Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003132

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67919/2023
IA/00376/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 14 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

SA
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
Representation
For the Appellant: Mr J Bryce, counsel instructed by RH & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms E Blackburn, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Edinburgh Tribunal Hearing Centre on 13 August 2025
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. The appellant Is a national of Pakistan. He arrived in the United Kingdom in 2015 with leave to enter and remain as a student until 2018. On 12 May 2021 he made a claim for international protection. That claim was refused by the respondent for reasons set out in a decision dated 19 December 2023. The respondent accepted the appellant is a national of Pakistan but rejected the core of the appellant’s account. The appellant's appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) Judge Kempton for reasons set out in a decision stated 22 May 2024.
2. The appellant claims the decision of the FtT is vitiated by error of law. Four grounds of appeal are advanced. First, it is not clear from the decision what evidence has been either accepted or rejected by the judge. Second, the judge’s consideration of the circumstances in which the appellant’s parents became aware of the relationship the appellant had entered into in the UK, and her conclusion that the appellant’s account is a fabrication is based upon speculation rather than evidence. Third, in concluding that the appellant is not at risk upon return from his ‘cousin’s father’ or his ‘uncle’, the judge failed to have adequate regard to the FIR issued against the appellant’s uncle and the evidence of the expert that the FIR is genuine. Finally, the appellant claims the judge failed to make adequate findings as to whether the appellant can internally relocate.
3. Permission to appeal was refused by FtT Judge Handler on 25 June 2024. The application for permission was renewed to the Upper Tribunal and permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge McWilliam on all grounds on 31 July 2024.
The Hearing of the Appeal Before Me.
4. Mr Bryce adopted the appellant’s grounds of appeal and the content of a ‘Note’ settled by Mr Bryce dated 8 August 2025. In summary Mr Bryce submits the judge has failed to set out in her decision, in clear terms, those aspects of the core of the appellant’s account that she either accepts or rejects. He submits the evidence before the FtT included evidence of an FIR dated 14 October 2022 in which the appellant’s paternal uncle, Waheed Shah stands accused of involvement in an incident leading to the death of one individual and injury to two others. The appellant’s claim was supported by expert evidence in the form of a report prepared by Mr Asad Ali Khan, who was called to the Bar of England and Wales (Middle Temple) and who is also a Senior Partner at Khan & Co, Barristers at Law, a firm of lawyers authorised by the Sindh Bar Council, Karachi, Pakistan. In his note, Mr Bryce states there are no reported decisions of the Tribunal concerning the evidence of Mr Asad Khan (“Mr Khan”) and his expertise. There are however a number of unreported decisions in which the unchallenged evidence of Mr Khan appears to have been accepted. In accordance with his duty of candour, Mr Bryce, quite properly, also refers to an unreported decision of the Upper Tribunal published on 29 April 2025 in which Judge Kelly developed a critical analysis of Mr Khan’s evidence and rejected his conclusions. Mr Bryce submits that although the judge made reference to the expert evidence of Mr Khan, the judge failed to engage with it when addressing whether there is a ‘sufficiency of protection’ available to the appellant from those that he fears and/or whether the appellant can internally relocate.
5. For her part, Ms Blackburn adopted the respondent’s rule 24 response dated 14 August 2024. She acknowledges that the judge does not say in terms, which aspects of the claim she either accepted or rejected, but reading the decision as a whole there can be no doubt that the judge rejected the appellant’s claim entirely. It was open to the judge to conclude, as she did, that the whole account is a fabrication in an effort to enable the appellant to remain in the UK. Ms Blacburn submits the judge referred to the documents relied upon by the appellant, including the FIR and the expert’s reports. The FIR does not relate to any incident or threat involving the appellant and is entirely unconnected to the appellant. The evidence was relied upon by the appellant to demonstrate the reach of the appellant’s paternal uncle and his influence. Even if, as the expert claims, the documents are genuine that cannot assist the appellant. The judge said that the appellant’s account is simply not credible and that he has fabricated his account. The appellant is not therefore at risk upon return from his father and/or paternal uncle. Ms Blackburn refers to the respondent’s review, which is cited in the decision of the FtT in which the respondent makes several criticism’s of the evidence of Mr Khan. Ms Blackburn submits the judge was not in the end required to address those criticisms. Having rejected the core of the appellant’s account, the question of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation did not arise.
6. At the conclusion of the hearing before me I informed the parties that I am satisfied that there is no material error of law in the decision of the FtT and that I dismiss the appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal. I said that I would give my reasons in writing and this I now do.
Decision
7. I have reminded myself of the important guidance handed down by the Court of Appeal that an appellate court must not interfere in a decision of a judge below without good reason. The power of the Upper Tribunal to set aside a decision of the FtT and to proceed to remake the decision only arises in law if it is found that the tribunal below has made a genuine error of law that is material to the outcome of the appeal.
8. The assessment of credibility and the risk upon return in a claim for international protection is always a highly fact-sensitive task. In an appeal such as this where the respondent challenges the core of the appellant’s account, Tribunal Judges adopt a variety of different evaluative techniques to assess the evidence. A judge will for instance consider: (i) the consistency (or otherwise) of accounts given by the appellant at different points in time; (ii) the consistency (or otherwise) of an appellant's narrative case for asylum with his actual conduct at earlier stages and periods in time; (iii) whether, on facts found or agreed or which are incontrovertible, the appellant is a person who can be categorised as at risk if returned, and, if so, as to the nature and extent of that risk (taking account of applicable Country Guidance); (iv) the adequacy (or by contrast paucity) of evidence on relevant issues that, logically, the appellant should be able to adduce in order to support his or her case; and (v), the overall plausibility of an appellant's account.
9. I have also reminded myself of what was said by the House of Lords in SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49[2008] 1 AC 678 and by the Supreme Court in Perry v Raleys Solicitors [2019] UKSC 5; [2020] AC 352. The FtT is a specialist body, tasked with administering a complex area of law in challenging circumstances. It is likely that, in doing so, it will have understood and applied the law correctly. Appellate judges should not rush to find misdirection merely because the judge at first instance might have directed themselves more fully or given their reasons in greater detail. There is a real rationale for the deference which an appellate court will display towards a trial judge’s findings of fact, and proper restraint must be exercised before deciding to interfere with such findings.
10. As Mr Bryce and Ms Blackburn accepted at the outset of the hearing before me, at paragraphs [11] to [13] of the decision, the judge summarised the core of the appellant’s account. At paragraphs [15] to [18] of the decision the judge set out the respondent’s position and the issues in the appeal. The judge’s findings and conclusions regarding the core of the appellant’s account are set out in paragraphs [22] to [28] of the decision. Although I accept the judge does not expressly state whether she accepts or rejects each component of the core of the appellant’s account, on any reading of the decision it is clear that the judge outlines the concerns that she has regarding the appellant’s account of events. If there were any doubt about the overall findings and conclusions reached by the judge, that doubt is laid to rest at paragraph [29] of the decision. Having set out a number of concerns regarding the appellant’s claim in the preceding paragraphs, the judge said:
“I consider that it is far more likely that this whole account is a fabrication in an effort to enable the appellant to remain in the United Kingdom. He has been in the United Kingdom for three years after the expiry of his last student visa, and it was only after those three years that he claimed asylum. It seems to be more likely that this is a ‘last ditch’ attempt to remain in the UK.” (my emphasis)
11. The judge concluded the whole account is a fabrication. It follows that the judge rejected the core of the claim made by the appellant regarding the dishonour he claims to have brought on his family on account of not following through with an arranged marriage with his cousin in Pakistan, to whom he has been betrothed since he was aged six years.
12. The judge had explained and provided her reasons in the decision regarding the concerns she had about the appellant’s claim that his family, and his fiancée’s found out about a relationship he had established in the UK. In Y –v- SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ` 1223, Keene LJ referred to the authorities and confirmed that a judge should be cautious before finding an account to be inherently incredible, because there is a considerable risk that they will be over influenced by their own views on what is or is not plausible, and those views will have inevitably been influenced by their own background in this country and by the customs and ways of our own society. However, he went on to say, at [26]:
“None of this, however, means that an adjudicator is required to take at face value an account of facts proffered by an appellant, no matter how contrary to common sense and experience of human behaviour the account may be…”
13. Standing back and considering the account relied upon by the appellant as a whole, I do not accept the conclusion reached by the judge that the whole account is a fabrication was based upon speculation. It was undoubtedly a conclusion that was open to the judge following her assessment of the claims made by the appellant.
14. Having reached the conclusion that the whole of the appellant’s account is a fabrication, it is clear that the appellant is not at risk upon return to Pakistan. His account of events was rejected and there is therefore no reason why he cannot return to his home area. Nevertheless, the judge did, at paragraphs [30] to [41] address ‘sufficiency of protection’ and/or internal relocation, albeit briefly. I accept as Ms Blackburn submits, the question of sufficiency of protection and/or internal relation does not arise and the judge was entitled to address those matters in the brief terms that she did.
15. The judge referred at paragraphs [31] and [32] to the ‘FIR’ relied upon by the appellant. At paragraph [33] the judge referred to the two expert reports prepared by Mr Khan and that Mr Khan has been told, following enquiry by him, that the FIR is genuine. As Mr Bryce acknowledges, the FIR was relied upon by the appellant to demonstrate the reach of the appellant’s uncle and what he is capable of. The FIR and other documents relied upon by the appellant concern an incident unconnected to the appellant and between the appellant’s uncle and others. Even if it is, as Mr Khan appears to claim, a genuine FIR, that is not to say that the document establishes the appellant is at risk upon return because of the relationship he had entered into in the UK.
16. I should say that I have had the opportunity of reading the expert evidence of Mr Khan that was before the FtT, including the qualifications of Mr Khan. I am far from satisfied that Mr Khan has the necessary qualifications and expertise to provide the opinions that he sets out in his reports. I gain little assistance from the unreported cases that are referred to by Mr Bryce in his note. Each of those decisions is fact sensitive and the decisions of the Tribunals, save in MI were reached in circumstances where the evidence of Mr Khan was not challenged or subjected to any proper analysis. Here, the judge referred at [22], to the matters set out in the respondent’s review. At paragraph [3] of the review, the respondent makes a number of criticisms of the ‘expert evidence’. The judge did not address those criticisms. She did not need to because she had found, at [29], that the whole of the appellant’s account is fabricated, a conclusion that she again reiterated at paragraph [40] of the decision. The criticisms made by the respondent appear to have some force, but because they were not and did not need to be addressed by the judge I do not need to say anything further about that in this decision.
17. There is no merit to the fourth ground of appeal. As I have said, having rejected the core of the appellant’s account, the question of internal relocation did not arise.
18. The decision of the FtT judge must be read as a whole. It could have been better expressed but the focus should be on the way the judge performed the essence of her task. The Upper Tribunal should not overturn a judgment at first instance unless it really cannot understand the original judge's thought process when the judge was making material findings. The decision is to be read looking at the substance of the reasoning and not with a fine-tooth comb in an effort to identify errors. Despite the best efforts of Mr Bryce to persuade me otherwise, it is now well established that it is necessary to guard against the temptation to characterise as errors of law what are in truth no more than disagreements about the weight to be given to different factors, particularly if the judge who decided the appeal had the advantage of hearing oral evidence. A fact-sensitive analysis of the risk upon return was required. In my judgement the judge reached a decision that was open to her.
19. It follows that I conclude there is no material error of law in the decision of the FtT capable of affecting the outcome of the appeal and I dismiss the appeal.
Notice of Decision
20. The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
21. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Kempton stands

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 August 2025