to avoid further delay, we granted the application. Whilst there were some initial difficulties with SA joining the hearing, and then with us being able to see him clearly, SA did join the hearing remotely. He advised he was suffering with flu symptoms and a headache which was exacerbated by daylight. He felt well enough to give evidence by video link, and he did so without any difficulty.

10. We were provided with a consolidated bundle of 115 pages, an appellant’s bundle of 322 pages, and skeleton arguments by both parties. The advocates confirmed this was all of the evidence and argument filed for the hearing. Both the appellant and SA adopted their witness statements and were cross-examined by Mr Tan. We heard submissions from both advocates, and at the end of the hearing we reserved our decision which we now give with reasons.

Analysis and Findings

Profile

11. We start our consideration by looking at the extent of the appellant’s sur place activity. Judge Ficklin found the appellant had attended demonstrations and that he had posted anti-regime material on Facebook. Before us, the appellant provided evidence that those activities had continued. In his witness statement of 20 August 2026, the appellant provides details of nearly 50 demonstrations, Zoom meetings, and publicity campaigns he has been involved with between 2021 and the end of August this year. A number of these events are also referred to in the support letter provided by Dakok dated 19 August 2026.

12. There were several points raised in Mr Tan’s cross-examination of the appellant which, in our consideration of the appellant’s activity, we have considered. First, there was a putative inconsistency between the appellant’s evidence as to where he met SA, and SA’s own evidence on this point. The appellant’s own witness statement indicated that he attended a demonstration on 31 August 2023 in Manchester, ‘condemning the ruling parties in the Kurdistan Region and marking the anniversary of 31 August 1996’. SA’s witness statement however states he and the appellant first met in London on 31 August 2023’.

13. When this point was put to the appellant, he said this was an error he intended to rectify, but Counsel had ‘forgotten’ to do so. The same point was put to SA separately, and he agreed it was Manchester as the appellant had stated, and that his reference to London was incorrect. In view of the fact that the appellant’s own witness statement, and the Dakok support letter both refer to the demonstration as taking place in Manchester, and SA’s acceptance that the reference to it being in London was a mistake, we are satisfied it was simply an error and does not detract from the credibility of the account.

14. Mr Tan also raised with the appellant the absence of his Dakok membership card from evidence. The appellant’s oral evidence was that every member of Dakok is issued with a membership card which bears a code and a unique membership number. In the appellant’s bundle, we were provided with a copy of SA’s membership card. On the face of this card is a ‘validation code’ which enables the bearer’s membership to be verified on Dakok’s website. When the appellant was asked why he had not provided his own card, he said he had it with him and could show it. When asked why it was not in the bundle, the appellant said that he had given it to his solicitors and it should be within the bundle.

15. Whilst it is right that the appellant has not provided a copy of his own membership card, and that this evidence would have been easily obtainable, especially in view of the appellant’s offer to show it at the hearing, we do not find the absence of this evidence particularly undermines his claim. The appellant’s claim to be a member of Dakok was corroborated by live evidence from a person holding a leadership role within Dakok, and we are satisfied the appellant is a member as claimed.

16. Mr Tan asked the appellant how anyone from Dakok would know about the activities he was involved in, and whether this was just what the appellant had told them. The appellant said that when he asked for a support letter from Dakok, they would check his Facebook page to establish his involvement in activities. SA also confirmed this process of verifying a person’s activity on Facebook before writing a support letter. In view of the consistency in the evidence given by both the appellant and SA on this point, we find the appellant has been involved in the activities he claims.

17. As to the appellant’s profile, the respondent characterises him as having a ‘low profile’ which would not put him at risk upon return. The appellant’s evidence, however, was that he now has responsibilities within Dakok which mean he falls to be considered as a ‘high profile’ activist. The appellant claims to have stewarded events, prepared and distributed material, attended planning meetings and published a number of articles.

18. Turning to the articles the appellant relies on, there are seven provided in the appellant’s bundle. The first of these articles (p.142, AB), was published on the Dakok Facebook page. Whilst it is not clear from the image how many views the article has had, there are 129 ‘likes’, 36 comments, and was reposted once. The article is accompanied by a photograph of the appellant and bears his name (at least part of it).

19. There are three articles which appear on a blog site, SP. There are screenshots from this website which again show each article being accompanied by a photograph of the appellant and bearing his name. Whilst the captions accompanying the screenshots all detail the number of ‘viewers’ of each article, the word ‘viewer’ does not appear on any of the translated versions of these articles, and it is unclear who it was who added it to the captions.

20. Two further articles appear on another blog site, B. Again, these articles name the appellant, bear his photograph, and are accompanied by the same caption indicating the number of viewers of each article. We note again that the word ‘viewers’ does not appear on the translated versions of these articles, and we do not know who added it to the captions. The final article has the same features as the other articles, appearing in a publication entitled ‘KT’. The appellant’s photograph and name appear on the article.

21. The appellant’s claimed authorship of these articles was not challenged at all by Mr Tan. In light of the fact these articles appear on four different websites, all of them showing the appellant’s photograph, as well as his name, we accept the appellant is the author of thesearticles, and that they have been published on the websites claimed. It is unclear to us whether the number of ‘viewers’ of each article is a reliable figure given what we have said about our lack of clarity as to where those numbers come from and the absence of the description from the translations.

22. We accept the appellant is a person who has, over a period of several years, attended demonstrations in the United Kingdom, that he has expressed views critical of the ruling parties in Kurdistan on Facebook, and that he is the author of seven articles which have been published online.

Motivation

23. We were invited by Mr Tan to conclude that notwithstanding this activity, the appellant’s political views are not expressions of genuinely held belief but are confected to create the appearance of risk. We were referred to the appellant’s witness statement prepared for his hearing before the First-tier Tribunal (p.27 of the consolidated bundle). In that statement, the appellant refers to what happened to his claimed partner in Iraq and refers to campaigning for change because he does not want anyone to go through what he has been through. Mr Tan submitted that if this was the appellant’s motivation, it fell to be rejected because the account that it emanates from was rejected by Judge Ficklin.

24. We note however the appellant’s more recent statement provides significant detail about his motivation for his political activity here in the UK:

11. When I arrived in the United Kingdom, I found that Kurdish people here talk openly about the parties, about the missing salaries, about the journalists who have been shot or jailed and about the corruption. Nobody is arrested for it. The first time I stood in a street in London holding a placard against the parties who run Kurdistan, I was frightened for the whole of the first hour and then I was not frightened at all. That day changed something in me.

12. I began to read and to follow what was happening at home. I learned the names of people I had never heard of in Iraq because nobody was allowed to say them. Sardasht Osman. Kawa Garmiani. Soran Mama Hama. Sherwan Sherwani. Once you know those names you cannot pretend you do not know them.

25. The appellant’s evidence on this point was not challenged before us. Whilst we bear in mind that the appellant’s claim of events in Iraq has been rejected, it does not automatically follow that the entirety of his account lacks credibility. We find the appellant’s evidence as it pertains to his motivation to be plausible in circumstances where the appellant, his claimed relationship aside, has detailed an ability to express his views in the UK without fear. The appellant’s claim to be dissatisfied with the ruling parties of Kurdistan and therefore seek to demonstrate against them due to what he perceives as corruption is also not wholly implausible. Taking the appellant’s evidence in the round, we find his sur place activity is an expression of genuinely held political belief.

Risk

26. The appellant asserts that he would, because of his political activity in this country, be of adverse interest to the authorities in Kurdistan upon return. There was, however, limited evidence before us which would establish such a risk existed. We were referred by Mr Read to the respondent’s own CPIN: Iraq, Opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), version 3.0, July 2023. Specifically, Mr Read relied on paragraph 3.1.3 of the CPIN:

However, available evidence does indicate that the following groups of people may be at higher risk of arrest, detention, assault, excessive use of force and extrajudicial killing by the KRG authorities:

• Individuals with higher profiles: Those who have a prominent public presence, who are actively involved in or have previous history of organising or participating in protests and demonstrations.

• Journalists: Those who are seen to be criticising government officials or engage in critical reporting on controversial political or other sensitive issues, for example protests and demonstrations, corruption, abuse of authority etc.

27. The respondent, in her skeleton argument, refers to 3.1.2 of the same CPIN:

The evidence is not such that a person will be at real risk of serious harm or persecution simply by being an opponent of or having played a low-level part in protests against the KRG. Despite evidence that opponents of the KRG have been arrested, detained, assaulted and even killed by the Kurdistan authorities, there is no evidence to suggest that such mistreatment is systematic. The instances of mistreatment are small in relation to the vast numbers who attended the protests. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that the KRG have the capability, nor the inclination, to target individuals who were involved in the protests at a low level.

28. We accept that there is an element of risk for those who are perceived to be higher profile, or journalists. We do not consider that the appellant falls into either of these categories, such that he would be at risk upon return. Whilst we accept that a person’s profile cannot always be neatly characterised, reminding ourselves of the findings we have made about the appellant’s activities, we find that he is not reasonably likely to be perceived as someone ‘high’ profile.

29. As the decision in XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 states, by reference to BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36, that when assessing risk from attending demonstrations it is necessary to consider the evidence such as leadership role and/or degree of involvement in the protests, nature of activities, political and/or sectarian background of the individual, gender, visibility, being known to the authorities (e.g. previous arrest), etc.

30. First, the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations has been largely as an attendee, although there have been examples of him stewarding at these events, demonstrated by photographs of him wearing a high-visibility jacket. The appellant does not claim to have been an organiser of any of these demonstrations. In his witness statement, he refers to coordinating an event at SOAS in April 2024, however this event does not, on its face, appear to have been a political event or critical of the ruling parties of Kurdistan. SA’s evidence before us was that Dakok has over 1000 members, and there are also people who attend the demonstrations who are not part of Dakok. The appellant told us that there would usually be around 600 to 700 people in attendance at each demonstration, depending on where it was held.

31. We do not consider it reasonably likely that the appellant’s attendance at these events, even where he has been involved in stewarding on occasion, would have come to the attention of the authorities in Kurdistan. We reach this finding in view of the absence of any evidence before us suggesting that the authorities in Kurdistan have the inclination or ability to monitor members of the Kurdish diaspora. This is especially so when, as Mr Tan submitted, there are numerous events held across the UK at various times, and which are then posted about on multiple platforms.

32. This point was put to SA in cross-examination, following the assertion in his witness statement that ‘the ruling KDP and PUK authorities actively monitor diaspora activism and target individuals who write and publish critical articles or organise anti-regime protests’. SA’s response in evidence was that ‘there was many evidences, many people arrested because of commenting and participating, news inside the country and many comments being made on our posts from hostile groups inside the country’. We note there is no evidence before us of the appellant ever receiving comments on his posts from anyone hostile to his views from either those involved with the authorities in Kurdistan or those who support them.

33. We have taken into account the decision of the Upper Tribunal in XX. Whilst it concerns the country of Iran, we have taken into account the sections which are of general application. Paragraphs 5–9 deal with the guidance on Facebook more generally and also between paragraphs 73– 81 in more detail. As relevant to this particular appeal the UT found at paragraph 5 that there was no evidence that the Facebook website itself has been “hacked” either by the Iranian or any other government. There is no evidence before us to demonstrate that the authorities in the IKR or the Iraqi authorities are able to access Facebook or that they have monitored this appellant’s Facebook activity.

34. Further, we consider that if there were people in this country subsequently being arrested for their online activity upon return to Kurdistan, there would be some evidence supporting that assertion. When asked why there was no evidence provided, SA said he had seen people from the consulate recording people during the demonstrations. Again, if that were the case, we consider there would be some background evidence confirming this was not only happening but also causing difficulties for people returning to Kurdistan.

35. In his skeleton argument, the appellant relies on MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 in making the point that there is unlikely to be direct evidence of covert surveillance. We accept that is true. In circumstances however where it is specifically claimed by SA and OS as part of the appellant’s case that this is happening, and is something that is well known, we do not consider it unreasonable that evidence would exist.

36. In this regard, whilst we acknowledge the appellant’s role as part of the Council of Dakok, he does not claim that role is known or visible to anyone outside of the organisation. We also note the appellant’s authorship of the articles referred to above. The articles are generalised and attribute no source material to any of their contents. We do not have any reliable evidence of the popularity or reach of the websites the appellant’s posts have been published on.

37. Simply, it is for the appellant to make his case. He has not adduced any reliable evidence that a person of his profile is reasonably likely to face persecution upon return to Kurdistan. There is no evidence before us that the Kurdish authorities are reasonably likely to have discovered his social media activity, nor is there evidence of any kind of ‘pinch point’ upon return at which his activities would be revealed to the authorities. In light of the factual findings of FtTJ Ficklin as preserved, the appellant has no previous profile in Iraq. We therefore do not find there would be a well-founded fear of persecution upon return to Iraq on this basis.

38. We turn finally to address the question of how the appellant would act upon return to Iraq, and whether he succeeds on the basis of the point dealt with by the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31. We remind ourselves of our finding that the appellant’s political activities are an expression of genuinely held belief.

39. In his witness statement, the appellant refers to his political activity as being his ‘whole life’, and that he does not think he would have the courage to continue his activities upon return. Whilst we accept the appellant has a subjective fear of ill-treatment should he involve himself in protests upon return to Iraq, we do not find there is an objective risk to him.

40. As above, the evidence before us establishes that the risk of persecution is confined to those who are involved in the organisation of protests, or those who are journalists. We do not find the appellant is likely to be perceived as either upon return to Iraq, even if his current activities were replicated. It follows therefore, that we do not find he would be compelled to conceal his political opinion for fear of persecution, as there would be no risk of persecution to him.

41. As we do not find there is a well-founded risk of persecution to the appellant, we do not find he succeeds in his appeal on asylum grounds. We also do not consider there is a risk of serious harm to him upon return such that he could succeed on humanitarian protection grounds.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal having been set aside, we remake the appeal, dismissing it on all grounds.

CJ Williams

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 October 2026